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Abstract:
The thesis examines the role of the concept of identity under nationalism as a 
principle of classification, simultaneously subordinating all of social reality to its 
premise, functioning as a boundary-marker and lending the prevailing social order 
authority by giving it the appearance of being founded on a correspondence with an 
immutable, external, natural phenomenon. The actual working of the principle of 
classification is rendered invisible by this analogy drawn from nature, investing it 
with a self-evident quality, which embeds it in the habitus (the thought categories and 
assumptions held in common by the collectivity, which bind it together), in the realm 
of doxa (unquestioned, shared beliefs).
The contextuality of identity can be demonstrated by considering four different 
aspects, material, functional, affective and circumstantial. Material identity is 
distinguished by its high degree of stability, deriving from its permanence. It is the 
least problematic to the individual mind and as such situated within the doxa. 
Nationalism invokes identity as its principle of classification based on a simple 
dichotomy (those who belong to the nation and therefore act as repositories of the 
national essence and those who do not), convincing the members of the collectivity 
that they are materially different from outsiders. Where nationalism provides the 
unifying concept the state appropriates its principle of classification. However, the 
nationalist ideal of complete structural homology between the administrative reach of 
the state and the territory inhabited by those deemed to belong to the nation is often 
unattainable, hence the problematic nature of minority identity.
It is against this backdrop that representations of Hungarian minority identity are 
analysed. The content of the representations (which straddle the political and cultural 
fields) is intimately linked to the dominant principle of classification, which shifted to 
that favoured by communism in the course of the period considered. Ceau§escu’s 
revival of national sentiment as a cohesive force ensured that the presence of the 
Hungarians in Romania remained problematic, reinforcing attitudes, which still 
persist today.
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Introduction
I Objectives and Methodology
P&l Bodor,1 taking stock of the situation in Romania in 1990, provides an account of 
why an up to date programme on the minorities of that country was conspicuous by its 
absence at the elections after Ceau§escu's fall, summarising the predicament the 
Hungarians found themselves in:
"I know that a substantial proportion of Romanians, if not the majority:
a) Does not believe, does not know, denies that between the two World Wars and then 
even more ruthlessly afterwards, particularly in the Ceau§escu era, the Romanian 
minorities were oppressed.
b) They regard the principle elements of the enlightened modem system of minority 
rights as privileges without justification, as a murderous assault against the 
sovereignty of the Romanian state and nation, if not, to make no bones about it, the 
"prelude" to an attack against the territorial integrity o f the country.
c) They confuse the concept of national sovereignty with national dominion, with 
ethnocracy.
dj They regard the minorities as tolerated newcomers who (in so far as they lay claim 
to the same rights as the Romanians of the Austro-Hungarian Empire demanded - 
deservedly! - and which were promised to them by the Gyulafehervdr/Alba Iulia 
decisions!) are abusing...the right of hospitality.
e) Amongst a substantial section of Romanian public opinion virtually every piece of 
news and scare story, analysis of history and of recent events, which justify suspicion,
1 Bodor, author and journalist, bom in Budapest in 1930, lived in Romania between 1936 and 1983, 
during which time he established himself as a leading figure in intellectual life, contributing to the 
major Hungarian-language newspapers and periodicals. From 1951 to 1967, he was editor-in-chief of 
the Irodalmi Konyvkiad6 [Literary Publishing House] and of Kriterion Kiad6 [the most important 
publisher of material in Hungarian and other minority languages] and from 1970 to 1979 was in charge 
of the Hungarian and German-language broadcasts on Romanian state radio and television. These 
positions gave him privileged access to top-level meetings on cultural policy under the Ceau§escu 
regime. Since returning to Budapest in 1983, his literary career has continued to flourish, which has 
been recognized in the form of numerous awards.
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fear and hatred of the minorities, particularly the Hungarians have been taken as 
authentic”.2
It is important to bear in mind that when Bodor put pen to paper, the Hungarian 
population of Transylvania had officially been citizens of Romania since the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Trianon, which had been signed by the Hungarian 
delegation to the Peace Conference on 4th June 1920 in the Grand Trianon palace at 
Versailles3. The continued relevance of such attitudes is amply illustrated by the 
more recent controversy over the Law on the Hungarians living in Neighbouring 
Countries, more commonly known as the Status Law.4
The primary aim of the thesis is to arrive at a greater understanding of the 
phenomenon of national identity, in particular as it reveals itself amongst members of 
national minorities in a manner, which provides insights into the stability and 
resilience of their allegiance to an agreed collective image of themselves even whilst 
confronted by opposition, disputes over definitions, discrimination and outright 
persecution, the persistence of their separate identity being decried as irrational. The 
dynamic relationship between nationalism, national identity and representations of 
identity must be evaluated in order to gain insight into the historical development of 
collective bonds of solidarity founded on a concept of shared origin and destiny.3 
The method selected to shed light on the matter in hand is a case study of the form 
and contents of one particular identity, which may be broadly labelled Hungarian
2 P£1 Bodor, A hisztdria sziiksdgdllapota. Kellemetlen kdzikdnyv Romdnidrdl. Szabad T6r Kiadd, 
Budapest, 1990, pp 4-5. Emphasis in the original. Unless otherwise specified all translations have 
been carried out by the author. For further information on the Gyulafehdrvdr/AIba Iulia decisions, see 
below, Chapter 2, p229 and following.
3 Igndc Romsics, A trianoni bdkeszerzodds, Osiris Kiadd, Budapest, 2001, p205.
4 In Hungarian, the reference is to Law LXII. of 2001 (A szomszddos dllamokban did magyarokrdl). It 
was adopted by the Hungarian Parliament on June 19th of that year. For the debate surrounding it, see 
the Hungarian daily Magyar Nemzet, which printed more a hundred articles on the subject over a two- 
month period, including a detailed summary of its main provisions by Istvdn Pataky and the leader by 
Csaba Lukdcs on June 20th.
5 Civic nationalism throws the blood kinship concept overboard, substituting loyalty to an avowed set 
of principles (as enshrined in a constitution, for example), but, as I shall maintain, the oath corresponds 
to a material (qualitative) metamorphosis.
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(anyaorszdgi)6 identity, over the course of an extended period of time and through a 
change in regime, which endeavoured to impose its own vision of an alternative 
source of identity upon its subjects. In a very real sense Hungarian minority identity 
differs in substance from that of the anyaorszdgiak rather than involving little more 
than a slight renegotiation or being a mere derivative. Indeed, I would venture that 
the evolution of post-Trianon anyaorszdgi identity to this very day cannot be 
fathomed without proper scrutiny of the fate of the minorities as they continue to 
occupy a prominent position in the anyaorszdgi mind.7 The advantage of turning 
directly to the point at which rupture occurs (by which I refer to the break up of the 
Hungarian state and the transformation of traditional views of what being Hungarian 
involves) is that it permits us to attend the birth of a new identity, or at least a radical 
reassessment or reframing of an older identity to fit the changed circumstances. 
During this process certain mechanisms are thrown into high relief. On the 
anyaorszdgi side, a choice had to be made between reconciling themselves to the 
international community's decision enshrined in the Trianon Treaty to regard the 
Transylvanian Hungarians as citizens of Romania and therefore accept that as 
Romanians they no longer formed part of the Hungarian nation and rejecting an 
artificial redrawing of boundaries that severed members of the nation from their 
compatriots. By opting for the latter, the anyaorszdgiak were effectively insisting that 
culture or essence (or "material identity") transcend man-made frontiers. The moral 
dimension of the anyaorszdgi appeals for revision derives from this contention that 
the natural order has been perverted, that the geographical unity of Hungary as 
ordained by Nature itself stretching to the Carpathians8 has fallen victim to Romania's
6 To avoid confusion I shall henceforward employ the term Hungarian to refer to the Hungarians of 
Transylvania and the Hungarian anyaorszdgi, plural anyaorszdgiak, to indicate the Hungarians of 
Hungary proper, in other words of the country reduced to one third of its original size by the Treaty of 
Trianon.
7 As shown once again by the Status Law (see footnote 4 above) and the Basic Treaties signed with the 
Ukraine (1993), Slovakia (1995) and Romania (1996). On the Basic Treaties, see Glspdr Bir6, 
Bilateral Treaties Between Hungary And Its Neighbours After 1989, in Geopolitics in the Danube 
Region, edited by Igndc Romsics and B61a Kirdly, Central European University Press, Budapest, 1999 
(henceforth Romsics 1999), pp347-378.
8 Cf. Pdl Teleki's article Erdily helyzete Magyarorszdgon is Europdban [Translyvania's Place in 
Hungary and Europe] in Erdily, Magyar T6rt6nelmi Tdrsulat, Athenaeum, Budapest, 1940, pp9-20. 
The author, apart from being a renowned geographer, was Prime Minister of Hungary from July 1920
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insatiable appetite for territorial aggrandisement (what this view ignores will be dealt 
with later). On the Transylvanian side a parallel, though more complex, choice 
between acceptance of their lot as Romanians (and whether this ought necessarily to 
be accompanied by a denial or abandonment of linguistic and cultural heritage) and 
clinging to their Hungarianness without making any concessions to their new 
nationality had to be weighed up. As we shall see, even where the former course was 
adopted, Romanian fears and scepticism meant that the Transylvanians were 
continually placed on the defensive, compelled to "prove" that they were not latent 
irredentists.
Although there have been many treatments of aspects of Hungarian minority identity 
in Hungarian, most of these have tended to concentrate on aspects such as literary 
output (for example Bdla Pomoglts, Vdltozd Erdely [Changing Transylvania], 
Lucidus Kiadd, Budapest 2001, Erdelyi ttikor [Transylvanian Mirror], Krlter muhely 
egyesiilet, Budapest 1995; compilations of articles from literary journals, such as Zord 
ido antoldgia, Mentor Kiadd, Maros vlslrhely, 1998 or Andris Gorombai's Kisebbsegi 
magyar irodalmak 1945-1990, Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadd, Debrecen, 1997), collections 
of articles by individual authors on a variety of topics with Transylvania as the 
common theme (Istvln Nemeskiirthy, £des Erdely, Erdelyi Krdnika [Sweet 
Transylvania, Transylvanian Chronicle], Szabad Tdr Kiadd, Debrecen, 1988; Andris 
Siitd, Erdelyi Vdltozatlansdgok [Unchanging Features o f Transylvania] Kossuth 
Egyetemi Kiadd, Debrecen, 2001), memoirs, eyewitness descriptions of the 
pernicious effects of government policies such as urbanisation or of specific events 
(including the sub-genre of what I would dub "refugee literature" popular during the 
1980s, cf. Llszld Kiirti, The Remote Borderland, Transylvania in the Hungarian 
Imagination,9 pp 108-110, comprising testimonies such as PH Koteles, Bucsu 
Erdily tol, Egy menekules anatdmidja [Farewell to Transylvania, The Anatomy o f an 
Escape], Eotvos Kiadd, Budapest, 1988; Pdter Kende, Erdelybol jottek [They Came 
from Transylvania], Ifjuslgi Lap- 6s Konyvkiadd, Debrecen, 1988; Tibor Franka, 
Most jottem Erdelybol [I Have Just Arrived from Transylvania], Ling Kiadd, Pdcs,
to April 1921 and again from February 1939 to his suicide in April 1941. For more detailed 
information see Jdzsef Bfildny, Magyarorszdg kormdnyai 1848-1992, Akaddmiai Kiadd, Budapest, 
1992; Ferenc Fodor, Teleki Pdl, Mike 6s Tdrsa antikvdrium, Budapest, 2001 and Istv4n Csicsery- 
Rdnay, Kdroly Vigh, Teleki Pdl is  kora, Occidental Press, Budapest, 1992.
9 State University of New York Press, Albany, 2001, henceforth Borderland.
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undated; the fruits of oral history research, for example, Az en Erdelyem, Domonkos 
Pdl Peter elmondja eletet [My Transylvania, Peter Pdl Domonkos Recounts His Life 
Story], Vita Kiadd, Budapest, 1988; a first hand recollection of the riots in 
Marosvdsdrhely/Tirgu Mure§, Elod Kineses, Marosvdsdrhely fekete mdrciusa [Black 
Spring in Marosvdsdrhely/Tirgu Mure§], Piiski Kiad6, Budapest, 1990), historical 
investigations of aspects of relevance (Gdbor Vincze, Magyar vagyon roman kezen 
[Hungarian Property in Romanian Hands], Pro-Print Konyvkiadd, Csfkszereda, 
2000) and ethnographic studies into life in the Szdkelyfold region (works by Lajos 
Baldzs and Gizella Cs. Gergely),10 systematic theoretical perspectives have been thin 
on the ground, the valuable work of the KAM group in Csfkszereda (Regionllis 6s 
Antropoldgiai Kutatdsok Kozpontja, Centre for Regional and Anthropological 
Research), concentrating on analyses of particular themes (such as relations between 
Hungarian and Roma populations, popular beliefs, stability and change in local 
society and strategies adopted by the minority)11 and the journal Magyar Kisebbseg 
founded in 1922 in Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca a partial exception to the rale. Even 
these, however, take Hungarian minority identity for granted, failing to dissect the 
underlying assumptions concerning what being Hungarian (whether anyaorszdgi or 
Transylvanian) actually means.
Similar problems beset two German language surveys of the Hungarian minorities, 
one comprising a set of three essays covering the interwar years (on minority rights in 
the Carpathian Basin, minority rights and Hungarian foreign policy and legislation on
10 For example Baldzs, Szeretet fogott el a gyermek irdnt [I was Seized by Love o f the Child], Pallas- 
Akaddmia Konyvkiad6, Csfkszereda, 1999 a description of customs surrounding birth and Az in  elso 
tisztessiges napom [My First Day o f Respectability], Kriterion Kdnyvkiadd, Bukarest, 1994 on the 
subject of courtship and marriage and Gergely, Asszonyi helytdllds Szikelyfold&n [The Duty o f Women 
in the Sziketyfold], Magyar Napl6, Budapest, 1999, focusing on the role of women in village life.
11 Egy-mds mellett ilis, A magyar-romdn, magyar-cigdny kapcsolatrdl, Pro-Print Kdnyvkiadd, 
Csfkszereda, 1996; J6zsef Gagyi, Jelek igen is  foldon, Hiedelem is  helyi tdrsadalom a Szikelyfoldon, 
Pro-Print Kdnyvkiadd, Csfkszereda, 1998; Vdltozdsban? Elemzisek a romdniai magyar tdrsadalomrdl, 
Pro-Print Kdnyvkiadd, Csfkszereda, 1995 and Zolt&i A  Bfrd, Stratigidk vagy Idnyszerpdlydk? 
Tanulmdnyok a romdniai magyar tdrsadalomrdl, Pro-Print Kdnyvkiadd, Csfkszereda, 1998, 
respectively.
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minorities in Romania)12 of limited scope, the other more ambitious, as reflected in its 
title Rumanien und seine nationalen Minderheiten 1918 bis heute, and at first glance 
more promising, offers an outline of the legal and to some extent political history of 
Romania as these affected the German, Jewish, Roma and Hungarian minorities. It 
does not, however, address the issue of identity as such and is further hampered by an 
absence of conceptualisation, leaving the reader none the wiser as to what Hungarian 
identity might compri se other than linguistic difference.13
My approach situates Hungarian identity within the framework of the broader concept 
of national identity rather than considering it as self-evident, arguing that the features 
deemed to be distinctive or unique cannot be interpreted except by being placed 
firmly in context, the justification for the relatively long time span covered (stretching 
from before the Hungarian minorities came into being in the first instance to the 
collapse of the Communist dictatorship in Romania) being precisely that general 
trends emerge gradually, that ideas cannot not divorced from the ebb and flow of 
historical circumstances (whereby the signing of the Treaty of Trianon in 1921 or the 
Communist takeovers in Hungary and Romania immediately following the Second 
World War influenced not only life trajectories, but also what forms of knowledge 
and representation were approved or suppressed),14 nor can they be viewed as 
somehow distinct from the societies in which they are conceived and subsequently 
adopted (again thereby subtly altering the cognitive parameters and standards of 
normality within which thought may occur).
A huge literature on nationalism already exists and the plight of national minorities is 
increasingly becoming the object of attention, most frequently from the point of view 
of multiculturalism or as a factor in destabilising international relations.15 In the
12 By Zoltin Szisz, L£szl6 Szarka and Simion Retegan in Die Minderheiten zwischen den beiden 
Weltkriegen, Schriften des Italienisch-Deutschen Historischen Institute in Trient, Band 10, 
Herausgegeben von Umberto Corsini and David Zaffi, Duncker and Humblot, Berlin, 1993.
13 Othmar Kolar, Rumdnien und seine nationalen Minderheiten 1918 bis heute, Bohlau Verlag, Wien, 
1997 (henceforth Kolar).
14 A phrase borrowed from Mary Douglas; see her essay Cultural Bias, ppl 83-254 of In The Active 
Voice, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1975.
13 See for example such works as Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics o f Recognition, 
Princeton, 1992; Paul Smith (editor), Ethnic Groups in International Relations, New York University 
Press, Dartmouth, 1991 and Will Kymlicka, The Rights o f Minority Cultures, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1995.
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following section I will review the output of some of the most influential theorists of 
nationalism before moving to a more detailed consideration of the growing body of 
work devoted specifically to assessing whether a qualitative difference exists between 
“Eastern” and “Western” expressions of nationalism.16 My deliberations throughout 
will be concentrated exclusively upon Europe, although many of the authors 
mentioned have also moved beyond such geographical confines. This is connected to 
one of the aims of the present undertaking, namely that of providing an in-depth 
account of two comparatively neglected nationalisms.17
1.1 Theories of Nationalism
Studies of nationalism as an ideology and political force have tended to focus on three 
issues: determining when the nation was bom, whether a state is a prerequisite for a 
nation and finally whether nationalism is inherently bad or whether it has some 
redeeming features.18
16 Unfortunately, space constraints preclude consideration of many significant works, such as Elie 
Kedourie’s Nationalism, Fourth Expanded Edition, Blackwell, Oxford, 1996 (originally 1960, 
henceforth Kedourie); Charles Tilly’s The Formation o f Nation States in Western Europe, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1975; Montserrat Guibemau’s Nationalisms: The Nation-State and 
Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996 (henceforth Guibemau); Hans- 
Ulrich Wehler’s Nationalisms: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen, C.H. Beck Verlag, Miinchen, 2001; 
Hagen Schulze’s States, Nations and Nationalism, Blackwell, Oxford, 1996; Walker Connor’s 
Ethnonationalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994; Liah Greenfeld’s Nationalism: Five 
Roads to Modernity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992; Hugh Seton- 
Watson’s Nations and States, Methuen, London, 1977; Miroslav Hroch’s Social Preconditions o f 
National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis o f the Social Composition o f Patriotic Groups 
among the Smaller European Nations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985; Karl Deutsch’s 
Nationalism and Social Communication, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1966 (second edition) and Craig Calhoun’s Nationalism, Open University Press, 
Buckingham, 1997, all of which I recommend for further study.
17 From a Western European vantage point
18 For an invaluable summary of the main schools of thought as well as a guide to the critiques of each 
approach, see Theories o f Nationalism by Umut Ozkirimli, Palgrave, Houndmills, 2000, henceforth 
Ozkirimli. On the three issues about which theorists quarrel, cf. Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities, Verso, London, 1991 (1983), p5 and John Armstrong’s contribution to Notions o f 
Nationalism, edited by Sukumar Periwal, Central European University Press, Budapest 1995, 
henceforth Periwal, pp34-43. On the difficulties of reaching agreement on even the most basic
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1.2 The Modernists19
Ernest Gellner
Ernest Gellner opens his seminal Nations and Nationalism,20 with a set of concise 
definitions: “Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the 
political and the national unit should be congruent.”21 Nationalist sentiment is either 
a feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of 
satisfaction occasioned by its fulfilment and a nationalist movement is one actuated 
by a sentiment of this kind. The principle can be trespassed against in ways, which 
Gellner catalogues: “The political boundary of a given state can fail to include all the
questions relating to nationalism, see John Breuilly’s Reflections on Nationalism, in Stuart Woolf, 
Nationalism in Europe 1815 to the Present, ppl37-154 (henceforth Breuilly 1996a), ppl37-8.
19 Throughout I will be employing Anthony D. Smith’s terminology, which sorts theories of nationalism 
into four principle groups, the primordialist, perennialist, modernist and ethno-symbolisL Although 
references to these are to be found scattered throughout his many works, a systematic and relatively 
concise set of definitions is given in 'Ethno-symbolism ’ and the Study o f Nationalism in Smith, Myths 
and Memories o f the Nation (henceforth Myths), Oxford University Press, 1999, pp3-19. In brief, 
primordialism refers to the belief that nations are the natural divisions of humanity and that the key to 
the nature, power and incidence of nations and nationalism lies in the rootedness of the nation in 
kinship, ethnicity and the genetic bases of human existence (Myths, pp3-4. See also Ozkirimli, pp64- 
84). Perennialist denotes those who hold that nations have existed throughout recorded history, but do 
not see them as part of the natural order (Myths, pS). Modernists regard both primordialism and 
perennialism as expressions of nationalism itself and hence fatally flawed. For them, the nation is not 
only recent, but also novel and a product of the processes of modernization. The era of the French 
Revolution marks the entrance of nationalism on to the world stage (Myths, p6). Ethno-symbolists 
attribute the power of nationalism to its myths, memories, traditions and symbols of ethnic heritages 
and argue that modem nations have their roots in pre-modem ethnic communities (Myths, pp9 and 13). 
See also Op. cit., pp99-101, and his Nationalism and Modernism, Routledge, London, 1998 
(henceforth Smith 1998). Since the work of the “classical" theorists of nationalism surveyed below 
challenges primordialism and perennialism and since the representations of national identity upon 
which the present thesis focuses could be assigned to either of these categories I have not felt it 
necessary to explore them in depth at this juncture. My stance can be condensed as follows: 
perennialists and primordialists both take the nationalist principle of classification, which seeks to 
project itself back through time and thereby appear “natural” and inevitable, at face value, swallowing 
it hook, line and sinker. Cf. Hutchinson, Modem Nationalism, Fontana, London, 1994, p3.
20 Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, henceforth Gellner.
21 Gellner, p i.
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members of the appropriate nation; or it can include them all but also include some 
foreigners; or it can fail in both these ways at once, not incorporating all the nationals 
and yet also including some non-nationals. Or again, a nation may live, unmixed with 
foreigners, in a multiplicity of states, so that no single state can claim to be the 
national one”.22 However, one such anomaly towers above all others: “if the rulers of 
the political unit belong to a nation other than that of the majority of the ruled, this, 
for nationalists, constitutes a quite outstandingly intolerable breech of political 
propriety. This can occur either through the incorporation of the national territory in a 
larger empire, or by the local domination of an alien group”.23 Ethnic boundaries 
should not cut across political ones and within a state they should not separate the 
power-holders from the rest.
Taking Max Weber's description of the state as the agency within society, which 
possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence as his starting point, Gellner adds that 
it represents an elaboration of the social division of labour, more specifically: “the 
state is the specialization and concentration of order-maintenance”.24 The problem of 
nationalism does not crop up in stateless societies. Where, however, politically 
centralized units are the norm it is a different story. Human history can be split into 
three fundamental stages, the pre-agrarian, the agrarian and the industrial. During the 
latter the presence of the state is inescapable.25 Although the nation appears to be an 
inherent attribute of humanity it is not. Both nations and states are contingencies.
A nation is present when individuals share the same culture (in the sense of a system 
of ideas and signs and of ways of behaving and communicating) and where they 
recognise each other as belonging to it: “nations are the artefacts of men's convictions 
and loyalties and solidarities”.27 The act of recognition itself is the vital element 
rather than what they have in common.
In order to explain why the pre-industrial world is one where nations do not exist, 
Gellner takes stock of the salient features of agrarian society, more particularly 
analysing the relationship between culture and power. During the agrarian stage, the
22 Op. tit., pi; emphasis in the original.
23 Op. tit., p i.
24 Op. tit., p4.
25 Op. tit., p5.
26 Op. tit., p6.
27 Op. tit., p7.
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most significant achievements are literacy, the establishment of a reasonably 
permanent and standardized script, which opened the possibility of cultural and 
cognitive storage and centralization, and the rise of a clerical class or estate, the 
clerisy, whose ability to read and write the source of their prestige.28 In such societies 
the ruling stratum (which can be sub-divided into a number of more specialized 
layers, such as warriors, priests, clerics, administrators and burghers) is rigidly set 
apart from the great majority of direct agricultural producers, or peasants. Its 
ideology exaggerates the inequality of classes, with great emphasis on cultural 
differentiation rather than homogeneity as a means of reducing friction and ambiguity 
between them. Below the horizontally stratified minority at the top, the petty 
communities of the laterally separated lay members of society are to be found. 
Although these divisions are functional, they are not presented as such: “by 
externalizing, making absolute and underwriting inequalities, it fortifies them and 
makes them palatable, by endowing them with the aura of inevitability, permanence 
and naturalness. That which is inscribed into the nature of things and is perennial, is
<*Q
consequently not personally, individually offensive, nor psychically intolerable”. 
Almost everything in an agro-literate society therefore militates against the definition 
of political units in terms of cultural boundaries. Only the clerisy has a “cultural 
policy** and it is anxious to strengthen its own position by making itself indispensable. 
The complementary roles it ascribes to itself and the laity formally preclude its own 
universalisation.30
Industrial society relies on sustained and perpetual growth, on an expected and 
continuous improvement.31 The old stability of the social role structure is 
incompatible with growth and innovation; high productivity requires a complex and 
refined division of labour, which is subject to rapid change. Mobility thus becomes 
the order of the day and to permit it unspecialized and standardized training becomes
28 A condensed and slightly reworked version of the characteristics of agrarian and industrial societies 
can be found in Gellner’s essay The Coming o f Nationalism and Its Interpretation: The Myths o f 
Nation and Class (henceforth Gellner 1996), in Gopal Balakrishnan (editor) Mapping the Nation, 
Verso, London and New York, 1996, (henceforth Balakrishnan), pp98-145. On literacy as a badge of 
rank, see Gellner 1996, ppl01-2.
29 Gellner, pp8-l 1, quotation, pi 1.
30 Op. cit., pl6.
31 Op. cit., p22.
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essential. Modem society “provides a very prolonged and fairly thorough training for 
all its recruits, insisting on certain shared qualifications: literacy, numeracy, basic 
work habits and social skills, familiarity with basic technical and social skills. For the 
large majority of the population the distinctive skills involved in working life are 
superimposed on the basic training, either on the job or as part of a much less 
prolonged supplementary training; and the assumption is that anyone who has 
completed the generic training common to the entire population can be re-trained for 
most other jobs without too much difficulty”.32 The reproduction of social 
individuals and groups can be carried out according to the centralized method,33 
whereby local socialization is complemented by the activities of an educational 
agency, which is distinct from the local community and takes on board the preparation 
of young people for being handed back to the wider society to assume their roles 
within it.34 Another name given by Gellner for this removal and reinsertion is exo- 
training (or education proper)35 and is one of the hallmarks of a modem society.
At the same time the content of work undergoes change. In industrial society, work 
does not mean moving matter: it is no longer the manipulation of things, but of 
meanings. The implications of this are momentous: explicit and reasonably precise 
communication becomes generally, pervasively used. In the course of their work 
individuals “must constantly communicate with a large number of other men, with 
whom they frequently have no previous association, and with whom communication 
must consequently be explicit, rather than relying on context. They must also be able 
to communicate by means of written, impersonal, context-free, to-whom-it-may- 
concem type messages. Hence these communications must be in the same shared and 
standardized linguistic medium and script. The educational system which guarantees 
this social achievement becomes large and is indispensable, but at the same time it no
32 Op. cit., p28.
33 Gellner contrasts this with the “one-to-one or on-the-job principle” when a family, kin unit, village, 
tribal segment or similar fairly small unit takes the infants bom into it and by obliging them to take part 
in communal life, plus utilizing specific methods such as exercises, precepts, rites of passage and so 
forth, turns them into adults resembling the preceding generation. Gellner, p29.
34 Gellner, pp29-30.
35 Gellner, p31. He then labels the intra-community training as “acculturation”.
36 Gellner, pp32-3. See also Gellner 1996, pl06.
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longer possesses monopoly of access to the written word: its clientele is co-extensive 
with the society at large”.37
The educational infrastructure needed for this vast undertaking is too costly for any 
organization other than the state and only the state can control so crucial a function. 
Culture now plays a radically different part in human affairs: “Culture is no longer 
merely the adornment, confirmation and legitimation of a social order which was also 
sustained by harsher and coercive constraints; culture is now the necessary shared 
medium, the life-blood or perhaps rather the minimal shared atmosphere, within 
which alone the members of the society can breathe and survive and produce. For a 
given society, it must be one in which they can all breathe and speak and produce; so 
it must be the same culture. Moreover, it must now be a great or high (literate, 
training-sustained) culture, and it can no longer be a diversified, locality-tied, illiterate 
little culture or tradition”.38
The third vital function performed by the state is quality control: the educational 
product cannot be shoddy and sub-standard, the unified culture must be effectively 
passed on.39 The imperative of exo-socialization is the main clue as to why state and 
culture must be intimately linked.
The secret of nationalism, where a high culture pervades the whole of society, defines 
it and must be kept alive by the polity, is thus laid bare.40 Nationalism is not the 
awakening of an old, latent, dormant force as the ideologues would have it, but “the 
consequence of a new form of social organization, based on deeply-internalized, 
education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state”.41 A viable state 
of this type cannot fall below a certain minimum size and there is only room for a 
limited number of them. Furthermore, although nationalism has determined the norm 
for the legitimacy of political units in the modem world: “Nations as a natural, God- 
given way of classifying men, as an inherent, though long-delayed political destiny, 
are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them 
into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that
37 Op. cit., p35.
38 Gellner, pp37-8. Emphasis in the original.
39 Op. cit., p38.
40 Op. cit., pl8. See also p35.
41 Op. cit., p48. See also p95.
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is a reality.”42 Nationalism engenders nations, not the other way round 43 It is the 
establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable 
atomized individuals, held together primarily by a shared culture in place of a 
complex structure of local groups.44
Gellner employs a botanical analogy to describe the new situation, comparing cultures 
with wild and cultivated varieties of plants. The wild kinds are produced and 
reproduce themselves spontaneously as parts of everyday life without conscious 
design, supervision, surveillance or special fertilizers. The cultivated or garden 
cultures, in spite of having evolved from their wild cousins, are richer, but are 
dependent upon being tended by skilled personnel and would wither away without 
being fed with distinctive nutrients. Not every wild culture can become a high culture 
and those without serious prospects bow cut without bearing a nationalist fruit. 
Where the prospects are good, however, the human carriers of culture slug it out 
amongst themselves for available populations and state-space. This is one species of 
nationalist conflict. Once the high culture is expected to shoulder the burden assigned 
to it, a political infrastructure cannot be dispensed with.43 Industrialism did not arrive 
simultaneously in all parts of the world, or in the same manner. The differences in 
arrival-time split humanity into rival groups and became acute if the communities 
could make use of cultural, genetic or similar indicators of differentiation left over 
from the agrarian past.46
National sentiment is more than a mere cold-blooded cost-benefit analysis. Prior to 
the advent of nationalism, it made no sense to ask whether peasants cherished their 
culture, as it was like the air they breathed; they would only have noticed its absence.
42 Op. cit., pp48-9. Emphasis in the original.
43 Op. cit., p55.
44 Op. cit., p57. As Gellner goes on to say, this is exactly the opposite of what nationalist beliefs 
proclaim.
45 Gellner, pp50-51. He also uses the analogy of the breathing chamber or aquarium, ppSl-2.
46 Op. cit., p52. On pp43-50, Gellner draws attention to the discrepancy between the number of 
potential and of actual nationalisms taking languages as the marker of difference, which could fuel a 
nationalism. His conclusion is that “For every effective nationalism, there are n potential ones, groups 
defined either by shared culture, inherited from the agrarian world or by some other link (on the 
“precedent” principle) which could give hope of establishing a homogenous industrial community, but 
which nevertheless do not bother to struggle, which fail to activate their potential nationalism, which do 
not even try” (p45, emphasis in the original). The nationalist urge is relatively weak, in other words.
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The catalyst for change was to be found in the new opportunities: “But when labour 
migration and bureaucratic employment became prominent features within their social 
horizon, they soon learned the difference between dealing with a co-national, one 
understanding and sympathizing with their culture, and someone hostile to it. This 
very concrete experience taught them to be aware of their culture, and to love it (or, 
indeed, to wish to be rid of it) without any conscious calculation of advantages and 
prospects of social mobility. In stable self-contained communities culture is often 
quite invisible, but when mobility and context-free communication come to be the 
essence of social life, the culture in which one has been taught to communicate 
becomes the core of one’s identity”.47
Gellner’s sophisticated theory pays little heed to the identity component cf 
nationalism, as good as ignoring its emotional side, the nuances of how the individual 
and collectivity’s perception of self (self-image) holds so firm a grip. It is also weak 
in its treatment of the past. No social formation exists without antecedents and 
actively constructs its own past. Once the nationalist principle of classification48 
becomes established and literally and metaphorically re-creates the world in its own 
image, a particular relationship with the past is established.
The particular strength of Gellner’s approach resides in his account of the link 
between the need for standardized communication and widening interaction amongst 
members of the same national community, the rise of state-organized education49 and 
the transmission of the shared meanings and patterns ofbehaviour, which Bourdieu 
refers to as the doxa.50
47 Op. dt., p61.
48 In other words, a principle of classification based on a concept of nationhood with an irreducible, 
material distinction being drawn between national collectivities - even if this distinction resides in 
loyalty to a unique constitution or set of civic values expressed in a constitution - with greater or lesser 
degrees of permeability of the frontiers thereby drawn. This will be dealt with in detail in Chapter One 
below.
49 To which it might be useful to add the role of qualifications as certificates of aptitude in state- 
sanctioned skills, which open access to greater material resources in the form of boosted eaming- 
power.
50 On the doxa, see Chapter One below. For critiques of Gellner’s works, see Ozkirimli, ppl37-143 and 
for Hroch’s objections, pl64; John A. Hall and Ian Jarvie’s The Social Philosophy o f Ernest Gellner, 
Rodopi, Amsterdam and Atlanta, Georgia, 1996, pp71-189 (cf. Gellner’s immediate riposte in Reply to
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Eric Hobsbawm
In Nations and Nationalism since 1780,51 Eric Hobsbawm states that the meaning of 
the word nation as used today is no older than the eighteenth century.52 What 
constitutes the nation itself has been a tough nut for scholars to crack, which is hardly 
surprising: “For the chief characteristic of this way of classifying groups of human 
beings is that, in spite of the claims of those who belong to it that it is in some ways 
primary and fundamental for the social existence, or even the individual identification 
of its members, no satisfactory criterion can be discovered for deciding which of the 
many human collectivities should be labelled in this way”.53 For Hobsbawm, the 
nation is a recent newcomer in human history and is the product of particular, 
localized or regional conjunctures. Language, ethnicity or any other features, which 
might be adduced to show that a nation is present, are “fuzzy, shifting and ambiguous, 
and as useless for the purposes of the traveller’s orientation as cloud-shapes are 
compared to landmarks” 54 The alternative is to resort to subjective definitions, such
Critics on pp623-686, particularly pp623-639); John A. Hall (editor), The State o f the Nation, Ernest 
Gellner and the Theory o f Nationalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998; Smith 1998, 
pp27-46; John A. Hall, Nationalisms, Classified and Explained, in Periwal, pp8-33; John Breuilly, 
Nationalism and the State, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1993, henceforth Breuilly 1993, 
pp416-8, Breuilly 1996a, ppl 39-145 and 150-3 and his essay Approaches to Nationalism, in 
Balakrishnan, ppl46-174, (henceforth Breuilly 1996), ppl54-6 and ppl61-2; Elie Kedourie, 
Nationalism, Fourth Expanded Edition, Blackwell, Oxford, 1996, originally 1960, henceforth 
Kedourie, ppl42-144; Guibemau, pp49-50 and 76-80, and Greenfeld, op. cit., the very title of which 
disputes Gellner’s core proposition. For her, the nation represents the constitutive element of 
modernity: “In this belief, I reverse the order of precedence, and therefore of causality, which is 
usually, if sometimes tacitly, assumed to exist between national identity and nations, and nationalism 
and modernity: namely that national identity is simply the identity characteristic of nations, while 
nationalism is a product or reflection of major components of modernization. Rather than define 
nationalism by its modernity, I see modernity as defined by nationalism” (pl8 and cf. p21, where she 
adds: “Historically, the emergence of nationalism predated the development of every significant 
component of modernization”).
51 Second edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992 (originally 1990), henceforth 
Hobsbawm.
52 Hobsbawm, p3. He traces the gradual changes in meaning of the word in various languages on ppl5- 
20.
53 Op. cit., p5.
54 Op. cit., p6.
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as Renan’s nation as a daily plebiscite or the Austro-Marxist stance that “nationality” 
adhered to persons wherever they lived and whoever they lived with if they chose to 
claim it.ss The objection, which he raises to both attempts, is that “defining a nation 
by its members’ consciousness of belonging to it is tautological and provides only an 
a posteriori guide to what a nation is. Moreover it can lead the incautious into 
extremes of voluntarism”.56 In addition, the insistence upon choice subordinates the 
multiple and complex ways in which humans define and redefine themselves as 
members of groups to the single option of the nation. Hobsbawm adopts an agnostic 
posture, operating on the “assumption [that] any sufficiently large body of people 
whose members regard themselves as members of a “nation”, will be treated as 
such”. It is not primary or unchanging and is a social entity only insofar as it relates 
to a certain kind of modem territorial state: ’The equation nation = state = people, and 
especially sovereign people, undoubtedly linked nation to territoiy, since structure and 
definition of states were now essentially territorial. It also implied a multiplicity of 
nation-states so constituted, and this was indeed a necessary consequence of popular 
self-determination”.58
Hobsbawm agrees with Gellner on the issue of the elements of artefact, invention and 
social engineering, which enter into the making of nations. They have to be analysed 
in terms of political, technical, administrative, economic and other conditions and 
requirements because they are located at the point of intersection of politics, 
technology and social transformation. In brief, nations are dual phenomena, 
constructed from above, but incomprehensible unless also addressed from the vantage 
point of the hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people, which are not
33 The reference is to Ernest Renan's famous lecture Qu’est-ce qu’urte nation? delivered in 1882. For 
an abridged translation, see What Is A Nation? in Nationalism in Europe 1815 to the Present, edited by 
Stuart Woolf, Routledge, London and New York, 1996, pp48-60. Cf. Smith’s comments in Myths, 
pp32-3. On Austro-Marxism, see for example Charles C. Herod’s The Nation in the History o f 
Marxian Thought. The Concept o f Nations with History and Nations without History (henceforth 
Herod), Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1976, pp39-65 and Otto Bauer’s The Question o f Nationalities 
and Social Democracy, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2000 (henceforth Bauer), which 
contains a particularly informative introduction by Ephraim Nimni on ppxv-xlv (henceforth Nimni 
2000).
56 Hobsbawm, pp7-8.
37 Op. cit., p8.
58 Op. cit., pl9.
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necessarily national and still less nationalist. His major criticism of Gellner is that in 
his eagerness to fathom the process of modernization from above, he loses sight of the 
view from below. Three correctives must be taken into account: firstly, that official 
ideologies are not guides to what is in the minds of even the most loyal of citizens; 
secondly, that it cannot be simply taken as read that national identification excludes or 
is always or indeed ever superior to the remainder of the set of identifications, which 
make up the social being and thirdly that national identification and what it is 
believed to imply can shift in time. Finally, from Hroch, Hobsbawm takes on board 
the insights that national consciousness develops unevenly among the social 
groupings and regions of a country and that it spreads to the popular masses last.59 
As far as nationalism is concerned, Hobsbawm once again concurs with Gellner on it 
being a principle advocating congruence between the political and national unit, 
supplementing it with the idea that the political duty of the national to the polity 
overrides all other public obligations and in extreme cases such as war all other 
obligations of whatever kind.60
In his broad historical survey of nationalism from its birth, Hobsbawm concentrates 
on three main periods, from the French Revolution to 1918, from 1918 to 1950 and, 
finally, the late twentieth century.61 During the first, he examines some of the main 
tenets of liberal nationalism.62 The nation had to be of sufficient size to form an 
economically and culturally viable unit of development. If it did not achieve certain 
dimensions it had no justification. Hobsbawm refers to this as “the threshold 
principle.**63 Self-determination applied only to such nations.
59 Op. cit., pp9-12. The reader will note the care, which Hobsbawm takes to avoid the word ..identity”. 
Hobsbawm returns to the issue of multiple loyalties when examining the principles on which political 
appeals to the masses were based, notably the class appeal of the socialists, the confessional appeal of 
religious denominations and the appeal of nationality: „Men and women did not choose collective 
identification as they chose shoes, knowing that one could only put on one pair at a time. They had, 
and still have, several attachments and loyalties simultaneously, including nationality, and are 
simultaneously concerned with various aspects of life, any of which may at one time may be foremost 
in their minds, as occassion suggests. For long periods of time these different attachments would not 
make incompatible demands on a person” (pi23).
60 Op. cit., p9.
61 Ozkirimli, ppl 19-120.
62 For this term, see, for example, p24 and p32. Cf. the discussion of Kohn et al below.
63 Hobsbawm, p31.
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Nation-building was seen as a process of expansion: social evolution increased the 
scale of human groupings from family and tribe to county and canton, local to 
regional, the national and eventually the global. In practice this meant that national 
movements were expected to press for unification. That nation-states would be 
ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous was accepted readily “as there were many 
parts of Europe and much of the rest of the world where nationalities were so 
obviously mixed up on the same territory, that a purely special unscrambling of them 
seemed to be quite unrealistic”.64 Moreover it appeared logical that “small and 
backward” nationalities had everything to gain by merging into greater nations, 
making their contributions to humanity through these.65 The conclusion that some of 
these small nationalities and languages were doomed to extinction was not 
chauvinistic; it did not testify to innate hostility against them, especially since major 
nations could foster the dialects, lesser languages, historic and folklore traditions of 
sub-communities within them.66
All in all throughout the era of triumphant bourgeois liberalism (1830-1880) only 
three criteria allowed a people to be regarded as a nation (provided it passed the 
threshold): historic association with a current state or one with a fairly lengthy and 
recent past; the existence of a long-established cultural elite with a written national 
literary and administrative vernacular and a proven capacity for conquest.
64 Op. cit., p33.
65 Op. cit., p34. As Ldszld Kontler in his A History o f Hungary, Palgrave, Houndmills, 2002 
(henceforth Kontler) comments, Hungarian Liberals in the nineteenth century believed that the 
extension of individual rights would render collective rights for the nationalities superfluous and that 
they would be happy to assimilate voluntarily into the Hungarian nation (pp241-2). Cf. Emil 
Niederhauser’s The National Question in Hungary, in The National Question in Europe in Historical 
Context, edited by MikuldS Teich and Roy Porter, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, 
pp248-269, particularly p253. For Lajos Kossuth's position on the issue, see Miklds Molndr's A 
Concise History o f Hungary, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001 (henceforth Molndr), pi 73 
and Kossuth’s article from 26th April, 1849 A magyar-romdn megbikdlis feltiteleirol (On the 
Conditions for Reconciliation between the Hungarians and the Romanians), in Kossuth Lajos Uzenetei, 
compiled by Gyorgy Szabad, IKVA Kdnyvkiadd, Budapest, 1994, ppl69-171. See also Roman 
Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988 (henceforth Szporluk), 
pp 155-7.
66 Hobsbawm, pp34-5. Here Hobsbawm is defending Engels. For a useful summary of the latter’s 
pronouncements on the subject of small nations, see Herod, pp6-38.
67 Op. cit., pp37-8.
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In the years between 1880 and the First World War a new breed of nationalism came 
to the fore, which differed from its liberal predecessor in three respects. It abandoned 
the “threshold principle”: “Henceforth any body of people considering themselves a 
“nation” claimed the right to self-determination which, in the last analysis, meant the 
right to a separate sovereign independent state for their territory”.68 As a consequence 
of “this multiplication of potential “unhistorical” nations”, ethnicity and language 
became the central, even the only accepted indicators of potential nationhood. Lastly, 
national sentiments within the established nation-states veered sharply to the political 
right69
Ethnic nationalism received a boost from the increasingly massive geographical 
migrations of peoples and the transformation of the concept of race,70 whilst 
nationalism in general was helped along by the resistance of traditional groups 
threatened by the onrush of modernity and the mushrooming of new classes and strata 
in the urbanizing societies.71 These were further bolstered by the political changes, 
which made individuals receptive to national appeals, namely the democratization of 
politics and the creation of the modem administrative, citizen-mobilizing and citizen- 
influencing state.72
68 Op. cit., pl02.
69 Op. cit., p i02. In the previous chapter, Hobsbawm examines ‘feelings of collective belonging which 
already existed and which could (...) fit in with modern states and nations” (p46), which he calls 
“proto-national” bonds. They are of two types: the supra-local forms of popular identification, which 
go beyond those circumscribing the actual spaces in which people spent most of their lives and the 
political ties and vocabularies of select groups more directly linked to states and institutions, and which 
are capable of eventual generalization, extension and popularization (pp46-7). In his opinion “neither 
can be legitimately identified with the modem nationalism that passes as their lineal extension, because 
they had or have no necessary relation with the unit of territorial political organization which is a 
crucial criterion of what we understand as a “nation” today” (p47). They include language (ppSl-63); 
ethnicity (pp63-66); religion (pp67-73) and lasting statehood (pp73-76). On the question of why
v liberals found the nation alluring in the early days, see p40 where Hobsbawm attributes its links to the 
great liberal slogans as the product of long association instead of logical necessity, as liberty and 
equality are to fraternity: ‘To put it another way, because the nation itself was historically novel, it was 
opposed by conservatives and traditionalists, and therefore attracted their opponents”. Again on the 
slippage to the right, see pl21.
70 Op. cit., ppl07-8.
71 Op. cit., pl09.
72 Op. cit., pi 10.
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From 1918 to 1950 the nineteenth century principle of nationality triumphed as the 
result of two unintended events, the collapse of the multinational empires of Central 
and Eastern Europe and the Russian Revolution. The Wilsonian effort to make state 
frontiers coincide with national ones was stillborn due to its “utter impracticability*’.73 
Most of the new states were every bit as multinational as the structures they were 
intended to replace with oppressed minorities rilling the vacancy left by oppressed 
peoples. This meant that post-1919 the aspirations of the typical national movement 
were directed against national states and therefore essentially separatist.74 Another 
feature of national identification after the war was that it acquired new means of 
expressing itself in high technology societies, firstiy in the shape of the mass media 
(press, cinema, radio), which standardized, homogenized and altered popular 
ideologies as well as permitting their exploitation for propaganda purposes by private 
interests and states. The latter was, however, not as far-reaching in impact as the 
breaking down of the divisions between the private and local spheres in which 
citizens normally lived and the public and national one. The second means of 
bridging the gap between private and public worlds was sport.73 
Militant nationalism, even if it was not a reflex of despair, compensated for the 
failure, impotence and apparent inability of other political projects to realize people’s 
hopes: “It was the utopia of those who had lost the old utopias of the age of 
Enlightenment, the programme of those who had lost faith in other programmes, the 
prop of those who had lost the support of older political and social certainties”.76 
The final period is that of the late twentieth century, in which nationalism has 
declined as a vector of historical change.77 The upheavals following the dissolution
73 Op. tit., pl32.
74 Op. tit., pl39.
75 Op. tit., ppl41-3.
76 Hobsbawm, p i44. In the mid-1930s, the Communist movement tried to recapture the symbols of 
patriotism and an antifascist nationalism fought literally (in Spain) and metaphorically in an 
international ideological civil war, in which a section of numerous national ruling classes opted for an 
international political alignment of the right, and the states identified with i t  Such domestic parties 
jettisoned the appeal to xenophobic patriotism. Workers and intellectuals made an international choice, 
which happened to reinforce a national sentiment Thus nationalism became associated with the left in 
the antifascist period. This was subsequently confirmed by the experience of anti-imperial struggle in 
colonial countries (ppl45-8). Cf. Ozkirimli, ppl 19-120.
77 Hobsbawm, pi 63.
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of the Soviet Union Hobsbawm describes as the chickens of Versailles coming home 
to roost,78 or, to phrase it less figuratively, the unfinished business of 1918-1921.79 
Nationalism was the beneficiary of these events, but did not contribute a great deal to 
bringing them about.80 It cannot provide a solution to the problem of the age, which 
arises from a combination of international population movements with unprecedented 
social and economic transformations.81 At best, ethnic identity can be held up like an 
amulet to stem the tide. In “the western ex-communist societies” the ensuing 
disorientation is intensified by the end of life as most of the inhabitants had learned to 
live it. Hobsbawm quotes an unpublished paper by Hroch for whom nationalism or 
ethnicity in the region today is a substitute for factors of integration in a disintegrating 
society.82 National identity functions as a device for delineating the community of the 
innocent and, by extension, the guilty responsible for the unpleasant predicament of 
the present since Communist regimes are no longer available as scapegoats. The 
phenomenon, however, is not confined to post-communist states, however, but is 
universal.83 For Hobsbawm the anguish and desire to find firm bearings, which the 
hunger to belong articulates are: “symptoms of sickness rather than diagnoses, let 
alone therapy. Nevertheless, they create the illusion of nations and nationalism as an 
irresistibly rising force ready for the third millennium”.84 Further weight is lent to the 
impression by attaching the semantic label of nation to all states. Consequently all
Off
movements seeking territorial autonomy tend to attach it to themselves.
In reality, the nation is in the process of being eroded as it has to relinquish many of 
its staple functions, such as running the economy, to intergovernmental
78 Here I merge his images from Hobsbawm, p i64 and p259 of Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe 
Today, in Balakrishnan, pp255-266.
79 Op. cit., pl65.
80 Op. cit., pl67.
81 Op. cit., pl71. He presents the case in greater detail in Balakrishnan, pp255-266.
82 Hobsbawm, p i73 and in Balakrishnan, p261. The title of the 1991 paper is Nationale Bewegungen 
friiher und heute. Ein europdischer Vergleich.
83 Hobsbawm, pl74.
84 Op. cit., pl77.
85 Op. cit., ppl77-8.
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organizations.86 It is trapped between the rock of supranationalism and the hard place 
of infranationalism.87
In his earlier collaboration with Terence Ranger The Invention o f Tradition?* 
Hobsbawm demonstrates that many of the most venerable traditions, whose origins 
seem shrouded in the mists of antiquity, actually date from much more recently. An 
“invented tradition” is defined as “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or 
tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate 
certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies 
continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish 
continuity with a suitable historic past”.89 They are responses to novel situations, 
which take the form of reference to old situations, or which build up their own past by 
quasi-obligatory repetition,90 and crop up more frequently when a rapid 
transformation of society weakens or destroys the social patterns for which “old” 
traditions had been designed, rendering the latter obsolete. Since the Industrial 
Revolution, invented traditions could be clustered into three overlapping types: those 
promoting or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of groups, real or 
artificial communities; those legitimizing institutions, status or relations of authority 
and those whose principle aim was socialization, instilling beliefs, value systems and 
conventions of behaviour.91
86 Op. cit., p i81. Hobsbawm is quick to point out that the number of intergovernmental international 
organizations grew from 123 in 1931 through 280 in 1972 to 365 in 1984.
87 Op. cit., p i87.
88 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Canto Edition 
1992 (original date of publication 1983), henceforth Invention. See also Ozkirimli, ppl 16-118.
89 Invention, p i .
90 Op. cit., p2.
91 Op. cit., p9. Hobsbawm does not suggest, however, that the invention of tradition is confined to 
either ..traditional” or modem societies. Nor does he claim that older forms of community and 
authority structure and the traditions associated with them were unadaptable or that „new” traditions 
simply resulted from the inability to recycle old ones. Adaptation took place for old uses in new 
conditions and by utilizing old models for new purposes. Old institutions with established functions, 
references to the past and ritual idioms, such as the Catholic church, might need to go down this route 
(p5). See also p263 and Ozkirimli, pi 17.
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At this point the historian’s craft came into its own: “For all invented traditions, so far
0 2
as possible, use history as a legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion”.
This is made particularly clear by the history of the nation, since what has been 
absorbed into the fund of knowledge “is not what has actually been preserved in 
popular memory, but what has been selected, written, pictured, popularized and 
institutionalized by those whose function it is to do so”.93 Indeed by virtue of making 
a contribution, consciously or unconsciously, to the creation, dismantling and 
restructuring of images of the past, an activity, which straddles the spheres of 
specialist investigation and of politics, they are sucked into this process, like it or not. 
The era of the mass-production of traditions (1870-1914) coincided with the 
emergence of mass politics within the framework of states, which, seen from below 
“increasingly defined the largest stage on which the crucial activities determining 
human lives as subjects and citizens were played out”.94 The state increasingly 
registered and regulated the civil existence of its subjects and its “probing 
interventions” proved decisive.95 In developed countries, the “national economy”, its 
area coextensive with that of a state provided the framework within which economic 
transactions took place, whilst the standardization of administration, law and 
education inside the same boundaries made individuals receptive to the concept of 
nationhood. To influence the government or its policy was the main objective of 
domestic politics and the common man was entitled to take part in it: “It was thus 
natural that the classes within society, and in particular the working class, should tend 
to identify themselves through nationwide political movements or organizations 
(‘parties’), and equally natural that de facto these should operate essentially within the 
confines of the nation. Nor is it surprising that movements seeking to represent an 
entire society or ‘people* should envisage its existence essentially in terms of that of 
an independent or at least an autonomous state. State, nation and society 
converged”.96
Viewed from above, in the perspective of the formal rulers or dominant groups within 
the state, the problem of securing obedience, loyalty and cooperation of the masses as
92 Op. cit., p i2.
93 Op. cit., pl3.
94 Op. cit., pp264 and 269 and Ozkirimli, pi 17.
95 Invention, p264.
96 Op. cit., pp264-5.
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well as cementing their own legitimacy in the public mind became urgent. The older 
devices for maintaining social subordination, whereby relatively autonomous 
corporations under the monarch had controlled their own members in pyramids of 
authority linked to higher authorities at their apexes were no longer effective, the 
stratified social hierarchies in which each stratum did not get ideas above its station 
were crumbling. Even if only in the form of elections, the people’s desire to engage 
in politics could no longer be ignored as it now had institutional anchorage.97 Thus 
the beleaguered power-holders “rediscovered the importance of ‘irrational’ elements 
in the maintenance of the social fabric and the social order”.98 Taking France as an 
example, Hobsbawm isolates three innovations in the invention of tradition as 
particularly significant. The first was primary education, “imbued with revolutionary 
and republican principles and content, and conducted by the secular equivalent of the 
priesthood”.99 The second was the invention of public ceremonies (of which Bastille 
Day was the most striking exemplar) with the mass production of public monuments 
as the third.100
The result of these efforts was that “nationalism became a substitute for social 
cohesion through a national church, a royal family or other cohesive traditions, or 
collective group self-presentations, a new secular religion, and that the class which 
required such a mode of cohesion most was the growing new middle class, or rather 
that large intermediate mass which so signally lacked other forms of cohesion”.101 
Consequently, in Hobsbawm’s words: “just because so much of what subjectively 
makes up the modem ‘nation’ consists of such constructs and is associated with 
appropriate and, in general, fairly recent symbols or suitably tailored discourse (such 
as ‘national history’), the national phenomenon cannot be adequately investigated 
without careful attention to the ‘invention of tradition*”.102
97 Invention, p265.
98 Op. cit., p268.
99 Op. cit., p271.
100 As above. On public monuments, see also p264. For a comparison with Germany under Kaiser 
Wilhelm II, see pp273-9.
101 Invention, p303. On the nature of the middle classes and the specific problems they faced due to the 
fluidity of membership, see p291.
102 Invention, pl4.
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Like Gellner, Hobsbawm shows no great interest in national identity, but is more 
overtly hostile towards nationalism as an ideology.103 He virtually quarantines 
nationalism, denying it any trace of rationality, restricting it to the gullible or the 
unscrupulous cliques of the socially dominant, desperate to retain their power and 
privileges intact.104 I, by contrast, agree with Michael Billig that nationalism has 
become the normal condition of existence, the background assumption (or principle of 
classification) upon which society rests, its source of cohesion, the framework of 
everyday being. Regardless of the irrational responses that it is capable of provoking, 
it therefore fulfils a rational purpose of cosmos-building in the modem environment.
Benedict Anderson
Benedict Anderson, in his original and stimulating Imagined Communities,105 looks 
upon nationality and nationalism as “cultural artefacts of a particular kind”. In 
order to understand them, it is necessary to observe how they have come into 
historical being, how their meanings have changed over time and why they command 
such profound emotional legitimacy. For him, the nation is “an imagined political 
community -  and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”.107 It is 
imagined “because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of 
their fellow-members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives
103 For other critiques of Hobsbawm, see Ozkirimli, ppl20-7; Smith's Nationalism, Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 2001, henceforth Smith Nationalism, pp89-93, his Nations and Nationalism in a Global 
Era, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995, (henceforth Global), pp8-l 1, ppl2-13 of his contribution to 
Guibemau and Hutchinson, op. cit., pp9-31 entitled Nations and History, Smith 1998, ppl 17-131 and 
Myths, pp42-3 and 204-5.
104 On Invention, pp263-4 he makes a slight concession: “conscious invention succeeded mainly in 
proportion to its success in broadcasting on a wavelength to which the public was ready to tune in. 
Official new public holidays, ceremonies, heroes or symbols, which commanded the growing armies of 
the state’s employees and the growing captive public of schoolchildren, might still fail to mobilize the 
citizen volunteers if they lacked genuine popular resonance”.
105 Second edition, Verso, London, 1991 (original edition 1983), henceforth Imagined.
106 Imagined, p4.
107 Op. cit., p6. Cf. Hans Kohn’s formulation in The Idea o f Nationalism, A Study in its Origins and 
Background, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1961 (originally 1944, henceforth Idea)'. 
“Nationality is formed by the decision to form a nationality” (p i5).
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the image of their communion”.108 Anderson points out that Gellner had made use of 
the verb “to invent” in Thought and Change, which contained the first major 
statement of his theory of nationalism,109 but objects to it since “Gellner is so anxious 
to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences that he assimilates 
“invention” to “fabrication” and “falsity”, rather than to “imagining” and “creation”. 
In this way he implies that “true” communities exist which can be advantageously 
juxtaposed to nations”.110 In reality all communities larger than primordial villages 
are imagined and what distinguishes them from one another is not whether they are 
genuine or false, but the style in which they are imagined. Returning to his definition, 
the nation is imagined as limited because even the largest has finite boundaries, 
beyond which other nations lie and as sovereign because the concept first saw the 
light of day in an age in which Enlightenment and revolution were destroying the 
legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic dominions and reached 
maturity when even the most devout adherents of universal religion were forced to 
acknowledge the pluralism of such faiths, that each was confined territorially, so that 
the dream of the nation became that of freedom directly under God, the emblem of 
such liberty being the sovereign state. Finally, it is imagined as a community 
because: “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, 
the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship”.111 This fraternity 
has elicited willingness to make enormous sacrifices, including laying down one’s life 
for the nation’s sake.
In its preoccupation with death and immortality, nationalism betrays a strong affinity 
with religion. Religious thought has tried to answer the questions surrounding life's 
contingency and to transform fatality into continuity, concerning itself with the links 
between the dead and the yet unborn. In Western Europe the eighteenth century 
marks the dawn of nationalism and the dusk of religious modes of thought. Suffering 
did not disappear, yet rationalist secularism brought no comfort for it. Death 
appeared more arbitrary than ever before and salvation absurd. Nationalism jumped
108 Op. c it, p6. Cf. again Kohn Idea, where he denies that nationalism in the sense of solidarity or 
identification with “the life and aspirations of uncounted millions we shall never know, with a territory 
which we shall never visit in its entirety” can be deemed the same as love of home and family (pp8-9).
109 Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1964, ppl47-178.
UQ Imagined, p6.
1,1 Op. cit., p7.
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into the breech: “If nation-states are widely conceded to be “new” and “historical”, 
the nations to which they give political expression always loom out of an immemorial 
past, and, still more important, glide into a limitless future. It is the magic of
119nationalism to turn chance into destiny**. In other words, nationalism has to be 
comprehended by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but 
with the large cultural systems that preceded it. Two of the latter, which are of 
particular relevance, are the religious community and the dynastic realm.
The great sacral cultures incorporated conceptions of immense communities, 
imaginable through the medium of a sacred language and written script. Even though 
these languages made it possible to entertain the idea of, for example, Christendom, 
the scope and plausibility of these communities cannot be explained by them alone, 
since their readers were tiny literate reefs on top of Vast illiterate oceans. The 
relationship between the literati and their societies furnishes the vital clue: they were 
adepts in a cosmological hierarchy of which the apex was divine. By mediating 
between vernacular and Latin, the bilingual clerisy actually mediated between earth 
and heaven. However, their unselfconscious coherence waned steadily after the late 
Middle Ages due to the impact of explorations in the non-European world, which not 
only widened the cultural and geographic horizon, but also conceptions of possible 
forms of human life, unleashing the corrosive effects of relativisation, and of a 
gradual demotion of the sacred language itself, with Latin’s fall from grace 
exemplifying a larger process in which the sacred communities were fragmented, 
pluralized and territorialized.113
As far as the second system was concerned, kingship organizes everything around a 
high centre, its legitimacy deriving from divinity, not populations, who are subjects, 
not citizens. Borders were porous and indistinct and sovereignties faded 
imperceptibly into one another. After the French Revolution, however, the dynasties 
had to go on the defensive and “monarchy” became a semi-standardized model.114 
Beneath the ebbing of the sacred communities and lineages a fundamental change in 
modes of apprehending the world was taking place. The medieval Christian mind did 
not perceive history as an endless chain of cause and effect or of radical separations
112 Op. cit., ppl 1-12.
113 Op. cit., ppl2-19.
1,4 Op. cit., ppl9-22.
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between past and present. Instead events were joined together through divine 
providence, the here and now not a mere link in an earthly chain of occurrences, but 
simultaneously something, which has always been and will be fulfilled in the future. 
Borrowing from Walter Benjamin, Anderson explains that what has taken the place of 
“simultaneity-along-time” is ‘‘homogenous empty time”, in which “simultaneity is, as 
it were, transverse, cross-time, marked not by prefiguring and fulfilment, but by 
temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar*’.115 The importance of 
this transformation for the birth of the nation is revealed by examining the basic 
structure of two forms of imagining, which first flowered in Europe in the eighteenth 
century: the novel and the newspaper. They provided the technical means for “re­
presenting” the kind of imagined community that is the nation.
In their plots, novels connect protagonists by embedding them in social settings 
(geographically designated). The societies in which they interact are sociological 
entities of such firm and stable reality that their members can pass each other on the 
street without ever becoming acquainted and still share a connection. The characters 
are, furthermore, linked in the minds of the omniscient readers who watch them going 
about their daily business all at once. Anderson's conclusion: “That all these acts are 
performed at the same, clocked, calendrical time, but by actors who may be largely 
unaware of one another, shows the novelty of this imagined world conjured up by the 
author in his readers’ minds”.116 This idea of a sociological organism moving 
calendrically through empty, homogenous time is a precise analogue of the idea of the 
nation, which is also apprehended as a solid community moving steadily down 
history.
Similarly, newspapers, which contain a bewildering collection of reported stories, all 
happening independently without the participants in the individual dramas being 
remotely aware of each other, follow literary conventions. The arbitrariness of the 
inclusion and juxtaposition of the material is enough to demonstrate that the linkage 
between news items is imagined. It is achieved firstly by simple calendrical 
coincidence, the date at the top of each page denoting the unifying factor, the passage 
of time, during which the world ambles ahead. The second source of linkage is to be 
found in the relationship between the newspaper, as a type of book, and the market.
115 Imagined, p24. The Benjamin passage is taken from Illuminations, Fontana, London, 1973, p263.
1,6 Op. cit, p26.
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The book was the first modem-style mass-produced industrial commodity. In this 
perspective, the newspaper is comparable to a book sold in colossal print-runs, but of
117ephemeral popularity, “one-day best-sellers”. It creates the mass ceremony of 
almost exactly simultaneous consumption of the “newspaper-as-fiction”, with
| 1 Q
morning and evening editions devoured between certain hours of the day. 
Although it is performed privately, each communicant knows that what he is doing is 
being replicated at the same moment by millions of others “of whose existence he is 
confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion”.119 The newspaper 
reader, seeing copies of the same product in the hands of neighbours and fellow 
commuters, is reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life.120 
Print knowledge thrived on reproducibility and dissemination. The initial market for 
books was a wide, but thin stratum of (bilingual) Latin readers across Europe. Once it 
was saturated, the monoglot masses beckoned. A shortage of money made publishing 
entrepreneurs think seriously about peddling cheap editions in the vernaculars. Three 
factors allowed these considerations to gather further momentum. The first was a 
change in the character of Latin itself. The Humanists had revived the literature of 
pagan antiquity, widening an appreciation of the ancients’ sophisticated achievements 
in style. The Latin the intelligentsia aspired to write became even further removed 
from ecclesiastical life, lending it an esoteric quality different from that of church 
Latin in mediaeval times, which had been arcane because of its status as text. Now it 
became arcane because of what was written as well.
The second was the impact of the Reformation, which owed much of its success to 
“print-capitalism” itself. The coalition between Protestantism and print-capitalism
quickly created large new reading publics and mobilized them for politico-religious
 121purposes.
The third was “the slow, geographically uneven, spread of particular vernaculars as 
instruments of administrative centralization by certain well-positioned would-be
117 Op. cit., p35.
118 Op. cit., p35.
119 As above.
120 Op. cit., pp35-6.
121 Op. cit., pp37-40.
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absolutist monarchs”.122 The “choice” of language was a pragmatic and haphazard 
development dictated by the inner convenience of officialdoms.123 
The cumulative outcome was the “dethronement of Latin”.124 
Capitalism “assembled” (within the limits imposed by grammars and syntaxes) 
related vernaculars into mechanically reproduced print-languages capable of being 
sold throughout the market. These print-languages laid the foundations of national 
consciousnesses in three ways: by creating unified fields of exchange and 
communication below Latin and above the spoken regional variants, by imparting a 
new fixity to language, which in the long term helped to build the image of being 
ancient so central to the idea of the nation, and by begetting languages-of-power 
different from the older administrative vernaculars in that certain dialects were 
inevitably closer to each print-language and dominated their final forms.125 Anderson 
is careful to stress that in their origins, the fixing of print-languages and the 
differentiation of status between them were accidental, the result of the explosive 
interaction between capitalism, technology and human linguistic diversity. Once in 
place, however, they could become formal models to be imitated or indeed 
deliberately exploited.126
Anderson draws inspiration from both Durkheim and the social constructionist school 
of thought as pioneered by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann in The Social
1 17Construction o f Reality, paving the way for the study of representations and the
122 Op. c it, p40.
123 Op. city p42.
124 As above.
125 Op. cit., pp44-5.
126 Op. cit., p45.
127 Penguin, London, 1991 (original publication 1966), henceforth Construction. For a discussion of 
social constructionism, see Chapter One below. Durkheim was the father of the theory of collective 
representations, as set out in his The Elementary Forms o f Religious Life, The Free Press, New York, 
1995, original date of publication 1912 (henceforth Elementary). The concept of imagined community 
first appears on p42, where he states: “A Church is not simply a priestly brotherhood; it is a moral 
community made up of the faithful, both laity and priests”. The theme is developed throughout his 
examination of totemism (especially on ppl49-150,190-3 and 221-231 and see also p425). On the 
issue of Durkheim’s influence on Anderson, see Karen Fields’ introduction to Elementary, pxxxiii. For 
critiques of Anderson, see Ozkirimli, ppl51-6; Michael Billig in Banal Nationalism, Sage, London,
page 36
psychological dimension of nationalism. As John Breuilly judiciously remarks in his 
assessment of Anderson’s contribution, the argument on the literary genres of 
newspaper and popular novel, with the sense of oneness between author and audience 
shows that “a culture comes to be constructed through representation”.128
John Breuilly
In his Nationalism and the State,129 John Breuilly regards nationalism as “an
especially appropriate form of political behaviour in the context of the modem state
and the modem state system,”130 more specifically as referring to “political
movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with 
1^1nationalist arguments,” dismissing the assumptions that it is either a search for a 
national identity or an expression cf class interest, social structure or a cultural
1Wformation. Ultimately it boils down to politics and power, the latter centering upon 
control of the state. Until the relationship between nationalism, politics and power 
has been grasped, considerations such as culture, ideology and class only muddy the 
waters. Methodologically, Breuilly is sceptical of the utility of coming up with a 
general theory, which is subsequently applied to cases, preferring to develop a 
typology of nationalism first: “The internal variations within nationalism are too great 
to allow of a single method of investigation and so one must begin by identifying
1995 (henceforth Billig), pp24,70 and 125; Breuilly 1996a, ppl45-153; Smith 1998, ppl31-142; Smith 
Nationalism, pp78-80; Gopal Balakrishnan, The National Imagination, in Balakrishnan, ppl98-213; 
Breuilly 1996, ppl59-161 and Breuilly 1996a, ppl45-153.
128 Breuilly 1996a, p i46.
129 For bibliographical details, see footnote 50 above.
130 Breuilly 1993, pi.
131 Op. cit., p2. On the same page he defines a “nationalist argument” as “a political doctrine based on 
three basic assertions”, that such a thing as a nation with an explicit character exists, that the interests 
and values of the nation take precedence over all other interests and values and that the nation must be 
as independent as possible, which is usually understood as attaining political sovereignty.
132 He summarises this stance with the utmost clarity in his essay The State and Nationalism, in 
Montserrat Guibemau and John Hutchinson (editors): Understanding Nationalism, Polity, Cambridge, 
2001, pp32-52, henceforth Breuilly 2001, p32: „”I do not regard tha nation as having a significant pre­
modem history, or as a ,.real” group with an identity and consciousness which produces political effects 
such as nation-states, or as a discursive construct. Rather I treat the nation as a modem political and 
ideological formation which developed in close conjunction with the emergence of the modem, 
territorial, sovereign and participatory state”.
page 37
various types of nationalism which can be considered separately. After such a 
consideration one can seek to locate underlying similarities between those types. 
Second, each type must be investigated by the comparative historical method. Within 
each type I select a few cases. I analyse these cases using the same methods and 
concepts, which also enables me to compare and contrast them systematically. Only 
in this way can one move on to draw general conclusions from the case studies.”133 In 
so doing, he prefers to concentrate on what he calls significant nationalist movements, 
those which posed a serious challenge to the state.134 A nationalist opposition can 
aim to break away from the present state, in which case he classifies it as separation 
nationalism, to reform the state in a nationalist direction (reform nationalism), or to 
unite it with other states (unification nationalism). These categories are further 
broken down according to whether the movements are opposed to nation or non­
nation states.135 Within these movements, nationalist ideas can perform three 
functions: coordination (where they are used to persuade elites, which would 
otherwise pursue separate interests in challenging the existing state, that they have a 
common cause), mobilisation (where they drum up support for the political movement 
amongst groups previously excluded from the political process) and legitimacy 
(where they justify the goals of the movement both to the state it seeks to usurp and to 
external agents, such as foreign powers and their public opinions).136 
Breuilly draws attention to the different meanings attached to the term nationalism 
within the broad theoretical debate, with three particular areas of interest emerging, 
namely doctrine, politics and sentiment.137 Furthermore, multiple approaches to the 
problem are possible, such as the primordial (adopted by the nationalists themselves), 
functional (psychological, Marxist and so on), narrative (when historians recount the 
story of the rise of nationalism, thereby taking it for granted) and modernist.138
133 Breuilly 1993, p2.
134 Op. cit., pp7-8.
135 Op. cit, p9. For a brief outline of each, see Breuilly 2001, pp39-42.
136 Breuilly 1996, ppl 66-7, cf. Breuilly 1993, p93.
137 See Breuilly 1996, which contains the most accessible and systematic statement of his position in 
general. The advantages and disadvantages of focusing on each of the areas of interest are discussed on 
ppl46-149.
138 The primoidialist position is dealt with in detail in Breuilly 1996, ppl49-154 and in Breuilly 1993 
on pp405-6; the functional in Breuilly 1996, ppl54-156 and in Breuilly 1993, pp407-414 (Marxist) and
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Within the latter, emphasis can be placed on the transformation of consciousness and 
the production and reception of nationalist ideas (Benedict Anderson, Miroslav 
Hroch), social transformations (Gellner) or Breuilly* s preferred option, 
transformations in the nature of power.139 Political action imposes discipline on 
ideas, steering them in the direction of practical goals as well as channelling diffuse 
emotions. By asking the simple question about how much support such political 
movements are able to tap within their society and how powerful they are, the 
significance of ideas and sentiments can be gauged.140
The next step is to relate nationalism to the process of modernisation, which for 
Breuilly involves a fundamental change in the generic division of labour.141 This 
meant that the broadest categories of human activity, coercion (power), cognition 
(culture) and production (the economy) were redefined and placed in a different 
relationship to one another. In Europe, a transition occurred from a corporate to a 
functional division of labour, the former found in a society where “a bundle of 
different functions are carried out by particular institutions, usually on behalf of some 
distinct group”.142 By way of illustration, Breuilly cites the ideal-typical guild, which 
performs the economic functions of regulating production and distribution of 
particular goods and services, the cultural functions of taking care of the vocational 
education of apprentices, organising the recreational and ceremonial activities of 
members and enforcing religious observance as well as the political functions of 
running courts to punish wayward members and, finally, participation in town 
governments. Churches, lordships, peasant communes and the monarch in his 
capacity as privileged landowner exhibited similar polyvalence. By the late 
eighteenth century this division of labour had been undermined by sustained attacks 
from various quarters, which envisaged an alternative “whereby each of the major
pp414-418 (psychological). In the earlier work, he assessed the Marxist and psychological 
independently of the functionalist analysis (pp418-420) and included a section on the communications 
approach (pp406-7).
139 See Breuilly 1996, ppl58-162.
140 Op. cit., pl63.
141 The argument is taken from Gellner, Plough, Sword and Book, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1988, pp20-22.
142 Breuilly 1996, pl63.
page 39
social functions was concentrated into particular institutions”.143 The 
disentanglement advocated by the critics eventually carried the day, superseding the 
older arrangements.
The link with nationalist politics is provided by the development of the modem state, 
one aspect of the wider processes.144 Breuilly takes pains to ensure that neither 
modernisation itself nor the state is viewed as the “cause” of nationalism. More 
accurately: “The formation of the specialized, sovereign, territorial, public state is the 
institutional context within which the idea of nationalism appears appropriate as 
ideology, both in intellectual terms and as a way of mobilizing support. Political 
modernization relates to other features of modernization -  the free market economy, 
the autonomous world of culture, the domestication of family life, and so on -  all of 
which have a bearing on nationalism but only once its political specificity is 
grasped”.145
The state assumed a liberal form, which entailed a pooling of “public” powers into 
state institutions such as parliaments and bureaucracies, leaving many “private” 
powers under the control of non-political institutions. This in turn brought about a 
double transformation of government with “public” institutions losing “private” 
powers and vice versa.146 Thus a distinct idea of the state as “public” and civil 
society as “private” was elaborated. Within both there was a new emphasis upon
143 Op. cit., p i64.
144 On p369 of Breuilly 1993, he once again makes effective use of an ideal-type: „The modem state is 
the possessor of sovereignty over a given territory. Sovereignty resides in a specific institution such as 
monarchy or parliament, and is considered to be, by its very nature, indivisible. The state possesses an 
elaborate institutional structure which delimits, justifies and exercises the claim to sovereignty. The 
activity of the state is devoted to the maintenance and exercise of its sovereignty against both external 
and internal threats. Externally the limit upon sovereignty is set by the sovereignty of other states. The 
political world is made up of a plurality of sovereign territorial states. It has no order other than that 
created out of the rational pursuit of self-interest which states follow in their dealings with one another. 
Internally the sovereignty of the state is limited -  or, more precisely, divided -  by the distinction 
between the public and the private spheres. In the public sphere the state exercises sovereignty 
directly; in the private sphere it does no more than provide ground rules for dealings between 
individuals and groups, rules which can, if necessary, be enforced when broken”. For modernization as 
a whole, see Breuilly 2001, pp36-38.
lAS Breuilly 2001, p51.
146 The examples given are the monarchy on the one hand losing “private” powers, such as the right to 
grant monopolies, and the churches and guilds losing “public” powers to government.
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people as individuals as a result of the breakdown of corporate ties. Hence the main 
problem in establishing political order came to be that of making the state-society 
connection, in other words how to reconcile the public interests of citizens with the 
private interests of selfish individuals. The built-in competitive edge of nationalist 
ideas was that they were compatible with both attempts at finding a response: one 
based on citizenship, the other based on culture.147
The first solution recast society as a polity of citizens, generating a sense of 
commitment to the state through taking part in democratic institutions, the “nation" 
being no more than the body of citizens, whilst the second stressed its collective 
character with nationalism providing a sense of identity in place of the criteria of 
privilege employed in a corporate society.148
Liberalism lost ground to nationalism because it experienced difficulties in coming to 
terms with the idea of community interests, which should be accorded political 
recognition. In addition, many sections of the population had an aversion to 
liberalism, especially where formal participation rights masked real, socially 
structured inequality. Furthermore, nationalism was more than capable of rising to 
the challenge of appealing to a wide range of groups inhabiting a given territory. 
Although the two concepts of nation as a body of citizens and as a cultural collectivity 
conflicted logically, nationalism pulled off a sleight of hand that bound them 
together.149
1.3 The Ethno-Symbolists
John Armstrong
John Armstrong, in Nations before Nationalism,150 seeks to unearth the ethnic roots 
of “the intense group identification”, which goes by the name of nation.151
147 Breuilly 1996, pl65. Cf. The concluding remarks in Breuilly 1993, p390.
m  Breuilly 1996, p i65.
149 Op. cit., p i66. For a more extensive account of the intellectual sources of nationalist ideology, see 
Breuilly 1993, ppSS-64, which is particularly illuminating on historicism, authenticity and the contrast 
between the natural and the unnatural. On Breuilly, see Ozkirimli, ppl04-109 and 120-125; for 
critiques, see Global, pp55-6 and 75-8 and Smith 1998, pp84-94,196-7 and 234.
130 The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1982, henceforth Armstrong. According to 
Ozkirimli, A.D. Smith and others have regarded him as either a primordialist or a perennialist. I agree
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Advocating study of ethnic relations over extended historical periods, he believes that 
his comparative approach is suited to the discovery of patterns or typologies rather 
than general laws. His task is that of condensing the experiences of ethnic 
identification to shorthand description that will subsequently allow specific questions 
about analogous phenomena to be asked. In so doing, he provides an impressive and 
highly detailed overview of Eastern and Western Christendom and Islamic 
civilisation. Since the late eighteenth century, nationalism has been elevated to the 
dominant political doctrine: “The right of individuals to choose the state to which 
they belong, that is, to establish territorial political structures corresponding to their 
consciousness of group identity, has constituted a principle theme of political 
analysis. My examination, however, stops at the threshold of nationalism, before the 
period (...) when consciousness of ethnic identity became a predominant force for 
constituting independent political structures. A major objective of my work is, 
indeed, to provide a perspective in which such historically novel demands posed by 
nationalist movements must confront a lengthy record of human association in which 
persistent group identity did not ordinarily constitute the overriding legitimization of 
polity formation”.152
A time dimension encompassing many centuries, similar to the longue duree of the 
Annales school of French historiography, is essential for disentangling independent 
ethnic experiences from the effects of diffusion and mimesis as well as for perceiving 
modem nationalism as part of a cycle of ethnic consciousness. The epoch of 
Absolutism was one in which elites rejected ethnic differentiation. As it immediately 
preceded nationalism, it created the impression that the ideological newcomer was 
entirely without precedent. However, a longer look suggests the recurrence of such 
widespread ethnic identifications, though in other forms. Absolutist Enlightenment 
brought the revived linguistic awareness stimulated by the Reformation and Counter- 
Reformation conflicts to a wider audience, one of the results being “that modem 
nationalist thought, succeeding to an age of cosmopolitanism, has sought permanent
with Ozkirimli’s assessment to the effect that: “it can be asserted that the arguments put forward in this 
study, particularly Armstrong’s overall perspective, have laid the groundwork for ethno-symbolism” 
(Ozkirimli, pl70). Therefore I feel that it is appropriate to examine Armstrong’s ideas immediately 
prior to Smith’s.
151 Armstrong, p3.
152 Armstrong, p4.
page 42
“essences” of national character instead of recognising the fundamental but shifting 
significance of boundaries for human identity”.153
By emphasising the latter, Armstrong follows the Norwegian anthropologist Frederik 
Barth,154 who proposes a social interaction model of ethnic identity that does not posit 
a fixed “character” or “essence” for the group, but instead concentrates on the 
perceptions of its members, which distinguish them from other groups. Indeed: 
“groups tend to define themselves not by reference to their own characteristics, but by 
exclusion”.155 The advantages of addressing attitudinal boundary mechanisms are to 
be found in the insights that both the cultural and biological content of the group can 
alter as long as the boundary mechanisms are maintained, that, although these 
boundaries may have geographical counterparts, ethnic groups are not necessarily 
based on the occupation of exclusive territories and that other ethnic features, such as 
the use of languages as alternative codes rather than as ethnic identifying symbols or 
prescriptive communication media, are relevant.156
The implication of the concept is that “ethnicity is a bundle of shifting interactions 
rather than a nuclear component of social organisation”.157 It is part of a continuum 
of social collectivities including classes and religious bodies. Over a long period of 
time each may transmute into one of the others. Consequently, Armstrong is more 
interested in the interplay between class, ethnic and religious characteristics than in 
“compartmentalising definitions”. Nevertheless there are tendencies, which allow 
the observer to tease them apart. Where ethnicity and religion have coincided, groups 
cultivate peculiar linguistic features associated with sacral identity. They favour 
endogamy and symbolic border guards such as architecture, dress and manners. The
133 As above. Armstrong is rigorous in his use of terminology, refusing to treat “boundary” and 
“frontier” as synonyms. Throughout “the term “boundaries” will be reserved for all relevant informal 
limits resulting from social processes such as linguistic, folkloric, and economic development, whereas 
“frontier” will denote borders defined by political action, including the formal action of autonomous 
ecclesiastical authorities” (pp9-10).
154 In Barth’s Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, Bergen, Universitetsforlaget, 1969. For a summary of 
Barth’s work on ethnicity, see Richard Jenkins, Social Identity, Routledge, London, 1996 (henceforth 
Jenkins), pp90-103.
155 Armstrong, p5.
156 Armstrong, pp4-5.
157 Armstrong, p6.
158 Op. cit., p6.
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dividing lines between class and ethnicity are sharper. In the pre-modem era, 
functional or occupational differentiation from neighbouring social or ethnic groups 
was a prime distinguishing trait both of traditional diasporas and nomads. Generally, 
however, a lower class cannot constitute a group as consistentiy conscious of its 
identity as an ethnic collectivity, since its incomplete occupational pyramid does not 
yield an elite with the communications and bargaining skills needed to legitimise the 
boundary mechanisms of the class within the larger polity. An underclass is therefore 
also vulnerable to manipulation by the elites that act as guardians of the myths and 
symbols common to the society as a whole. That being said: “the presence of very 
different linguistic patterns among peasants and elites, as contrasted to minor dialect 
differentiation, made maintenance of a latent but persistently strong identity 
easier”. '59
Where a counter-elite has developed within the incipient ethnic collectivity, however, 
it can try to enter into an exchange relationship with the dominant elite. The very 
potential for such a relationship can represent a criterion for separating ethnicity ffom 
class. Even without an autonomous political structure, ethnic identification is 
possible.160
In their origins and their most fundamental effects, ethnic boundary mechanisms exist 
in the minds of their subjects rather than as lines on a map or norms in a rule book. 
Words operate as symbolic boundary markers, warning a group member when he is 
nearing a barrier between his collectivity and another. The cues conveyed by symbols 
are signals from one ethnic group to another or among members of the same group, 
which means that symbolic interaction can be considered as a type of communication. 
Since symbols are established as content generations before they are transmitted in 
their capacity as cues to any given members of a group, ethnic symbolic 
communication by definition takes place over the longue duree, between the dead and 
the living. The persistence of the symbol lies at the heart of its significance and is 
closely related to its incorporation within a mythic structure.161 
Again over long periods of time, the legitimising power of individual mythic 
structures is enhanced by fusion with other myths in a mythomoteur, which defines
139 Op. cit., p7.
160 Op. cit., p7.
161 Armstrong, pp7-8.
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identity in relation to a specific polity. Demonstrable historical validity is not the 
critical point here. Instead, the effect of the myth recital in arousing heightened 
awareness among group members of their “common fate” and thereby reinforcing the 
salience of boundaries is vital. Armstrong concludes: “it is the symbolic rather than 
the materia] aspects of common fate that are decisive for identity. Moreover, symbols 
need not directly reflect the “objectively” most important elements of the material 
way of life even when it does constitute a sharply differentiating underlying factor”.162 
Armstrong embarks on his analysis by contrasting two fundamentally different ways 
of life, the nomadic and the sedentary, not because they embody ethnic identities, but 
because the myths and symbols accruing to them divide nearly all subsequent 
identities into two groups based on incompatible principles.163 
Nostalgia, the expression of the respective myth-symboi architectures, is described by 
Armstrong as “a persistent image of a superior way of life in the distant past”.164 As a 
social form, it articulates the yearning to return to a golden age, to halcyon days 
before corruption and equivocation permeated civilised life and is emotionally 
charged. Through it, earlier life patterns condition the attitudes of later generations by 
setting conditions in which boundaries are perceived.165 The territorial principle 
ultimately triumphed in Europe, whilst the genealogical principle prevailed in most of 
the Middle East.166
The two great universal religions, which came to dominate the Mediterranean world 
by the early Middle Ages, Islam and Christianity, each propagated their own 
legitimising myths. As these developed, the respective identity components derived 
from the two ways of life interacted with doctrinal cleavages to produce two strongly 
opposed identities. Their common origins as well as their geographical proximity 
made the religions the negative reference points for one another, so that they
162 Op. cit., p9.
163 Op. cit., pl2. Armstrong summarises the difference as between dreaming of vast, open spaces and 
of the security and tranquillity of a little plot of earth (pl9).
164 Op. cit., pl6.
165 As above.
166 Armstrong, pl2. For the details of the respective developments, see ppl9-27 for the transition from 
sedentary to territorial, with a subsection on Stamm and tribe on pp27-37, and pp38-46 on the nomadic 
experience. In Europe, ancient polities and ecclesiastical organizations based on settled agricultural 
populations consolidated territorial attachment by precisely delimiting jurisdictions (pp51-2).
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resembled on a grand scale ethnic groups that define themselves in relation to out­
groups. All Moslems thought of themselves as united at least in contrast to 
neighbouring Christians and vice versa. Hence each perpetuated and redefined the 
other’s identity in a “superethnic” manner. Violent conflict further consolidated these 
attitudes in a spiral of mutual antagonism. Intrusions by steppe nomads and Christian 
reprisals led to the coming into being of a “broad frontier zone of insecurity” between 
the two civilisations.167 Moreover, the concept of defending this frontier became the 
source of constitutive myths for polities on both sides, as mirrored in the terms ghazi 
(Islamic) and Antemurale (Christian).
Armstrong then delves into the role of the city. Citizenship began with the experience 
of intimate involvement in the affairs of a small political entity. Its effect can scarcely 
be over-exaggerated: “The intense identity this participation fostered became, after 
many vicissitudes, the basis for many if not most broader identities”. In order to 
appreciate fully the impact of towns, a range of factors, from architecture to legal 
codes, has to be taken into account.169 In moving from this level of identification to 
that of the imperial polity, the central question is: “how could the intense 
consciousness of loyalty and identity established through face-to-face contact in the 
city-state be transferred to the larger agglomerations of cities and countryside known 
as empires?”170 The answer lies at least in part in the ancient Mesopotamian myth of 
the universal terrestrial empire reflecting the order of heaven, which was used as a 
vehicle for incorporating city-state loyalties into a larger framework.171 Bureaucracies
167 Armstrong, p91. For the section as a whole, pp90-92.
168 Op. cit., p93. Indeed, on p95 Armstrong puts forward the city as a third way of life, „as ineradicable 
and permeating as nomadism or sedentarism”. The difference between the Moslem and the Christian 
relationship to the city is examined on p94.
169 Armstrong, pl3. On architecture, see pp96-102; on Italian and Mediterranean cities, see ppl02-6; 
on Northern European cities and Magdeburg and Liibeck Law, see ppl06-113 and on urbanism in the 
..shatter zone” (p91, East Central Europe along the Habsburg-Ottoman frontier) see ppl 13-122. 
Armstrong sketches eight city types on the basis of combining three criteria for classifying the influence 
of cities in general on ethnicity (ppl 27-8).
170 Armstrong, pl3. Cf. Ozkirimli, ppl72-3.
171 Armstrong, pl3, although, as he makes clear on pl65, the model was being emulated unconsciously. 
For details of the Mesopotamian myth, see pi 32; on Byzantium, see ppl45-151; on the myth of Empire 
in Western Europe, see ppl52-154 (which Armstrong summarises as follows on pl52: „the ideal 
solution was a universal secular empire protecting a universal spiritual domain and in tutelage to the
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with their hierarchical structure and post-recruitment socialization processes together 
with the establishment of capitals furnished the institutional complement for building 
up central power.172
Language is the final issue, which Armstrong treats in depth and which he had 
deliberately downplayed earlier “in order to emphasize that early ethnic alignments 
could arise without much attention to linguistic affiliations”.173 In pre-modem times, 
communication at the mass level over long distances was usually too slight to make 
language crucial for the average person. Obstructions to communication between the 
major language families are such that awareness of linguistic difference has always 
been present, though not necessarily salient in people's consciousness. As an 
offshoot of compact territorial settlement, the boundary between the Romance and 
Germanic language groups has been a fixed geographical line since the early medieval 
period. This language boundary rarely coincided with political frontiers, however.
latter. In practice, the balance between secular and ecclesiastical forces permitted the emergence of a 
Western polity separate from both church and empire, followed by an entire series of competing 
polities that became the European state system. In the West, moreover, an emperor, unless endowed 
with great charisma, was restricted by material limitations, legal traditions, and ecclesiastical power to 
an extent rarely encountered in other imperial polities”) and on the French exception, see ppl54-9. For 
a useful summary of his findings in the chapter, see ppl64-7.
172 Armstrong, pp 13 and 197. On ppl99-200, Armstrong compresses the results of his extensive 
historical investigations into a typology of imperial polities. He concedes that „the Christian 
ecclesiastical network constituted a far more effective penetrative organization than did the 
administrations of large pre-modem polities” (p202). Indeed, he devotes an entire chapter to religious 
organizations and ethnic identity, covering diasporas (pp206-213), the rift between the Eastern and 
Western churches (pp213-222), triangular ecclesiastical rivalry in East Central Europe (pp222-230, 
where Catholic, Orthodox and the German missions sponsored by the Holy Roman Emperors 
competed) and the Protestant Reformation versus the Catholic Counter-Reformation (pp230-233). The 
principle conclusion for our purposes is that religious organizations .greatly stimulate the use and 
written codification of popular languages, especially during periods of intense sectarian controversy” 
(p238).
173 Armstrong, p241. Having dealt with the Islamic world (pp242-250), he examines European 
linguistic barriers, turning first to the Germanic-Romance (pp250-257) and the Germanic-Slavic cases 
(pp258-261) before focusing on „the lack of perceptible dividing lines among transitional dialects of 
the same language family”, which „did not necessarily constitute latent factors available for identity 
mobilization, although specific historical circumstances might make particular dialects available for 
such manipulation” (p261). He illustrates this proposition by looking at the Romance (pp261-272) and 
Slavic (pp272-279) groups.
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Only when speakers of the two language families were intermingled on the same 
territory, with speakers of one revelling in higher social status, did language 
difference cause political cleavage. Even in East Central Europe, where such 
intermixing was more commonplace, language divisions did not function as the chief 
locus of ethnic identity until the modem period.174
Within the regions occupied by the Romance, Germanic and Slavic families 
respectively, local patois blurred imperceptibly into each other. Consequently, the 
ordinary traveller experienced linguistic changes as the accumulation of minor 
variations, none of which was pivotal in itself. As long as neither legal precision nor 
literary elegance was called for, individuals could communicate throughout extensive 
territories. From this, Armstrong arrives at the conclusion that “the significance of 
language for ethnic identity is highly contingent*’, with politics and religion exerting a 
decisive influence over the elaboration and subsequent careers of linguistic codes.175
In Towards a Theory o f Nationalism: Consensus and Dissensus,176Arm strong retreats 
from his earlier stances, albeit only slighdy, on the insurmountability of obstacles in 
the path of a general theory (referring to his appraisal as “somewhat too pessimistic”) 
and on the nature of the nation.177 National identity as a primordial phenomenon has 
been thrown out by members of the academic community, although they are willing to 
accept that it coalesced at a specific point, however remote, in history: “Nationalism -  
the conscious demand for political expression of the nation -  originated, on the other 
hand, no earlier than the fifteenth century”.178 Uah Greenfeld dates its emergence to 
sixteenth-century England, whilst impressive French works place it slightly before 
then.179 Nonetheless, “the notion that nations, or even “ethnic groups”, have existed
1 ftfiforever is scarcely tenable among scholars”. Reviewing his own contentions 
concerning the Germanic tribes, he concurs with Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson 
“that, like other human identities, national identity has been an invention. The
174 Armstrong, p281.
175 Op. cit., p282.
176 In Periwal, pp34-43.
177 Periwal, pp34 and 35.
178 Op. cit., p35.
179 Greenfeld, op. cit.
180 Periwal, p35.
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principle remaining disagreement is over the antiquity of some inventions and the 
repertory of pre-existing group characteristics that inventors were able to draw on”.181 
As Ozkirimli comments, he offers no explanation as to why he had undergone this 
change of heart.182
Anthony D. Smith
Anthony D. Smith, in The Ethnic Origins o f Nations}** National Identity,184 and
18 SMyths and Memories o f the Nation, like Armstrong, throws down the gauntlet to
the modernists, tracing the genealogy of nations to well before the outbreak of the 
French Revolution or the advent of industrialism: “This means (...) grounding our 
understanding of modem nationalism on an historical base involving considerable 
time-spans, to see how far its themes and forms were pre-figured in earlier periods 
and how far a connection with earlier ethnic ties and sentiments can be 
established”.186 He is quite emphatic in affirming the validity of Armstrong’s 
concentration upon the myth-symbol complex, which dovetails with his own 
approach.187 While “objective” considerations, such as population size, economic 
resources, communications systems and bureaucratic centralization are essential when 
it comes to creating the environment of states, which then help to mould nations, they 
tell us little about the qualities and character of the national community itself: “For 
that we must turn to more “subjective” factors: not the more ephemeral dimensions of 
collective will, attitude, even sentiment, which make up the day-to-day fabric of 
ethnic consciousness, but the more permanent cultural attributes of memory, value,
181 Op. cit., p36.
182 Ozkirimli, pl71. For critiques of ethno-symbolism, see Ozkirimli, ppl83-9. On Armstrong, see 
Smith 1998, ppl67-8,181-7 and 196-7 and Kedourie, op.cit., pl41.
183 Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, henceforth Ethnic.
184 Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1991, henceforth Smith 1991.
185 For publication details, see footnote 19, ppl3 above.
186 Ethnic, p i3.
187 On p2 of Ethnic, Smith writes about Armstrong: “By focusing on these very elements of myth, 
symbol and memory, he has been able to encompass what has undoubtedly seemed the most perplexing 
feature of investigation into ethnic and national phenomena: the curiously simultaneous solidity and 
insubstantiality of ethnic communities and nations”. For further endorsements, see ppl4-15. Smith 
also borrows Armstrong’s terminology, such as the mythomoteur (see ppl5-16) and the longue durde 
{Myths, plO).
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myth and symbolism. For these are often recorded and immortalized in the arts, 
languages, sciences and laws of the community which, though subject to a slower 
development, leave their imprint on the perceptions of subsequent generations and 
shape the structures and atmosphere of the community through the distinctive 
traditions they deposit”.188 Hence a historical comparison of the “durable constitutive 
elements”, the core of ethnic communities (or ethnie, Smith’s preferred term) and 
nations is called for, without falling victim to the perennialist fallacy.189 He therefore 
feels entitled to describe his position as “intermediate”, falling between perennialism 
and modernism, reiterating his central argument that “not only did many nations and 
nationalisms spring up on the basis of pre-existing ethnie and their ethnocentrisms, 
but that in order to forge a “nation” today, it is vital to create and crystallize ethnic 
components, the lack of which is likely to constitute a serious impediment to ‘nation- 
building’”.190 Although there are a number of cases where very little in the way of 
ethnie raw material can be found this does not invalidate the main contention, as they 
remain the exception rather than the rule. Usually “some dim memories and elements 
of culture and alleged ancestry” can be dredged up.191
Light can be shed on the origins and development of nations by asking three 
questions:
“1. Who is the nation? What are the ethnic bases and models of modem nations? 
Why did these particular nations emerge?
2. Why and how does the nation emerge? That is, what are the general causes and 
mechanisms that set in motion the processes of nation-formation from varying ethnic 
ties and memories?
188 Ethnic, pp3-4.
189 Op. cit., pp4 (cited text),13 and 13. Slightly later, Smith justifies his predilection by stating that “the 
French term 'ethnie’, which unites an emphasis upon cultural differences with the sense of an historical 
community. It is this sense of history and the perception of cultural uniqueness and individuality which 
differentiates populations from each other and which endows a given population with a definite 
identity, both in their own eyes and in those of outsiders” (pp21-2).
190 Op. cit, pi 7. Cf. Ozkirimli, pp 174-5.
191 As above.
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3. When and where does the nation arise? What were the specific ideas, groups and 
locations that predisposed the formation of individual nations at particular times and 
places?”192
Smith endeavours to answer these throughout the entire corpus of his writings. In 
reply to the first, he provides definitions of ethnic communities and nations. Ethnies 
are human populations discerned by both members and outsiders as possessing the 
following attributes:
“1. an identifying name or emblem;
2. a myth of common ancestry;
3. shared historical memories and traditions;
4. one or more elements of common culture;
5. a link with an historic territory' or ‘homeland’;
6. a measure of solidarity, at least among the Elites”.
The affinity with the nation becomes clear from his summary of its properties: “a 
named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical 
memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and 
duties for all members”.194 As he himself remarks, however, the two types of
192 Smith 1991, pl9, emphasis in the original. Cf. Ozkirimli, pl75.
193 Myths, pl3 (cf. also ppl05-6). This represents a slightly modified version of the definition 
presented in Smith 1991, p21. In his essay Nations and History, published in Guibemau and 
Hutchinson op. cit., pp9-31, he gives the following shorter version: “a named unit o f population with 
common ancestry myths and shared historical memories, elements o f shared culture, a link with a 
historic territory, and some measure o f solidarity, at least among the ilites" (pi 9, emphasis in the 
original, henceforth Smith 2001). In Ethnic, he charts the “dimensions of ethnie” (p22) in detail: 
collective name, pp22-24; common myth of descent, pp24-5; shared history, pp25-6; distinctive shared 
culture, pp26-8; association with specific territoiy, pp28-9 and a sense of solidarity, pp29-30. Likewise 
on p42 of Ethnic, he presents an ideal-type of pre-modern ethnies.
194 Smith 1991, p i4, emphasis in the original. In his more recent The Nation in History: 
Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism (henceforth Smith 2000), University Press 
of New England, Hanover, 2000, he reworks this: “a named human population occupying a historic 
territory or homeland and sharing common myths and memories; a mass, public culture; a single 
economy; and common rights and duties for all members” (p3, emphasis in the original). Similarly, on 
pl04 of Myths, he sketches an ideal-type of the nation, from which he extracts a definition almost 
identical to that in Smith 2000. He raises a number of valuable points about it (ppl04-5). To kick off 
with it is modernist in the sense that its very concepts are meaningless outside the modem setting, 
although his refusal to give his blessing to the modernist explanation of nations and nationalism stands
page 51
community differ in important respects. Firstly, modem nations appeal to and equate 
the nation with the whole people as citizens, something that only happened very rarely 
before the onset of modernity; secondly, they are political communities, with a 
common code of laws stipulating the rights and duties of citizenship, their 
legitimation grounded in the ideology of nationalism with its ideals of autonomy, 
unity, authenticity and popular sovereignty; thirdly, they constitute a distinct territorial 
community, in which the population inhabits its historic homeland and is united by a 
shared national landscape, with unfettered mobility throughout the area in question 
and, finally, they take their place within an “inter-national" system of nation-states, 
which has during the twentieth century become duly global for the first time in 
history.195
Furthermore, the relationship between ethnic community and nation is rarely 
straightforward: “Seldom will we find a one-to-one correspondence between 
antecedent ethnie and subsequent nation; few modem nations are culturally 
homogenous and most have diverse ethnic origins, especially if we narrow the
undiminished. It treats subjective elements such as myths and memories as objective realities. On the 
one hand, each constituent is die brainchild of nationalists and others, whilst on the other each has an 
empirical referent, for example, a chronicle or epic poem and an institutional embodiment, such as 
courts of law. Another feature is that the definition makes no mention of the state. Although Smith 
accepts Weber’s dictum that a nation is a common bond of sentiment whose adequate expression would 
be a state of its own and which normally tends to give birth to one, the very use of the qualification 
“normally” suggests that the nation is first and foremost a social and cultural community independent of 
the state and that it can exist without a state to call its own. State and nation should be kept 
conceptually distinct. His final comment is that it is silent on ethnic identity in spite of the two being 
intimately related. Indeed, the nation is “a sub-category of, and development out of, the far more 
common phenomenon of the ethnic community, which is itself a development out of the global 
phenomenon of the ethnic category” (pl05).
193 Smith 2001, pp 19-20. He acknowledges his debt to Greenfeld (op. cit. chapter one) for the first of
these. The implied periodization, whereby pre-modern epochs are characterized by “ethnicity” and the
prevalence of ethnies, whilst the modem age is one of nations and nationalism requires certain 
qualifications, which he deals with on pp20-22. Cf. also Smith 1991, p40 and p69, where he places 
greater emphasis on “a unified economy with a single division of labour, and mobility of goods and 
persons throughout the national territory”; “a fairly compact territory, preferably with ’natural’ 
defensible frontiers, in a world of similar compact nations” and “a single ’political culture’ and public, 
mass education and media system, to socialize future generations to be ’citizens’ of the new system” as 
the modem properties of the nation.
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concept of ethnicity down to actual physical descent”.196 Using the broader 
definition, however, it is possible to reach the conclusion that “dominant or ‘core’ 
ethnies furnished much of the cultural basis for the formation of nations in general, 
and provided later nationalists with many cultural elements for forging modem 
nations”.197
Given the high proportion of subjective components in ethnic identity, the ethnie can 
hardly be considered as primordial. As the significance of each waxes and wanes for 
the individual members of a community, so does the cohesion and self-awareness of 
the community as a whole. Coalescence and division represent the governing 
principles of ethnic formation. In the course of the first, separate units come together 
with, for example, city-states being amalgamated or of absorption of one group by 
another, as in the assimilation of regions or tribes. The second is where ethnies are 
subdivided through fission, as with sectarian schism, or proliferation, when a part of 
an ethnic community leaves it to establish a new group.198 The frequency of such 
processes attests to the shifting nature of ethnic boundaries and the malleability, 
within certain limits, of their members’ cultural identity, although neither of these 
should be exaggerated to the point where it becomes impossible to account for the 
recurrence of ethnic ties and their durability through changes in particular instances. 
It also “reveals the ‘concentric’ nature of ethnic, and more generally collective 
cultural, affiliations. That is to say, individuals may feel loyalty not only to their 
families, villages, castes, cities, regions and religious communities, as well as to class 
and gender identifications; they may also feel allegiances to different ethnic 
communities at different levels of identification simultaneously”.199 At any specific 
moment, one or other of these might take priority for political, economic or other 
reasons, but this in itself merely shores up the ‘instrumentalist’ arguments against 
primordialism.
Smith favours reconstituting the notion of collective cultural identity in historical, 
subjective and symbolic terms: “Collective cultural identity refers not to a uniformity 
of elements over generations but to a sense of continuity on the part of successive
196 Smith 2001, p23.
197 As above.
198 Smith 1991, pp23-4. Smith borrows the term “proliferation” from Donald Horowitz’s Ethnic 
Groups in Conflict, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985, pp64-74.
199 Smith 1991, p24.
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generations of a given cultural unit of population, to shared memories of earlier
events and periods in the history of that unit and to notions entertained by each
generation about the collective destiny of that unit and its culture”.200 Traumatic
events such as war and conquest, exile and enslavement, the influx of immigrants or
religious conversion may scramble the basic patterning, but destruction of identity is
not their inevitable consequence. Quite the opposite: where combined with a rich
inner history, such adverse external disruptions to the peaceful life of the community
may help to crystallize and perpetuate ethnic identities. State-making, military
mobilization and organized religion are particularly valuable in nurturing ethnic 
201awareness.
The characteristic mechanisms of ethnic self-renewal are religious reform (Smith 
contrasts the Jewish and Greek experiences), cultural borrowing (whereby selective 
absorption of foreign input and controlled cultural contact provide sustenance to the 
community), popular participation (with movements agitating for greater participation 
in the cultural or political hierarchy) and myths of ethnic election (belonging to a
A/M
chosen people). Together with location, autonomy, polyglot and trading skills and 
the organized religion already alluded to, these contribute to ensuring the continued 
existence of ethnic communities, the gradual build-up of ethnic cores, or “fairly 
cohesive and self-consciously distinctive ethnies which form the kernel and basis of 
states and kingdoms such as the barbarian regna of the early medieval era”.203 As 
indicated earlier, the significance of these is that “a state’s ethnic core often shapes 
the character and boundaries of the nation; for it is very often on the basis of such a 
core that states coalesce to form nations”.204 He continues: “For, since ethnies are by 
definition associated with a given territory, not infrequently a chosen people with a 
particular sacred land, the presumed boundaries of the nation are largely determined 
by the myths and memories of the dominant ethnie, which include the foundation
200 Op. cit., p25.
201 Op. cit., pp25-6. Cf. also, p28.
202 Smith 1991, pp35-7. See also Chosen Peoples: Why Ethnic Groups Survive in Myths, ppl25-147. 
On pl25, Smith talks about four patterns of ethnic survival: imperial-dynastic, communal-demotic, 
emigrant-colonist and diaspora-restoration (each considered in greater detail on ppl36-8). More 
generally on ethnic survival and dissolution, see Ethnic, pp92-125.
203 Smith 1991, pp38-9.
204 Op. cit., p39.
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charter, the myth of the golden age and the associated territorial claims, or ethnic title- 
deeds”.205 However, not all nations have immediate antecedent ethnie, which renders 
the relationship between the two “problematic and uncertain” 206 At this juncture, 
Smith salvages his central hypothesis that the origin of the nation is to be sought in 
pre-modem ethnic ties by citing three reasons not to abandon it. Firstly, there is no 
doubt that the earliest nations did evolve out of ethnic cores and because they were 
powerful and culturally influential they provided models for subsequent cases of 
nation-building around the world. Secondly, part of the appeal of these ethnic models 
was that they were “sociologically fertile”, sitting easily on the “demotic” kind of 
community that had made it as far as modem times.207 Lastly, even where ethnic ties 
were shadowy or altogether absent the need to cobble together a coherent mythology 
and symbolism of a community and history from whatever cultural raw materials 
were available became paramount as a condition of national survival and unity.
To answer his second question, on the matter of why and how ethnies transmute into 
nations, Smith begins by drawing a distinction between two kinds of ethnic 
community, the “lateral” and the “vertical”.209 The former “was usually composed of 
aristocrats and higher clergy, though it might from time to time include bureaucrats, 
high military officials and the richer merchants. It is termed lateral because it was at 
once socially confined to the upper strata while being geographically spread out to 
form often close links with the upper echelons of neighbouring lateral ethnies”.210 
Consequently, its borders were ragged and it lacked social depth. The latter was 
comparatively more compact, its ethnic culture diffused to other social strata and 
classes. Instead of social divisions being underpinned by cultural differences, the 
historical culture helped to unite classes around a common heritage and traditions. As
205 As above.
206 Smith 1991, p41. Cf. also Ozkirimli, ppl77-8.
207 Smith 1991, p41.
208 Smith 1991, p42. See also Section 5.2 below.
209 Smith 1991, p52. See also Ethnic, pp76-7 for general comments; pp79-83 on the lateral ethnie in 
detail and pp83-87 on vertical ethnie, where he examines city-state amphictyonies, frontier, tribal 
confederations and diasporas and sects as sub-types. On the processes by which ethnie evolve into 
nations, see Ethnic, ppl53-173.
210 Op. cit., p53.
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a result the ethnic bond was often more intense and exclusive and barriers to 
admission higher.211
The trajectory of lateral ethnies towards nationhood took them along the course of 
“bureaucratic incorporation” with the creation of strong states, which adopted and 
spread an £lite culture to outlying regions and lower strata over centuries, such as 
occurred in France, England, Castile-Spain and Sweden.212 In the first two cases, the 
relatively early development of their nations coincided with successive revolutions in 
the spheres of administration, the economy (capitalism) and culture (the decline of 
ecclesiastical authority, the rise of secular studies and radical improvements in 
communications). Smith denies that the state created the nation, that its activities of 
taxation, conscription and administration generated a sense of corporate identity and 
civic loyalty. If deep state penetration of society were the criterion of nationhood, 
nations in the West came into being several centuries later than conventional wisdom 
holds. Their temporal priority over other examples of nation-forming would comprise 
no more than a few decades, as the lower classes were not politically incorporated 
until the very end of the nineteenth century and women not until the 1920s. The 
influence of England and France in the wider world was exerted well beforehand, 
however, so that the mass mobilizing state cannot take the credit for producing the 
nation, at least in the perceptions of others. The state's share of the responsibility was 
in conjunction with the other processes mentioned. In short, although ultimately 
the modem nation was “the outcome of a vigorous programme of political 
socialization through the public, mass education system” it was long preceded by the 
more gradual dissemination of an aristocratic ethnic culture, which eventually grew 
into a more truly national one.214
The alternative route was that of “vernacular mobilization” followed by the “vertical” 
or demotic ethnies. Here an indigenous intelligentsia, opposed to imperial mle seeks 
to spur “the people” into political action through the rediscovery of ethno-history and 
the politicization of vernacular culture, which has been preserved by the church and
211 As above.
2,2 Smith 1991, p55; Smith 2001, p25 and Myths, pi 8.
213 Smith 1991, pp59-61. See also Ethnic, p77.
214 Smith 1991, p61.
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local communities.215 In responding to Western ideologies and discourses its main 
task is to provide new communal self-definitions and goals, purifying the community 
from the accretions of centuries and thereby emancipating it. Passive subordination is 
replaced by active political assertion; various movements strive to place the 
community in its homeland, a secure and recognized compact territory and to achieve 
economic unity within it; to celebrate the masses by re-educating them in national 
values, memories and myths and to turn ethnic members into legal “citizens” by 
conferring civil, social and political rights on them.216 The success of these 
undertakings in the face of hostility from both the imperial power and the guardians 
of tradition whose leadership was jeopardized by the new definitions hinged on a 
return to the living past, no mere quarry for antiquarian research, but derived from the 
sentiments of the people. A twofold strategy of furnishing “maps” of the community, 
its history and destiny and “moralities” for the regenerated collectivity to inspire the 
present generations to emulate the public virtues deemed to express the national 
character was pursued. The intellectuals constructed the maps and moralities in two 
ways. The first was through a return to “nature” and its “poetic spaces”, transforming 
the homeland from stage set for the national drama to protagonist in it, whilst the 
second was through the cult of golden ages.217
215 Smith 1991, pp61-68; Myths, pl8 and Smith 2001, p25. In Smith 1991, the emphasis is more on 
vertical ethnies as subject communities cemented together through organized religion, sacred 
scriptures, liturgy, rituals and clergy. Among communities such as the Byzantine Greeks, early 
Orthodox Russians, Monophysite Copts and Ethiopians, Gregorian Armenians, Catholic Irish and 
Poles, Sikhs, Jews and Druse, religion connotes a whole way of life. As he explored the concept of 
ethno-history more thoroughly, Smith has shifted his focus to Central and Eastern Europe, downplaying 
the religious side (cf. ppl26-131 of Smith 1991', Smith 1998, pl94, Myths, pl8 and ppl71-181 and 
Smith 2001, p25). I have therefore followed his lead and concentrated on the latter in my summary.
Cf. Ozkirimli, pp179-180, which includes both. Again in his more recent work, Smith also speaks of a 
third path, the immigrant-colonist, in which the founding immigrant part-ethnie is supplemented by 
waves of pioneering colonizers who together create a plural or polyethnic immigrant nation 
(AfyrAs.pl 8). Since this does not apply to Europe I do not concern myself with i t  For a more elaborate 
statement of the argument see Smith 1998, pl94; his Global, pp85-l IS and Ozkirimli, pi 80.
216 Smith 1991, pp64-5.
217 Smith 1991, pp65-6. See also Ethnic, ppl83-190 on landscapes; ppl91-200 on golden ages and 
pp202 and 207 on maps and moralities.
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Smith’s final question, concerning when and where nations arose, brings the issue of 
nationalism to the fore.218 He is in no doubt as to the modernity of the phenomenon, 
bowing to the virtual consensus amongst historians that it is a product of the
219eighteenth century. As a term, nationalism has been used in several ways. It can 
signify:
“1. the whole process of forming and maintaining nations or nation-states
2. a consciousness of belonging to the nation, together with sentiments and aspirations 
for its security and prosperity
3. a language and symbolism of the ‘nation’ and its role
4. an ideology, including a cultural doctrine of nations and the national will and 
prescriptions for the realization of national aspirations and the national will
5. a social and political movement to achieve the goals of the nation and realize its 
national will”.220
His own definition of nationalism is “an ideological movement for attaining and
maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf o f a population deemed by some
001o f its members to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation”'.
The central propositions or “core doctrine” of the ideology are as follows:
“1. The world is divided into nations, each with its own individuality, history and 
destiny.
2,8 Smith 1991, p99 and Ozkirimli, pl80.
219 Myths, p46. On ppl 14 of Myths, he writes: “The emergence of nationalism marks a critical divide 
in the history of ethnicity and nationality. For only after 1800 has it been possible for every self-aware 
ethnie and political community to claim the title of nation and strive to become as like the nationalists’ 
pure type of the nation as possible. Before the eighteenth century, no such doctrine or movement was 
available to confirm nations in their status, or guide would-be nations to their goal”. See also Smith 
1991, p44; Smith 2001, p22 and Ethnic, pi 8.
220 Smith 1991, p72. Cf. Myths, plOl, where he pares this down to four usages (the whole process of 
growth of nations and national states; sentiments of attachment to and pride in the nation; an ideology 
and language (discourse) extolling the nation and a movement with national aspirations and goals) and 
warns against confusing “national sentiment” with the ideology/language and movement of 
“nationalism”: “One can have nationalist movements and ideologies in a given unit of population, 
without any real diffusion of national sentiment in that population”.
221 Smith 1991, p73, cf. also p51, emphasis in the original. See also Myths, ppl8 and 189 (where 
instead of “population” he talks of “social group”) and Smith 2000, p3. On identity in the nationalist 
triad, see Smith 1991, pp74-6; on unity, pp76-7.
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2. The nation is the source of all political and social power, and loyalty to the nation 
overrides all other allegiances.
3. Human beings must identify with a nation if they want to be free and realize 
themselves.
4. Nations must be free and secure if peace and justice are to prevail in the world”.222 
From this it becomes clear that in Smith’s view nationalism is an ideology of the 
nation, not the state. The notion that every nation must have its own state is a 
common, but not necessary deduction from the doctrine. Nor has every nationalist 
movement made acquisition of a state its primary goal. In brief, as Smith reiterates: 
nationalism is “a political ideology with a cultural doctrine at its centre”.223 It 
provides the “legitimating principle of politics and statemaking today”.224
The charge of attributing no real significance to identity, which I have levelled against 
the modernists, does not apply to the ethno-symbolists. Rather than considering it a 
mere epiphenomenon, the latter place identity at the very heart of their argument. 
A.D. Smith in particular has fully acknowledged the uses to which history is put in 
constructing an identity, a subject to which we shall return later. Therefore, whilst I 
recognise the merit of the modernists’ insights as regards the recent date of 
nationalism as an ideology, I agree with the ethno-symbolists that nations slowly 
evolved from earlier collectivities, preserving and building upon elements of their 
myths and memories.
222 Smith 1991, p74. Cf. Myths, pl02, where he under point one stresses “character and destiny”, 
rewords point three (“everyone must belong to a nation, if everyone is to be truly free”) and adds a 
fourth (“to realize themselves, nations must be autonomous”) and pp 188-9. On specific contents, see 
also Smith 1991, pp46-7, p49 and p70.
223 Smith 1991, p74. Cf. also p84 for the “deeper meaning” of nationalism.
224 Ethnic, pl29. For critiques of Smith, see Guibemau, op.cit., pp50-l and Breuilly 1996, ppl50-l.
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1.4 Social Psychological Approaches
Michael Billig
Michael Billig’s Banal Nationalism225 constitutes, in Ozkirimli’s words: “the first 
study that provides a systematic analysis of the reproduction of nationalism”.226 The 
author begins by contesting the customary usage of the term “nationalism” in both 
popular and academic writing, where it is associated with those who struggle to create 
new states or with extreme right-wing politics: “It always seems to locate nationalism 
on the peripheiy. Separatists are often to be found in the outer regions of states; the 
extremists lurk on the margins of political life in established democracies, usually 
shunned by the sensible politicians of the centre. The guerrilla figures, seeking to 
establish their new homelands, operate in conditions where existing structures of state 
have collapsed, typically at a distance from the established centres of the West”.227 
This banishes nationalism to the outer reaches, investing it with an exoticism, which 
allows those in long-standing nations to view it as the property of others. Such 
complacency is misleading because it overlooks the nationalism of the West's nation- 
states, which is not simply an intermittent mood, but the endemic condition.
In times of peace, where no crisis prompts leaders to unfurl the national flag and issue 
a call to arms, countries such as France, the United Kingdom and the United States 
rely upon a complex of beliefs, assumptions, habits, representations and practices to 
reproduce themselves as nations and their citizenries as nationals within a global 
context of nations. Far from being accomplished through tub-thumping or 
ostentatious displays of patriotic muscle, this reproduction is so subtle as to melt into 
the background, hence Billig's term “banal nationalism”. Daily, the nation is 
“flagged” in the course of the everyday business of living in the established nations
225 Bibliographical details are given in footnote 127, p35. For an alternative summary, see Ozkirimli, 
pp199-203.
226 Ozkirimli, p i99. Although Billig himself adopts a modernist stance (pp9-10 and ppl9-29),
Ozkirimli subsumes his work under the heading of „new approaches” (Ozkirimli, pp 190-8). Combining 
elements from Gellner, Giddens and Benedict Anderson (plO), Billig identifies nationalism as the 
ideology that creates and maintains nation-states: „There can be no nationalism without nation-states; 
and, thus, nationalism, as a way of depicting community, is a historically specific form of 
consciousness” (pi 9).
™ Billig, p5.
228 Op. cit., pp6-7.
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(those which have confidence in their own continuity): “nationhood provides a 
continual background for their political discourses, for cultural products, and even for 
the structuring of newspapers. In so many little ways, the citizenry are reminded of 
their national place in a world of nations. However, this reminding is so familiar, so 
continual, that it is not consciously registered as reminding. The metonymic image of 
banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; 
it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building”.229
Building on Hobsbawm’s contention that no serious historian of nations and 
nationalism can be a committed political nationalist,230 Billig suggests that more 
distancing has to be done by a social scientist wishing to study nationalism as an 
ideology. Metaphorical brackets have to be employed to permit him to question the 
obviousness of existing social arrangements. The very concepts, which seem so 
solidly real, do not themselves stand outside the topic to be analysed. Common sense 
about nationhood, the psychology of national attachments and the like should be 
located within the history of nationalism as this reveals them to be products of a 
particular age.231
By ignoring its banal manifestations, many social scientists have projected 
nationalism onto others and naturalized “our” nationalism out of existence. This 
occurs in two types of theorizing, which frequently accompany each other. Billig 
refers to the first as “projecting theories”. They “tend to define nationalism in a 
restricted way, as an extreme/surplus phenomenon. Nationalism is equated with the 
outlook of nationalist movements and, when there are no such movements, 
nationalism is not seen to be an issue”.232 This is often flanked by a claim that 
nationalism is impelled by irrational emotions. Insistence on the part of theorists that 
they are furnishing a rational account of the phenomenon serves as a declaration of 
immunity. They inhabit a world of nations, however, carrying passports and paying 
taxes. Their theories take this world for granted as the “natural” environment in 
which the dramas of nationalism periodically erupt, bringing us neatly back to what
229 Billig, p8.
230 Hobsbawm, p i2.
231 Billig, ppl4-16. Cf. also Szporluk, pl66.
232 Op. cit., pl6.
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they leave out and how this allows them to deny that nationalism as a condition 
affects “us”.
The second type comprises “naturalizing theories”, whereby contemporary loyalties to 
nation-states are presented as instances of something, which is psychologically 
general, an integral feature of the human condition. Banal nationalism not only 
ceases to be nationalism, but also drops off the horizon as a problem for 
investigation.233 Moreover, “our” nationalism is cordoned off from the dangerous 
variety by means of the rhetorical device, which casts it as “patriotism”, a beneficial 
force. Some social scientists separate the two by maintaining that they represent 
different states of mind, whilst others base the psychological distinction on the 
direction (love of country as opposed to hatred of foreigners) of the attitudes rather 
than their intensity.234
In order to avoid lapsing into such errors, Billig proposes putting the focus back on 
“us” by subjecting the “infinite variety of psychological acts” required for the 
reproduction of nation-states to critical scrutiny: “This necessitates reversing the 
theoretical frameworks of many conventional theories of social psychology, which 
presume that psychological variables are universal, rather than historically created”.235 
Both remembering and forgetting are vital to the process of banal reproduction. 
Renan had recognised the importance of the latter.236 In a nutshell, as Billig points 
out: “once a nation is established, it depends for its continued existence upon a 
collective amnesia”.237 What Renan omits is the parallel forgetting of the present.
233 Op. cit., pi 7. Cf. also pp43-4 for the theoretical neglect of banal nationalism and p44 for “hot” 
nationalism (outbreaks of nationalist passion, which arise in times of social disruption and are reflected 
in extreme social movements).
234 Billig, pp55-6. Walker Connor’s writings are quoted by way of an example. As Billig concludes, 
these assertions are extremely difficult to back up with empirical proof.
235 Billig, p i7. See also pp38-9. On pp51-9, Billig discusses the common sense content of academic 
disciplines and what it hides. He does not believe that he himself is pure as the driven snow, unaffected 
by banal nationalism as a social psychologist (cf. p i2): ‘Traces of nationalism and flag-waving are not 
merely to be found in others. Analysts, too, should confess” (pl25). He practices what he preaches on 
pp125-6.
236 Billig, p37. Cf. also Gellner's lecture Nationalism and the Two Forms o f Cohesion in Complex 
Society, reprinted in Culture, Identity and Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, 
pp6-28. The section on Renan can be found on pp6-8.
237 Billig, p38.
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Reminders of national identity are so numerous and familiar that they operate 
mindlessly rather than mindfully, absorbed into the surroundings.238 Similarly, 
patterns of social life become habitual and in so doing embody the past. Billig calls 
this process “enhabitation”: “thoughts, reactions and symbols become turned into 
routine habits and, thus, they become enhabited. The result is that the past is 
enhabited in the present in a dialectic of forgotten remembrance”.239 The multitude of 
fluttering decorative flags become enhabited and “turn background space into 
homeland space”.240
For Billig, a national identity embraces all these forgotten reminders. Consequently it 
is to be found in the habits of social life, including those of thinking and using 
language 241 A particular manner of conceiving the nation is encouraged, which 
historically brought about a transformation in the ways that people thought about 
themselves and about community. The fluctuating boundaries of the tribe or “sphere 
of trade”, previously the locus of identity were supplanted by fixed boundaries and 
clearly delineated identities. Nationalism was the instrument of change. It is “a 
theory of community, as well as a theory about the world being ‘naturally* divided 
into such communities” 242 Billig perceptively highlights the political implications of 
such thought: “The assertion of belonging to a ‘people’, if made in a political context 
in which ‘peoples’ are assumed to deserve nation-states, is not an assertion of an inner 
psychological identity. A movement of national independence will not only claim 
that ‘we are a nation’, but, in so doing, it will be demanding the political entitlements 
which are presumed to follow from being a nation”.243 In other words: “as the world 
of nations is set in place as the  world, so the theory becomes enhabited in common
238 Billig, in distinguishing between the symbolic and signalling (communicating particular messages 
with practical information content) functions of flags, expressed in the image of waved and unwaved 
flags, rightly stresses that a symbol need not have a direct emotional impact to be effective. For 
example, most national flags do not demand to be saluted: “They are merely there as symbols, whether 
on a forecourt or flashed on to a television screen; as such they are given hardly a second glance from 
day to day” (p40).
129 Billig, p42.
240 Op. cit., p43.
241 Op. cit., p8. Later, he refers to national identity as “a short-hand for a whole series of familiar 
assumptions about nationhood, the world and ‘our’ place in that world” (p93).
242 Op. cit., p63.
243 As above.
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sense”.244 Billig explicitly warns against the temptation to explain the nationalist 
mindset in terms of identity as if the latter were a psychological state divorced from 
contact with forms of life. Instead, nationalism is “a way of being within the world of 
nations” as well as a feeling of identity and an interpretation of the world.245 
Members of a nation have to be in a position to know what a nation is and to identify 
the identity of their own nation and they are surrounded by verbal and other cues, 
which ensure that they never completely forget.246 Nationhood, however, requires a 
homeland as well as of a people. This entails “the imagining of a bounded totality 
beyond the immediate experience of place”.247 In the standard modem nationalist 
idiom, one national territory does not shade into another, but nations stop abruptly at 
demarcated frontiers. The coundy is the home of homes, a unity comprising outlying 
districts and metropolitan areas alike and must be considered special.248 The 
mysticism of this vision slips quietly into the waters of Lethe and so nations appear as 
inevitable entities.249
Inwardness and outwardness are as essential to nationalism as a division between “us” 
and “them”. “Internationalism” is not its polar opposite as if it were a rival 
ideological consciousness.250 Without constant observation of the world of other 
nations, nationalists would not be able to claim that their nations meet the accepted
244 As above, emphasis in the original.
245 Billig, p65. To his mind, the heart of the problem is “that the historical particularities of 
nationalism, and its links with the world of nation-states, tend to be overlooked, if national ‘identity’ is 
considered as functionally equivalent with any other type of ‘identity’. A complex topography of 
heights and depths then becomes flattened into a single plain” (p65).
246 Billig, p68. For example, “stodgy government documents” make use of a grammar of basic 
categories for “their” country and people, which is part of the “universal code of nationality” (p77).
247 Billig, p74. Although he borrows Benedict Anderson’s terminology, Billig remains true to his line 
of argument on banal nationalism by indicating the limitations of Anderson’s model: ‘In  established 
nations, the imagination becomes enhabited, and, thereby, inhibited. In this sense, the term ‘imagined 
community’ may be misleading. The community and its place are not so much imagined, but their 
absence becomes unimaginable” (p77).
248 Op. cit, pp74-5.
249 Op. cit, pp77-8.
230 Op. cit, p61. Billig makes the valuable point that: “Nationalism, like other ideologies, contains its 
contrary themes, or dilemmatic aspects”. He returns to this theme on pp87-8.
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criteria of recognition as such.251 Furthermore, they would not have ready access to 
stereotyped judgements about foreigners.252 Far from being the preserve of narrow­
minded bigots, stereotypes are “shared, cultural descriptions of social groups”, which 
contribute to “our*’ perception of a unique identity.253
Billig then moves on to examine the daily flaggings of nationhood in detail through 
exploring familiar linguistic useages, particularly the small words (rather than the 
grand memorable phrases), starting with political discourse.254 Although they are not 
necessarily figures of great influence, politicians are important because, in the 
electronic age, their faces are shown regularly in newspapers and on television screens 
bestowing celebrity status upon them.255 The nation-state supplies the backdrop for 
political debate and the politicians represent the nation to itself in the dual meaning of 
“standing” or “speaking” for and “depiction”: “At its simplest level, the politician, 
who claims or campaigns to speak for the interests of the nation, will evoke the 
nation”.256 Seen in this light, nationalism is not a particular political strategy, but the 
condition for conventional strategies and is therefore not confined to populist right- 
wing parties, even though the “patriotic card” is commonly played by the latter.257 On 
the contrary, nationalist cliches and platitudes are to be found in unspectacular 
speeches delivered during or after elections, which journalists did not feel the need to 
comment on as specifically patriotic, sarcastically or otherwise.258
231 Op. cit., pp61 and 85-6. This recognition hinges not upon „intemal unity” of ethnicity, language or 
culture, but on the state’s ability to impose order and monopolize violence within established 
boundaries (p85). Here, Billig is following Giddens.
252 Op. cit., p80.
253 Op. cit., pp80 and 81.
254 Billig, pp93-4 and p96.
255 Billig, p96. Their fame comes from participation in national politics (p96). The simultaneous 
celebration of democracy and nationhood in today’s political rhetoric is no coincidence: “In the world 
of nations, democracy is nationally structured; its organization follows national boundaries; nations, or 
their ‘people’, are democratic actors, who are conventionally said to make their own choices, and who 
are to be represented democratically. It is as if democracy today knows no other home, no other 
grounding, except national homelands” (p97).
256 Billig, p98. What occurs is not merely an elision of the two types of representation, but also of the 
general and the particular interest.
257 Billig, pp99-100. See also, pl03.
238 Billig, p i04. He deliberately selects examples from the left-wing British press as confirmation.
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Where remote communication has become the norm, not only does the style of 
address change (with a blurring of the audiences of supporters who have gathered to 
hear the orations of a politician in a hall or conference room and the wider audience 
of random viewers who will potentially overhear his words from the comfort of their 
armchairs), but a “deixis of little words” flows from the mouths of “our” 
representatives to invoke the national “we” and place “us” within “our*’ homeland.259 
The unobtrusive nature of deixis Can be demonstrated by considering the use of the 
definite article, such as in “the nation”, “the people” and “the country”. No 
specification is called for: “the” nation is “this” nation and, by extension “our” 
nation 260 What is “ours” is conflated with the objective world: “The homeland is 
made both present and unnoticeable by being presented as the context. When the 
homeland-making phrases are used with regularity, ‘we’ arc unmindfully reminded 
who ‘we* are and ‘where* we are. ‘We’ are identified without even being 
mentioned”.261
To deflect the possible objection that rhetorical flagging and deixis are restricted to 
the circles of professional politicians, Billig directs his attention to the media with a 
day survey of British national newspapers split into three market groups, the 
“sensational” tabloids, the “respectable” tabloids and the broadsheets.262 The 
“context of awareness”, or underlying pattern of the news items employs a deixis of 
“here” and “now”. The latter is straightforward, understood as the “now” of up-to- 
date news, whilst the former is somewhat more complex. Particularly in their
259 Billig, ppl06 and 107. The term “deixis” is taken from linguistics and “has to do with the ways in 
which sentences are anchored to certain aspects of their contexts of utterance”. It can include 
interjections and metaphors as well as pronouns.
260 Billig, pl07. For further examples, see ppl08-9.
261 Op. cit., pl09, emphasis in the original.
262 Op. cit., pi 10. On ppl 10-1 he lists the sources by name, explaining the niceties of ownership, sales 
volumes and target readership. The reasons behind the selection of the day in question, 28th June,
1993, are set out on pi 11. As Billig makes clean “To demonstrate this systematically, it would be 
necessary to sample the various forms of mass media and mass culture over a lengthy period in a 
number of countries. Of particular interest would be the quotient of flagging on ‘ordinary’ days, which 
are not days of national celebration or intense electoral campaigning” (p i09). For the main contents of 
the newspapers included in the survey, see ppl 11-4.
263 Billig, pi 14. “Context of awareness” is taken from Stuart Hall’s Introduction to A.C.H. Smith’s 
Paper Voices, Chatto and Windus, London, 1975.
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opinion and editorial columns, newspapers, irrespective of the population segment 
they cater for, resemble politicians in speaking to and for the nation as well as 
representing it in both senses of the word. Similarly, weather reporting implies a 
national deixis, which is repeated day in day out. A small map of Britain, not actually 
labelled as such, is printed and the only gales, scattered showers or sunshine worthy 
of note are those affecting “us”, the weather as contained within national 
boundaries.264
In addition, the deixis is built into the organization of many newspapers, especially 
the broadsheets with home and overseas or foreign news sections.265 The cumulative 
effect of these constant flaggings is that “whatever else is forgotten in a world of 
information overload, we do not forget our homelands”.266 If we are being primed for 
the dangers of the future, this does not take the form of a topping up of aggressive 
energy, but of “reading and watching, of understanding and taking for granted”.267
By focusing on the cognitive impact of nationalism, Billig* s superb study brings 
nationalism “home” to “us”, reclaiming it from the dustbin of history. What I 
denote as the “contagious** effects of the nationalist principle of classification in their 
“constricting of the imagination” are set out with the utmost clarity.269 The role of 
representations in the mundane yet vitally important task of weaving and reweaving 
the social fabric is also accurately outlined.270 To Billig I owe both the focus upon
264 Billig, p i 17.
265 Billig, ppl 17-9. On the sports pages, see ppl 19-122. Although perusing them may seem nothing 
more than a harmless male pleasure, they insidiously prime the nation’s sons for the ultimate sacrifice 
of laying down their lives on the battlefield (ppl22-5). Sport occasionally strays into the main body of 
the newspaper where its idols are held up as objects of female adoration (pi 26).
266 Billig, p i27.
267 As above.
268 Cf. Billig, ppl26-7. The modernists have been all too eager to throw nationalism on the scrapheap, 
labelling it a spent force (see, for example, Hobsbawm, ppl69,181 and 188-192).
269 The phrase can be found on pl03.
270 This section would not be complete without at least mentioning one more social psychology-based 
work: Self and Nation, by Stephen Reicher and Nick Hopkins, Sage, London, 2001. Taking Scottish 
national identity as its case study, it analyses how discourse and other representations make “the 
contingent seem necessary” even where the meaning of nationhood is argued over (p51). Their central 
proposition (and conclusion) is identical to my own: “National identity is always a project, the success
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representations and the methodology of discourse-analysis. However, I not only 
examine the development of representations over a considerably longer time span, 
which allows the interaction between representations and political changes to emerge 
more clearly, but I also place them within a wider theory of institutions and identity, 
providing a more adequate explanation of the taken for granted quality of both 
representations and institutions.
1.5 Hans Kohn and “Eastern” versus “Western” Nationalism
Hans Kohn
Hans Kohn and his later imitators are of special relevance as they posit a difference in 
kind between nationalism in the West and its later manifestation in Central and 
Eastern Europe, the region to which both Hungary and Romania belong.
In two works, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History271 and The Idea o f Nationalism, 
A Study in its Origins and Background?72 Kohn traces the history of nationalism back 
to eighteenth century Western Europe, linking its rise to that of democracy and 
industrialism with which it continuously interacted in an accelerating process of 
acculturation, economic exchange and intensification of communication that 
subsequently spread to every comer of the world.273 In his opinion a full insight can 
only be gained by means of a comparative approach, permitting the discernment of 
different types of nationalism.274
of which depends upon being seen as an essence" (p222). It should also be noted in passing that 
Scottish nationalism is customarily regarded as “civic”.
271 D. van Nostrand Company Ltd., Princeton, New Jersey, 1955, henceforth Nationalism. Ozkirimli 
refers to him as the founding father of academic scholarship on nationalism together with Carlton 
Hayes (Ozkirimli, p 13).
272 Bibliographical details provided in footnote 107, p30 above.
273 Idea, Preface, VII.
274 Idea, ix and ppl 19-120: “Nationalism is a product of historical, social and intellectual conditions; 
its rise in the different countries varies, therefore, according to the conditions prevailing then and there. 
In its individual and concrete expressions nationalism carries a different meaning with different peoples 
and at different ages. But an understanding of nationalism can be gained only by comparing similar 
developments among different peoples; only a universal history of nationalism will enable the student 
to see each individual case in its proper perspective and in its conditional nature”.
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Kohn belongs therefore to the modernist school, although he does not pretend that 
nationalism was created out of a vacuum: “Like all historical movements, nationalism 
has its roots deep in the past”.275 Some of its traits are shared with Western 
civilization in general, extending back to the Hebrews and ancient Greeks. Both of 
those peoples “had a clearly defined consciousness of being different from all other 
peoples”; the “bearer of group consciousness was with them not king or priesthood, 
but the people as a whole” and, whereas with the other peoples of antiquity only rulers 
and empires left their traces on history, with the Hebrews and Greeks “it was the 
national character and the spiritual creative energy of the people which endured”.276 
Indeed three far from negligible components of modem nationalism originated with 
the Hebrews, namely “the idea of the chosen people, the emphasis on a common stock 
of memory of the past and of hopes for the future” and “national messianism”,277 
whilst the principle Greek contribution was that of an overriding duty and devotion to 
the political community.278
Kohn defines nationalism as “a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the 
individual is felt to be due to the nation-state”.279 Claiming to inspire all of the 
members of a given collectivity, it “asserts that the nation-state is the only legitimate 
form of political organisation and that the nationality is the source of all cultural 
creative energy and of economic well-being”.280 From the 19th century onwards it has 
become a focus of self-identification, serving “as the justification for the authority of 
the state and the legitimation of its use of force, both against its own citizens and 
against other states”. Thus the growth of nationalism as the process of integration 
of the masses of the people into a common political framework presupposes “the 
existence, in fact or as an ideal, of a centralized form of government over a large and 
distinct territory”, and is inconceivable prior to the emergence of the modem state.
275 Idea, p3. Cf. Smith, Myths, p37.
276 Nationalism, pi 1. For a more detailed examination, see also Idea, pp27-60.
277 Nationalism, pi 1.
278 Nationalism, pi 2.
279 Nationalism, p9. See also Idea, ppl0-12;16 and ppl8-19.
280 Nationalism, plO.
281 Nationalism, pi 1.
282 Idea, p4.
page 69
In short: “Nationalism demands the nation-state; the creation of the nation-state 
strengthens nationalism”, the one reinforcing the other.
The influence of the Renaissance with its new concept of princely power was crucial, 
contributing to the rise of dynastic states, the embryonic form out of which the later
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nation-states would develop. In sweeping away the various feudal and local 
allegiances, the absolute monarchs made the integration of all ties of loyalty in one 
centre possible, although this in itself was insufficient to weld the people together in a 
nation: for that a fundamental change in the relationship between ruler and ruled had 
to occur, as expressed in the notion of popular sovereignty.285
In seventeenth century England and then in the wake of the French Revolution the 
state ceased to be the mere property of the king and was regarded as belonging to the 
people, engendering an unprecedented depth cf feeling towards the homeland 
celebrated in a groundswell of patriotism.286
In both instances ordinary individuals had a new dignity bestowed upon them as the 
subjects, rather than the objects, of history. In both the reinterpretation of the past 
was accompanied by optimism concerning the future and the message conveyed was 
“liberal and universal”.287 It was no accident that these strands intertwined: 
“Nationalism and democracy were in their origin contemporary movements, and in 
many respects sprang from similar conditions; but nationalism had its roots in the 
order of group feelings of “natural” cohesion, while democracy was based on the faith 
in the liberty and equality of each individual”.288
Amongst the other preconditions that had to be fulfilled before nationalism could 
occupy a position of ascendancy, Kohn mentions the crumbling of faith in a universal
283Idea, pl9 For Kohn, a nationality can never be truly content without a state and, whilst it may make 
do with some degree of autonomy or pre-state organisation on a temporary basis, its ultimate goal will 
be independent statehood.
284 Nationalism, pl4. On Machiavelli’s contribution, Idea, ppl27-9.
285 Nationalism, ppl4-15 and Idea, p3.
286 Nationalism, pl5, Idea, p3. Calling the Civil War “the first great surge of nationalism which 
embraced a whole people”, Kohn puts England “a century ahead of the Continent” by virtue of 
depoliticizing and deterritorializing religion, of introducing religious tolerance and the supremacy of 
Parliament over the king and the victory of individualism over authoritarianism. Idea, pi 25 and 
ppl66-8. For the favourable conditions England profited from, see op. cit., ppl56-157.
287 Idea, ppl66-7.
288 Op. cit., ppl91-2.
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ideal embodied in the Roman Empire289 and Christianity290 with monarchical
*5Q1dynasties as the chief beneficiaries, States emancipating themselves from the power
of the Church,292 the rise of the Third Estate, which represented a potent source of 
innovation, both culturally and economically, the impact of the Reformation with its 
promotion of linguistic293 and religious pluralism, the slow advance of 
secularisation.294 On the latter: “The rise of nationalism demanded a new attitude of 
this-worldliness and affirmation of nature, the birth of individualism, and a new 
interpretation of history” compared to that of the Middle Ages295 and the birth of a 
public opinion.296
289 “The Roman Empire had converted the orbis terrarum, the whole earth, into one city, with a 
common history in which all participated, with a common civilisation in which all shared and to which 
all contributed, with a common law in which the influences of Roman, Greek, and Oriental law 
mingled”, Idea, p67.
290 “The universalism of the Empire, which was rooted in Hellenistic civilisation, but devoid of the 
exclusiveness of the Greek state, prepared the soil for the universalism of Christianity, which was 
rooted in Judaism, but devoid of the exclusiveness of Israel”, Idea, p70.
291 Idea, ppl 88-9: “Etatism, not nationalism, emerged from the disintegration of medieval 
universalism”.
292 Op. cit., p i89.
293 Idea, pl43: “it was certainly of importance that Protestant translations of the Bible and Protestant 
sermons created for European peoples a new literature accessible to the common man, a unified literary 
language, and thereby a strong tie which could serve as a foundation for the later growth of nationalism. 
But the Protestant Bibles and prayer books were not motivated by a national spirit; they were intended 
to serve religious ends”.
294 Idea, pp3-4, Nationalism, ppl2-14. Kohn’s depiction of the role played by religion in the medieval 
period is eloquent: ‘The whole intellectual and emotional life of man and the political and social ideal 
of organization were dominated by religious concepts and norms; in a way scarcely imaginable to us, 
they coloured and determined the thought and feeling of every minute of life”, op. cit., p78. Earthly 
life was but a prelude to eternity and the order of things was “firmly anchored in a supranatural 
unquestionable revelation”, op. cit., p82. Secularisation led to a reassessment of man’s position: ‘less 
emphasis was put on his sinful nature, more on his original goodness which makes him strive after a 
peaceful and harmonious order and endows him with the capacity of achieving a lawful order similar to 
that prevailing throughout nature. Man, every man, could understand this order with the help of the 
lumen naturale, the natural light of reason (...) Nature, formerly the seat of danger, became kind to 
man; it was recognised as created by God in his all-kindness for the benefit of man, for his secure and 
peaceful life”, op. cit., ppl97-8.
295 Op. cit., pl04. These were furnished by the Renaissance, op. cit., ppl20-123.
296 Op. cit, p210.
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For Kohn, the strength of nationalism derives from its dissemination amongst the 
masses and its appropriation of fundamental emotions: ‘There is a natural tendency in 
man -  and by “natural tendency” we mean a tendency which, having been produced 
from social circumstances from time practically immemorial, appears to us as natural 
-  to love his birthplace or the place of his childhood sojourn, its surroundings, its 
climate (...)• We are all subject to the immense power of habitude, and even if in a 
later stage of development we are attracted by the unknown and by change, we delight 
to come back and to be at rest in the reassuring sight of the familiar”.297 Patriotism 
was not originally associated with a large territory, restricted instead to the villages, 
cities or valleys where most people spent their entire lives. Only travel and 
instruction, privileges beyond the reach of all but the fortunate few, could foster a 
wider attachment. Kohn, furthermore, denies that nationalism in the sense of 
solidarity or identification with “the life and aspirations of uncounted millions we 
shall never know, with a territory which we shall never visit in its entirety” can be 
deemed the same as love of home and family.
Although some feeling of nationality may occasionally have stirred before modem
2QQ
nationalism it was “largely unconscious and inarticulate”, lacking the deep and 
pervasive quality in informing human thought and action that it later acquired. 
Certain individuals gave voice to it occasionally and groups only ever in times of 
stress or provocation, but in the long term it was negligible as a factor in determining
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aims or actions and could not be understood as a “purposeful will”.
Kohnfs most famous and lasting contribution to the theory of nationalism is his 
proposition concerning a radical split between nationalism as it evolved in the West 
and anywhere else: “In the Western world, in England and in France, in the 
Netherlands and in Switzerland, in the United States and in the British dominions, the 
rise of nationalism was a predominantly political occurrence; it was preceded by the 
formation of the future national state, or, as in the case of the United States, coincided 
with it. Outside the Western world, in Central and Eastern Europe and in Asia, 
nationalism arose not only later, but also generally at a more backward stage of social
297 Idea, p5.
298 Idea, pp8-9.
299 Idea, p6.
300 Idea, pp6 and 17.
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and political development: the frontiers of an existing state and of a rising nationality 
rarely coincided; nationalism, there, grew in protest against and in conflict with the 
existing state pattern -  not primarily to transform it into a people’s state, but to redraw 
the political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic demands”.301 
Precisely what this backwardness had consisted of was something Kohn had touched 
upon earlier in discussing Germany. Luther and other prominent figures had rejected 
modem capitalism, keeping alive the medieval distrust of commerce and the trading 
classes, clinging to the antiquated feudal order and equating economic system with 
moral virtue: the agrarian regime was ethically sound and therefore typically German, 
anything else wicked.302 The weakness of the Third Estate was a symptom of the 
authoritativeness of these ideas.303 Calvinism, which had taken hold in the countries 
Kohn deems enlightened and progressive, had insisted upon “the sanctity of work and 
the rational calculability of the economic process”.304 As a result: “this rising 
nationalism outside the Western world found its first expression in the cultural field. 
It was at the beginning the dream and hope of scholars and poets, unsupported by 
public opinion -  which did not exist, and which the scholars and poets tried to create 
-  a venture in education and propaganda, rather than in policy-shaping and 
government. At the same time all rising nationalism and the whole modem social and 
intellectual development outside Western Europe were influenced by the West, which 
for a long time remained the teacher and the model. Yet this very dependence on the 
West often wounded the pride of the native educated class, as soon as it began to 
develop its own nationalism, and ended in an opposition to the “alien” example and 
its liberal and rational outlook”.305
301 Idea, p329. In his Cosmopolitanism and the National State from 1907 Friedrich Meinecke had 
drawn a similar distinction between cultural and political nations (Kultur- und Staatsnationen): “we can 
still divide nations into cultural nations and political nations, nations that are based primarily on some 
jointly experienced cultural heritage and nations that are primarily based on the unifying force of a 
common political history and constitution. A standard language, a common literature and a common 
religion are the most important and powerful assets that create a cultural nation and hold it together” 
(plO and for further elaboration pp9-22 of the 1970 translation published by Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, New Jersey). See also Smith 1991, p8.
302frfea,pl35.
303 Op, cit., p4.
304 Op. cit., p i99.
305 Op. cit., pp329-330.
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Each new nationalism sought justification and authenticity in the heritage of its past, 
extolling the primitive and ancient depth and peculiarities of its own traditions: 
“Nationalism in the West arose in an effort to build a nation in the political reality and 
the struggles of the present without too much sentimental regard for the past; 
nationalists in Central and Eastern Europe created often, out of the myths of the past 
and the dreams of the future, an ideal fatherland, closely linked with the past, devoid 
of any intimate connection with the present, and expected to become sometime a 
political reality”.306
The new nationalisms, not grounded political and social reality, lacked self-assurance, 
their “inferiority complex was often compensated by over-emphasis and 
overconfidence”. Kohn cites the German example again as evidence: “nationalism 
in Germany did not find its justification in a rational societal conception, it found it in 
the “natural” fact of a community, held together, not by the will of its members nor by 
any obligations of contract, but by traditional ties of kinship and status. German 
nationalism substituted for the legal and rational concept of “citizenship” the 
infinitely vaguer concept of “folk” (...). It lent itself more easily to the embroideries 
of imagination and the excitations of emotion"”.308
The German Romantics misunderstood Rousseau, for whom a nation that expressed 
itself through the general will could not be a product of nature, transferring his 
antithesis between nature and folk traditions on the one hand and aristocratic and 
urban civilisations on the other to the realm of society and nationalism. For them the 
state was “a mechanical and juridical construction, the artificial product of historical 
accidents, while they believed the nation to be the work of nature, and therefore 
something sacred, eternal, organic”.309
At this juncture Kohn restates his theory concerning the impact of the Reformation 
and Renaissance in the West and the remainder of Europe, which, in his eyes, 
amounted to no more than “purely scholarly and theological events”, leaving Russia 
and the Near East untouched.310 A further indicator of the gulf separating the
306 Op. cit., p330.
307 Op. cit., p330.
308 Op. cit., p331.
309 Idea, p249.
310 He quotes the charter drafted at the time of the installation of the Patriarch of Moscow in 1589 
proclaiming the city to be the Third Rome, the Tsar the sole Christian ruler in the midst of a sea of
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European regions was the lingering fascination with the medieval idea of world 
empire that persisted in Central and Eastern Europe, its glowing embers stirred by 
antiquarian research.311
On the whole, Kohn’s portrayal of the East is not exactly flattering: lagging behind in 
almost every conceivable respect it wallowed in the slough of despondency, infused 
with a festering resentment that periodically gave rise to bombastic effusions of the 
unity of blood and spirit. The nationalisms, which thrived there were not “based upon 
liberal middle-class concepts and pointing to a consummation in a democratic world 
society” but battened on “irrational and pre-enlightened concepts” tending towards 
exclusiveness”.312
John Plamenatz
Kohn’s typology has been widely criticized and yet much imitated, as illustrated by 
John Plamenatz.313 In Two Types o f Nationalism,314 Plamenatz goes along with the
ungodliness, Op. ciL, p332. See also pp332-3 and pp350-l on Germany, where Lutherism led to 
political quietism, the Germans satisfied with being subjects rather than laying claim to the rights and 
obligations of the politically more self-aware citizens. The pernicious effect of feudal oppression upon 
the peasantry was to make them sink into “stupidity, vulgarity and physical degeneracy” and to 
encourage resignation and servility, Idea, p350.
3,1 Idea, p331.
312 Op. cit., p457. Compare his glowing praise of England on ppl78-9 and pp458-461 with his 
condemnation of the nobles in Poland and Hungary on pp518-526 and pp527-534 respectively. His 
sympathies are not always consistent with his geographical divisions, however, as his appraisal of 
nationalism in the Czech lands (pp551-560) and Spain (ppl46-155 and pp487-493) reveal.
313 Further examples would include A. D. Smith's „territorial” and „ethnic” in Smith 1991, pp9-14 and 
82-3, Ethnic, ppl34-152, Smith 2000, pp6-26 and Myths, pp30 and 36-7; Liah Greenfeld’s civic and 
ethnic, op. cit., pp9-12 and in her Is Nation Unavoidable? Is Nation Unavoidable Today? in Kriesi, 
H.; Armingeon, K.; Siegrist, H. and Wimmer, A. (eds.): Nation and National Identity. The European 
Experience in Perspective, Verlag Ruegger, Zurich, 1999, pp37-54; Peter Alter’s Risorgimento (pl9), 
its sub-type reform in Asia (p23) and integral (p26, coined by French writer CharlesMaurras, cf. 
OzJdrimli, p40) in Nationalism, Second Edition, Edward Arnold, London and New York, 1994 (first 
edition 1989); Breuilly 1993 on East-West differences in state formation (p373) and on “illiberal” 
nationalism, p396; Gellner, pp97-8 on “classical Habsburg (and points south and east)” in his threefold 
typology of nationalisms (Habsburg, unification and diaspora), cf. Brendan O'Leary's summary in On 
The Nature o f Nationalism: An Appraisal o f Ernest Gellner’s Writings on Nationalism, in Hall and 
Jarvie op. cit., pp81-3; Michael Ignatieffs Benign Nationalism? The Possibilities o f the Civic Ideal 
and Robert Fines Benign Nationalism? The Limits o f the Civic Ideal, in People, Nation and State: The
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verdict of the modernists on nationalism as a child of the eighteenth century, 
describing it as “a phenomenon peculiar to peoples who share a cosmopolitan and 
secular culture in which the belief in progress has taken two markedly different
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forms”. One of these is Western, the other Eastern. The latter flourished amongst 
the Slavs, as well as in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the appellation an 
acknowledgement of its place of origin within Europe. For Plamenatz, nationalism, 
or “the desire to preserve or enhance a people’s national or cultural identity when that 
identity is threatened, or the desire to transform or even create it where it is felt to be 
inadequate or lacking” is primarily cultural, though it can also manifest itself 
politically. What in the eyes of one people sets them apart from all others is to be 
found in ways of thinking, feeling and behaving, which they regard as uniquely their
317own.
Largely as a result of the military and political ascendancy of the French under 
Napoleon, nationalism, even in the West, became intensely political. The French 
were formidable, able to impose themselves on others because they had a powerful 
state, and if other peoples were to keep their independence or to resist excessive 
French influence, they needed to follow suit. Nevertheless, Plamenatz insists that the
Meaning o f Nationalism and Ethnicity, edited by Edward Mortimer with Robert Fine, I.B. Tauris, 
London and New York, 1999, ppl41-8 and 149-161 respectively and Ray Taras in Liberal and 
Illiberal Nationalisms, Palgrave, Macmillan, Houndmills, 2002. Cf. Peter Sugar’s appraisal of Kohn 
(pp9-l 1) in External and Domestic Roots o f Eastern European Nationalism, in Sugar and Lederer, op. 
cit., pp3-54 and his own subdivisions of the “Eastern” type, bourgeois, aristocratic, popular and 
bureaucratic (pp. cit., pp46-54). In essence, Michael Billig’s entire approach rejects the civic-ethnic 
distinction, but a particularly relevant passage is to be found on, pp46-9 of Banal Nationalism, where 
he picks apart Ignatieff s Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism, Chatto and 
Windus, London, 1993.
314 In: Eugene Kamenka (ed.), Nationalism, The Nature and Evolution o f an Idea (henceforth 
Kamenka), St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1976, pp23-36.
315 Kamenka, p23.
316 Kamenka, pp23-4.
317 Kamenka, p24. In Plamenatz’s view, patriotism, or “devotion to the community one belongs to”, 
which has existed for as long as there have been communities and national consciousness, or “a lively 
sense of, and perhaps also pride in, what distinguishes one’s own from other peoples” are distinct from 
nationalism. The latter “arises when people are aware, not only of cultural diversity, but of cultural 
change and share some idea of progress which moves them to compare their own achievements and 
capacities with those of others" (p24).
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wish to enhance cultural distinctness remained the driving force behind nationalism in 
the West.318 By contrast, even before Napoleon had been heard of, the Germans felt 
culturally overshadowed by the French, impelled to assert themselves against them. 
The ideas about man, morals and society associated with France (in reality West 
European) were widely embraced by the educated, as was the concept of progress, 
which came to be defined by reference to England and France. For a variety of 
reasons, these two countries were better placed than other Western nations to 
elaborate upon these ideas and to apply them. Thus they took on the appearance of 
being pre-eminently progressive, setting the pace culturally, economically and 
politically, admired by those who could not match their achievements. Nationalism 
therefore “is a reaction of peoples who feel culturally at a disadvantage”, under 
conditions where several peoples are in close contact yet conscious of their 
separateness, where they share common ideals yet some are further down the road to 
attaining them.319 More than simple envy, it is “confined to peoples who, despite 
their rivalries and the cultural differences between them, already belong to, or are 
being drawn into, a family of nations which all aspire to make progress in roughly the 
same directions”.320
When they first became nationalist, the Germans and Italians were already well off 
culturally according to the standards of the nations they measured themselves against. 
They had languages adapted to the practical and intellectual needs of the civilisation 
they were part of as well as universities and schools passing on the skills prized 
within it and philosophers, scientists, artists and poets of European reputation. To put 
themselves on a par with the English and French they did not have to appropriate 
what was alien to them. Culturally, they had as much to give as to take. The most 
pressing issue for them was to obtain national states. The situation of the Slavs was 
quite different. As Western ideas and practices slowly diffused amongst them, they 
were pulled irresistably into the orbit of a foreign civilisation, forcing them to 
undergo a transformation. To stake a claim as equals they had to tackle the problem 
of lagging behind, further handicapped by the fact that their ancestors had bequeathed
318 Kamenka, p25.
319 Op. ciL, p27.
320 As above. As Plamenatz makes clean “it is broader than the demand (or doctrine) that every 
nationally conscious people should form a state of their own or at least an autonomous province in a 
federal state. It is broader than merely political nationalism” (p27).
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them insufficient resources for the challenge. Nationalism came to the Slavs from the 
Germans, stimulating their interest in folklore. Linguists and grammarians, most of 
whom had studied abroad, were confronted with the twofold task of providing a 
literary language flexible enough to cope with the demands of modem life whilst 
respecting and retaining enough of the original dialects to stay true to themselves. 
The nub of the dilemma was that if they wanted to maintain their separate cultural 
identity, they had to emulate the foreigners with whom they refused to identify 
themselves and in so doing loosen their attachments to the old ways.321 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as the governance of the Habsburg lands 
became more centralized and industry and trade grew, many Slavs had to all intents 
and purposes become German by mastering that tongue in order to make a career, 
advance socially, accumulate wealth and live in the towns. In the nineteenth century, 
a powerful resistance to the processes of Germanization and Magyarization took root 
with the spread of nationalist teachings. Sterility and second-rateness would be the 
penalty of succumbing to the temptation of straying from the native path. The 
attractiveness of the doctrine stemmed from the revolution turning societies in which 
the tightly-knit, tradition-bound and self-supporting village is the most important 
community into urbanized societies with much greater social mobility and more 
complex administrations. In the Habsburg context, this was happening under the 
leadership of peoples having at their disposal languages and cultures relatively well 
fitted to the new forms of activity at the expense of those who did not.322 
New opportunities abound for the individual against the backdrop of social change, 
allowing him to move from the countryside to the city to make his fortune in industry, 
commerce, one of the professions or in the service of the state. The price to be paid to 
succeed in this undertaking is renunciation of the speech and manners of the village in 
favour of those of the new circles he moves in. If this presents him with no great cost, 
he will stump up willingly. If, however, he sees himself at a great disadvantage and 
cherishes hopes of removing that disadvantage by combining with fellow sufferers 
then that is what he will do. Together they will turn their backs on those at the top, 
demanding that the price be renegotiated.
321 Kamenka, pp29-31.
322 Kamenka, p32.
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As the changes gather speed, competition over the opportunities becomes fiercer and 
those less well positioned to grasp success are increasingly anxious to close the gap 
between themselves and their rivals. Acquiring a culture as well tailored to enabling 
its bearer to make the most of the chances available becomes the most pressing 
concern, even though this new culture cannot help but copy models from 
elsewhere.323
This brings us full circle with a fuller account of the Western nationalism of the 
Germans and Italians in the nineteenth century, “the nationalism of peoples who for 
some reason feel themselves at a disadvantage but who are nevertheless culturally 
equipped in ways that favour success and excellence measured by standards which are 
widely accepted and fast spreading, and which first arose among them and peoples 
culturally akin to them'’ and its Eastern equivalent, “the nationalism of peoples 
recently drawn into civilisation hitherto alien to them, and whose ancestral cultures 
are not adapted to success and excellence by these cosmopolitan and increasingly 
dominant standards. This is the nationalism of peoples who feel the need to transform 
themselves, and in so doing to raise themselves; of peoples who come to be called 
‘backward*, and who would not be nationalists of this kind unless they both 
recognised this backwardness and wanted to overcome it”.324 Plamenatz does not 
suggest that it is possible to shake off every trace of native cultures or that peoples 
even attempt to discard them completely. Similarly, no matter how thoroughly the 
imitation is cultivated, the end product is never quite the same as the original. 
Catching up is a profoundly disturbing experience, which is precisely why Eastern 
nationalism is shot through with an ambivalence unknown in the Western variant. 
Unlike Kohn, Plamenatz does not consider Eastern nationalism as innately illiberal.325
323 Kamenka, pp32-3.
324 Kamenka, pp33-4. Plamenatz does not lump together the different peoples falling under die Eastern 
category indiscriminately, but is aware that whereas some “are relatively primitive and mosdy 
illiterate”, others “were highly sophisticated long before they became nationalist and progressive’” 
(p34).
323 Kamenka, p35. He likewise criticises Kedourie for condemning nationalism in general as inherently 
illiberal on p27. See also pp35-6 where he reviews the liberating side of the efforts of rulers who 
embark on a course of creating a nation as well as the new kinds of oppression that follow in their 
wake. Furthermore, on p29 he assesses nationalism in the West in a more nuanced fashion than its 
more embittered foes. Although it was “not entirely liberal” in the nineteenth century, it was so more 
often than not, including amongst the Germans and Italians before they had attained political union. In
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With his more sensitive stance on the predicament of the materially and culturally less 
advanced peoples outside of the “core”326 and his conviction that there is nothing 
inherently reprehensible about nationalism, Plamenatz offers a more sophisticated 
analysis than his predecessor Kohn.327
Rogers Brubaker’s Critique
Rogers Brubaker in The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distinction between 
“ C iv ic ” and “Ethnic” Nationalism328 contends that the dichotomies in the Kohnian 
mode derive from the protean quality of nationalism itself.329 According to the 
proponents of such classificatory schemes there are only two breeds of nationalism, 
the civic, with its cluster of positive associations “liberal, voluntarist, universalist and 
inclusive” and its dark mirror image the ethnic, with its correspondingly negative 
connotations of the “illiberal, ascriptive, particularist and exclusive”. Each rests on 
its own understanding of nationhood, the first taking common citizenship as its 
starting point, the second common ethnicity 330
the twentieth century, it degenerated into the strident illiberalism of Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and the 
extreme Right-Wingers in France, but this has been “the nationalism of peoples defeated in war or 
disappointed in victory. It has been the nationalism of peoples already united politically and humiliated 
or disregarded in spite of this unity”.
326 On the “core” and “periphery” concepts, see Ethnic, p9; Ivdn Berend and GyOrgy Rdnki’s The 
European Periphery and Industrialization 1780-1914, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982 
and The Origins o f Backwardness in Eastern Europe, edited by Daniel Chirot, University of California 
Press, Berkeley, 1989.
327 For alternative reactions to Plamenatz, see Smith 1991, p81 and Gellner, pp99-101.
328 In: Kriesi et al, op. cit., pp55-71, henceforth Manichean. Brubaker is also a modernist, as he makes 
clear in Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1992, p35 (henceforth Citizenship), where he dates the genesis of the nation-state to the 
French Revolution. In his later discussion of its legacy he avails himself of an analogous distinction 
between benign and malignant strains of nationalism: “The nation-state may, indeed must, discriminate 
between citizens and foreigners. It is in this sense inherently nationalistic. Its nationalism need not be 
the aggressive or xenophobic sort of 1792 and after. More often it has a routine, normal, taken-for- 
granted quality. Both sorts of nationalism -  the normal “background” nationalism of the nation-state 
and the noisy, bellicose variety -  descend to us from the French Revolution”. Op. cit., p47.
329 Manichean, p55.
330 Manichean, p56.
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Although Kohn projects these in space, the customary usage of the civic-ethnic 
opposition is in differentiating between states or national movements, often in order 
to put down an ideological marker, separating the wheat of one’s own legitimate, 
civic nationalism from the chaff of the illegitimate, ethnic nationalism of one’s 
neighbours. Separatist movements invoke the benign civic variety to ward off 
accusations of intolerance and lay claim to the “normative prestige” and international 
respectability adhering to i t331
Brubaker then goes on to list the analytical weaknesses of the civic-ethnic dividing 
line, illustrating the deep ambiguities of the terms by exploring how culture can be 
mapped on to them. The relationship between ethnicity and culture is unclear due to 
the vagueness and consequent elasticity of ethnicity itself. Ethnic nationalism can be 
defined narrowly as giving primacy to descent, yet many collectivities whose 
nationhood is not called into question do not summon up the figure of a common 
ancestor, and even where imputed descent does feature in argumentation it often plays 
a minor role. If, however, ethnicity is confined to strict blood kinship, then any 
rhetoric focusing on shared culture has to be counted as civic nationalism. By the 
same token, if “ethnic” is expanded to “ethnocultural” then virtually every 
nationalism can be counted as such.332
As a category “civic” is equally problematic. In a more restrictive interpretation its 
dimensions are acultural, ahistorical, rationalist and universalist with the nation as “a 
voluntary association of culturally unmarked individuals”. Even France and the 
United States, those much-vaunted paradigms of civic nationalism, have a sense of 
peoplehood. A purely acultural understanding of nationalism suffers from certain 
deficiencies even as an ideal type. In Brubaker’s reading, Ernest Renan’s famous 
metaphor of the nation as a “daily plebiscite” was intended merely as a “rhetorical 
flourish” to highlight the importance of subjective self-understanding in constituting 
nationhood, but Renan did not neglect cultural aspects, specifically mentioning the 
possession of a legacy of memories and a long past of endeavours, sacrifice and 
devotion.334
331 Op. cit., pp57-8.
332 Op. cit., pp59-60.
333 Op. cit., p61.
334 Manichean, p61. In his stimulating The Myth o f the Civic Nation, pi 98, Bernard Yack reproduces 
the Renan quote in greater detail, elucidating that “the subject of that plebiscite is what we will do with
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Brubaker turns to Keating’s definition of civic nationalism by way of an exemplar of 
the broader way of approaching the phenomenon. In Keating’s words:
“It is a collective enterprise of its members but is rooted in individual assent rather 
than acsriptive identity. It is based on common values and institutions, and patterns 
of social interaction. The bearers of national identity are institutions, customs, 
historical memories and rational/ secular values. Anyone can join the nation 
irrespective of birth or ethnic origins, though the cost of adaptation varies. There is 
no myth of common ancestry. Civic nationalism is based upon territorially defined 
community, not upon a social boundary among groups within a territory. This is not 
to say that any piece of real estate can form the basis for a nationalism. There need to 
be a structured set of political and social interactions guided by common values and a 
sense of common identity (...). Civic nationalism tends to start from the individual 
and build to the nation rather than deriving individual rights and duties from common 
nationality. The bearer of nationality may be the state itself, in those cases where the 
state preceded the nation and based its founding doctrine on civic principles. In other 
cases, where the nation does not have its own state, national identity may be bome by 
institutions and practices in the civil society and shared values to which all can 
adhere.
Nations in the civic vision are further distinguished from ethnic groups in being 
global societies, containing within them the full range of social institutions and 
mechanisms for social regulation. People within the nation do not need to share 
social customs, habits or ways of thinking; rather nationality is common to them in 
the way a table is to a group of diners”.335
the mix of competing symbols and stories that make up our cultural inheritance”. The article appears 
in: Critical Review, 1996, Vol. 10, No. 2, ppl93-211.
335 Michael Keating, Nations Against the State: The New Politics o f Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia 
and Scotland, St. Martins Press, New York, 1996, ppS-6. In contrasting civic and ethnic nationalisms, 
Keating does not pretend that all is rosy in the civic garden: “Civic nationalism can be violent and (...) 
civic values may be narrow and intolerantly applied. It is in their doctrine, the bases of their appeal and 
the strategy for nation-building that they differ”, op. cit., p7.
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The difficulty here is that Keating wants to have his cake and eat it, lumping together 
choice and a range of the cultural features routinely appropriated by the “ethnic”
336camp.
In order to shed further light on the dilemmas raised, language policy is addressed. 
Promoting one language at provincial or state level can be praised as an indispensable 
step towards equality and the bedrock of republican citizenship, abolishing barriers to 
communication and opening access to public office. Making citizenship conditional 
upon fluency and adopting legislation on teaching, publishing or broadcasting in a 
given language are often held up as classical hallmarks of ethnic nationalism. Thus 
the identical activity of encouraging the use of one language at the expense of others 
can fall into either category, revealing the inadequacy of the civic-ethnic 
distinction.337
Brubaker then goes back to Kohn to examine the normative function performed by the 
contrast, showing how the latter’s neutral observations on the subject of the 
predominantly political nature of Western nationalism were interspersed with value 
judgements lauding liberty and cosmopolitanism followed by lengthy denunciations 
of the illiberal tendencies of the East.338 Kohn’s later imitators have followed in his 
footsteps in this respect as well: “When civic and ethnic nationalism are paired, the 
former is invariably a term of praise, the latter a term of abuse”.339 
Returning to his earlier work Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany ,340 
Brubaker convincingly refutes the proposition that civic nationalism is inclusive 
whilst ethnic is exclusive. As he indicates all forms of nationalism (and I would add 
all identities) are simultaneously inclusive and exclusive: what varies are the criteria 
of inclusion and exclusion.341
The civic version of nationhood is conventionally glossed as inclusive for two 
reasons, firstly because it is based on citizenship and extends to all citizens regardless 
of their extraction, skin colour, cultural affinities and so on. By its very nature,
336 Manichean, p62. Indeed, Brubaker demonstrates their affinity with Smith’s “myths, memories, 
values and symbols”.
337 Manichean, pp62-3.
338 Manichean, p63.
339 Manichean, p64.
340 See footnote 328 above for bibliographical details.
341 Manichean, p64.
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however, citizenship is an instrument of social closure, a concept elaborated by Max 
Weber in Economy and Society?*2 Frontiers with their checkpoints and passport 
controls, immigration services and the like are embodiments of such closure. Even 
naturalisation, which governs admission to the status of citizen, is out of bounds to 
the unqualified, making citizenship the object of closure as well,343 likened by 
Brubaker to an international filing system for allocating persons to states.344 
Sociological analysis of the state has focused on the transition from the medieval 
polity, as a network of persons, to the modem form of territorialized rule, leaving “the 
division of the world’s population into a set of bounded and mutually exclusive 
citizenries” obscure.345 Current administrative practice centres on regulating access 
to political territory thereby presupposing membership since it must have some means 
at its disposal to tell apart those who belong to the state from those who do not. 
Tangible material provisions are at stake given that welfare benefits, access to labour 
markets and a plethora of other opportunities are only open to citizens.346 
Furthermore, virtually all modem states subscribe to the doctrine of popular 
sovereignty, deriving their power from and wielding it on behalf of a nation, with the 
avowed intention of furthering its interests. The routine barring of non-citizens from 
suffrage, military service and posts in public administration has been and continues to 
be sanctioned by reference to these principles.347
Outsiders or ineligibles must be categorised and recognised if closure is to be 
enforced. They may be classed residually, as non-members, or directly, as possessing 
some disqualifying attribute. The scope and time span of the insider-outsider 
grouping may vary, at one extreme ad hoc and ephemeral, tied to a particular, fleeting 
interaction and strictly context-bound, at the other crystallising into a more structured 
segment of the populace, persisting over time and actualised across a range of
342 Manichean, p64. Economy and Society, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1978, pp43-46 and 341-343.
343 Citizenship, pp22-3.
344 Op. cit., p31. In theory nobody is left out because the entire habitable land mass of the globe is 
divided into states.
345 Citizenship, p22.
^ O r, as far as remunerated employment is concerned, those having been awarded a work permit. Op. 
cit., p24.
347 Op. cit., pp28-9.
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interactions relatively independent of context. Being a citizen is “to be defined in a 
general, abstract, enduring and context-independent way as a member of the state”.348 
Rather than being the object of a tacit, internalised body of knowledge, this definition 
is formally codified in law in accordance with agreed standards, monitored and 
regulated by officials within an apparatus devised expressly for the purpose of 
ensuring that the rules instituting and maintaining closure are respected.349 
The second reason for dubbing civic nationalism inclusive is that it accepts as its own 
anyone willing to adopt and live by a given political creed. Kohn and others have 
regarded America as the paragon of virtue from this perspective, although the 
historical accuracy of such a resounding endorsement has come under fire.351 
Brubaker adduces the grotesque spectacle of the McCarthy witch hunts to reveal that 
the creed-based model of membership has its own brand of exclusion before issuing a 
reminder that even in Germany Catholics and Social Democrats were ostracised from 
the moral community of the nation during the Bismarck era, written off as enemies of 
the state because their lack of loyalty towards it was assumed.332 
In drawing to a close, Brubaker briefly deals with three further arguments, which 
challenge the normative content of the civic-ethnic distinction: the relevance of choice 
(in contrast to compulsion) in deciding which nation to be part of even in settings 
where ethnic nationalism predominates; the communitarian critique of liberalism, 
which has enhanced appreciation of the cultural contexts forming the backdrop to 
choice, and multiculturalism, which not only assigns value to ethnic or ethnocultural 
identities, but also sees public recognition of them as supportive of rather than
348 Op. cit., p29.
349 Op. cit., p30.
330 For example Philip Gleason, American Identity and Americanization, in: Harvard Encyclopaedia o f 
American Ethnic Groups, edited by Stephan Themstrom, Ann Orlov and Oscar Handlin, Cambridge 
Massachusetts, Belknap Press, 1980, pp31-58. On p32 he states die case succincdy: „To be or become 
an American, a person did not have to be of any particular national, linguistic, religious, or ethnic 
background. All he had to do was to commit himself to the political ideology-centered on the abstract 
ideals of liberty, equality, and republicanism. Thus the universalist ideological character of American 
nationality meant that it was open to anyone who willed to become an American”.
351 Brubaker mentions Rogers Smith’s Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions o f Citizenship in U.S. History, 
Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1997 as hostile to the unashamedly optimistic view.
352 Manichean, p65.
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inimical to citizenship.353 In its place he recommends a differentiation between state- 
framed and counter-state nationalisms: “In the former, “nation” is conceived as 
congruent with the state, and as institutionally and territorially framed by it. In the 
latter “nation” is imagined as distinct from and often in opposition to, the territorial 
and institutional frame of an existing state or states”354
In Brubaker's estimation the advantage of this alternative is that it does not set up an 
antithesis between state-framed nationhood and ethnicity or culture, permitting a more 
nuanced treatment of language and other phenomena. Similarly, counter-state 
nationalisms need not be specifically ethnic, but could equally be based on territory, 
enjoyment of centuries old privileges or a separate political history prior to absorption 
into a larger state.355
Although the differences pinpointed by Kohn do exist, they do not depend on 
geography so much as the nature of the society in which they finds expression.356 The 
principle of classification is always the same in that it provides a criterion of inclusion 
and exclusion (“us” and “them”, the national and the non-national). What varies is 
how this principle is applied: the specific interpretative slant given to it is contingent 
upon each society and its fund of political and historical experience. Under Herder’s 
influence, the later nationalisms did indeed give greater prominence to “essence”, as 
expressed through language because they did not already possess states of their own. 
In this respect, Kohn confuses “backwardness” with fundamental primitivism. 
Brubaker's discussion of citizenship provides a salutary reminder that exclusion is not 
the preserve of “illiberal” nationalism. Entrenched conflicts over the “title-deeds”
353 Manichean, pp66-7.
354 Op. cit., p67.
355 Op. cit., p68. He adds on the following page that even if, as with Scotland or Catalonia, the nation 
is circumscribed in cultural or ethnic terms it may retain a „civic” bias. Three further articles of 
interest on the civic-ethnic dichotomy and upon which Brubaker draws are: Bernard Yack, op. cit. 
(reprinted in Theorizing Nationalism, edited by Ronald Beiner, State University of New York Press, 
Albany, 1999, ppl03-l 18); Nicholas Xenos’ Civic Nationalism: Oxymoron? likewise in Critical 
Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp213-231 and Raymond Breton’s From Ethnic to Civic Nationalism: English 
Canada and Quebec, in Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1998, Vol. 11, No.l, pp85-102.
3561 would agree with Plamenatz that timing of exposure to the ideals of nationalism was crucial.
3S71 am not trying to suggest that Kohn’s body of work is without value for today’s scholars of 
nationalism. On the contrary, I concur with him on several issues, such as his characterization of
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to territory are likely to poison relations within and between communities thereby 
releasing the negative potential of the classification.358
The question of the origins of nationalism is not explicitly addressed in what follows 
partly due to the fact that the specific historical example selected for investigation is 
located in a context within which nationhood had already become embedded in the 
popular consciousness as the dominant principle of classification with all the 
connotations of normality and venerability thereby implied, partly due to the focus 
upon the function of nationhood and nationalism as the doctrine articulating it as a 
principle of classification as well as upon its operation at a cognitive level. As 
indicated a moment ago, the variety of nationalisms which flourish, far from being 
enigmatic, must be viewed in terms of differences in emphasis in turn attributable to 
the needs, value-systems, culture and perceptions of different societies (the social 
tropes). From Guibemau I take on board the idea that possession of a sovereign state 
is not an indispensable prerequisite for a national consciousness.360 With Gellner I
nationalism as “a psychological and social fact” (Idea, pplO-13). For further assessments of Kohn, see 
Ozkirimli, pp36,41-3, and 61-2; Smith’s Nationalism, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp39-42, Myths, 
pp36-7, Global, pp77-83, Smith 1998, ppl7 and 146 and Smith 1991, pp80-l; Breuilly 1993, ppl2-3; 
Tom Naim in Faces o f Nationalism: Janus Revisited, Verso, London, 1997, pp59-60,63,65 and 109; 
George Schopflin in Nations, Identity, Power, Hurst and Company, London, 2000, pp4-5; Guibemau, 
p48; Rogers Brubaker’s Myths and misconceptions in the study o f nationalism in John A. Hall (ed.), 
op. cit., pp272-306 (particularly pp281-5); John Hutchinson’s The Dynamics o f Cultural Nationalism, 
Allen and Unwin, London, 1987, pp8-47, where he outlines his concept of cultural nationalism and 
pp31-3 specifically on Kohn and his Modem Nationalism, pp48-51 and, in greater depth than any of 
the aforementioned, Aira Kemilainen’s Nationalism, Problems Concerning the Word, the Concept and 
Classification, Kustantajat Publishers, Jyvaskyla, 1964, ppl 11-142, ppl90-207 for a comparison 
between Kohn and Hayes, pp224-230 for concluding remarks and pp235-7 for Snyder’s outline of the 
Kohn dichotomy.
358 As we shall see in the dispute between Hungary and Romania over Transylvania. Another way of 
putting this would be to talk of background „civic” nationalism degenerating into strident „ethnic” 
hatred.
339 Cf. Breuilly, in the Encyclopaedia o f Nationalism, Volume One, Editor-in-Chief Alexander J. 
Motyl, Academic Press, San Diego, 2001, p784: “By 1918 the nation-state was the accepted model for 
political organization in Europe and areas of white settlement beyond Europe. The Wilsonian 
Principles made it clear that those seeking to establish successor states in the territories of the defeated 
powers would have to justify this in national terms”. See also op. cit., pp790-l.
360 Op. cit., pp47-8.
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hold that the concept of the nation as we know it today is indeed a product of modem 
times, although like Smith I do not believe that it was miraculously conjured out of 
thin air with no antecedents or that it has been immanent throughout all human 
dealings. The cognitive aspects, which my theory adds, derive from the proposition 
that nationalism embodies the principle of classification based on nationhood, subtly 
pervades our thinking in a myriad of ways.361 Our lives are shaped and ordered by it, 
colouring our perceptions of reality. Since it is held to conform to a feature of 
external reality, in other words nature itself,362 it drops out of sight into the realm of 
the self-evident where it holds sway unchallenged. The national principle of 
classification accords primary importance to the identity, which it generates and 
which also upholds it, rendering it tangible to the individual, whilst at the same time 
the representations that appear most convincing due to the espousal of the principle of 
classification help to solidify it further. Thus principle of classification, identity and 
representations of identity sustain each other in a mutually reinforcing relationship.363 
One further crucial feature of principles of classification is their effect on what Pierre 
Bourdieu has termed the field of cultural production.364 Although Bourdieu restricts 
his penetrating analysis to art, literature and aesthetics his model of change arising 
from competing position-takings on the part of artists can be extended to the output of 
intellectuals in general. I therefore apply his ideas to the generation of knowledge and 
values whilst contending that the principle of classification acts as a background
361 Cf. Billig. The technique of analysing representations in order to apprehend underlying structures of 
meaning I owe to him.
362 Cf. Douglas, Implicit Meanings and How Institutions Think, Bourdieu in Outline o f a Theory of 
Practice and Kohn in Idea, who writes that rapid population growth, education for all and new 
techniques in information and propaganda have been instrumental in giving “the new feeling of 
nationality a permanent intensity which soon made it appear as the expression of something ‘natural’, 
of something which had always existed and would always exist” (p21).
363 To reiterate: according to this view, distinctive notions of identity preceded the national principle of 
classification, the new classification drew on these whilst creating its own identity, giving rise to new 
representations concerning the significance of the national identity, which in turn modified the older 
ideas of what constitutes identity in general. None of this occurs in a vacuum and the role played by 
institutions in the process will be discussed later.
364 In his brilliant collection of essays of the same title, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1993 (henceforth, 
Field).
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filter365, suggesting what knowledge is "worthwhile" as well as roughly outlining its 
contents. Representations, whether institutionalised as such (for example artefacts 
arranged to convey information in accordance with expert interpretations of their 
meaning in museums,366 paintings put on show for sale in galleries or advertisements 
on hoardings) or claiming scientific neutrality (history being the most pertinent), are 
imbued with its preferences and shore it up. That this way of conceptualising the 
relationship between knowledge and underlying principles does not preclude change 
becomes clear from the internal dynamics of the field with each new position-taking 
displacing its predecessors. At the same time, cognitive dissonance remains a 
constant danger threatening to jolt the principle of classification from the doxa, such 
as in instances where glaring discrepancies between espoused political aims and their 
application in practice can no longer be ignored.367
Far from being static, identity is dynamic and capable of evolving over time, albeit 
slowly, as it incorporates and adapts to new ideas. Given that identity is far from 
immune to the impact of more general developments within society, influenced by 
accepted representations; it is therefore legitimate to talk of a history of identity. 
Indeed our current understanding of identity is not only the result of a long tradition of 
thought from the very dawn of European philosophy,368 but will inevitably also be 
superseded. In keeping with the social constructionist school,369 I propose that the
365 In democracies. The more overt enforcement of the principle of classification under Communism is 
handled separately.
366 For a useful illustration see Henrietta Lidchi's essay The Poetics and Politics o f Exhibiting Other 
Cultures in Stuart Hall (editor), Representation, Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices, 
Sage, London, 1997, ppl51-222.
367 For the definition of doxa, see Bourdieu, Outline o f a Theory o f Practice, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1977, ppl64-171 and Chapter One. On cognitive dissonance, cf. also David 
Kertzer, in Ritual, Politics and Power, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1988 (henceforth Kertzjef), 
pp97-8.
368 Cf. Charles Taylor who in his Sources o f the Self, The Making o f the Modem Identity, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1989, traces the lineage of the idea from Plato through St. Augustine and 
the Enlightenment to our contemporary dilemmas.
369 The original statement of the social constructionist theory is to be found Construction (for 
bibliographical details, see footnote 127, p35 above). Since then, it has been refined and has branched 
out into different fields. SeeVivien Burr, An Introduction to Social Constmction, Routledge, London, 
1995; Kenneth J. Gergen, Social Construction in Context, Sage, London, 1999 and, by the same author, 
An Invitation to Social Construction, Sage, London, 1999.
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tenets of individualism have obscured the social component of identity370 with all the 
attendant problems of discrepancies between self-definition on the part of an 
individual or collectivity (internal definitions) and external definitions emanating 
from surrounding groups or collectivities. Struggles over the right to define a 
collectivity and over which definition is indeed authentic become particularly acute 
where they are bound up with power imbalances in society as a whole and minorities 
are therefore particularly vulnerable to having unwanted definitions (prejudices, 
stereotypes) imposed upon them. That this holds true not only of national minorities 
can be seen from the proliferation of movements organised to reclaim identities, such 
as gay pride.371
In order to comprehend more fully why nationalism possesses the cognitive 
persuasiveness that it does, it is vital to examine identity more closely. I posit that 
various layers of identity may be distinguished between. The bedrock of our selves, 
the core from which our perceptions of who we are derive, I term material identity. It 
is characterised by its solidity, its ineluctability, an impression corroborated by our 
socialisation and comprises fundamental and immediately visible markers such as 
gender and skin colour, which are saturated with social meanings as well as cultural 
identity, equally salient and owned, whereby the literally material components 
(artefacts) and the non-material (habitus, language) are reciprocally potentiating. The 
other identities, categorised as functional, affective and circumstantial, are less 
important at this juncture.372 Under nationalism, the principle of classification 
founded on nationhood is applied in such a way that national identity (the outward 
expression of cultural difference, frequently associated with territorially bounded 
administrative units in the form of states, though this is not a sine qua non) is invested 
with a material quality, in other words that national identity represents a material 
difference between members of the nation and outsiders (cultural difference conflated
370 For an excellent discussion of the problem, see Jenkins, ppl4-28.
371 For analyses of latter day identity-orientated activism see Manuel Castells, The Power o f Identity, 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1997, henceforth Castells. He also speaks of a plurality of identities, differentiating 
between legitimizing identity that sanctioned and fostered by the dominant institutions, resistance 
identity, that of the stigmatised minority constructed in opposition to the foregoing and project identity, 
a redefinition designed not only to improve the social position of its holders, but also to re-weave the 
fabric of society itself. Castells, pp6-10.
372 For a full statement of what they entail see Chapter One below.
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with material "essence”). As regards their function principles of classification are 
always identical in that they draw boundaries between "us" and "them", here 
separating those who belong to the nation and those who do not.373 The permeability 
of these boundaries is not inscribed in the principle of classification itself, however, 
but is strictly context-determined according to the values of each society and the 
relative importance attached to kindred concepts such as nationality, ethnicity and
374race.
Echoing Brubaker, this becomes clear where families or larger, more loosely 
configured groups migrate and are required to undergo a rite of passage, whether this 
consist of a citizenship examination, demonstrating knowledge of the laws of the land 
or proficiency in its language or simply the elapsing of a period of residence during 
which the candidate is assumed to have adapted to the new environment, has not 
transgressed against law and order and has, ideally at least, made a constructive (and 
productive) contribution to the host society before they are officially embraced into 
the ranks of "naturalised" citizens. Formal administrative recognition of the new 
status is thus made contingent upon proof of fitness. That nationality has to be earned 
and is bestowed solely upon the deserving is a belief upheld by state bureaucracies the 
world over.
It may be objected that civic nationalism, such as exists in America to name but one 
example, negates the proposition that materiality, an irreducible difference between 
the collectivity in question and all others, is the message nationalism preaches. After 
all, anyone can become an American as long as they share in the great dream of 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness with the United States exerting a magnetic pull on 
the downtrodden and oppressed and priding itself on giving them shelter and succour. 
Yet even here a new identity is "assumed" (layered over the old) after the 
probationary period: a transformation still takes place (immigrant to fully-fledged 
citizen). The significance of blood origin (kinship metaphors, ethnicity) is 
downplayed, with the qualitative (material) difference residing in the allegiance and 
unswerving devotion to the values enshrined in the constitution. There is no
373 The principle does not, however, prescribe in detail what the doctrine should claim as desirable or 
appropriate, which is the reason why a variety of nationalisms are possible in line with my argument 
concerning contextuality.
374 Indeed, a racist will never accept someone of a darker complexion or foreign accent as truly melding 
with the national community.
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requirement to relinquish the former identity in entirety, but it must be modified to a 
sufficient extent as to merit outside endorsement.375 The constitutional values 
themselves assume the function of boundary marker in place of blood ties.376 What 
we observe therefore is not an absence or denial of material transformation, but a 
difference in emphasis in favour of greater inclusiveness. “Ethnic” nationalism with 
its less yielding boundaries refuses to admit that such mutations are possible and in 
the case study of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania it is precisely this 
exclusionist strain that is the key to the ongoing conflict.377
That nationalism has not lacked rivals in presenting itself as the paragon of 
expediency emerges from the experience of Communism in Romania and Hungary. 
Many commentators have remarked upon the apparent failure by Marx to recognise 
the importance of nationalism in his humanitarian project to overcome the evils of 
exploitation and oppression. I briefly review the works of Ephraim Nimni and 
Roman Szporluk on the relationship between Marxism and nationalism, which 
challenge conventional thinking on the subject and of Walker Connor on Marxist- 
Leninist strategies.379
Whatever the merits or demerits of Marxism as an ideology I by contrast consider the 
Communist experiments in Hungary and Romania from the vantage point of the 
structural homology that exists between them and nationalism in terms of their 
function as principles of classification precipitating new identities and moulding
375 The effectiveness of the incorporation procedure is not relevant, merely the fact that a 
transformation, that is a material change, is both presupposed and demanded. On the American case, 
see Hobsbawm’s Invention, pp279-280.
376 “Spiritual” kinship substitutes for “blood” kinship, the members of the nation united by shared 
beliefs. On a subjective level, geographical distance facilitates the acceptance that a new state of being 
has been entered with the crossing of frontiers and assumption of the new status.
377 Here I have used the term for the sake of convenience. To translate it into my own, in instances 
where the nationalist principle of classification accords primacy to blood or “spiritual” ties, the degree 
of exclusion becomes correspondingly greater. Cf. Sugar and Lederer op. cit., p20.
378 Such as listed for example in Ronaldo Munck, The Difficult Dialogue, Zed Books, London, 1986 
(henceforth Munck), p2. Cf. Ephraim Nimni, Marxism and Nationalism, Pluto Press, London, 1994 
(originally 1991, henceforth Nimni), pp4-6,17,41-2 and 186.
379 For bibliographical details on Szporluk see footnote 65, p23 above and Nimni see footnote 55, p21 
above, and Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984, henceforth Connor, respectively.
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social realities to fit their image of rational organisation with the attendant 
representations pertaining to both. Certain of the more overtly repressive practices of 
Communism such as the need for control of representations through censorship and 
the containment of dissent can be attributed to this feature. The urgency with which 
the establishment of a monopoly on virtue, legitimacy and knowledge was pursued 
was fuelled by the awareness that nationalism had reigned supreme over hearts and 
minds. After all, when the Communists engineered their takeovers they did so against 
a backdrop where nationalism was the dominant principle of classification, the nation 
was seen as the "natural" unit to be governed and states could boast a distinguished 
pedigree on that basis.380 The new rulers did not attempt to abolish the state frontiers, 
nor did they eradicate symbols of national identity altogether, preferring to harness the 
emotional attachment accruing to membership of the collectivity as a source of 
strength it would otherwise have lacked. The balance struck between asserting 
Communism's supremacy and moral superiority (nationalism was demonised as the 
cause of war, strife and genocide, its ordering, cohesion and solidarity-promoting 
aspects assiduously overlooked) and cultivating patriotism to the greater exaltation of 
the national Party was a delicate one. In Romania under Ceau§escu all pretence at 
keeping a tight rein on national sentiment was dropped with disastrous results for the 
Hungarian minority.
II Sources
Access to the cognitive shifts brought about (or intended to be accomplished) by the 
supplanting of one principle of classification by another at social level can best be 
secured by an analysis of representations. In their role of presenting definitions 
(reiterating received wisdom or issuing a direct challenge to orthodoxy) and 
reaffirming and consolidating the dominant principle of classification, representations 
are the veiy stuff of identity, the instrument by which it is reproduced and
380 For the psychological effects of a dominant principle of classification see Chapter One and cf. 
Billig, pp8-10,15-19,29,37,51-5 and 103.
381 The reluctance to renounce the national principle of classification unequivocally could be taken as a 
tacit admission of its legitimacy and relevance.
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renegotiated, lending consistency to lived reality.382 Even where representations run 
direcdy counter to the common sense appreciations prompted by the principle of 
classification they still take that principle as their starting point. Whereas academic 
history stakes its claim to prestige as a branch of serious scientific enquiry on a 
staunch defence of its objectivity it nevertheless remains inextricably entangled with 
the principle of classification, is deeply implicated in upholding the prevailing value- 
system and can therefore be included within the category of representations, which is 
not to repudiate the rigour that hallmarks the work of professional historians with 
consultation of sources or that some facts may be more readily substantiated than 
others.383
Representations therefore may be defined as motivated statements about or depictions 
of a social reality (or specific aspects thereof), which are simultaneously constitutive 
of it, in relation to a presupposed collectivity (audience or target group), seeking to 
influence thought (and often provoke debate), either with a view to maintaining 
existing classifications or to subvert or overthrow them.384
Representations are neither objective nor value-neutral, but involve position-takings 
within the wider sphere of public discourse and are largely the preserve of 
intellectuals and politicians. They always come into being with a distinct agenda, a
382 In spite of being portrayed as material, national identity in common with all forms of collective 
identity must be renewed and refreshed at regular intervals, its content replenished and the heartstrings 
tugged by reminders such as anthems played on public occasions. Cf. Durkheim Elementary 
(bibliographical details in footnote 127, p35 above), pp211-2,217-8,379,382-7,390-1,403-5,429; 
Kertzer (bibliographical details in footnote 367, p88), pp8-14,29-34,37-42,51,54-6,61-9,73-6 and 
99-101; Zdzislaw Mach’s Symbols, Conflict, and Identity, State University of New York Press, Albany, 
1993 and cf. Guibemau, pp73-4 and 80-4. On the importance of addressing the specific content of 
nationalist representations, see Szporluk, pl64.
383 History is not being unfairly singled out for "demotion", as the same "accusations" could be levelled 
against sociology or the natural sciences given that all knowledge is a product of its particular time.
See Chapter One and Chris Lorenz, Konstruktion der Vergangenheit, Bohlau Veriag, Wien, 1997, 
pp22-38,38-47 and 367-414.
384 Cf. Serge Moscovici, Social Representations, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000, particularly The 
Phenomenon o f Social Representations on pp 18-77.
385 The output of advertising industry gurus, artists, film directors and other adepts of non-written 
representations are excluded from the following partly due to space constraints and partly because they 
do not wear their intentions on their sleeves to the same extent as authors declaring themselves openly 
to be addressing the matter of the fate of the nation and/or the minority. The interest and pertinence of
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practical purpose or goal to be attained and in this respect differ from "pure” works of 
art, which directly cash in on their pretence of disinterestedness to accumulate cultural 
capital (historians will no doubt vehemently disavow that they are in the business of 
manufacturing representations). Consequently their validity must be tested according 
to their success in sustaining identities, in reproducing culture (or for that matter 
triggering a paradigm shift).386 Nor can they be dealt with in isolation from the 
intellectual heritage that preceded them, the soil in which they are rooted.387 Musings 
on national character, for example, far from being the quaint and whimsical 
preoccupations of a bygone age form an integral part of an uninterrupted and ongoing 
process of preserving and updating (adapting to the ceaseless flow of circumstances) 
of an established identity.
Representations themselves make up primary sources and their nature as contributions 
to a discourse means that they were tailored for public consumption (as opposed to 
diaries, government circulars and the like). Hence archival material has not been 
consulted.388 In the light of their status as outlined above and in the absence of a 
systematic treatment of them from a theoretical perspective (compounded by their 
unavailability in English-language translation) I feel that reproducing representations
alternatives to written representations is demonstrated by Ktirti who touches upon the dance house 
movement, which juxtaposed its own distinctive vision of the purity of Transylvanian identity with its 
pallid anyaorszdgi workaday counterpart, protesting against the latter by celebrating the rich musical 
heritage of ballads and folk dances from beyond the divide of the frontier. Borderland, pp137-164.
386 This means of accounting for why theories rise to prominence and eventually fall from grace 
originated in Thomas Kuhn's The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1962.
387 Sorin Mitu, whose approach is also based on the critical appraisal of representations, aptly writes on 
the dilemmas faced by both the historian and the social scientist in his National Identity o f Romanians 
in Transylvania (Central European Univeristy Press, Budapest, 2001, henceforth Mitu): ‘Text analysis 
is, obviously, the main technique used in this work. Yet, the risk was run of remaining too poorly 
equipped in face of a discourse thus divorced from the context of social action that generated it, 
alienated from the live presence of the people who contributed to its validation. (...) I believe that the 
historian too, can develop a sensitive relationship with the characters of his inquiry, unravel traces of 
their presence that are still alive, and thus establish a more direct dialogue with their value systems” 
(plO).
388 Although archival sources could usefully complement the work carried out here by showing the 
extent to which the representations and the principle of classification they support had been 
internalised.
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of Hungarian identity at length is acceptable, all the more so since it is preferable to 
make a first-hand acquaintance with the vocabulary and substance389 rather than via a 
summary, however competent.390
A brief sketch of the criteria availed of in selecting sources will highlight further the 
contextuality of representations and knowledge.
As far as the background texts on Hungarian (anyaorszdgi, pre-Trianon) identity are 
concerned, I have not made a random sample of the rich seam available, but instead 
concentrated on those, which proved the most influential at the time, which cemented 
themselves in the Hungarian collective consciousness by becoming an integral part of 
the canon (the revered body of knowledge passed down from one generation to the 
next through teaching in educational establishments and seldom out of print). Here 
we are looking at "official” history, "respectable" narratives of the past, in sum the 
fruits of the labour of the most eminent intellectuals (the closest we can come to 
objectivity) or to call them by another name, members of the historical establishment. 
By virtue of setting out the conventional interpretative framework for the processing 
of raw facts these accounts reveal the assumptions subsumed within subsequent 
representations (as indicated, the histories themselves belong to that category) and 
hence the perimeters of the field.
In the wake of the failures of the Aster392 and Communist revolutions393 the political 
landscape of the interwar years was dominated by the right, two of the Prime
389 Admittedly, no translation can ever provide a perfect rendition. This dilemma is familiar to linguists 
endeavouring to transpose ideas from one context to another where often no one to one correspondence 
between cultural concepts exists.
390 This has the added advantage of paring the interference of an intermediary to the bare minimum, 
reducing the amount of distortion when giving the original writers a voice. Cf. Lorenz, op. cit., pp89- 
188.
391 Although relatively little was known about the origins of the Hungarian people this did not dampen 
the speculative ardour of authors content to draw inspiration from the archaeological remains 
unearthed. Myth and history intertwine in a colourful tapestry of conclusions concerning the lifestyle, 
morals and social mores of the ancestors, Jo6 being a typical example of this tendency to blend fact 
with fiction.
392 With Count Mih&ly K&oly (who favoured severance of Hungary’s connections to Austria and 
Germany, the conclusion of a separate peace, the introduction of social and political reforms and 
concessions to the nationalities) at its head, the Oszirdzsds Forradalom (or Aster/Frostflower 
Revolution) began on 30th October 1918 following the creation five days earlier of a counter- 
government in opposition to Istv&n Tisza, calling itself the Hungarian National Council and comprising
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Ministers, Istvdn Bethlen and P&l Teleki, scions of the Transylvanian landowning 
nobility.394 The Treaty of Trianon, signed on 4th June 1920, which had stripped 
Hungary of two-thirds of its former territory (excluding Croatia, with Romania alone 
receiving 103,093 km2), sixty per cent of its population (including thirty per cent 
ethnic Hungarians, reducing almost 3.2 million to minority status in compact blocs 
contiguous with Hungary), left the country dependent on exports and imports and 
hence vulnerable to Shockwaves in the world economy. On the day of the signing, 
hundreds of thousands protested against it on the streets of Budapest, to no avail.393 
Unsurprisingly, the Treaty dominated the Hungarian political landscape between the 
World Wars and beyond. In the words of historian Lajos Kontler: “The tragedy of the
a coalition supported by three parties, the Social Democrats, the Kdrolyi Party and Oszkir Jdszi’s 
Radical Party. Its first act had been to issue a proclamation containing twelve points, modelled on the 
March 1848 Proclamation of the Hungarian Revolution and written by J4szi. On the 31** Tisza was 
assassinated and Kirolyi sworn in as official Prime Minister. For more detailed accounts, see Peter 
Pastor’s Hungary between Wilson and Lenin: The Hungarian Revolution o f 1918-1919 and the Big 
Three, Columbia University Press, New York, 1976, pp21-47; C.A. Macartney’s Hungary: A Short 
History, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1962, pp203-5; J6rg Hoensch’s A History o f Modem 
Hungary 1867-1994, Second Edition, Longman, London, 1996, pp85-92; Molndr, pp250-3; Kontler, 
pp328-334; A History of Hungary, edited by Peter Sugar, Pdter Handk and Tibor Frank (henceforth 
Sugar 1994), Indiana University Press, Bloomingdale and Indianapolis, 1994, pp295-303; Konrdd 
Salamon, Nemzeti tinpuszttids 1918-20 (henceforth Salomon), Korona kiadd, Budapest, 2001, pp39-78 
and Igndc Romsics, Magyarorszdg tortinete a XX. szdzadban, Osiris Kiadd, Budapest, 2000 
(henceforth Romsics 2000), ppl 10-121.
393 The day after Kirolyi’s resignation as President of the Republic on 20th March 1919, Bdla Kun 
proclaimed a dictatorship of the proletariat See Pastor, op.cit., pp 140-7; Macartney, op.cit., p205; 
Hoensch, op. cit., pp92-8; Molndr, pp254-261; Kontler, pp334-9; Sugar 1994, pp303-9; Salamon, 
pp88-174 and Romsics 2000, ppl21-130.
394 Cf. Kontler, p345. Bethlen's Debrecen speech in 1928, marking the official adoption of revisionism 
as a policy aim of the government (Romsics 2000, p235), and the oration before the Royal Foreign 
Affairs Society (see Chapter Two) stand out as the most famous political representations of their era 
calling for the restoration of Transylvania to the Hungarian homeland.
395 Romsics 2000, pl46; Kontler, pp342-4 and Macartney, op. cit., pp206-7 and pp210-213 on the dire 
economic straits Hungary was plunged into. On the latter, see also Hoensch, op. cit., ppl04 and 124-6 
and Gydrgy Rdnki's essay in Sugar 1994, pp356-67. Statistics concerning Hungary’s losses as a result 
of Trianon can be found in Romsics 2000, ppl43-5; Molndr, p262 and Hoensch, op. cit., pl03. For the 
full text of Law XXXIII of 1921 implementing the provisions of the Treaty, see Trianon, edited by 
Miklds Zeidler, Osiris, Budapest, 2003 (henceforth Trianon), ppl66-296.
page 97
aftermath of the First World War and the Peace Treaty of Trianon consists, far more 
than merely putting the seal on the unavoidable, in the fact that it contributed to the 
survival of socio-political structures which had steered the country towards the war 
and its consequences. Hungarian national consciousness was tailored to the reality of 
a medium-sized state of twenty, in far-flung dreams even thirty million inhabitants in 
which Magyar primacy was based not on the vulgar principles of statistical majority 
and racial identity but on historical and political achievement: it was bewildered by 
being forced within the confines of a small country with a population of eight 
million”.396 The Treaty could, moreover, serve as a scapegoat for all Hungary’s
*Q 7
ensuing woes. Left-wing marginalisation meant that no great heed was paid to 
vision of good neighbourly cooperation within a Danube Federation, leaving 
revisionism as the focus of political and diplomatic effort.398 Hungarian foreign
396 Kontler, p327.
397 Cf. Kontler, p344.
398 On the strength of the conservatives, see Kontler, pp327 and 345-6. The aftershock of Trianon can 
still be felt in contemporary Hungarian nationalism with its ongoing concern for the fate of the 
minorities (cf. Kontler, p344, Molndr, pp343-5 and 348-9, Hoensch, op. cit., pp325-9 and Trianon, 
pp620-30). On revisionism, see Kontler, pp355-8; Molndr, p266; Romsics 2000, pp233-250 and 
Hoensch, op. cit., ppl04-5 and 121. The Danubian Confederation was proposed by Lajos Kossuth, 
leader of the 1848 Revolution. Originally intended only for use in diplomatic negotiations, it was 
published in the journal L ’Alleanza in Milan in May 1862. It would have consisted of Hungary (in a 
personal union with Transylvania), Croatia, the Romanian principalities and Serbia. Besides economic 
union, there would have been joint foreign and military affairs under the authority of a two-chamber 
assembly and a council. Each member state would be sovereign in its domestic affairs, with full 
religious equality and language rights at village and county level (Kontler, p275). On Kossuth’s plans, 
see also Gyorgy Szdraz, Lajos Kossuth’s Role in the Conceptualization o f a Danubian Federation, in 
Romsics 1999, pp61-97. See also Molndr, p263 on the idea of a Danubian Confederation in French 
policy. Oszklr J&szi (1875-1957) took up the idea again in A Monorchia jovoje, A dualizmus bukdsa 
is  a Dunai Egyesiilt Allamok, Uj magyar r6szv6nyt£rsas£g, Budapest, 1918. On Jdszi’s ideas, see 
GyOrgy Litvdn, Oszkdr Jdszi’s Danube Federation Theories, in Romsics 1999, pp227-242, and in the 
same volume, Gyorgy Gyarmati, Conceptual Changes in Central European Integration in Hungarian 
Political Thinking, 1920-1948, pp201-226; Pdter Handk, “Why Did the Danubian Federation Plans 
Fail?”, in Romsics 1999, pp305-313 and Jdszi OszJcdr dunaipatriotizmusa, Magvetfi Konyvkiadd, 
Budapest, 1985 and Rudolf Jod, A nemzeti kirdis is  a dunai foderdcids-konfoderdcids tervek a 19, 
szdzad mdsodik feliben is  a 20. szdzad elejin, in Nemzeti is  nemzetisigi onrendelkezis, onkormdnyzat, 
egyenjogdsdg, Kossuth Kdnyvkiadd, Budapest, 1984, pp38-58. On possible alternatives to the course
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policy was faced with a choice between two irreconcilable courses of action: 
integration in the new order of Europe and border modifications based on earning the 
goodwill of the Great Powers and the neighbouring states or forcible restoration of 
Greater Hungary based on armed cooperation with the other vanquished.399 In opting 
for the latter, Hungary was propelled into the arms of Germany.400 
The representations, which I consider to be of relevance to the state of affairs ensuing 
after Trianon, were produced on both sides of the new frontier, by anyaorszdgi, 
Romanian and Transylvanian intellectuals. Inclusion is no longer restricted to the 
mainstream, but the unifying theme is to be found in the subject matter: the identity of 
the Hungarian minority. Those emanating from within the minority itself were often 
drafted in response to Romanian charges of treachery, disloyalty or nurturing 
irredentism or set out survival strategies. This had obvious ramifications for content: 
the minority members reconciled to staying put had to "sell" themselves as loyal to 
the new state to appear unthreatening and ward off discrimination. Moreover there 
was a broad consensus within the minority that presenting a united front would allow 
them to communicate their demands to the Romanians more effectively. Any hint of 
fragmentation or being riven by strife would create scope for competing factions to be 
played off against one another, sapping the strength of all. Many of the 
representations gloss over disagreements and disharmonies for this very reason. 
Throughout the period covered the Transylvanians preferred to dedicate their energies 
and efforts to ensuring the welfare of a single political party,401 which inhibited the 
plurality of opinion that might otherwise have been expected. Thus the internal 
representations had to conform not only to the logic of Hungarianness, but also had to 
bow to outside exigencies.
Hungary steered between the wars, see Gydrgy Gyarmati, A revfzid altemativdja, in Limes, 28, 1997, 
pp43-79.
399 Kontler, p354. Cf. Sugar 1994, pp327-9.
400 On Hungary and Germany, see Macartney, op. cit., pp225-235, Molndr, pp280-3, Hoensch, op. cit., 
ppl33-147 and Sugar 1994, pp332,335-344 and 346-353.
401 Imre Mikd in Huszonkdt iv, Studium, Budapest, 1941 (henceforth MikS), which remains the best 
source on the period even today, meticulously catalogues the cracks in the united front on pp66-7,72-3, 
86,93-4,155-6,165-7,188-192 and 194-7. On Mik6, see Slndor Bal£zs, Mikd Imre, tle t-is  
pdlyakip, Polis KOnyvkiadd, Kolozsvdr, 2003.
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In stark contrast, the Romanian stances were frequently concerned with downgrading 
the Hungarians to barbarous invaders who upset the peaceful civilisation of the 
indigenous Romanians, descendants of the Dacians and heirs of Rome. The 
Transylvanians were reminded of the reversal of fortune, which had befallen them 
that they remained on sufferance whilst the chief motive was to vindicate the decision 
made at Trianon to place Transylvania under Romanian rule by asserting priority.402 
The Transylvanians were additionally impaired in their ability to engage in 
autonomous intellectual production by the crippling effects of mass unemployment 
amongst former civil servants leading to the impoverishment of the middle classes, 
which subsequently acted as a major brake on the funding of mother-tongue 
publications. At the same time, the expropriation of land crippled the churches in 
their capacity as educational providers since they could barely afford the upkeep of 
the schools that had formed the backbone of teaching in Transylvania. To all intents 
and purposes fluency in Romanian became the inescapable precondition of entry to 
university, agricultural colleges and other seats of tertiary learning.403 These 
developments combined to put normal cultural reproduction at risk, the fear of an 
erosion of identity lurking not far behind. As a result the sheer number of 
representations dropped drastically.
This trend was exacerbated under Communism, partially due to the constraints of the 
ideology itself, which held that history had been moving inexorably towards its 
culmination in the revolution,404 partially because of the propensity inherent in 
principles of classification to project themselves back through time. Only one version 
of history was encouraged by the Party. Indeed Ceau§escu's regime founded its entire 
claim to legitimacy upon this interpretation of history, representing itself as the only 
government ever to grasp fully the aspirations and fight for the true interests of its 
populace having distilled the message of the past. The entire apparatus of overt and
402 See Chapter Three.
403 See Chapter Two for a more detailed elaboration of these points.
404 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, edited by C.J. Arthur, Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1999 (original edition 1970) pp42-52,57-60,65-8,87-9 and 94; Giddens, op. cit., ppl8-34; 
cf. S.H.Rigby, Marxism and History (henceforth Rigby 1998) Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1998 (originally 1987), pp7-15,30-1,71-7,104-7,143-170 and his Historical Causation: 
Is One Thing more Important than Another? in History, 80, 1995, pp227-242 and Szporluk, pp3-4,19- 
20 and 62-4.
page 100
more subtle coercion was subordinated to the cause of controlling representations 
(one of the more ingenious ploys directed towards achieving this aim was the 
rationing of paper).405 In addition to the subordination of print runs to the whims of 
the Party, Ceau§escu's words literally became law, the fount of information prefacing 
changes in policy. Similarly, his speeches dictated the contents of approved 
Hungarian minority representations, by signalling the relevant issues to be dealt with. 
Ambitious Party faithfuls slavishly reiterated his words in thinly disguised form as 
part of a ritual obeisance, whilst the bolder, more critical spirits felt duty-bound to 
react by tactfully countering his more extreme utterances (therefore also centering 
their representations on Ceau§escu's latest offerings).
The difficulties in guaranteeing an adequate foundation for cultural reproduction 
amongst the Transylvanians were compounded by the worst excesses of the 
Conducator's reign, whereby they were isolated from contacts with Hungary, deprived 
of the concomitant linguistic input and even their physical record of their existence, 
their imprint on the environment was to be annihilated (by the wholesale demolition 
of ancient villages and monuments).406
Ill Structure
Chapter One, which presents the theoretical background to the case study, begins with 
a discussion of Durkheim's theory of social fact. If a collectivity accepts and 
implements a set of organising principles and representations they attain the status of 
social fact. In a challenge to conventional rationality, a myth becomes true if a 
society sees fit to regard it as such. When this consensus is reached, the coercive (or 
behaviour-regulating) aspect of the social fact is forgotten. Following Mary 
Douglas407 I contend that this invisibility lies at the heart of the principle of 
classification, concealing its provenance. It is inappropriate to discount a priori 
beliefs that hold collectivities together, such as religion no matter how outlandish they
405 See Chapter Three.
406 Cf. Dinu Giurescu, The Razing o f Romania's Past, The Bath Press, London, 1990; GSbor Vincze, 
Illdzidk 4s csaldddsok. Fejezetek a romdniai magyarsdg mdsodik vildghdboru utdni tortdnetibol, 
Status Konyvkiadd, Csflcszereda, 1999 (henceforth IUdzidk), p i00 and Hoensch, op. cit., pp286-7.
407 In How Institutions Think, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1987 (henceforth Institutions) and 
Implicit Meanings, Routledge, London, 1993 (originally 1975), henceforth Implicit.
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may appear at first glance.408 By the same token, nationalism and the representations 
it stimulates, far from being the ravings of a few misguided intellectuals hoodwinking 
innocent populations or a subspecies of unreason, emerge as social facts. Rather than 
discrediting it further, the emotions stirred by nationalism's symbols (emotion 
traditionally having been depicted as the antithesis of reason in Western thought) 
occupy a central position in its appeal.409
The importance of contextuality in the genesis of shared categories of thought and in 
decisions concerning what knowledge is worthwhile is then emphasised. Once a 
principle of classification has become socially established it imparts meaning and 
order to an otherwise indifferent and chaotic universe,410 thereby providing criteria of 
relevance and irrelevance. This is the point of departure for the exploration of the 
cognitive dimension of nationalism.
A closer examination of the relationship between society and cognition, lays bare the 
degree to which the smooth functioning of society depends on the compression of 
reality into manageable proportions, which the principles of classification achieve. 
Returning to Douglas' insights into the workings of institutions I argue that beyond 
enabling us to interact and approach new situations with confidence by permitting us 
to take so much for granted, the principle of classification itself must disappear from 
view in order to be truly effective. Only if it bears the semblance of being inscribed 
in nature itself can it become convincing. As part of the mental furniture we cease to 
notice how it conditions our attitudes, it sinks into the doxa. History itself, however, 
is strewn with struggles between orthodoxy and heterodoxy and the menace of 
cognitive dissonance is ever-present.411
Having reviewed why we need principles of classification and why in our everyday 
lives we are usually not aware of our reliance upon them or of how they channel our 
thought, I move on to an elaboration of their properties and their resemblance to
408 Cf. Elementary, p430-l.
409 For the "rehabilitation" of the emotional dimension in relation to nationalism see Guibemau, pp43, 
44-5,51,65 and pp75-6 as well as Durkheim, Elementary, pp229-231.
410 For the transformation of chaos into cosmos, see Mircea Eliade, The Myth o f the Eternal Return, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991 (originally 1965), pplO-11.
411 Durkheim's main interest was in cohesion rather than rifts. Cf. Giddens, Capitalism and Modem 
Social Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1971 (references are to the 2000 edition), 
ppix, 65-118 and Guibemau, pp21-31 and 39-42.
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symbols. From this it becomes clear that the strategic manipulation of symbols to 
consolidate and later revitalise the hidden principle of classification is no accident. 
Apart from furnishing us with a chart for navigating the potentially treacherous waters 
that surround us, investing our social relations with an element of predictability and 
enhancing our feeling of security as a result, principles of classification operate as 
boundary markers and it is in this capacity that they engender identities.
Contextuality is once again brought to the fore in weighing the merits of various ways 
of looking at identity. Having critically appraised social constructionism, I then 
advance my own hypothesis of identity, involving a series of headings under which 
the plethora of identities that inhere in individuals can be gathered: material, 
functional, affective and circumstantial. The most stable and permanent of these are 
die material identities.
The body with its growth and ageing processes supplies a natural metaphor for 
identity as a concept. Whereas continuity is unproblematic for the individual, 
collective identity has to be periodically reaffirmed, cultivated by means of ritual.
At this juncture I bring together the arguments concerning principles of classification 
and identity by maintaining that nationhood is the principle of classification expressed 
through nationalism, which both creates national identity and attributes pre-eminence 
to it, ranking it alongside other material identities as primordial and betokening 
absolute difference.412
Although the nationalist ideal is that of a perfect co-extensivity of nation and state, it 
has seldom been achieved, giving rise to the problem of minorities. I consider the 
identity of these "outsiders within" to borrow Smith's evocative phrase413 from the 
point of view of their vulnerability and the threat they imply to the established order 
and the principle of classification.
412 To reiterate, my position on the “constitutional nationalism” of “immigrant societies”, such as the 
USA and Canada is that publicly declared allegiance to a set of values serves as the functional 
equivalent of “ethnicity” elsewhere as a boundary marker, a badge of difference. My concept of 
materiality in relation to national identity refers to actual cultural distinctions raised by virtue of the 
nationalist principle of classification to the status of tokens of absolute difference, often (but not 
always) conflated with ideas of character, blood or race. It therefore applies to both “civic” and 
“ethnic” nationalisms, the distinction between them being one of emphasis or degree of inclusiveness.
413 See Ethnic Nationalism and the Plight o f Minorities in Myths, pi 87.
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The final identity to be scrutinised before proceeding to look at representations is that 
fostered by Communist regimes. By way of illustrating the practical effects of the 
enforcement of the new (Communist) principle of classification I choose the 
Hungarian example, partly because it explains the official aloofness to the fate of the 
Hungarian minorities during the Rdkosi and (although to a lesser extent) K&Mr eras414 
and partly since it shows how Hungarianness could be reinterpreted thereby 
facilitating the task of pinpointing the uniquely Transylvanian accommodation to the 
strictures imposed.
Chapter One closes with an investigation of representations and their authors, the 
intellectuals based on Bourdieu’s field theory. As indicated previously, 
representations are the lifeblood of the principle of classification and its associated 
identity and the object of the case study which follows.
Chapter Two opens with a sketch of the historical circumstances under which a 
reassessment of Hungarian identity became imperative. In order to appreciate the 
shifts in meaning and content at the heart of this exercise, concepts of Hungarian 
(anyaorszdgi) identity prior to the upheavals triggered by the Treaty of Trianon must 
be analysed. These were the raw materials available to those who found themselves 
stranded on the wrong side of the new frontiers.
Having touched upon a number of the most influential source texts, I turn to readings 
drawn from the interwar years, each of which is emblematic of a particular notion of 
Hungarianness: as vocation, as character traits and as essence. These are then 
contrasted with the representations of Transylvanianness circulating amongst the 
Hungarian minority in Romania and the strategies adopted to prevent the complete 
erosion of its identity and cultural distinctiveness. Clearly, the first step towards 
playing an active part in the political life of the new homeland was to come to terms 
with the momentous change in national status that had befallen the minority. 
Discriminatory legislation passed by successive Romanian governments betrayed the 
underlying attitude towards the Hungarians: in keeping with the national principle of 
classification they comprised an alien element within the body of the nation. 
Enforced assimilation was deemed the most efficient route towards eradicating this 
identity, camouflaged in the case of the Land Law as equitable redistribution of
4,4 Cf. Walter Kemp, Nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Palgrave, 
Houndmills, 1999 (henceforth Kemp), pp 180-1.
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resources amongst the poorest sections of the community and in education as 
common sense.
In spite of the devastating impact of the laws in terms of financial wherewithal, 
linguistic competence and the recruitment of replacement intellectuals (though the 
latter was a problem that only became acute in the longer term) Transylvanianism 
flourished as a literary school, its representations permeated by a distinct philosophy 
of identity. The work of some of its principle exponents is contemplated alongside 
that of writers of rival persuasions.
Chapter Three continues with the chronological survey of representations after the 
war from the reunification of Northern and Southern Transylvania under Communist 
leadership onwards, examining the manoeuvrings of the Groza and Gheorghiu-Dej 
administrations within the wider sphere of international relations. In agreement with 
Gdbor Vincze4151 do not construe Ceau§escu's blatantly oppressive policy towards the 
Hungarian minority as a radical break with a more liberal and tolerant line. Instead 
the occasional policy relaxations on the part of his predecessors either played to the 
gallery in appeasing the international community (for example the political role 
conceded to the MNSZ or Hungarian Popular Alliance) or were the precursors 
temporarily lulling the minority into a false sense of security to more disadvantageous 
arrangements (such as the Hungarian Autonomous Region superseded by a redrawing 
of the administrative boundaries that divided the Szdkely population, rendering it 
more susceptible to Romanianisation).
As the sheer number of repressive measures multiplied under Ceau§escu's iron grip, 
the writing of history became a boom industry where the struggle over definitions of 
the nation was fought. Representations of the origins of the Romanian people, far 
from being innocuous renditions of a distant past, legitimated the course steered by 
the dictator in the present. Dissenting voices were able to poison relations between 
Romania and its neighbour, as the scandal that erupted following the publication of a 
three-volume History of Transylvania in Budapest makes apparent.
The conclusion summarises the findings of the case study, subjecting them to a 
critical appraisal, which takes account of their implications for the theories of 
nationhood as a principle of classification and of identity.
415 In IUuzidk, p85-7,101-2,208-212.
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Chapter One: Towards a Working Hypothesis of Identity.
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to lay the theoretical foundations of the subsequent case 
study. Before proceeding to a brief outline of its structure, two key terms, nation and 
nation-state need to be defined.
At its most basic level, a nation is a human collectivity organized in accordance with 
a principle of inclusion and exclusion (classification), which involves giving it an 
identity. Of all the analysts of the nation, A. D. Smith captures its qualities best: “a 
named human population occupying a historic territory or homeland and sharing 
common myths and memories; a mass, public culture; a single economy; and common 
rights and duties for all members”.416 To this I find it appropriate to add two 
elements from Montserrat Guibemau* s definition, namely that the nation has “a 
common project for the future” and that it claims “the right to rule itself’.417
In the Encyclopaedia o f Nationalism,418 A. D. Smith, under the entry “State and 
Nation” links the goal of autonomy espoused under nationalism with the desire to 
attain a sovereign state for each nation, a “nation-state”, which he defines as “a 
political community that is congruent and coextensive with a historic culture- 
community” (that is, a nation). He continues: “Not only are the boundaries of state 
and nation coextensive; within its borders there is a single nation, and its public 
culture and laws, as well as its myths and memories, encompass and pervade the 
whole population within its boundaries”. Whereas this definition may serve as an 
ideal-type, it poses certain problems: “In practice, few contemporary polities can be 
characterized as ’nation-states* in the strict sense of the term. Most must be regarded 
as ’national states’, states that aspire to become unified nations and are legitimated by 
the principles of nationalism. The reason is that such political communities are not
416 The Nation in History, University Press of New England, Hanover, 2000, p3. Emphasis in original.
417 Guibemau, p47.
418 Edited by Athena S. Leoussi, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick and London, 2001. All of the 
quotations from Smith may be found on p286. Emphasis in original.
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culturally unified, let alone homogenous; they usually include one or more ethnic 
minorities, and derive their origins from several ethnic and cultural sources’*. 
Montserrat Guibemau echoes these concerns: “The nation-state is a modem 
phenomenon, characterized by the formation of a kind of state which has the 
monopoly of what it claims to be the legitimate use of force within a demarcated 
territory and seeks to unite the people subjected to its rule by means of 
homogenization, creating a common culture, symbols, values, reviving traditions and 
myths of origin, and sometimes inventing them. The main differences between a 
nation and a nation-state, when the nation and the state do not coincide, as they hardly 
ever do, are that, while the members of a nation are conscious of forming a 
community, the nation-state seeks to create a nation and develop a sense of 
community stemming from it. While the nation has a common culture, values and 
symbols, the nation-state has as an objective the creation of a common culture, 
symbols and values. The members of a nation can look back to their common past; if 
the members of a nation-state do likewise, they may be confronted with a blank 
picture -  because the nation-state simply did not exist in the past -  or with a 
fragmented and diversified one, because they previously belonged to different ethno- 
nations. While the people who form a nation have a sense of fatherland and feel 
attached to a territory, the nation-state may be the result of a treaty, or the will of 
politicians who decide where to draw the line between states”.419 
In the world of nations, the nation-state in its ideal form has become the 
internationally acknowledged unit of popular sovereignty (democratic rule). As the 
accepted standard, it enjoys a degree of respectability and prestige. However, this has 
the effect of screening out the existence of national minorities, such as the Hungarians 
in Romania and nations without a state, such as the Scots or Catalonians.
Dominant national communities have the dual advantage of being in possession of a 
fully-fledged administrative apparatus governing the entirety of a territory (including 
the minority or stateless nation enclaves) and of outside recognition of the borders and 
official bodies of its state. They can thus appeal to stability and rationality in resisting 
separatist agendas, confining concessions to greater autonomy largely to the cultural
419 Guibemau, pp47-8. See also the discussion on “legitimate” and “illegitimate” states, pp59-62.
420 See Guibemau, ppl00-l 14.
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realm (limited tax-raising powers may also be granted to a regional assembly, but 
foreign policy and defence usually remain the preserve of the centre).421 
I will concentrate on the nation-state as an institution both founded upon and 
employing a principle of classification (nationhood) as its source of legitimation. 
Institutions subtly yet pervasively influence our ways of thinking and making sense of 
the world, convincing us of their expediency, whilst overwhelming us with their 
normality. It is this very banality (Billig), which renders their workings invisible. 
Having examined these properties of institutions, I move on to discuss the nature of 
classifications before turning more specifically to the issue of nationhood.
The cognitive and emotional power of national identity cannot be fully understood 
outside a discussion of identity in general, which takes up the bulk of the chapter.
The volume of academic work on identity exceeds that on nations and nationalism 
many times over, straddling the disciplines of sociology, psychology, philosophy, 
histoiy, anthropology and political science. This in itself should suffice to indicate 
that there is a multitude of possible approaches to the subject beyond the one adopted 
here (although the particular merit of the latter is precisely that it does not take 
national identity to be either an outdated collective delusion, an irrational aberration 
or a mere side-issue of minor importance, whose specific contents are an irrelevance. 
Such views obscure the fact that national identity is the cohesive principle, which 
continues to hold collectivities together in the world of nations, as Billig has so 
cogently demonstrated and they fail to take the role of representations into account). 
Providing a comprehensive overview of the literature on identity in even one of the 
fields of research mentioned is not my intention here. Instead I shall confine myself 
to listing a few of the publications, which I have found particularly useful as 
background material as well as some other important contributions, which cover 
pertinent aspects not given prominence due to my specific focus.
Philip Gleason in Identifying Identity: A Semantic History 422 and Andrew Weigert in 
Identity: Its Emergence Within Sociological Psychology,423 both chart the origin and 
development of the concept in the United States, outlining the most influential 
schools of thought (including the writings of Erik H. Erikson, Mead and Goffinan)
421 Cf. Guibemau, ppl08-l 11.
422 In The Journal o f American History, 69 (4), 1983, pp910-931.
423 In Symbolic Interaction, 6 (2), 1983, pp183-206.
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and as such constitute valuable sources of bibliographical information on the subject.
A J ARichard Jenkins in Social Identity complements these with a more comprehensive 
treatment from a European perspective.
The historic specificity and cultural relativity of concepts of personal identity are 
revealed in Aaron Gurevich’s The Origins o f European Individualism?2S Charles 
Taylor’s Sources o f the Self?26 Roy F. Baumeister’s Identity?21 Leslie Stevenson and 
David L. Haberman’s Ten Theories o f Human Nature and in Anthropology o f the 
S e lf29 by Brian Morris.
Heiner Keupp et aV s, Identitatskonstruktionen?30 is illuminating in respect of the 
differences between modem (p30 and 40-5) and postmodern views on identity (pp46- 
59), as is the companion volume Identitatsarbeit Heute431 edited by Keupp and Hofer. 
Lutz Niethammer's Kollektive Identitat432 traces the phenomenon to its intellectual 
roots as well as offering a blistering critique.
On the issue of territoriality and identity, one of the areas to which I pay relatively less 
attention Anthony P. Cohen, The Symbolic Construction o f Community?33 Hastings 
Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson, Borders434 and Ethnic Groups and Boundaries435 
edited by Fredrik Barth are indispensable.
Similarly, on geography and identity I recommend the collection of essays in 
Geography and National Identity?36 edited by David Hooson and Gertjan Dijkink’s 
National Identity and Geopolitical Visions?31
424 For bibliographical information, see footnote 154 above.
425 Blackwell, Oxford, 1995.
426 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.
427 Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986.
428 Third Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998.
429 Pluto Press, London and Boulder Colorado, 1994.
430 Heiner Keupp, Thomas Ahbe, Wolfgang Gmtir, Renate Hofer, Beate Mitzscherlich, Wolfgang 
Kraus and Florian Strauss, Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2002 (originally 
1999), henceforth Keupp.
431 Heiner Keupp and Renate H5fer, Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1997 
(henceforth Identitatsarbeit).
432 Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2000 (henceforth Niethammer).
433 Routledge, London, 2000 (original 1985).
434 Berg, Oxford, 1999.
435 Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1994 (original edition 1969).
436 Blackwell, Oxford, 1994.
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Following the discussion of national identity, minority and Communist identity are 
also considered as a preliminary to the case study (of Hungarians in Romania over an 
extended period, which includes a Communist takeover).
The closing section introduces the idea of representations and their producers, the 
intellectuals. It is through the critical analysis of representations that we can gain 
crucial insights into how identities are constructed and maintained and their 
relationship with the principle of classification.
Section One: Remembering and Forgetting.
1.1 Definition of Social Fact.
In The Rules o f Sociological Method, Durkheim defines social facts as follows: "A 
social fact is any way o f acting, whether fixed or not, capable o f exerting over the 
individual an external constraint;
or:
which is general over the whole o f a given society whilst having an existence o f its 
own, independent o f its individual manifestations. "438
That the individual does not necessarily recognise the constraint as external, that one 
of its persuasive virtues lies in the facility with which it may be internalised whilst 
continuing to manifest itself externally in individual actions is also taken into account 
Durkheim writes: "If this constraint in time ceases to be felt it is because it gradually 
gives rise to habits, to inner tendencies which render it superfluous; but they supplant 
the constraint only because they are derived from it"439
437 Routledge, London, 1996.
438 Edited with an introduction by Steven Lukes, Macmillan, Houndmills, 1982, p59. On Durkheim’s 
Rules, see also Giddens, op. cit., pp86-94.
439 Op. cit., p54.
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and: "Hence we are the victims of an illusion which leads us to believe we have 
ourselves produced what has been imposed upon us externally."440
In this way, the promptings and demands of society become a "natural" part of our 
cognitive processes, influencing our behaviour without our perceiving their original 
source outside ourselves.441 Our conscience, our sense of right and wrong share this 
origin. Nor are our dispositions or expectations immune to this influence. Thus 
society extends to embrace the whole of reality, defining the limits of the possible and 
the impossible.
Values, morals and even prejudices, provided that they And expression in collective 
action, therefore belong tc the realm of social fact as much as the written laws that 
constitute and regulate the life of society. In short, whatever may be observed to have 
a social effect is a social fact.
Conventional notions of reality as that which may be empirically established to be 
true take on a different complexion. Reality comprises that which is real in its social 
effects. Such effects cannot simply be ignored or dismissed as distortions, 
superstitions or delusions, nor can it be denied that they correspond to genuine needs. 
Durkheim states these points eloquently: "The whole social world seems populated 
with forces that in reality exist only in our minds. We know what the flag is for the 
soldier, but in itself it is only a bit of cloth. (...) collective representations often 
impute to the things to which they refer properties that do not exist in them in any 
form or to any degree whatsoever. From the most commonplace object, they can 
make a sacred and very powerful being.
However, even though purely ideal, the powers thereby conferred on that object 
behave as if they were real. They determine man's conduct with the same necessity as 
physical forces. (...) The soldier who dies defending his flag certainly does not 
believe he has sacrificed himself to a piece of cloth. Such things happen because
440 Op. cit., p53.
441 See also p226 of Elementary (for bibliographical details, see footnote 443 on p!03 above).
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social thought, with its imperative authority, has a power that individual thought 
cannot possibly have."442
What has sometimes been referred to as collective fiction is therefore social fact, 
whether this be a faith, an ideology or a nation, as Durkheim’s example shows. One 
of the distinctive properties of such collective beliefs is their extreme contagiousness. 
Once conceived, they irresistibly spread to subordinate every aspect of existence to 
their premises, always retaining internal consistency. They become reality by being 
congruent with reality in the minds of their adherents. The sole requirement for this 
to occur is that they be beliefs held in common. It is from this that they derive their 
authority. Their plausibility emanates from their link with the structure of the society 
that they serve, reflecting it in a transfigured form.443 This is why they do not seem 
arbitrary. Once asserted, they are open to challenge from competing views.
Nations, not the primordial collectivities that nationalists believe them to be, are in a 
sense “imagined communities”, but they are also social facts.444 The question as to 
whether or not they are simply invented traditions in Hobsbawmian mode is in many 
respects misplaced:445 it neither detracts from the cognitive warping potential of 
nation-states as institutions (or, for that matter, the “material” quality of national 
identity) nor does it undermine the nation’s undeniable presence in everyday life. 
What does matter is not that the nation is imagined, but how it is imagined and in
442 Op. cit., pp228-9.
443 Elementary, passim.
444 Cf. the discussion of Benedict Anderson above.
445 Kertzer states his allegiance to the “invented tradition” school most forcefully: “the nation itself has 
no palpable existence outside the symbolism through which it is envisioned” (p6). He continues: 
“People subscribe to the ‘master fiction’ that the world is divided into a fixed number of mutually 
exclusive nations; they see these units as part of the nature of things, and assume an antiquity that the 
nations in fact lack This symbolic conception of the universe leads people to believe that everyone 
‘has’ a nationality, in the same sense that everyone has a gender” (p6). Cf. Kemp, ppl6: “political 
culture is like a nationally shared apperception -  a cumulative integration of the nation’s previous 
knowledge and experience into its collective understanding of present reality. Granted, some aspects of 
this identity may be invented or based on mythology, but they must still strike a chord with the nation’s 
sense of itself. I therefore profoundly disagree with David Kertzer’s assertion (...), for this would 
suggest that there is no deeper collective consciousness behind the symbols”.
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what way this imagining shapes our wider perceptions. These are the issues I intend 
to address.
The same point can be made in relation to a nation’s willingness to avail itself of 
myths in creating a glorious past or identity. The ease with which such elements can 
be incorporated into national lore should not tempt us to write off collective identities 
altogether. Regardless of the implausibility of certain of its building blocks, the 
nation is real in that it is a community of shared culture, memory, history and 
experience.
1.2 Contextuality.
The meeting of minds which gives rise to shared categories of thought is the genesis 
of society. No object in the physical world carries meaning within itself.446 It is 
society that projects meaning outwards, reflecting its principles of organisation, 
ordering the universe and assigning mankind his proper place within it.447 Reality 
itself is therefore a social construct.448
Making sense of the world, the act of agreeing on a system of classification, also 
involves a drawing of boundaries around a community, creating a distinction between 
insiders and outsiders, excluding those who do not adhere to the moral precepts of the 
group.449 The practical experience of cosmos building450 provides the raw materials
446 Cf. Jenkins, p4.
447 Cf. Elementary, p230: "Religious force is none other than the feeling that the collectivity inspires in 
its members, but projected outside the minds that experience them and objectified. To become 
objectified, it fixes on a thing that thereby becomes sacred; any object can play this role."
448 Cf. Construction, p p l3 ,123,134 and 146.
449 As Stuart Hall phrases it: “identities are constructed through, not outside, difference. This entails 
the radically disturbing recognition that it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what 
it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside that the “positive” 
meaning of any term -  and thus its ‘identity’ -  can be constructed. Throughout their careers, identities 
can function as points of identification and attachment only because of their capacity to leave out, to 
render ‘outside’, abjected. Every identity has at its ‘margin’, an excess, something more” (Who Needs 
Identity? In: Questions o f Cultural Identity, edited by Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay, Sage, London, 
1996, pp4-5. Emphasis in original).
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from which ideas are formed. Ideas cannot be conceived outside a social context and 
their substance as well as their wider significance reflect this context. This remains 
true even where alternatives to the prevailing social organisation are proposed. In 
most instances, the alternative defines itself in opposition to dominant values. In 
rejecting them, it negatively integrates some of their elements. In other words, even 
the most inspired and fanciful notions of improvement cannot escape the influence of 
what is. Society defines success and failure, teaches us what we should expect in life, 
what is desirable for us to strive after. Changes in outlook are preceded by changes in 
practice that enable us to abandon "outmoded” ideas, replacing them with concepts 
that better suit our needs.
Once the historicaliy-specific social order has taken firm root, the qualities attributed 
to nature are felt to inhere in it and the meanings contained in man's environment are 
harnessed to the purposes of perpetuating it in a strategy of legitimation, "proving" 
that it is the best for the collectivity involved. Thus the social origin of these 
meanings is forgotten and they assume the appearance of independence, existing 
separately, apart from social intervention.451
The effect of consensus is to encourage cohesion within a given society, but this is not 
the only principle at work, for alongside consensus is conflict, a centrifugal force that 
constantly threatens to sever ties of solidarity, contesting conventions of thought and 
behaviour. The tension arising from the co-existence of these two principles explains 
the dynamic nature of society. Without conflict, there could be no change. Without 
consensus, there could be no stability, a modicum of which is indispensable for 
regulating interactions. Far from being the result of obedience of inexorable laws 
inscribed in the universe itself, the epitome of reason, consensus is the product of 
continuous negotiation, though not necessarily on a conscious level. Maintenance and 
reproduction of a social order require the consent of the individuals that make up 
society, whether they are aware of this or not.
4501 have borrowed this concept from Mircea Eliade, see footnote 410, plOl above. Cf. also 
Construction, ppl21-2.
451 Douglas, Implicit, pp210-229 and 276-318 and Institutions, pp45-53 and 63-5. See below for a 
more detailed discussion.
page 114
1.3 Society and Cognition.
"Mankind is an inventive species; and where an invention is obvious and absolutely 
necessary, it may as properly be said to be natural as any thing that proceeds 
immediately from original principles, without the intervention of thought or 
reflection."
(David Hume: A Treatise o f Human Nature, Book Three, Section One, p536).452
Society exerts a profound influence on cognition by providing us with the categories 
in and with which we think. Our schemes of perception allow us to arrange and 
classify our experiences by submitting them to its constraints, organising them in a 
hierarchy of relevance, of what is worth remembering and what may safely be 
forgotten. We fail to notice what does not jar, what fits in neatly with what we have 
become accustomed to expect453 Routine dulls inquisitiveness. What is taken for 
granted may be ignored. The "normal", that which we expect to happen, does not 
make demands on our attention precisely because it fits in with undisputed patterns. 
This has the advantage of allowing us to make shortcuts so that we do not require to 
evaluate each new situation as it arises, but can make assumptions about the likely 
course of events.454 The validity of these assumptions is confirmed in our dealings 
with others from a similar background with similar expectations. Thus we are put in 
a position to absorb and assimilate vast amounts of information, which can be used in 
refining strategies for living.455
In two works, Implicit Meanings and How Institutions Think, Mary Douglas examines 
the mechanisms by which thought-styles become convincing and which permit them 
to subordinate the flow of knowledge to social control. Reliance on institutions
452 Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1969 (original 1739-40).
453 Cf. p243, Implicit.
454 Cf. Construction, p71.
455 Cf. p48, Institutions', Bourdieu’s Outline o f a Theory o f Practice, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1997 (original 1977, henceforth Outline), pl69 and Construction, pp74-5.
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confers certain benefits such as facilitating communication and saving energy.456 
Before this can be achieved, however, an essential precondition must be fulfilled:
"(•••) the incipient institution needs some stabilising principle to stop its premature 
demise. That stabilizing principle is the naturalisation of social classifications. There 
needs to be an analogy by which the formal structure of a crucial set of social 
relations is found in the physical world, or in the supernatural world, or in eternity, 
anywhere, so long as it is not seen as a socially contrived arrangement. When the 
analogy is applied back and forth from one set of social relations to another and from 
these back to nature, its recurring formal structure becomes easily recognised and 
endowed with self-validating truth."457
The analogies endow the institutions with venerability, which consolidates the hold 
they enjoy on individual minds: "Any institution that is going to keep its shape needs 
to gain legitimacy by distinctive grounding in nature and reason: then it affords to its 
members a set of analogies with which to explore the world and with which to justify 
the naturalness and reasonableness of the instituted rules, and it can keep its 
identifiable continuing form.
Any institution then starts to control the memory of its members; it causes them to 
forget experiences incompatible with its righteous image, and it brings to their minds 
events, which sustain the view of nature that is complementary to itself. It provides 
categories of their thought, sets the terms for self-knowledge, and fixes identities. All 
of this is not enough. It must secure the social edifice by sacralizing the principles of 
justice."458
One of the salient features of an institution, then, is that it moulds the past, individual 
as well as collective, in its own image.459 The effect of this is to enhance its authority 
and prestige by ensuring that rival interpretations drop out of sight, claiming a 
monopoly on truth. Compatibility with the cherished assumptions of the institution is 
of vital importance when it comes to encouraging receptiveness to new concepts:
456 Institutions, pp. 55 and 63.
457 Op. cit., p 48.
458 Op. cit., pi 12.
459 See also Institutions, p92 and cf. Construction, pp 120-1.
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"Only one term sums up all the qualities that enable a speculation to become 
established and then to escape oblivion; that is the principle of coherence. (...)
The principle of coherence is not satisfied by purely cognitive and technological fit. It 
must also be founded on accepted analogies with nature. This means that it must be 
compatible with the prevailing political values which are themselves naturalized. (...).
Inevitably, if it seems that an analogy does match nature, it is because the analogy is 
already in use for grounding dominant political assumptions. It is not nature that 
makes the match, but society."460
The primary advantage of deploying analogies from nature is that nature itself 
possesses a quality of self-evidence, which removes these analogies from the sphere 
of argument and debate, of compromise and negotiation.461 To straggle against nature 
is an exercise in futility, because its commands are inexorable. We must accept what 
is, resigning ourselves to it with dignity. Thus our social institutions are infused with 
a sense of inevitability.462 From these considerations it emerges that control of the 
public memory463 and of the constituting analogies through representations is of the 
utmost significance in reproducing a given social order.
A second effect of the use of nature as the source of legitimation is that it makes the 
workings of the institutions invisible so that we cease to be immediately aware of our 
reliance on them.464 Once again, this means that they are put beyond reach of 
questions and, should serious doubts arise, their identification with innate principles 
of justice as mentioned above makes us think twice about overturning them.
The concealment brought about by self-evidence and its relationship to the 
perpetuation of power structures is made even more explicit by Pierre Bourdieu in his 
exploration of the interdependence of practice and cognitive and social structures.
The affinities with Douglas' arguments are at their most apparent in his definition of
460 Op. cit., p90.
461 For this point see Implicit.
462 Cf. Construction on reification, pp 106-9.
463 Douglas uses this phrase in Institutions, p80. Historians are the custodians of public memory.
464 Cf. Institutions, p98.
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doxa: "Every established order tends to produce (...) the naturalisation of its own 
arbitrariness. Of all the mechanisms tending to produce this effect, the most 
important and the best concealed is undoubtedly the dialectic of the objective chances 
and the agents' aspirations, out of which arises the sense o f limits, commonly called 
the sense of reality, i.e. the correspondence between the objective classes and the 
internalised classes, social structures and mental structures, which is the basis of the 
most ineradicable adherence to the established order. Systems of classification which 
reproduce, in their own specific logic, the objective classes, i.e. the divisions by sex, 
age, or position in the relations of production, make their specific contribution to the 
reproduction of the power relations of which they are the product, by securing the 
misrecognition, and hence the recognition, of the arbitrariness on which they are 
based: in the extreme case, that is to say, when there is a quasi-perfect correspondence 
between the objective order and the subjective principles of organisation (...) the 
natural and the social world appears as self-evident. This experience we shall call 
doxa, so as to distinguish it from an orthodox or heterodox belief implying awareness 
and recognition of the possibility of different or antagonistic beliefs. Schemes of 
thought and perception can produce the objectivity that they do produce only by 
producing misrecognition of the limits of the cognition that they make possible, 
thereby founding immediate adherence, in the doxic mode, to the world of tradition 
experienced as a "natural world" and taken for granted. The instruments of 
knowledge of the social world are in this case (objectively) political instruments 
which contribute to the reproduction of the social world by producing immediate 
adherence to the world, seen as self-evident and undisputed, of which they are the 
product and which they reproduce the structures in a transformed form."465 
The principles of organisation of a society derive their enduring appeal from their 
doxic quality. They resist change, though they can never escape it. In Bourdieu's 
vision of society, domination and the struggle for supremacy are the only constants. 
Domination must disguise itself in order to retain its efficacy, lest it lose the support 
of the collectivity. It is the specific form and content of the strategies of dissimulation 
that vary over time and in differing social contexts rather than the necessity to 
dissimulate in itself. It is worth stressing, however, that, for Bourdieu, these 
strategies are not pursued consciously or in a spirit of cold-blooded calculation. As
465 Outline, p i64. Emphasis in the original.
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soon as doxa is revealed as arbitrary, it is forced onto the defensive, transformed into 
orthodoxy, which Bourdieu labels an "imperfect substitute" since it is immediately 
associated with the self-interest of the establishment.466 It no longer has the 
spontaneous and unreflective character of reflex or instinct: what was once routine 
must now be justified, must assert its claim to superiority alongside a host of rivals.
A further concept, that of habitus, recognises the social element of cognition without 
reducing the individual to a mere passive recipient of external stimuli, allowing for 
divergence in responses and in strategy whilst at the same time stating why there is a 
remarkable similarity in thought processes amongst members of the same 
collectivity:467 "The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (...) 
produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures, 
that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations 
which can be objectively "regulated" and "regular" without in any way being the 
product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing 
a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain 
them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the 
orchestrating action of a conductor.468
One of the merits of this approach is that it insists cognition is firmly embedded in 
social context: it is an integral part of practice. The operations of habitus only make 
sense within a continuum stretching back into the past and forward beyond the 
immediately perceived consequences of action. Habitus reproduces the structures, 
which engendered it, prolonging them, ensuring continuity and regularity.469 By 
subtly guiding our aspirations, habitus encourages us to accept the social constraints 
imposed upon us, to make do with our allotted portion.470 It facilitates exchanges by 
providing us with a common frame of reference: "One of the fundamental effects of
466 Outline, pi 69. Once doxa is challenged, its suitability to act as a foundation for dispensing justice 
appears dubious.
467 Which could be explained in slightly different terms as common outlook based on culture. On 
habitus, see also Billig, p42.
468 Outline, p72.
469 Op. cit., pp 72-73 and p82.
470 Op. cit., p77.
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the orchestration of habitus is the production of a common sense world endowed with 
objectivity secured by consensus on the meaning (sens) of practices and the world, in 
other words the harmonisation of agents' experience and the continuous reinforcement 
that each of them receives from the expression of individual or collective (...), 
improvised or programmed (...), of similar or identical experiences. The homogeneity 
of habitus is what - within the limits of the group of agents possessing the schemes (of 
production and interpretation) implied in their production - causes practices and 
works to be immediately intelligible and foreseeable, and hence taken for granted."471
In the light of the above deliberations, claims about the nature of reality can no longer 
maintain any pretence of objective neutrality. They must always be evaluated 
carefully, both as representations and as political justifications for a sanctioned course 
of action. They bind together members of a collectivity. Human knowledge and 
human cognition are mediated through our institutions as our preferences and 
dispositions are through our culture. Concepts cannot be divorced from social context 
without distortion and, ultimately, misunderstanding. The nation-state, once 
established as the organizing framework of a collectivity, becomes an institution.
This is the source of its extraordinary grip on the minds of the people within its 
borders. It displays all the properties examined above (taken for granted quality, 
“naturalness”, assuming the appearance of being the epitome of rationality, 
inevitability, invisibility, employing a legitimating principle of classification, 
“warping” cognition, naturalizing a certain view of reality and channelling thought to 
fit its expectations).
In their administrative capacity, nation-states differentiate between citizens and non­
citizens, insiders and outsiders, nationals and non-nationals. Since the primary social 
significance of national identity is its use as a system of classification, it is to this 
aspect we shall now return in greater depth.
1.4 Classifications.
471 Op. ci/.,p80. Emphasis in original.
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We have already observed that systems of classification have as their motivation a 
wish to impart order in the midst of the chaotic variety of phenomena in the natural 
world. Stability and predictability are indispensable to the functioning of society. 
Although predictability is the rule rather than the exception in nature, with the regular 
rhythms of day passing into night and the changing of the seasons, randomness can 
never be entirely ignored. In applying classifications, situating ourselves within a 
complex structure of meanings, we suppress the latent feelings of uncertainty and 
insecurity which otherwise might inhibit us.472 Our classifications guide us in our 
interpretation of experience and in our dealings with others. We are constantly 
required to take instant decisions, to consider information concerning individuals we 
do not know or topics about which we have no expertise. Practice demands this 
aptitude of us. We rely on our classifications to make rapid appraisals of new 
situations, sparing us the effort of lengthy deliberations for which we have no time in 
the cut and thrust of events. In short, classifications are principles of organisation, 
which create reality in their own image.473
The dichotomy is the simplest form of classification and differentiation, dividing 
objects into two classes. As Durkheim points out: "When a classification has only 
two genera, they are almost necessarily conceived as antithetical. They are used first 
as a means of clearly separating those things between which the contrast is most 
pronounced. (...) Once the logical contrast has replicated itself as a kind of social 
conflict, the opposition of things is extended to persons."474 Having won acceptance, 
the opposition is ready for further use as an analogy, attracting further thought-pairs in 
a comparison that spreads contagiously to encompass all of reality, submitting it to 
the logic of its emerging categories.475 A typical example of the association of 
thought-pairs runs as follows: man is to woman as right is to left, as day is to night, as 
culture is to nature, as active is to passive, as ruler is to ruled, and so on.476 This, in 
turn, suggests the notion of kind: "Kind is the external framework whose content is
472 Cf. Construction, ppl 19-20.
473 Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, Masculine Domination, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp5,11-3.
474 Elementary, ppl45-6.
473 Here the term category denotes the result of the act of separating and dividing which is 
classification.
476 Cf. Masculine Domination, pp7-10.
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formed, in part, by objects perceived to be like one another. The content cannot itself 
provide the framework in which it is placed. The content is made up of vague and 
fluctuating images caused by the superimposition and partial fusion of a definite 
number o f individual images that are found to have elements in common. By 
contrast, the framework is a definite form having fixed contours, but can be applied to 
an indefinite number of things, whether perceived or not and whether existing or 
possible. (...) A genus is in fact an ideal, yet clearly defined, grouping of things with 
internal bonds among them that are analogous to the bonds of kinship."477 For 
Durkheim, classification is not possible without the experience of unity in diversity, 
which is society.
Durkheim goes on to mention one further property of classification, which is of 
interest here: "From another standpoint, a classification is also a system whose parts 
are arranged in a hierarchical order. Some are dominant features, and others are 
subordinated to those. The species and their distinctive properties are subsumed 
under genera having their own distinctive properties; and the different species are 
conceived as being on a par with one another. (...) The purpose of a classification is 
to establish relations of subordination and coordination, and man would not even have 
thought of ordering his knowledge in that way if he had not already known what a 
hierarchy is."478 Given that this is the case, classifications lend themselves to 
operating as instruments of social control, reinforcing power relations by consigning 
them to the doxa, the unquestionable assumptions 479 Social significance is attached 
to difference as a convenient sanction for the privilege and status discrepancies that 
separate individuals. Classification, whether dichotomal or polythetic, is universal 
because difference is universal.
The specific content of dichotomies and the associations that attach themselves to 
them differ according to the type of society in which they appear. For our purposes, 
the most important dichotomy (and classification) is that between members and non­
members of the nation to which we shall return in a moment.
477 Elementary, ppl47-148. Emphasis in the original.
478 Op. c it, pl49.
479 Cf. Masculine Domination, pp21-4,30,33-4 and 37-8.
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Section Two: Towards a Working Hypothesis of identity.
2.1 The Ubiquity of Identity.
Identity has become so important in contemporary society that it is impossible to be 
alive and not have an identity.480 Identity pervades our innermost being, our 
consciousness, our self-awareness. Even death does not release us from being 
classified by it,481 though we lose every last vestige of our former individuality in our 
new status as deceased, being reduced to representatives of the position or rank we 
once occupied, or to the absolute anonymity and obscurity of a generic category such 
as "woman who died at the end of the 20th century" or "unknown Scottish soldier 
who died heroically defending his country". We cultivate the memory of our most 
famous dead, celebrating their accomplishments, basking in reflected glory.482 
Identity is social recognition expressed as classification.483
2.2 The Contextuality of Identity.
In The Social Construction o f Reality, first published in 1966, Peter Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann484 set out a theory of knowledge in society and, as an aspect of 
this, of identity. Their primary focus is upon the world of everyday life:
“Its privileged position entitles it to the designation of paramount reality. The tension 
of consciousness is highest in everyday life, that is, the latter imposes itself upon 
consciousness in the most massive, urgent and intense manner. It is impossible to 
ignore, difficult even to weaken in its imperative presence. Consequently, it forces
480 Cf. Dieter Hoffman-Axthelm, Identity and Reality: The End o f the Philosophical Immigration 
Officer, p i96, in Modernity and Identity, edited by Jonathan Freedman and Scott Lash, Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1991, ppl96-217 and Keupp, p28.
481 Cf. Jenkins, p4.
482 Cf. Smith 1991, ppl60-l.
483 On recognition and identity, see Keupp, p28.
484 The Social Construction of Reality, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1966
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me to be attentive to it in the fullest way. I experience everyday life in the state of 
being wide-awake. This wide-awake state of existing in and apprehending the reality 
of everyday life is taken by me to be normal and self-evident, that is, it constitutes my 
natural attitude.
I apprehend the reality of everyday life as an ordered reality. Its phenomena are 
prearranged in patterns that seem to be independent of my apprehension of them and 
that impose themselves upon the latter. The reality of everyday life appears already 
objectified, that is, constituted by an order of objects that have been designated as 
objects before my appearance on the scene. The language used in everyday life 
continuously provides me with the necessary objectifications and posits the order 
within which these make sense and within which everyday life has meaning for
»  485me .
The reality of everyday life is organised around the body and the present and is 
intersubjective.486 In the course of our face-to-face dealings with others487 we 
communicate through the medium of language, a symbolic system capable of
4 0 0
generating “semantic fields”, or “zones of meaning”:
“Within the semantic fields thus built up it is possible for both biographical and 
historical experience to be objectified, retained and accumulated. The accumulation, 
of course, is selective, with the semantic fields determining what will be retained and 
what “forgotten” of the total experience of both the individual and the society. By 
virtue of this accumulation a social stock of knowledge is constituted, which is 
transmitted from generation to generation and which is available to the individual in 
everyday life. I live in the common-sense world of everyday life equipped with 
specific bodies of knowledge. What is more, I know that others share at least part of 
this knowledge, and they know that I know this. My interaction with others in 
everyday life is, therefore, constantly affected by our common participation in the 
available social stock of knowledge”.489
485 Construction, pp35-36. Emphasis in original.
486 Op. cit., pp36-37.
487 The face-to-face situation is accorded special status as the prototypical case of social interaction. 
All other cases are derivative of it” (p43).
488 Op. c it, p55.
489 Op. c it, p56. On the characteristics and function of the social stock of knowledge, see pp56-61.
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It is the reciprocal action between society as objective and subjective reality, the use 
of common media of communication within shared symbolic universes490 absorbed 
during primary socialisation 491 maintenance and contribution to (expansion of) the 
shared stock of knowledge, participation in the processes of institutionalisation 
combined with a reification of the institutions inscribing them in nature that construct 
reality 492 Far from implying tacit acquiescence to an overwhelming and oppressive 
given, the constructionist view opens the possibility of altering structures, changing 
attitudes, and contains an emancipatory potential that has been latched on to by 
feminists and numerous other critics of the dominant order 493 
By highlighting the inherent relativity of all cultural suppositions494 the liberating 
implications of this stance for the idea of the self emerge clearly:
“The genetic presuppositions for the self are, of course, given at birth. But the self, as 
it is experienced later as a subjectively and objectively recognizable identity, is not. 
The same social processes that determine the completion of the organism produce the 
self in its particular, culturally relative, form. The character of the self as a social 
product is not limited to the particular configuration the individual identifies as
490 On symbolic universes, see ppl 13-122.
491 On primary socialization, see ppl49-157.
492 The authors are very careful to stress that institutions, in spite of their power, never completely take 
on a life of their own: ‘I t  is important to bear in mind that the objectivity of the institutional world, 
however massive it may appear to the individual, is a humanly produced, constructed objectivity. The 
process by which the externalized products of human activity attain the character of objectivity is 
objectivation. The institutional world is objectivated human activity, and so is every single institution. 
In other words, despite the objectivity that marks the social world in human experience, it does not 
thereby acquire an ontological status apart from the human activity that produced it” (p78). In other 
words: “the relationship between man, the producer, and the social world, his product, is and remains a 
dialectical one. That is, man (not, of course, in isolation but in his colectivities) and his social world 
interact with each other. The product acts back upon the producer” (p78).
493 See Kenneth J. Gergen, Social Construction in Context, Sage, London, 2001: „Constructionist 
critique was enormously appealing to many groups whose voices had been marginalized by science, 
and to all those whose powers of social equality and justice were otherwise thwarted by existing 
authorities of truth” (p8). See also Op. cit., pplO-1 and, by the same author, An Invitation to Social 
Construction, Sage, London, 1999, pp62-89.
494 On the relativity of knowledge, shared meanings, concepts of humanness and so on, see pp28,67, 
68,70,115,125-6,134,155,192,197 and 199-200.
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himself (for instance, as “a man”, in the particular way in which this identity is 
defined and formed in the culture in question), but to the comprehensive 
psychological equipment that serves as an appendage to the particular configuration 
(for instance, “manly” emotions, attitudes and even somatic reactions). It goes 
without saying, then, that the organism and, even more, the self cannot be adequately 
understood apart from the particular social context in which they were shaped”.495 
Identity is not fixed for all time, but can be modified by the active operation of our 
will.496
Acquiring an identity begins with primary socialisation and is highly context- 
dependent:
“(...) identity is objectively defined as location in a certain world and can be 
subjectively appropriated only along with that world. Put differently, all 
identifications take place within horizons that imply a specific social world”.497 Thus 
Berger and Luckmann’s concept of identity is one that encompasses a name, a place
j q a  AOQ
in society, a set of roles, the internalization of a socially-agreed reality and a 
personal biography integrated within a specific social structure.
495 Op. cit., p68.
496 This emerges more explicitly in later constructionist works, such as Keupp (for example on pp60 
and 70-2) and Florian Strauss and Renate Hofer, Entwicklungslinien aUtaglicher Identitdtsarbeit, in
Identittitsarbeit, pp270-307.
497 Op. cit., pl52. Emphasis in original. As the authors remark, at the earliest stage of our lives we are 
assigned a name, a signifier of identity by our parents: “The child learns that he is what he is called. 
Every name implies a nomenclature, which in turn implies a designated social location. To be given an 
identity involves being assigned a specific place in the world” (pi52, emphasis in original).
498 Acquired during secondary socialization, see ppl57-166. It should be noted in passing that Berger 
and Luckmann do not claim that socialization is everything: “On the other hand, there are always 
elements of subjective reality that have not originated in socialization, such as the awareness of one’s 
own body prior to and apart from any socially learned apprehensions of i t  Subjective biography is not 
fully social. The individual apprehends himself as being both inside and outside society. This implies 
that the symmetry between objective and subjective reality is never a static, once-for-all state of affairs. 
It must always be produced and reproduced in actu. In other words, the relationship between the 
individual and the objective social world is like an ongoing balancing act” (p i54, emphasis in the 
original).
499 The common stock of knowledge and the institutions, cf. ppl49-150.
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Reiterating their definition at a later stage, they emphasize the relativity of identity 
even more clearly:
“Identity is, of course, a key element of subjective reality and, like all subjective 
reality, stands in a dialectical relationship with society. Identity is formed by social 
processes. Once crystallised, it is maintained, modified, or even reshaped by social 
relations. The social processes involved in both the formation and the maintenance of 
identity are determined by the social structure. Conversely, the identities produced by 
the interplay of organism, individual consciousness and social structure react upon the 
given social structure, maintaining it, modifying it, or even reshaping it. Societies 
have histories in the course of which specific identities emerge; these histories are, 
however, made by men with specific identities”.500
A second theme contained in the above, the necessity of identity-maintenance, alludes 
to identity's external dimension, the input of others in our appreciation of self. The 
crucial (reality-fixing) role of affirmation played by key members of our supportive 
networks does not become redundant following our formative years:
“But significant others occupy a central position in the economy of reality- 
maintenance. They are particularly important for the ongoing confirmation of that 
crucial element of reality we call identity. To retain confidence that he is indeed who 
he thinks he is, the individual requires not only the implicit confirmation of this 
identity that even casual everyday contacts will supply, but the explicit and 
emotionally charged confirmation that his significant others bestow on him”.501 
Others with whom the individual has less intimate (and more formalized) 
relationships also play a part in this process, functioning as “a sort of chorus”.502 This 
holds true even if the identity concerned is not one that he is fond of.
500 Op. cit., pl94.
501 Op. cit., p i 70.
502 Construction, pl70.
303 Berger and Luckmann are conscious of the problem of consistency that might arise if there is a 
discrepancy between the messages coming from significant others and the chorus respectively. This 
can be resolved by accepting a less comfortable version of reality or by terminating the relationship 
with the offending party or parties. Furthermore, the relationship between the significant others and the 
chorus is dialectical (‘*0131 is, they interact with each other as well as with the subjective reality they 
serve to confirm”, pl71). For these discussions, see Construction, ppl70-2.
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In their report of face-to-face encounters, Berger and Luckmann introduce the concept 
of “typifications”. On the one hand, although the “embodied self*504 can know 
himself better than he can anyone else, as his subjectivity is accessible to him in a way 
no-one else’s can ever be, this “knowing” entails reflection, an arresting of the 
continuous spontaneity of experience in order to turn attention back upon the self. 
Whilst the self is not immediately appresented to the individual, the other is.
Knowing what he is does not call for a deliberative pause; it is ongoingly and 
prereflectively available. On the other hand, however, perception of the other is 
coloured by typificatory schemes, which are more “vulnerable” to his interference in 
face-to-face meetings than in “remoter” forms of interaction.505 These schemes 
enable the individual to deal with the other, structuring behaviour in the course of a 
conversation or transaction. Unless challenged, the typifications will hold until 
further notice. The examples of typifications, which the authors give are revealing, 
including, in the initial discussion, “a European” and “an American”.506 
The typifications become progressively more anonymous the further away they are 
from the direct face-to-face situation.507 Again, the example chosen, that of “my 
friend Henry*' as an Englishman, is telling. Certain aspects of Henry’s conduct will 
be ascribed to the typification (tastes in food, manners and emotional reactions are 
cited). As long as he is present, he will break through the type and manifest himself 
as a unique individual. Once the friendship has become a thing of the past, the type 
becomes increasingly resistant to individualization of this kind. In superficial and 
transient exchanges (such as a chat with an Englishman on a train) or where face to 
face contact has never taken place (such as when a businessman is aware of his 
competitors in England, but has never met them), this tendency is more 
pronounced.508
That Berger and Luckmann attach considerable importance to these typifications 
becomes apparent from their concluding remarks on the subject: “The social reality of
5041 have borrowed this term from Bryan S. Turner, The Body and Society, Second Edition, Sage, 
London, 1996 (henceforth Turner), p21.
305 Construction, pp44-5. Cf. also Jenkins on categorisations, p83.
506 Op. cit., p45.
507 Op. cit., p46.
508 Construction, p46.
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everyday life is thus apprehended in a continuum of typifications, which are 
progressively anonymous as they are removed from the ‘here and now* of the face-to- 
face situation. At one pole of the continuum are those others with whom I frequently 
and intensively interact in face-to-face situations -  my ‘inner circle*, as it were. At 
the other pole are highly anonymous abstractions, which by their very nature can 
never be available in face-to-face interaction. Social structure is the sum total of these 
typifications and of the recurrent patterns of interaction established by means of them.
C f \Q
As such, social structure is an essential element of everyday life”.
The nation provides the unacknowledged setting for “everyday life” in Berger and 
Luckmann, as the illustrations used in conjunction with the typifications show.510 
Although this is the case and although they devote a considerable amount of effort to 
cataloguing the cognitive effects of institutions and their legitimating apparatuses,511 
they are curiously blind to the power of legitimating discourses in respect of
509 Op. c it, pp47-8. The authors return to these arguments on pp 194-5 where they talk about “identity 
types", engendered by specific historical social structure (with Americans and Frenchmen used as 
examples). This is a prelude to their point concerning the relativity of theories of identity (or 
‘‘psychologies”) within a given society: “Identity is a phenomenon that emerges from the dialectic 
between individual and society. Identity types, on the other hand, are social products tout court, 
relatively stable elements of objective social reality (the degree of stability being, of course, socially 
determined in its turn)” (pi95, emphasis in the original).
510 Contemporary society was the object of the treatise, and in 1966 its framework was the nation-state. 
Further instances in the text include p48 (on typifications of “those who have preceded and will follow 
me in the encompassing history of my society”; the "Founding Fathers”); p56 (“Participation in the 
social stock of knowledge thus permits the ‘location’ of individuals in a society and the ‘handling’ of 
them in the appropriate manner. This is not possible for one who does not participate in this 
knowledge, such as a foreigner, who may not recognize me as poor at all, perhaps because the criteria 
of poverty are quite different in his society”. Here “country” can be substituted for “society” and 
“culture” for “social stock of knowledge” without the meaning being skewed); p57 (where “recipe 
knowledge” is explained by means of the example of applying for a passport); p60 (where the 
“relevance structure" is looked at in relation to America); pp169-70 (mentioning the “New Haven 
railroad”, the “New York Times'* and “Grand Central station” in a description of commuting). The 
nation is given its first mention on pl61.
311 On institutions and institutionalization, see pp65-109 and on legitimation, ppl 10-146. On pl94, the 
authors explicitly state their aversion to the term “collective identity”.
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identity.512 Whereas I fully agree with the social constructionists that identity is 
culturally and historically relative513 and that individuals enjoy a certain degree of 
freedom in piecing together “copyright me”, three inhibiting factors come into play. 
The first is the principle of classification, which gives priority to an “identity of 
identities” to borrow Billig’s expression.514 Even if it barely impinges on the 
consciousness, it is still present, demanding loyalty, silently (for the most part) 
guiding the course of our lives and shaping our attitudes. In short, construction 
begins where materiality ends.515
The second constraint is that of resources,516 not merely economic (relative wealth), 
but also including social (class, networks) and cultural capital (level of education, 
skills and “refinement”). The more resources an individual can mobilize, the 
greater the freedom of authorship he enjoys in determining his identity (although the
512 This is more obvious amongst Berger and Luckmann’s (postmodern) successors. Cf. Keupp, p87-8, 
where Hobsbawm’s invention of tradition stance is endorsed and national identities as “guarantees of 
coherence” are said to have lost much of their resonance and saliency.
513 Cf. also Keupp, pp28 and 30.
514 Billig, plO.
5,5 The material identities in their capacity of core cultural discourses provide the framework within 
which life narratives unfold.
316 Berger and Luckmann never explicitly mention inequalities in resource-accumulation. They come 
close to so doing in discussing the social distribution of knowledge resulting from the division of 
labour (on pl57, they admit that some skills may be learned at an earlier age in “varying sectors” of 
society, with the (somewhat patronizing) example of an upper-class child being taught about the 'Tacts 
of life” when a lower class child has mastered the rudiments of abortion technique and “class-based 
versions” are hinted at again on pl58) and in their account of socialization (on pl51 in relation to 
“double selectivity”, they write about “lower class” children and the “mood of contentment, 
resignation, bitter resentment, or seething rebelliousness” the lower class perspective might induce and 
on pl61, concerning the crises that may occur after primary socialization, where “the older child comes 
to recognize that the world represented by his parents (...) is actually the world of uneducated, lower- 
class, rural Southerners”). Keupp, by contrast, does incorporate resources (including Bourdieu’s 
cultural and social capital) into the theoretical model, on pp l9 ,73,100,198-207 and 296, as well as 
pp 180-1 and 186-8 on networks. See also Thomas Ahbe, Ressourcen -  Transformation -  IdentitUt, in 
Identitdtsarbeit, pp207-226.
317 Thomas Ahbe, op. cit., pp212-6 (on p215, Ahbe also mentions “regional resources” as a means of 
explaining why individuals are able to utilize accumulated capital to their advantage more effectively) 
and Bourdieu, Okonomisches Kapital, kulturelles Kapital, soziales Kapital, in Reinhard Kreckel, 
Soziale Ungleichheiten, Verlag Otto Schwartz und Co., Gottingen, 1983, ppl83-198.
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principle of classification and ascription still limit the potential of even the most 
fortunate).518
The final problem is that of ascription.519 Given that identity has both an internal and 
an external (social) component, the embodied individual never has a monopoly of 
self-definition.520 The body itself is replete with social meanings, which are likely to 
influence the initial impression others have of us.521
On the collective level, groups within a society (such as the national minority of 
Hungarians in Romania or stateless nations within the administrative unit of a nation­
state associated with a culturally and/or linguistically divergent majority) who are 
“marked out” by linguistic or other forms of difference are particularly vulnerable to 
stereotyping and prejudice. The power-imbalance in terms of self-definition is often 
to their detriment and can force them on to the defensive (if the surrounding
518 Cf. Jenkins, p51.
319 Berger and Luckmann do touch upon this issue, for example on pl61 where they write: “Some of 
the crises that occur after primary socialization are indeed caused by the recognition that the world of 
one’s parents is not the only world there is, but has a very specific social location, perhaps even one 
with a pejorative connection” (emphasis in original). Ascription as such only crops up in connection 
with unsuccesfiil socialization and “defective” identities (pp 184-8), such as “a physical deformity that 
is socially stigmatized” and “a stigma based on social definition” (p i84), with the cripple and the 
illegitimate child as the prototypes.
320 As Jenkins neatly puts it: “Identity is often in the eye of the beholder” (op. cit., p2). Anomie, the 
state of chronic disjuncture between the individual and those who surround him can seize us when the 
discrepancy between who we are told we are and who we know ourselves to be becomes unbearable. 
See Durkheim, Suicide, Routledge, London, 1970, pp288-289 and p382. Whence individuality when 
even our cognitive apparatus for deciphering the flood of sensory information that washes over us is 
provided by society in the shape of the habitus? In spite of habitus, we do not put exactly the same cast 
on events when we observe them, nor is the memory of shared experience stored in individual minds 
ever completely alike down to the very last detail. Moreover, we are embedded in different social 
networks, are bom into separate family units and our particular combination of roles throughout our 
entire biography is never completely identical to anyone else’s. Cf. Jenkins, p i36: “Individual identity 
is revealed as, to a considerable extent, a customised collage of collective identifications”.
321 Cf. Turner on the self in contemporary society as “a representational self, whose value and meaning 
is ascribed to the individual by the shape and image of their external body, or more precisely, through 
their body image. The regulatory control of the body is now exercised through consumerism and the 
fashion industry rather than through religion” (p23). Cf also Jenkins, p20: “The human body is 
simultaneously a referent of individual continuity, an index of collective similarity and differentiation, 
and a canvas upon which identification can play”.
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environment is intolerant or downright hostile towards them). It can therefore 
become a source of considerable anguish.
I would therefore propose a theory of identity that takes the aforementioned concerns 
into account
There are certain elements of personal identity that are more resilient and resistant to 
change than others, that are so solid as to appear incontestable. As such, they belong 
to the doxa, the self-evident, the taken-for-granted. Their plausibility especially 
where they are employed in a wider system of classification, as is the case with 
national identity, emanates from their correspondence to natural phenomena 
recognised and exploited by our institutions. In order to comprehend fully the 
contextuality of identity, to discern what qualities an identity must possess before it 
can lodge itself so firmly in the individual mind that it becomes part of the doxa, and 
to appreciate better why some identities are so bitterly fought over, it is instructive to 
group identities under four headings that differ in two principle respects, their relative 
stability or self-evidence and the degree of volition involved in sustaining them. The 
headings are as follows: material, functional, affective and circumstantial identity.
Material identity is distinguished by its high degree of stability, deriving from its 
permanence. It is the least problematic to the individual mind, invested with the 
indisputable character of doxa. Material identity is the identity acquired by each 
individual at birth and through early acculturation (socialisation).322 It therefore 
includes physical identity (skin colour, gender,523 genetic propensities) and cultural
522 Cf. Jenkins, p21, on “primary identities”.
523 On gender as “primary identity”, see Jenkins, pp49 and 62-4, and as a classificatory principle, op. 
cit., pp60-l. I agree with Smith when he writes: „At the same time the very universality and all- 
encompassing nature of gender differentiation makes it a less cohesive and potent base for collective 
identification and mobilization. Despite the rise of feminism in specific countries, gender identity, 
which spans the globe, is inevitably more attenuated and taken for granted than other kinds of 
collective identity in the modem world. Geographically separated, divided by class and ethnically 
fragmented, gender cleavages must ally themselves to other, more cohesive identities if they are to 
inspire collective consciousness and action” (Smith 1991, p4). Gender is steeped in cultural 
connotations (see for example Imagining Women: Cultural Representations and Gender, edited by 
Frances Bonner, Lizbeth Goodman, Richard Allen, Linda Jones and Catherine King, Polity,
page 132
identity (habitus, religious, linguistic, ritual and possibly the Weltanschauung that is 
part and parcel of a way of life, though this is not nearly as firmly rooted as the rest 
and is therefore more vulnerable to the pressure of external circumstances as we have 
already ascertained). It may also include class identity (which extends far beyond 
simple economic identity since it produces a discrete habitus) in societies where class 
structure is rigid and where class is openly assigned priority as a boundary marker, 
limiting access to opportunity. In such societies, individual trajectories are directly 
circumscribed by class identity.524 National identity may likewise be considered a 
material identity for reasons, which will be discussed below. With its strong cultural 
(habitus-generating) and affective components, it transcends its administrative 
function.525
Cambridge, 1982 and Nature, Culture and Gender, edited by Carol MacCormack and Marilyn 
Strathem, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980). Rules, written and unwritten, lay down 
appropriate standards of behaviour for the sexes and assign roles accordingly (on differing conceptions 
of sexuality, see: The Cultural Construction o f Sexuality, edited by Pat Caplan, Routledge, London, 
1991 and on the assignment of roles and their normative dimension, see Regulating Womanhood: 
Historical Essays on Marriage, Motherhood and Sexuality, edited by Carol Smart, Routledge, London, 
1992). Opportunities arise in line with the strictures of the rules and from the opportunities issue 
trajectories. Interestingly, Berger and Luckmann broach the subject of gender when pointing out that 
the contents of primary socialization are cultural-specific: „With language, and by means of it, various 
motivational and interpretative schemes are internalized as institutionally defined -  wanting to act like 
a brave little boy, for instance, and assuming little boys to be naturally divided into the brave and the 
cowardly. These schemes provide the child with institutionalized programmes for everyday life, some 
immediately applicable to him, others anticipating conduct socially defmed for later biographical 
stages” (Construction, pl55). Unfortunately, they do not enlarge upon the concept of the schemes, nor 
do they contrast boys with girls. Prescriptions and prohibitions cluster densely around material 
identities precisely because they form the basis of classificatory schemes.
524 Caste identity has a similar effect, though it is even less willing to admit exceptions. On castes and 
class, see T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1977, ppl91-219. On the weakness of class compared with national identity, see Smith 1991, 
ppS-6 and my section on Communist identity below.
525 All material identities stir our emotions. This affective reality makes us susceptible to manipulation. 
One way of persuading us that an identity is indeed material is to make us feel it, to activate it, so that it 
becomes palpable, tugging at our hearts. National identity is regularly reinforced by these means, 
primarily through ritual commemorations of a glorious shared past Having said this, the very self­
evidence of material identities reduces the intensity of their emotional appeal in the humdrum business 
of everyday life. This is dealt with in the passage on the solidarity paradox below.
page 133
Although all of these forms of identity may be altered by means of more or less 
drastic interventions (gender by surgery,526 language by learning), although all may be 
rejected in the course of an individual's life, traces of them will always remain, they 
can never be completely effaced from the individual's mind, even if only in a negative 
capacity as an unpleasant memory or as a source of vitality and vigour for the 
replacement identity, standing for everything execrable that the substitute is not In 
terms of volition, these identities rate very low; since they originate from outside, 
being imposed on the individual from the beginnings of conscious awareness before 
the individual was capable of questioning their relevance or validity for the self.
Functional identity, as its designation suggests, encompasses all the functions an 
individual fulfils in relation to others.527 Its root, therefore, is social participation, 
whether on a small scale, such as within the intimate sphere of the family or within a 
wider setting, such as affiliation to a particular political party. Administrative 
(taxpayer, unemployed, person requiring a residence permit, in short every official 
category and permutation involving contact between the individual and the state and 
its representatives), legal (which covers citizenship and nationality alongside other 
identities which prescribe obligations as well as conferring certain rights),528 religious 
(membership of a community of faith that subscribes to a moral code governing 
conduct), professional (stretching over a wide range of possibilities from
326 Cf. Keupp, pp88-9; Turner, pp20-l.
327 Another way of conceptualizing functional identities is to consider the roles an “embodied self’ 
plays in relation to others (although the correspondence is not exact, for which see below). Cf. Helga 
Bilden, Das Individuum -  ein dynamisches System vielfdltiger Teil-Selbste, in Identitatsarbeit, pp227- 
249, where she discusses “role-selves” (pp239-40).
328 Brubaker explicitly ties citizenship to the rise of the state: “As a general, inclusive, immediate status, 
citizenship is the product of the development of the modem state in the direction of unitary internal 
sovereignty. This involved the monopolization of the powers of rule by a single central authority; the 
reconceptualization of the powers of rule, traditionally understood as a bundle of limited, discrete, 
particular rights, now conceived more abstractly as indivisible and unlimited; and the unification of law 
and administration through the creation of a single, internally homogenous, externally bounded legal 
and administrative space. As a result, the intricate and multiform geometry of political and legal 
membership was starkly simplified. Before the development of unitary internal sovereignty, 
jurisdiction was based largely on personal status, not on territory." Citizenship, p53.
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straightforward employment for the purpose of providing for oneself and one's 
dependents to integration in a clearly delineated occupational group, entry to which is 
strictly regulated by exacting requirements in terms of qualifications and which 
cultivate an ethos or esprit de corps) and economic (relative prosperity and purchasing 
power which have repercussions on status and mobility) identities are essentially 
functional in nature. Their exact configuration and the extent to which they determine 
the lot of the individual hinges on the organisation and values of a society and on its 
tolerance for new ideas as well as its ability to sustain unexpected shocks such as 
abrupt economic collapse. Whereas, then, these identities are in principle more open 
to negotiation than their material counterparts, their acquisition still does not depend 
entirely on the determination and alacrity of the individual. Professional 
advancement, for example, is possible, but the initiative, skill and effort necessary for 
obtaining it are directly proportionate to the inbuilt, background resistance in the 
individual's social milieu.529 Given that functions may be renounced or acquired 
more easily than is the case for material identities, the volition rating attached to 
functional identities is higher and their persistence or resilience is correspondingly 
less.
Functional identities also have a territorial and symbolic dimension that is clearly 
marked off in social space, in architecture.530 We commute to our workplace, 
whether it be an office, a classroom or a factory, departing from the enclosed 
personalised haven of our homes, crammed with items we have deliberately chosen to 
surround ourselves with, which reflect our preferences and have sentimental value 
because of their associations, to enter an environment we occupy together with our 
colleagues, superiors and subordinates in which even the placing of modest tokens of 
our presence such as framed photographs of children may be physically impossible or 
meet with disapproval. The more important the individual office-holder, the greater 
the degree of segregation. Company directors, for example, are often housed on the 
top storey of buildings, imperiously surveying the hustle and bustle far below in 
luxuriously furnished premises reserved for them alone. Unwelcome distractions and
529 Cf. Masculine Domination, pp60-l and 92-3.
530 Cf. Denise L. Lawrence and Setha M. Low, The Built Environment and Spatial Form, in Annual 
Review o f Anthropology, 19,1990, pp453-505.
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disturbances are screened out, so all energies may be devoted to the task in hand. 
Many obstacles are strewn in the path of those who seek an audience with them; they 
have to pass by security desks and secretaries, through ante-rooms and doorways 
before being ushered into the inner sanctum.531
Uniforms are another symbolic representation of function and rank.532 Donning a 
uniform is shedding individuality, becoming anonymous, being reduced to function. 
In uniform, you are a soldier, a policeman, a sailor, a waitress, a checkout assistant, a 
shelf-stacker, an assembly line worker, an employee at McDonald’s, a doctor, etc. 
You are immediately categorised as such and deferred to or ordered about 
accordingly. There is no ambiguity in the dress code: you can neither hide what you 
do nor can you pretend to enjoy greater status than has been apportioned to you.533
The idea of "professionalism" is a symbolic indicator of the transition from one social 
space to another. Assuming your specialised functional identity forces other facets of 
your individuality into the background.534 Personal considerations are not to intrude 
into the workplace. To deflect the charge of lack of professionalism, the individual 
must become a diminished self, utilising only those aptitudes called for by the job, 
forgetting for the duration of the commercial transaction that, apart from being, say, a 
lawyer or an architect, he is also a parent and an amateur singer or sports enthusiast, 
though he is always free to draw on knowledge and skills from outside work that may
531 Cf. Tim R. V. Davis, The Influence o f the Physical Environment in Offices, in The Academy o f 
Management Review, Volume 9 (2), 1984, pp271-283.
532 Cf. Nathan Joseph and Nicholas Alex, The Uniform: A Sociological Perspective, in The American 
Journal of Sociology, Volume 77 (4), 1972, pp719-730.
333 On the symbolic function of dress, see Michael G. Pratt and Anat Rafaeli, Organizational Dress as 
a Symbol o f Multilayered Social Identities, in Academy o f Management Journal, Volume 40 (4), 1987, 
pp862-898.
334 Cf. Construction, p i62, where Berger and Luckmann discuss the anonymity of roles (“they are 
readily detached from their individual performers”). The fact that they are the products of secondary 
socialization means that roles possess much less subjective inevitability: “This makes it possible to 
detach a part of the self and its concomitant reality as relevant only to the role-specific situation in 
question. The individual then establishes distance between his total self and its reality on the one hand, 
and the role-specific partial self and its reality on the other”. Cf. also T. H. Marshall, op.cit., ppl58- 
179.
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improve performance or the quality of work done. Individual conduct, in other words, 
is also affected by the standards of the workplace, so that the formal setting is 
complemented by rules, written into the contract of employment or left unstated, that 
facilitate communication and enforce the hierarchy.
That such demarcations in physical and symbolic space are not unique to economic 
activity and the division of labour, that their sole raison d'etre is not the rational 
concentration of resources and equipment under one roof to maximise profit and 
efficiency may be shown by the site of a further functional identity, religious identity. 
The worshipper crosses a threshold into a consecrated, ceremonial space to commune 
with the divinity in a hushed, reverential attitude. The very act of stepping onto holy 
ground focuses thoughts on the spiritual, ordinary cares not so much banished as put 
in a different light, as problems for which the supplicant requests a remedy. It is 
precisely the ritualistic aspect of these boundaries of space and the modification in 
behaviour they induce that entitle us to maintain that functional identities are more 
than mere roles, that they warrant the name we give them.
It has already become apparent from the above that the presence of one type of 
identity under one heading does not automatically entail its exclusion from another. 
An identity may be located under more than one of the headings simultaneously. 
Sexual identity may serve as an illustration of this overlap. It combines various 
features, being at once material (gender and genetic predisposition), affective 
(emotional orientation) and functional (it preordains a certain lifestyle). Similarly, 
national identity contains a material (it is determined by the community and culture 
into which we are bom), a functional (nationality and citizenship, administrative 
identity) and an affective component (the latter usually referred to as patriotism).535
533 Indeed, these mutually reinforcing multiple facets of national identity contribute to its saliency, or
“materiality”. On patriotism and its link with nationalism, see Kedourie, p68 where he argues as
follows: ^Patriotism, affection for one’s country, or one’s group, loyalty to its institutions and zeal for 
its defence, is a sentiment known among all kinds of men” and is neither dependent upon a particular 
anthropology, nor does it assert a particular doctrine of the state or the individual’s relation to i t  
Nationalism, by contrast does peddle a particular conception of the appropriate relationship between 
the two and „has annexed these universally held sentiments [of patriotism] to the service of a specific 
anthropology and metaphysic”. Gellner slots patriotism neatly into his general theory: „What is being
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Affective identities are the focus of the individual's affections, the locus of his 
emotional bonds. For this reason, their hold on the individual is strong and they can 
inspire feelings of well-being and pride, impart a sense of shared destiny, of 
community. They can comprise nurturing roles, such as parenthood, leisure activities, 
such as sports or hobbies (particularly where a forum exists for meeting fellow 
enthusiasts, either in person or virtually, as in online communities of computer 
gamers), in short any regular social interaction to which the individual is emotionally 
committed. Under this third heading, we encounter the highest level of volition; since 
an affective identity usually results from an act of will on the part of an individual. 
Although he may be compelled in practice to select from among a limited number of 
options with the further restrictions of background, education and experiences (our 
expectations being conditioned by habitus as general cultural and practical restraint in 
turn refined by adherence to the specific way of life), his choice is nonetheless a 
purposeful decision, an affirmation of the self.536 It is also here that the whole issue 
of reality and identity comes to the fore. To the individual, identity is whatever he 
considers it to be. This perception may, however, be completely at variance with the 
opinion of society at large, dismissed as irrelevant or classed as self-deception (as in 
Nazi Germany when non-practising Jews were condemned because of their racial 
origin in spite of vehement protests that they were Germans first and foremost or that 
they had been baptised). What society designates as the determinant of identity may
claimed is that nationalism is a very distinctive species of patriotism, and one which becomes pervasive 
and dominant only under certain social conditions, which in fact prevail in the modem world, and 
nowhere else. Nationalism is a species of patriotism distinguished by a few very important features: the 
units which this kind of patriotism, namely nationalism, favours with its loyalty, are culturally 
homogenous, based on a culture striving to be a high (literate) culture; they are large enough to sustain 
the hope of supporting the educational system which can keep a literate culture going; they are poorly 
endowed with rigid internal sub-groupings; their populations are anonymous, fluid and mobile, and 
they are unmediated; the individual belongs to them directly, in virtue of his cultural style, and not in 
virtue of membership of nested sub-groups. Homogeneity, literacy, anonymity are the key traits”. 
Gelhter, pl38. Benedict Anderson’s perceptive comments on patriotism as „political love” (pl43) are 
to be found in Imagined, ppl41-8.
336 That the agent himself thinks of his choice as spontaneous and free is the supreme triumph of the 
doxa.
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not coincide with the individual's notions of who he or she actually is.537 One is a 
social fact, the other an individual reality. Both are equally valid, but where the 
perception of the individual clashes publicly with the collective consensus, the former 
usually yields, capitulating to the authority conferred by sheer weight of numbers.
The individual may stubbornly cling to his cherished self-definition, but he can 
neither ignore nor escape outside pressures; he will forever be on the defensive, 
mindful of his isolation.
Affective identities are susceptible to the caprices of mood and whim, to setbacks and 
reversals of fortune.538 This makes them intrinsically less sturdy than material 
identities though, paradoxically; they may be more precious to the individual539 than 
all the others.
The final cluster of identities is the most ephemeral, cutting across everyday divisions 
and disparities of wealth or consecration and may be described as random or 
circumstantial identity. It embraces two scenarios: firstly where individuals are flung 
together by chance, such as passers-by who witness an accident, passengers on board 
a flight that ends in disaster or victims of some calamity such as an earthquake, 
landslide or flood,540 or when they drift into a crowd at a gathering out of idle 
curiosity or prompted by vague stirrings of interest and secondly where they 
congregate to celebrate common convictions (say at an outdoor political rally or 
evangelising crusade) or to attend a sporting event as supporters of a team or a concert 
as devotees of a composer, conductor or hysterical fans of a popular band. Individual 
identity is cast aside; the participants merge into a group, each indistinguishable from 
the next. On dispersal, or on restoration of normality, some of the individuals will 
retain the defining identity of the group (victims, if they survive, may be scarred for
537 This is ascription, an identity being thrust upon the reluctant individual by society. Cf. Hoffman- 
Axthelm, op. cit., p202, on the dual meaning of identity: “Identity is ascribed, attributed, and it is a 
proposition of external origin. Identity cannot be asserted as a matter of fact; nor can it be described as 
an assertion of being-within-itself of the identical”. Cf. also Jenkins, p30.
338 When surprise and disappointment make a way of life untenable, affective identities founder until a 
firm anchorage is once again secured by an alternative.
339 See the argument on the solidarity paradox below.
540 Cf. Kohn, Idea, p ll .
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life by the experience, so haunted by it that it shatters their convictions, altering their 
self-understanding for all time; for obsessed followers of sporting idols, collecting 
memorabilia and attending matches may become the entire purpose of life) whilst it 
will lose significance for others. Here we are confronted with the chameleon-like 
quality of identity. As individuals, we move from one context to the next, interacting 
in a giddying variety of social situations, yet we blend in with ease, rarely calling into 
question our basic assumptions about ourselves. It is the social context in which we 
find ourselves that decides which aspect of identity and hence which mode of conduct 
takes precedence over all the others.541
Material identities, then, are those which are most intimately bound to the self, they 
are in-corporated, they cannot be changed without changing the self. Ethnicity,542 
with its mystical union of blood and spirit, and nationalism as doctrines underpinning 
social institutions have succeeded in entrenching themselves to the extent that we 
routinely submit to their claims upon us, we identify ourselves with them, we consent 
to their classifications of ourselves and our fellows: they are part of us, assimilated as 
material. Why is it that more fleeting and flimsy identities (circumstantial and 
affective) can unleash such fierce passions, whilst the most secure and enduring 
(material) do not have this effect under normal conditions? I refer to this apparent 
enigma as the solidarity paradox. It is difficult to summon enthusiasm for that which 
is doxic, ineradicably the self but constant, neither spontaneous nor elective. We are 
not consulted about our material identities, they are foisted upon us. Because they are 
always present, they lack urgency; they are so obvious that they go unnoticed. 
Emotions themselves ebb and flow, love often succeeded by hate, old affections 
rekindled by a chance encounter; we are subject to mood swings, sometimes
341 To clarify: this is specific contextuality. The contextuality of identity, as of any other concept, is 
first to be sought in social organisation and institutions, the habitus and dispositions they nurture and 
the classifications they use.
342 On ethnicity, see Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism, Pluto Press, London, 1993; 
Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (editors), Ethnicity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1975; Stuart Hall, Ethnicity: Identity and Difference, in Geoff Eley and Ronald Gregor 
Suny (editors), Becoming National, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, pp339-349 and Craig 
Calhoun, Nationalism and Ethnicity, in Annual Review o f Sociology 19, 1993, pp211-239. Cf. also 
Jenkins, pp65-6.
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depressed, sometimes euphoric. These fluctuations mean that it is well nigh 
impossible to prevent our ardour from flagging, even when its object is that which is 
dearest to us. Our material identities are banal by comparison, so it is hardly 
surprising that they do not enflame us except in circumstances where we perceive 
them as being under threat: any attack on them is viewed as an attack on the core of 
our being, on what we cherish most, mobilising our emotions in response.
Material identities do not occupy a prominent place in our thoughts because we know 
who we are. Similarly, they do not habitually make demands on our solidarity. We 
are too busy with other, more pressing concerns to expend valuable energies on them. 
They lurk in the background, informing our actions implicitly, the solidarity they are 
capable of invoking likewise condemned to the shades, dormant, latent, but never 
absent. This is true in spite of their tangibility. Our national identity is impressed 
upon us symbolically with such diverse tokens as passports, flags, anthems, frontier 
checks when we travel abroad, coins and notes.543 Without these, it could not survive 
as a principle of classification, as its power of conviction would gradually decline. As 
a reflection of social reality, it must be periodically reaffirmed.544
The tangibility of functional identities is of a different order. They are more visible 
(the legal and administrative dimension of national identity only becomes apparent 
when we apply for a passport or land in trouble abroad, turning to the embassy or 
consulate for assistance, or to immigrants or refugees who want to become fully- 
fledged citizens of the host country, formally adopting its nationality545), often 
demarcated in physical as well as social space and they take up the bulk of our waking 
hours (at work and at home). They are the locus of our immediate preoccupations, 
our source of personal fulfilment. All of these factors make them more concentrated, 
more conducive to emotional involvement than material identities.
343 Cf. Billig, p41 and Kemp, plS. To this list postage stamps could be added, cf. Kemp, pi 19.
344 Elementary, p429. Cf. the considerations on symbols, ritual and collective identity set out below. 
As we know, in order to be situated in the doxa, national identity must coincide with nature in some 
way.
543 Cf. Brubaker, pp33-4.
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Finally, to return to the outpourings of sentiment triggered by circumstantial 
identities, being caught up in a crowd enhances the effect already provoked by setting. 
Public rallies, demonstrations, protest marches and the like are all organised with the 
express intention of mobilising support, activating solidarity. Moreover, their 
principle aim is to harness the convictions of their converts to a cause, say, to avert a 
threat by putting on a show of strength, which amplifies the level of emotional 
intensity considerably.546 Participation is usually down to personal choice and 
inclination. Thus, in contrast to material identities, circumstantial identities (apart 
from the sub-group of catastrophe victims) are highly volitional, stimulating a release 
of emotion that can assume cathartic proportions, but which does not automatically 
outlive its catalyst.547
2.3 The Body as Natural Boundary and Metaphor
Identity is subject to a process of growth and transformation analogous to the 
biological process of ageing undergone by the individual and is therefore not left 
unscathed by the ravages of time. The slow progression from birth to death entails 
many re-evaluations by the individual of himself. His mature understanding of his 
past, with the dual benefits of hindsight and enhanced appreciation of the motives of 
others will most likely diverge from his previous, callow view, but this does not 
undermine his certainty of the fundamental unity of the self.548 The body itself is the 
natural metaphor of identity: our physicality separates us from others, producing an 
irreducible dichotomy. It is a frontier with the outside world, which cannot be 
crossed without our permission (rape is an invasion, a violation, an unauthorised
346 Other crowd-pullers, which we have already mentioned, such as football matches or concerts, also 
attract fans and aficionados, generating a great deal of infectious excitement.
547 Before leaving the taxonomy of identities, one further group must be mentioned, that of political or 
ideological identities, functional, but also potentially affective. Propagandists portray it as material in 
much the same way as national identity, but they are faced with an additional difficulty, namely that, 
once the ideological identity has cleared the political field of its rivals, it no longer corresponds to 
anything in reality. This puts it at a considerable disadvantage compared with national identity, whose 
classification of difference has a firmer foundation in "nature". The most important example of an 
ideological identity for our purposes is Communist identity, for which see section 3.4 below.
548 This feature is examined below together with continuity. Cf. Jenkins, pp45-6.
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entry), our private territory, the one possession from which we cannot be parted.549 
Each body is a one-off, offering a unique perspective, confirming us in our 
individuality.
We acquire new layers of identity with the passage of time (functional identities being 
the case in point: we tend to accumulate them as we grow older, reaching a peak at 
retirement, after which we have fewer social responsibilities) and with the aggregation 
of experience.550 Some of these changes are deemed by society to be of sufficient 
import to be marked by rites of passage. In these instances, the metamorphosis is 
accompanied by major social upheavals, with an entirely new role and burden of 
responsibilities within the community assumed by the individual agents.551 The 
ceremonies that initiate the transformations reinforce the sense of a breaking off with 
the past, a biographical caesura.
549 Cf. Jonathan Glover, I: The Philosophy and Psychology o f Personal Identity, Penguin,
Harmondsworth, 1988, p83: “My frontiers are those of my body. I may be unconscious for periods, but 
I still exist: my body has a continuous path through space and time. It is what is perceived by others 
when they perceive me. And the special ways in which I am aware of my body are at least a large part 
of my own self-consciousness”.
550 Florian Straus and Renate Hofer draw attention to this phenomenon on p278 of Identitdtsarbeit. Cf. 
also Mike Featherstone and Mike Hepworth, The Mask o f Ageing and the Postmodern Life Course, in 
Mike Featherstone, Mike Hepworth and Bryan S. Turner (editors), The Body, Social Processes and 
Cultural Theory, Sage, London, 1991, pp371-389 and Bryan S. Turner, Ageing, dying and death, in 
Bryan S. Turner, Medical Power and Social Knowledge, Sage, London, 1987, ppl 11-130.
551 Greater responsibilities often bestow enhanced status. Conversely, ceasing to play an active part in 
a community often leads to a loss of status. Youth and age, as we might expect from what we have 
already observed about the body as a site of social meaning, carry with them social connotations which 
colour our attitudes and behaviour. We are more lenient on young people for kicking over the traces 
once in a while, whereas age, which carries with it duties and obligations, is a more sober and serious 
state of being. Excess frivolity meets with censure, adults are supposed to set a good example, though 
it must be recalled that both the effect and the degree of this censure will be proportionate to the values 
prevalent in the society concerned. Youth and age have implications for identity, but also for 
autonomy: in our early years, we are legally placed under the tutelage of our parents and guardians. 
Decisions on our future are taken on our behalf by those appointed to protect our interests. The 
dwindling of physical and mental powers towards the end of life can again place us in a relationship of 
dependency with the ensuing reduction in autonomy. Retirement is as much an exclusion from the 
active life of production as it is a recognition of services rendered and a right to rest and leisure. Cf. 
Turner, pp29-30 and 33.
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Identities atrophy and are outgrown independently of social recognition as they 
become irrelevant to our way of life (as may occur with religious identities when our 
convictions are tested beyond endurance by crisis or on coming into contact with 
alternative philosophies which better match our changed outlook). Our allegiances 
shift; our appreciation of who we are and the stuff of which we are made subtly 
adjusts as we take challenges in our stride; we adapt, absorb, make concessions. As 
has already been hinted, however, subjective identity, that is, whom we consider 
ourselves to be, may be at variance with external (socially designated) representations 
of our identity. Moreover, whereas the physical manifestation of material identity 
may remain constant, the values, associations and status imputed to it by society may 
be substantially modified. No detail is too trivial to escape society's attention; no 
attribute is value-neutral.552
Bearing all of the foregoing in mind, we may summarise our conclusions on the 
nature and social significance of identity as follows: identity is dynamic and 
interactive, the outcome of a continuous process of bargaining and negotiation 
whereby we invent and reinvent ourselves in relation to others. It is culture-specific 
and context-dependent. Within society, it may serve as a criterion for distributing or 
withholding benefits and advantages, it may promote cohesion or sanctify division, 
justify integration or exclusion,554 its efficacy contingent on striking a chord of 
sympathy within each individual. Identity is an organising principle (of classification) 
upon which both individual and collectivity base their definition of who they are, 
what they stand for and hence how to conduct themselves. In this way, identity 
guides us in our approach to others.555 Without an identity, it is impossible to be
552 For example, left-handedness has been stigmatized in the past, for which see Turner, p8. Similarly, 
obesity attracts censure in contemporary society, for which see Bodies Out o f Bounds: Fatness and 
Transgression, edited by Jana Evans Braziel and Kathleen Lebesco, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 2001.
553 Cf. Brubaker, pp24 and 29-31.
554 Cf. Jenkins, pp80-l.
555 Etiquette and protocol refine the rough and ready prescriptions of functional identity and class 
disparities. Clearly, greeting a President calls for greater formality and courtesy than greeting a
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counted as fully human, to join in the life of society.556 Identity is the bedrock upon 
which we ascribe significance to events; it is the quintessence of our conscious 
existence, the site of our emotional attachments. Concepts of common interest, 
ancestry, and heritage have capitalised on this aspect of identity to bind together 
large-scale collectivities, with no need for their individual members ever to have met 
or been more than dimly aware of each other's existence.
2.4 Continuity and Identity
e c o
Continuity is essential to the establishment of an identity. For the “embodied self', 
continuity is axiomatic; the self is a sure reference, a fixed anchorage point I cannot 
inhabit more than one physically bounded entity simultaneously and so I carry my 
identity with me from the cradle to the grave. Though my perspective on who I am 
alters almost imperceptibly throughout the course of the years, though circumstances 
may change radically around me, I persist. If I were to read excerpts from a diary I 
kept as a teenager, I might smile at my own naivety or feel a twinge of nostalgia for 
the days when the decisions that had to be taken were so simple and the dilemmas that 
I agonised over were so petty, I might, in short, be astonished at how little I resemble 
the person I once was, but this in itself would never cause me to doubt that I went 
through those experiences. Instead, I would look back on my former self as the seed 
from which my present self grew, concentrating more on the similarities than on the 
differences.559
neighbour in the street or responding to a baffled tourist asking for directions. Cf. Erving Goffman, 
Interaction Ritual, Pantheon Books, New York, 1982 (original publication 1967), pp47-95.
556 Concentration camp victims, segregated from the rest of society, whose naked and starved bodies 
were literally and metaphorically stripped of every individualizing attribute, numbers tatooed on the 
skin replacing their names poignantly illustrate this. Their identity was systematically denied them, 
reducing them to suffering flesh as Hannah Arendt recognized (The Origins o f Totalitarianism, 
Harcourt Brace and Company, San Diego, 1973, pp 438 and 453-4).
557 Cf. Benedict Anderson, pp6 and 35.
558 For an opposing view of continuity and identity, see Geoffrey Madell, The Identity o f the Self, 
Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1981, pp49-77 and 108-140.
359 That function can be suggestive of continuity was noticed by Hume in his Treatise o f Human 
Nature, where he writes on pages 305 to 306 of Book One: "In like manner, it may be said without
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Memory, by linking together the past and the present self, persuades us of 
continuity.560 Hume accentuated its importance: "For what is memory, but a faculty, 
by which we raise up the images of past perceptions? And as an image necessarily 
resembles its object, must not the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions in 
the chain of thought, convey the imagination more easily from one link to another, 
and make the whole seem like the continuance of one object? In this particular, then, 
the memory not only discovers the identity, but also contributes to its production, by 
producing the relation of resemblance among the perceptions. The case is the same 
whether we consider ourselves or others.
"[...] Had we no memory, we should never have any notion of causation, nor 
consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or person. 
But having once acquir'd this notion of causation from the memory, we can extend the 
same chain of causes, and consequently the identity of our persons beyond our 
memory, and can comprehend times, and circumstances, and actions, which we have 
entirely forgot, but suppose in general to have existed. [...] memory does not so much 
produce as discover personal identity, by shewing us the relation of cause and effect 
among our different perceptions."561
breach of the propriety of language, that such a church, which was formerly of brick, fell to ruin, and 
that the parish rebuilt the same church of free-stone, and according to modem architecture. Here 
neither the form nor the materials are the same, nor is there any thing common to the two objects, but 
their relation to the inhabitants of the parish; and yet this alone is sufficient to make us denominate 
them the same.”
560 A recent fictional illustration of the intimate relationship between memory and identity is to be 
found in the film Blade Runner, where the nightmare of technology run wild coupled with the love of 
gain has led to a situation in which memory has been cynically reduced to a commodity, implanted in 
androids in order to make them more emotionally stable and compliant. There can no longer be any 
true self-knowledge: where consciousness has been tampered with, the individual can never be entirely 
sure whether his identity is really his or whether his most cherished recollections were stolen from 
someone else. Cf. also John R. Gillis (editor), Commemorations, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1994 (henceforth Commemorations), p3: „The core meaning of any individual 
or group identity, namely, a sense of sameness over time and space, is sustained by remembering; and 
what is remembered is defined by the assumed identity”.
561 Hume, pp 308-310, emphasis in the original. Memory is notorious for its selectivity. Where 
traumatic, the tiniest details are often preserved with unsurpassed clarity and freshness. Where it
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Collective identities,562 such as national identity, have to be maintained and 
reproduced to compensate for the lack of the direct, physical continuity of the 
“embodied self*. Although they exist as a social fact, a sense of continuity over 
time and communality linking individuals in a meaningful relationship in spite of 
manifest social divisions and inequalities has to be manufactured using a combination 
of symbols, rituals and representations as constant reminders.564
Ritual is as crucial to the maintenance of a collective identity as memory is to the 
individual. Our collective identities and loyalties must be renewed and revitalised, as 
Durkheim recognised: "Let the idea of society be extinguished in individual minds, let 
the beliefs, traditions, and aspirations of the collectivity be felt and shared by 
individuals no longer, and the society will die. Thus we can repeat about society what 
was previously said about the deity: It has reality only to the extent that it has a place 
in human consciousnesses, and that place is made for society by us."
"There can be no society that does not experience the need at regular intervals to 
maintain and strengthen the collective feelings and ideas that provide its coherence 
and its distinct individuality. This moral remaking can be achieved only through
stretches over a long period, mood and atmosphere are often recollected at the expense of details, 
which merge. Precisely what is destined for long-term storage and what is consigned to oblivion 
depends on a number of factors, including the aforementioned trauma, but social context (including 
habitus) and the way of life perform an initial selection for us by providing us with criteria of relevance. 
For an alternative account of the origin of causation with a more pronounced sociological flavour, see 
Durkheim, Elementary, pp367-373.
562 On collective identities, see Niethammer and JUrgen Straub, Personate und kollektive Identit&t. 2ur 
Analyse eines theoretischen Begriffs, in Aleida Assmann and Heidrun Friese, Identitdten, Suhrkamp 
Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1998, pp73-104.
363 Cf. Jenkins, p83: “the boundedness of a collectivity is different in kind from the bodily integrity of 
an individual. Where a collectivity begins and ends is not mappable using the sociometric equivalent 
of a dressmaker’s tape”.
564 Cf. Commemorations, pp5,7-16 and 19. For the concept of social memory, see James Fentress and 
Chris Wickham, Social Memory, Blackwell, Oxford, 1992, especially ppl-40.
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meetings, assemblies, and congregations in which the individuals, pressing close to 
one another, reaffirm in common their common sentiments.”565
Ritual supplies both a framework and a motivation for these gatherings, permeating 
every aspect of collective life. Military parades, the special honours accorded to 
visiting heads of state, the laying of wreaths at war memorials, all are calculated to 
remind us of who we are. The strength of rituals lies partly in their use of symbols as 
a kind of cultural short-hand and partly in their highly formalised nature that lays 
down strict rules for participation, removing them from the ordinary and the everyday, 
setting them apart. Props, such as bright banners and music rouse the emotions. As 
Kertzer points out: "Rituals do not simply excite, they also instruct. But the potency 
of that instruction depends heavily on the power of ritual to place the individual in a 
receptive frame of mind. Sensory devices of all kinds are used to affect a person's 
emotional state, from rhythmic chanting to stylised dancing and marching, from 
powerful singing to the doleful tolling of bells. The most effective rituals have an 
emotionally compelling quality to them: they involve not just part of the personality 
but the whole personality. In the intensity of ritual, people focus their attention on a 
limited range of symbols. The greater their emotional involvement the more the rest 
of the universe is obliterated and the more the symbols embodied in the rite become 
authoritative. ”566
The veiy fact that rituals are intended for repetition and remain unaltered over 
centuries imbues them with solemnity, forging a link between ourselves and our 
ancestors who performed them long before we were bom, thereby instilling a sense of 
continuity over time analogous to that of the “embodied self’.567
565 Elementary, pp351 and 429 respectively.
566 Kertzer, pp99-100.
567 Identification of rituals with the establishment, the powers-that-be, can loosen their grip on the 
individual once a crisis of faith has set in, when disillusionment with former ideals strips the ritual of 
meaning, giving it the appearance of a hollow instrument of control, a sterile, reflexive and uncritical 
genuflection to a system that hoodwinks the weak-minded. In such instances, the mantra-like quality of 
ritual becomes directly counter-productive, itself a source of alienation and contempt, hence the charge 
that it amounts to nothing more than superstition, mass delusion, a barrier to the exercise of reason and 
to progress.
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Ritual solidifies identity by making it tangible: seeing is believing. We more readily 
accept the proposition that, in spite of real conflicts of interest in the scrabble for 
money or position, there are indeed ties of a different order that bind us to each other. 
It is no accident that many of the examples of ritual cited above commemorate events 
in the life of the nation. National identity relies heavily on ritual to convince us of its 
materiality, overcoming our doubts. To understand why it has become so widespread, 
outlasting its competitors, we must seek an answer in its substance as the principle of 
classification favoured by an institution with a distinctive thought-style, that of the 
nation-state.
That we have a propensity to think by association has already been mentioned. 
Classification would be impossible without it. Precision is sacrificed for the sake of 
ease and taking shortcuts, resulting in a cognitive blur that compresses vast amounts 
of information into a few categories. Symbols have an obvious affinity with these 
categorisations, concentrating multiple meanings with great economy, suiting them 
for a wide range of applications. We merely have to select the quality we wish to 
emphasise. They convey messages vividly, succinctly and with immediacy; we do not 
have to take pains pondering why they suggest themselves to us, they are constantly 
available. It is not, however, the innate flexibility of symbols that makes them 
indispensable: "It is a well-known fact that the feelings a thing arouses in us are 
spontaneously transmitted to the symbol that represents it  (...) This transfer of 
feelings takes place because the idea of the thing and the idea of the symbol are 
closely associated in our minds. As a result the feelings evoked by one spread 
contagiously to the other. This contagion, which occurs in all cases to some extent, is 
much more complete and pronounced whenever the symbol is something simple, well 
defined, and easily imagined. But the thing itself is difficult for the mind to 
comprehend - given its dimensions, the number of its parts, and the complexity of 
their organisation. We cannot detect the source of the strong feelings we have in an 
abstract entity that we can imagine only with difficulty and in a jumbled way. We can 
comprehend those feelings only in connection with a concrete object whose reality we 
feel intensely. Thus if the thing itself does not meet this requirement, it cannot serve 
as a mooring for the impressions felt, even for those impressions it has itself aroused. 
The symbol thus takes the place of the thing, and the emotions aroused are transferred
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to the symbol. It is the symbol that is loved, feared, and respected. It is to the symbol 
that one is grateful.''568 Thus Durkheim. Unless a principle is made tangible, visible, 
it will cease to retain its hold on individual minds. Although its promptings are 
obeyed without conscious reflection, it cannot remain self-evident if it is not 
constantly activated. Symbols articulate the underlying reality of our actions and in so 
doing actually become constitutive of it. For this reason, strategic deployment of 
symbols is indispensable for the maintenance of collective identity.
Representations are the third means of consolidating and upholding a collective 
identity. As they will be dealt with in depth later, they need not detain us further here. 
I would simply observe at this juncture that history, the written record of the deeds of 
the collectivity, is synonymous with public memory and, as such, it occupies a 
privileged position amongst representations.570
Section Three: National Identity, Minority Identity, Communist Identity.
3.1 National Identity as a Principle of Classification
"The human mind is of a very imitative nature; nor is it possible for any set of men to 
converse often together, without acquiring a similitude of manner, and 
communicating to each other their vices as well as their virtues. The propensity to 
company and society is strong in all rational creatures; and the same disposition, 
which gives us this propensity, makes us enter deeply into each other's sentiments, 
and causes like passions and inclinations to run, as it were, by contagion, through the 
whole club or knot of companions. Where a number of men are united into one 
political body, the occasions of their intercourse must be so frequent for defence, 
commerce and government, that, together with the same speech or language, they
568 Durkheim, Elementary, pp221-222. See also op. cit., p443 for tangibility. Cf. Bourdieu, Outline, 
pp 89 and 94 for a discussion on how the principles are reflected in the social organisation of space and 
time and leave their mark upon the body.
569 Cf. Billig, pp39-43 and pp85-7.
570 Cf. Jenkins, p28: “Social continuity necessitates the positing of a meaningful past".
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must acquire a resemblance in their manners, and have a common or national 
character, as well as a personal one, peculiar to each individual”.571 Hume 
acknowledges both the social origin of notions of national character and their 
inextricable link to a certain form of government, the nation state. National identity is 
the principle of classification employed by nation states in their capacity as 
institutions forming part of a legitimating strategy designed to perpetuate their grip on 
the consciousness of the collectivity governed. The basic dichotomy, that between 
those who belong to the nation and therefore act as repositories of the national 
essence and those who do not, bears a close resemblance to the irreducible distinction 
between “embodied selves” (I and you). Although this element is present in the 
establishment of boundary markers the classification represents the preferred natural 
metaphors are of kinship and family ties (shared blood and traits) and of the human 
body, with a variety of component parts making up a cohesive and organic whole, 
harmoniously sustaining life and well being. Emphasis is placed on what is held in 
common, ranging from outlook and temperament to culture and revered 
organisational structures. This allows for disparities of wealth and privilege to exist 
without the fundamental concept of a unifying sameness being removed from the 
invisible, taken for granted realm of doxa. Hence the ease with which these potential 
sources of antagonism and division can be set aside in times of crisis (Burgfrieden). 
The particular feature singled out as the primary indicator of national uniqueness for 
purposes of inclusion or exclusion varies according to the needs of a given collectivity 
at a given juncture in history and can be more or less abstract (encompassing for 
example language or birthplace of parents). The cognitive trompe-l'oeil performed by 
nationalism is to convince us of the materiality of our national identity, since it is 
contrived as corresponding to external phenomena in nature rather than merely arising 
from an administrative imperative.573
571 David Hume, Of National Characters, in Selected Essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, 
pi 15.
572 On kinship, see Jenkins, p64.
373 The mere fact that citizenship may be awarded does not suffice to undermine the core assumption. 
The recognition of suitability to be included in the polity is linked to stringent demands such as clean 
criminal record and usually is "earned" over a long period of "naturalisation", implying at least a 
degree of integration into the dominant culture and acceptance of indigenous traditions of governance, 
law and customs. It could be described in terms of acquiring “spiritual kinship”. Since nationalism
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The functional aspect of national identity reinforces the underlying principle by 
providing visible, solid tokens of membership of the collectivity such as bank notes, 
coins, flags and passports. Likewise, attachment to these symbols, the feelings of 
loyalty they inspire, the bond between subject and locality leading to the 
transformation of the physical landscape into territorial or proprietal space and ritual 
reminders of organic contiguity and temporal continuity, congealing as the affective 
component of national identity, further enhance the persuasive power of the 
fundamental premise and are consciously manipulated by the state.
The anachronistic tendency of established nation states to claim immanence 
throughout history results partly from the application of the principle of classification 
itself (its inexorable spread to subdue all of reality including the past) and partly from 
their nature as institutions. As Douglas points out: "institutions survive by harnessing 
all information processes to the task of establishing themselves. The instituted 
community blocks personal curiosity, organises public memory, and heroically 
imposes certainty on uncertainty".575
Moreover: "Conscious tinkering and remaking is only a small part of the shaping of 
the past. When we look closely at the construction of past time, we find that the 
process has very little to do with the past and everything to do with the present. 
Institutions create shadowed places in which nothing can be seen and no questions 
asked.
(...) History emerges in an unintended shape as a result of practices directed to 
immediate practical ends".576
consists of the endorsement and practical application of the principle of classification that sets members 
of a national collectivity apart from all others by acknowledging that they are qualitatively different in 
some way, seeking to catalogue varying types of nationalism is an ultimately fruitless endeavour. The 
observable variations are of emphasis given that the principle of classification itself is immutable: us 
and them. Adaptations of its use are more indicative of the requirements of a different social context 
than of a different strain of nationalism itself. Cf. Brubaker, Citizenship, pp33-4. Cf. also Gellner 
1996, p99 where he writes, albeit on agrarian society’s relationship to nature: “nature not merely 
provides a modest but fairly constant material provision, but somehow underwrites, justifies the social 
order, and mirrors its arrangements” and Kohn, Idea, p21.
574 Cf. Billig, p41.
573 Douglas, Institutions, pl02.
576 Op. cit., pp 69-70.
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In conditions where a given principle of classification holds sway, particularly where 
it functions as the legitimating argument of an institution, the past becomes a 
malleable resource, a treasure trove of mythic heroes and defining moments and as the 
present is relentlessly projected backwards in a quest for affirming antecedents the 
interpretation of history reflects the urgent concerns of the here and now becoming 
the art of revealing origins, portraying ancestral struggles as part of an inexorable 
forward movement (often hampered by delays and other obstructions) culminating in 
the current forms of government. Thus history is imbued with purpose, it represents 
progress towards a reality attained and is tangled up with notions of destiny and 
inevitability.
In stark contrast to the constructionist stance, for nationalism (most obviously in its 
“organic” manifestation)577 identity is destiny. Certainty is the order of the day. The 
national essence is inherited; it consists of a set of predispositions, characteristics 
transmitted from parents to children in unbroken succession. The persuasive power, 
what I would dub the alchemy of nationalism, derives from a combination of its 
exploitation of the natural metaphors of kinship and blood ties alluded to above and 
the self-evident quality of belonging to the doxa, the unnoticed mental furniture of
• 578assumptions.
To reiterate: under nationalism, the principle of classification founded on nationhood 
is applied in such a way that national identity (the outward expression of cultural 
difference, frequently associated with territorially bounded administrative units in the 
form of states, though this is not a prerequisite) is invested with a material quality, in
577 Myths, p3. As we have seen in the course of the discussion of Brubaker, even in societies where 
blood ties are not emphasized, citizenship is still the basis for granting or withholding vital rights and 
benefits.
578 Cf. BilUg, pp8-10,15,17,29,37,44-5,51-5,103 and 174-7 and Szporluk, pl66. Cf. also Gellner, 
pl25 on the persuasive hold nationalism exerts: “Nationalism (...) is indeed inscribed neither in the 
nature of things, nor in the hearts of men, nor in the pre-conditions of social life in general, and the 
contention that it is so inscribed is a falsehood which nationalist doctrine has succeeded in presenting 
as self-evident”. On pl26, he comes back to the theme: “The key idea is in any case so very simple and 
easy that anyone can make it up at almost any time, which is partly why nationalism can claim that 
nationalism is always natural. What matters is whether the conditions of life are such as to make the 
idea seem compelling, rather than, as it is in most other situations, absurd”. In both quotations, 
emphasis in original.
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other words that national identity represents a material difference between members 
of the nation and outsiders (cultural difference conflated with material "essence"). As 
regards their function principles of classification are always identical in that they draw 
boundaries between "us" and "them", here separating those who belong to the nation 
and those who do not. The permeability of these boundaries is not inscribed in the 
principle of classification itself, however, but is strictly context-determined according 
to the values of each society and the relative importance attached to kindred concepts 
such as nationality, ethnicity and race. Nationhood is the principle of classification 
expressed through nationalism, which both creates national identity and attributes pre­
eminence to it, ranking it alongside other material identities as betokening absolute 
difference.
3.2 Nationalism and the State
Where nationalism provides the unifying concept the state embodies its principle of 
classification, appropriating it for its own ends. In accordance with the internal logic 
of the principle the state must present itself as fulfilling a certain role, styling itself as 
the guardian and benevolent custodian of the essence of the collectivity. Its source of 
legitimacy derives from its intimate relationship with and proximity to its subjects: 
the decision-makers within the apparatus of state were bom into the collectivity and 
their complete immersion in its lore, customs, traditions and mode of thought places 
them in a uniquely privileged position in terms of articulating its concerns and 
implementing its will. In short national officials and rulers simply by virtue of being 
home-grown are sensitive to subtleties that would be lost on "outsiders". Foreign mle 
is therefore pernicious by definition and becomes synonymous with oppressive 
domination: alien usurpers are out of tune with the nation, ignorant of what is best for 
it and have proven by the very act of conquest that their primary motivation does not 
reside in defending its heritage. Against this backdrop, self-determination assumes a 
deeply moral quality as an expression of justice. This is, of course, the ideal, the 
perfect image of what a nation-state should be and how it should behave. 
Nevertheless, it is precisely the “pure”, mythologized form that has served as the 
legitimation of the nation-state as building-blocks of the international system,
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permitting majority populations to ignore the querulous demands of minorities or sub­
state nations where convenient
In its allocative and organisational capacities the nation-state creates the most 
favourable conditions for its own reproduction through for example its distribution of 
resources to promote approved cultural manifestations or by structuring the 
educational system in such a way as to facilitate transmission of the doxa, defining the 
parameters within which thought can take place.
The nationalist ideal, that of complete structural homology between the administrative 
reach of the state and the territory inhabited by those deemed to be members of the 
nation by whatever yardstick, all too often proved unattainable and illusory.579 Such 
uncomfortable realities could be sidestepped by recourse to ethnicity, a means of 
conceptualising absolute materia] difference without depending on artificial frontiers. 
This principle of classification demotes citizenship and administrative nationality to 
the status of a mere legal niceties, irrelevant in the face of more profound spiritual 
(transcendental) and ancestral (blood) ties. As we shall see, stressing ethnicity can be 
aimed at justifying the maintenance of cultural links with the lost mother country, the 
homeland of the ethnic group, offering succour and sustenance to the unfortunate 
exiles or at denying rights reserved for the majority collectivity on grounds of innate 
inferiority or otherness.
3.3 Minority Identity
Minority identity assumes its contours in relation to the existence of nation states, of 
national frontiers. Minorities may comprise inter alia racial, religious, linguistic, 
ideological or other self-defined groups or subcultures within a national collectivity 
yet whose affiliation to that collectivity is not called into question;580 separatists 
(regarding themselves as stateless nations striving towards administrative 
independence within a delineated territory attached to a recognised nation state whose 
claims are resisted by that state); diaspora "latent nations" without a homeland (such
579 Cf. Gellner, pi.
580 In other words, they possess divergent functional or affective identities but remain firmly situated 
within the collectivity in terms of their primary material identity.
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as the Roma in Central Europe, scattered throughout many countries, with no uniform 
culture or language - as the example of Hungary alone illustrates, distinctions can be 
drawn even within the borders of a single state, as the Roma there separate themselves 
into three groups, the Romungro, Hungarian native speakers with a long-standing 
tradition of working as musicians in the noble houses, the beds, who fled Romania 
following the abolition of serfdom fearing that the decision could be reversed and 
whose language is a variant of Old Romanian and the lovdri, who migrated to 
Hungary from the Indian subcontinent - are in general are pariahs within the "host" 
nation, relegated to the ranks of a despised underclass, although attitudes towards 
them can admit to a grudging affection when their indigenousness is nevertheless 
conceded, betraying a deep ambivalence on the issue of what constitutes their material 
identity) and national minorities (amputated from the main body of the nation through 
revision of frontiers rather than migrating of their own volition). This latter category 
is the one to which the Hungarians of Transylvania belong and which therefore merits 
examination in greater detail.581
National minorities are considered by the international community to be vulnerable 
and their identities fragile, as evidenced by the proliferation of agreements, treaty 
annexes and conventions designed to afford them a minimum of protection and rights. 
Thus national minorities are viewed as a distinct entity within the broader society in 
which they live. Legally they are the subjects of a given state, but citizenship takes no 
account of the specific cultural, linguistic or other requirements stemming from their 
autonomous identity. They are recognised, in other words, as being materially 
different from their compatriots, yet they are situated beyond the territory occupied by 
those with whom they are presumed to have the greatest affinity, the nationals of the 
mother country. Atrophy and decline are almost inevitable concomitants of 
severance: vitality and growth can be guaranteed solely by endogenous rule. The
581 That the reversal of fortune, which befell the Hungarians and others in the same situation could be 
particularly hard to bear was recognized by Gellner: “And the nouvelles m inority  so to speak, those 
who suddenly had minority status and hence irredentist sentiment thrust upon them, were often 
members of the previous culturally dominant ethnic or linguistic group, not habituated to such a lowly 
position, and hence more liable to resent it, and better equipped to resist it. They could find help and 
encouragement in their home state, which was dedicated to their own culture. They at any rate did not 
need to reconstruct, revive or invent past national greatness: it was, only too painfully, a matter of 
living recollection” (Gellner 1996, ppl 17-8).
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process of decay will only be accelerated where the minority is unable to or is 
prevented from cultivating and expressing its true essence. The state to which the 
national minority owes allegiance as subjects is at best indifferent to its assertion of 
otherness and at worst directly inimical to it. Collective rights aim to redress the 
power imbalance inherent in national minority status (by virtue of unequal access to 
state-distributed resources and representation deficits) and attempt to arrest the 
erosion of the minority identity by creating a mutually approved space within which it 
may unfurl.582
Within the context of the beneficiary state583 by contrast the materiality of the national 
minority identity represents the main focus, both within the minority community itself 
(self-definition) and amongst the wider majority. Awareness of recent history, lack of 
a shared language, religion and the like attach to the doxa-drivcn perception of 
difference. In the face of this overwhelming otherness the authorities may choose 
between integration (incorporation into the national body, displaying tolerance and 
openness to difference by permitting a degree of cultural or even administrative 
autonomy), assimilation (complete absorption into the national body, enforcing 
majority adherence by eliminating the visible indicators of difference and thereby 
attacking the materiality of the identity itself) and outright persecution (refused 
admission to the national body in any form, isolation, stigmatisation and exploitation 
as a scapegoat for national woes).584 The assimilation strategy may involve imposing
382 Clearly these concepts are rooted in an acceptance of the nationalist principle of classification, 
evolving from its aversion to an imperfect fit between nation and territorial extent
383 The state which has been awarded or otherwise acquired the lands inhabited by the national 
minority.
384 Cf. Gellner, p2, where he ponders the fate of „non-nationals”: „a territorial political unit can become 
ethnically homogenous, in such cases, if it either kills, or expels, or assimilates all non-nationals”. See 
also p98 where he deals explicitly with classical Habsburg” nationalism: „Non-speakers of the new 
culture who happen to live in the territory now controlled by the new state themselves in turn face the 
options of assimilation, irredentist effort, emigration, disagreeable minority status and physical 
liquidation”. His most detailed examination of this issue is to be found in Gellner 1996, ppl 15-6, 
where, in covering the national irredentist period between 1815 and 1918, he looks at how convergence 
between culture and state can be secured.. Indeed: „One way of establishing a typology of the manner 
in which the world-without-nationalism has been transformed into a nationalist world is in terms of the 
concrete method used for the tidying up of the ethnic-political map” (pi 16). In his essay Ethnic 
Nationalism and the Plight o f Minorities (Myths, ppl87-202), Smith points out that homogenization 
antedates the rise of nationalism. However, ethnic nationalism increases the pressure on minorities
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a definition on the minority, stripping it of the right to determine its own proper place 
and source of internal cohesion.
National minority identity thus includes an external (international community and 
mother country) and an internal (prevailing attitudes of the dominant national 
collectivity and self-awareness within the minority) dimension. It is a complex, 
contested identity and a locus of struggle over the right of definition (sometimes 
presented as moral truth or authenticity) from which all subsequent claims to native 
language teaching and other separate entitlements flow. That the mere existence of a 
national minority can be apprehended by the beneficiary state as a threat arises from 
the challenge it poses to the doxa by revealing the essential arbitrariness of frontiers 
and opening up the possibility of restitution.585 The minority's loyalties are tom in 
two directions, calling exclusive and exclusionist models of sovereignty into question. 
It is precisely this duality, which is considered so dangerous. Furthermore the identity 
itself justifies entry into the political sphere (making its presence felt in the field of 
power) as a means of defending the values held dear by the minority community 
against possible depredations and of competing to obtain a fair share in financial 
allocations to education and culture from the central and local budgets.
3.4 Communist Identity
with its tendency „to single out and categorize minorities within as ’alien’ to the historic culture- 
community. Since the latter is seen as pure and authentic, non-members within are inevitably cast as 
counter-types and become targets of suspicion and hostility. Where there is also significant ethnic 
competition in labour markets, housing and education opportunities, the process of targeting is 
intensified and rationalized. Not only are jobs and houses reserved for members of the dominant ethnie 
and its authentic culture, aliens within become politically suspect and vulnerable. In these 
circumstances, they may be discriminated against, harassed, segregated and finally expelled, or even 
exterminated” {Myths, pp l97-8). See also Guibemau, pp59-62 on legitimate” and ..illegitimate” 
states and pp87-8 on the power imbalance between majorities and minorities.
583 From a nationalist vantage point any frontiers that do not respect geographical distributions of
national populations are an artificial construct violating a fundamental principle of justice.
Arbitrariness also comprises a realisation that such classifications are themselves socially agreed 
constructs and are not endowed with universal or absolute validity.
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Walter Kemp, in Nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union differentiates between classical Marxism, a socio-political ideal and “really- 
existing socialism” or Stalinism, a twentieth century political movement in defining 
communism. A third element, Marxism-Leninism acts as a link between the two.587 
Thus the term “Communism” as colloquially used588 masks a distinction between a 
political ideology (whose main tenets were the fruit of Marx and Engels' intellectual 
labours)589 and a set of practices, which first developed in Russia as the country where 
a successful Marxist revolution assumed power.590 Following the heady days of the 
Bolshevik victory, Lenin and his followers had to cope with the hostility of capitalist 
neighbours, a threat that did not disappear. The response to it eventually assumed the 
guise of ‘really existing socialism', crystallizing in the USSR in the 1930s and 
exported to Central Europe in the second half of the 1940s where it survived until the 
end of the 1980s.591 Kemp describes it as follows: “It was characterized by the 
hierarchically organized control of all aspects of social, political, economic and 
cultural life, regulated by a narrow oligarchy seated at the apex of the party and state 
apparatuses, the nomenklatura. Although socialist and democratic in theory, it tended 
to be uncompromising and authoritarian in practice. Reaching its zenith under Stalin, 
Communism and the monolithism it sought to impose ‘was the political reflection of
586 For bibliographical details, see footnote 414 on pl03 above.
587 Kemp, pp2-3. This is taken from Geoffrey Stem whose elegant shorthand for drawing the 
distinction involves giving the former a small and the latter a capital ‘c’ and is adopted by Kemp 
throughout Cf. Nimni’s definition of classical Marxism as “a tradition which sees social classes as 
protagonists of the process of social transformation. It also refers to original theoretical statements of 
historical materialism. Classical Marxists referred to the national question as the totality of political, 
cultural, ideological, economic and legal relations within and between national communities” (Nimni, 
p i6, emphasis in the original). For Kemp on Marxism, see pp3-4; on Marxism-Leninism, pp4-5 and on 
Stalinism, pp5-6.
388 As Kemp puts it: “in popular parlance ‘Communism’ became a code word for the Communist 
movement organized world-wide” (p5).
389 One of the best and most concise guides to Marxism as a political ideology can be found in Brian R. 
Nelson, Western Political Thought, Second Edition, Prentice Hall, Eaglewood Cliffs, New Jersey,
1996, pp326-358. For a wide-ranging and lucid analysis of Marx’s philosophy, see Shlomo Avineri, 
The Social and Political Thought o f Karl Marx, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968. See 
also Szporluk, pp4-5 and Giddens, op. cit., ppl-64.
390 Kemp, p6. Cf. Szporluk, p204.
391 Kemp, p5.
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the ideology of perfection and omniscience; it meant the denial of the possibility of 
error or political neutrality’”.592
These practices were adapted to suit local conditions in individual Central European 
states, with shifts of emphasis accompanying political turbulence. Control of
representations (and of intellectual output in general) was a constant, however. 
Having surveyed the engagement between classical Marxism and Marxist-Leninism 
with nationalism, I will argue that, far from being a mere tactic, this is a concomitant 
of Communism (a political ideology confronted with the practicalities of rale) 
attempting to establish itself as a principle of classification with a distinctive identity 
component (and interpretation of history).594
3.5 Marxism and Nationalism
3.5.1 Classical Marxism
In Communism and Nationalism,595 Roman Szporluk contrasts Marx’s thought on the 
nation with that of Friedrich List who concentrated on its economic dimension, 
particularly industrialisation. Whilst Marx believed that industrial progress 
intensified and sharpened the antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, 
List preached class cooperation and solidarity in building a nation’s power; whereas 
for Marx, the Industrial Revolution and the rale of the bourgeoisie that followed in its 
wake promoted the unification of the world, obliterating national differences, List 
claimed that the Industrial Revolution increased national differences, exacerbating 
conflicts between nations. Marx saw the necessity of workers uniting across nations
392 Kemp, p5. The quotation is from George Schdpflin (ed.), The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 
London, Muller, Blond and White, 1986, p i32.
393 Kemp identifies a cyclical pattern of Communism’s action and reaction vis-k-vis nationalism (pp83- 
4), which corresponds to phases of greater and lesser leniency in implementing the practices.
394 Therefore in Chapter Three onwards, my focus shall be on Communism with a capital ‘c’ with a 
case study of Romania. The concept of history comprises two elements, namely the teleological 
interpretation embodied by historical materialism (see Introduction) and the ‘colonization’ of the 
national past (see the section on Daco-Romanian continuity, pp354-376).
393 For bibliographical details, see footnote 65, p23. For a critical response to Szporluk, see Gellner’s 
Nationalism and Marxism, in Encounters, ppl>19.
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against the bourgeoisie, while List called for the unification of all segments of a 
nation against other nations. Both Marx and lis t criticized the political theories and 
institutions of the West, but where Marx argued that political liberty was illusory, 
envisaging the task in hand as that of abolishing politics altogether by carrying out a 
social revolution, which would free man as a human being,596 List felt that the real 
basis for a political community was that of the nation, which he defined by cultural 
criteria and to which he wanted to adjust political boundaries. List focused on the 
rules that regulated the relations among nations, especially the rules of free trade. In 
much the same way that Marx perceived political liberty as an ideological cover for 
class oppression, List considered free trade a cover-up for unequal relations among 
nations.597
In a departure from received wisdom, Szporluk reassesses the relationship between 
Marxism, capitalism and nationalism: “Conventionally, Marxism is seen as a 
challenge to classical political economy, which in turn is viewed as the ideology that 
legitimates the capitalist system. Marxism thus appears as a critique of capitalism 
from “within”, a critique speaking on behalf of the society’s underdog -  the 
proletariat. What this approach overlooks is that historically Marxism was more than 
a critique of capitalist relations of production within one country. It was also a 
critique of nationality (and religion) and a program for the liberation of people from 
all “intermediate” identities that obstructed an individual’s metamorphosis into a 
“world-historical personality”. Marxism postulated the formation of the proletariat as 
a force that transcended national identities and that operated on a supranational scale. 
Because of this, from its earliest beginnings, Marxism viewed nationalism as a rival 
and an enemy”.598
396 Szporluk returns to this on p54, where he writes: “It is a central point of the Marxist theory of 
history and society that all politics, including democratic politics, presupposes coercion and 
domination. Real freedom would transform the citizen -  that is, the member of a political community -  
into a human being”. Emphasis in the original.
597 Szporluk, pp4-5. A more detailed exploration of List's important contribution to nationalist thought 
is not directly relevant to our immediate concerns. On pp96-151, Szporluk covers the ground 
admirably. List’s influence on Hungary and Romania is dealt with on ppl60-l. Also on List, see 
Hobsbawm, pp29-31.
598 Szporluk, p i4. On the “world-historical personality”, see also pp51-3. Cf. Nimni, p i6: 
“Nationalism was unanimously defined by classical Marxists as a bourgeois phenomenon alien to 
Marxism”.
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For Szporluk, nationalism was “a third party on the battlefield where Marxism met 
capitalism”.599 By encouraging the formation of distinct national communities with 
their own economic and political interests, which emphatically included the workers, 
nationalism ran counter to the efforts of the socialists to nurture a solidarity amongst 
workers, which was oblivious to national frontiers. It held up the national state as an 
ideal, whilst Marxists condemned states per se as instruments of class control, 
prophesying that they would wither away.600
In his evaluation of List from 1845, Marx depicted the aim of the German bourgeoisie 
according to his adversary as that of establishing the domination of capitalist industry 
at the precise juncture when the enslavement of the majority as a result of such 
domination had become a well-known fact. Although the German bourgeoisie had 
not yet achieved the development of industry, a proletariat not content to put up 
meekly with its lot already existed. The poverty of political aspirations and outlook 
of the bourgeoisie in the German-speaking states were manifestations of their 
backwardness. In principle, a backward country could not make an original 
contribution to the advancement of economic thought. In other words: “Marx 
dismissed as reactionary all attempts, such as those of List, to develop an economic 
theory that reflected the national needs of less developed countries in their transition 
to capitalism and in their opposition to advanced capitalist countries”.601 
In Szporluk’s reading, Marx did not admit the possibility of a national road to 
capitalism and had nothing to say on socialism in one country602 because capitalism 
and communism were worldwide systems and could be treated only in a supranational 
setting. Unlike Marx, List viewed the nation as the fundamental unit into which the 
human race is divided and which passes through a number of stages of evolution.
This process did not occur in isolation, but in the course of interaction with other 
nations. To List’s mind, it was imperative to compare Germany’s level of 
development with that attained by England and to look upon the former as a
599 As above.
600 Szporluk, pi 5.
601 Op. cit., p31. In his account, Szporluk makes use of anachronisms, such as ‘‘Germany”, “political 
economy” and the like, but does so in a manner that does not distort the content of the thought sketched 
out I have followed suit for the sake of clarity.
602 Although first formulated in 1924, it only took off in 1929 and sought to develop a sense of socialist 
patriotism. See Kemp, pp87-8.
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“developing country” suffering economically and politically as a party engaged in 
“unequal exchange” with the latter.603
In Marx’s eyes, capitalism was the real exploiter, not England. For selfish reasons, he 
continued, the German bourgeoisie had put forward a different interpretation of the 
problem when competing against their French and English counterparts, that of 
“nationality”. This amounted to nothing more than a fraud and a disguise for the 
capitalist’s cynical materialism. As far as Marx was concerned, List’s theory sought 
to modify the principles of political economy and their application in relations 
between developed and developing countries for the advantage of the latter. This 
involved the idea of national interest as something that was distinct from the interest 
of the individual capitalist or the class as a whole.604
Marx saw List’s simultaneous support of free trade within a united Germany and 
defence of external tariffs as contradictory. The German bourgeois was keen to wring 
every last drop out of proletarians at home, but did not want to be exploited outside 
the country. The concept of the nation allowed him to justify such a stance. On the 
question as to whether the bourgeoisie as a class had common interests, Marx 
responded as follows: “However much the individual bourgeois fights against the 
others, as a class the bourgeois have a common interest, and this community of 
interest, which is directed against the proletariat inside the country, is directed against 
the bourgeois of other nations outside the country. This the bourgeois calls his 
nationality”.605
As Szporluk goes on to comment, Marx did not specify how and why it should be 
possible for some bourgeois to agree on a common interest against other bourgeois 
and why the basis for union and separation should be nationality: “Obviously, an 
economic factor was not the only determinant of national unity. Had Marx admitted 
as much, he would have recognized that nationality could not be wholly reduced to 
class economic interests”.606
Marx gave short shrift to the notion that the proletariat would succumb to nationalistic 
temptations proffered by the bourgeoisie, declaring instead that the nationality of the
603 Szporluk, pp32-3.
604 Szporluk, p34.
605 Quoted in Szporluk, p35. Emphasis in the original.
606 Szporluk, p35.
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worker was labour, his government capital, the air he breathed that of the factory and 
the land belonging to him a few feet below the ground.607 The proletariat was 
completely unlike any other class in that it is not recognized as such and is in itself the 
expression of the dissolution of all classes, nationalities and so on.608 Marx 
repeatedly insisted that its mission was to destroy not only class divisions derived 
from private property, but also nationality.609 Only the working class was concerned 
with bringing about the abolition of existing property relations. This meant that an 
end to national exploitation could not be attained within the framework of capitalist 
relations of property. In Marx’s words: “victory of the proletariat over the 
bourgeoisie is at the same time, victory over the national and industrial conflicts 
which today range the peoples of various countries against one another in hostility 
and enmity. And so the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie is at the same 
time the signal of liberation for all oppressed nations”.610
The communist revolution would overthrow the world market, removing all national 
barriers and instituting cooperation of individuals. This would put them in a position 
to enjoy the production of the whole earth. Such considerations formed the backdrop 
of Engels’ predictions about the future of nations under communism in his Draft o f a 
Communist Confession o f Faith from July 1847, where he wrote: “The nationalities of 
the peoples who join together according to the principle of community will be just as 
much compelled by this union to merge with one another and thereby supersede 
themselves as the various differences between estates and classes disappear through 
the superseding of their basis -  private property” 611
Having demonstrated that both Marx and Engels conceived the revolution as strictly 
international, Szporluk reminds us of Marx’s understanding of history: “For him, the 
real unit of history, and therefore the unit of historical analysis, was the whole of 
human society, not any of its segments divided by geographic, political, or linguistic 
criteria. He did not believe in a “revolution in one country” because he recognized no 
“history in one country”. In other words, Marx did not think that national or state
607 As above. Cf. also Szporluk’s analysis of The Communist Manifesto's more famous: “The working 
men have no country”, on p68.
608 Szporluk, p43.
609 Op. cit., p44. Cf. Engels* 1845 article dealt with on the same page.
6,0 Quoted in Szporluk, p45.
611 Szporluk, p52. On the world market and world literature, see also pp64-6.
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boundaries imposed a meaningful constraint on the operation of those larger causal 
factors that gave rise to such events as revolution. He did not think therefore that a 
state or a nation constituted an entity that could be analyzed within itself’.612 
Events in 1848 and afterwards as well as the triumph of capitalism in Germany were 
nothing short of a catastrophe for Marx in Szporluk’s opinion.613 Both he and Engels 
witnessed the unification of Italy and Germany (which did not take place in 
accordance with a Marxist scenario) as well as the mushrooming of national 
movements across Central Europe. To add insult to injury, in countries where the 
proletariat was thriving in numbers and influence, it did not define itself as the 
“universal class” Marx had expected, but was split along national lines.614 
The first major shift in Marx and Engels’ original stance on nationalism occurred in 
1848-9 when they endorsed the national liberation efforts of the “historic” or “great” 
nations, such as the Hungarians, Poles and Germans, all of whom wished to establish 
large national states.615 Since large states would facilitate proletarian agitation for its 
class goals, Marx announced that the nationalists’ aims were compatible with his 
strategic assessment of the prospects of the proletarian revolution.616 However, Marx 
and Engels approved of the German claims because Germans were “superior” to such 
“small” peoples as the Czechs and the Danes. They harboured only hostility towards 
the aspirations of the so-called “non-historic” nationalities of Central Europe, which
1*7stood in the way of German or Hungarian demands. Szporluk concludes that their
612 Op. cit., p49. See also pp62-3 and 70.
613 Szporluk, pl69.
614 Op. cit, pl70.
615 Op. cit, pl71. Cf. Herod, pp6-38. In the course of his incisive analysis of the output of Engels in 
the Neue Rheinische Zeitung (as well as the articles in Marx’s name in the New York Daily Tribune), he 
persuasively shows that even small peoples could find favour on occasion. As Szporluk makes clear 
(albeit discussing Marx’s position), local and national developments played an insignificant part in 
history unless “a nation happened to find itself, during a certain turning point in world history, at the 
head of the progress of all humanity” (p49). On state size, see also Nimni, p21. On historic and non- 
historic nations, see also Munck, pp21-2; Connor, p i2 and Nationalism in Eastern Europe, edited by 
Peter Sugar and Ivo John Lederer, University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, 1994 edition 
(original 1969), pp21-2.
616 Szporluk, pl71.
617 As above. Szporluk provides examples of disparaging commentary on pp 171-4 (cf. Nimni, pp29-30 
and pp26-37 on the theory in general). On the question of Marx’s authorship of the pieces in the New 
York Daily Tribune (collectively known as Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany), Szporluk
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endeavours to procure national emancipation “found no place in Marx’s schema of 
historical progress”.618
When the first volume of Capital appeared in 1867, Marx implicitly abandoned his 
position that capitalism would sweep away national boundaries and create a single, 
global economic and political process. The preface to Capital suggested instead that 
capitalism would affect individual countries as countries. Moreover, Marx no longer 
saw historical stages as applicable to the history of human society as a whole, but 
regarded individual nations as the units undergoing development. Szporluk warns 
against underestimating the significance of this reversal: “If this indeed was the case, 
Marx unknowingly had adopted the view that nations (countries, peoples) had a 
history which transcended historical socioeconomic formations -  in other words, that 
they existed above and beyond history understood as the history of class struggle”.619 
Ultimately, however “Marx was not prepared to admit that there might be something 
in the national character, national traditions, or national community that would call 
for a response not related to the class point of view and that yet might deserve being 
supported through political means”.620 Most notably, he failed to acknowledge that
indicates that: ‘These statements were written by Engels, but Marx published them as his own, a fact 
that, along with other evidence, indicates that he thought exacdy the way Engels did" (pi74). On the 
authorship of the editorials in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, see Herod, ppl7-20. On historic and non- 
historic nations, see also Nationalism in Eastern Europe, edited by Peter F. Sugar and Ivo John 
Lederer, University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, 1994 edition (original 1969), pp21-2 
and Herod.
6X% Szporluk, pl74. See also p i90.
619 Op. cit., pl77. Szporluk quotes a passage from the preface to substantiate this: “one nation can and 
should learn from others. And even when a society has got upon the right track for the discovery of the 
natural laws of its movement -  and it is the ultimate aim of this work, to lay bare the economic laws of 
motion of modem society -  it can neither clear by bold leaps, nor remove by legal enactments, the 
obstacles offered by the successive phases of its normal development But it can shorten and lessen the 
birth pangs” (also pl77). See also Marx’s deliberations on Russia, catalogued by Szporluk on ppl77- 
181. However, Marx “did not waver in his opposition to the infiltration or contamination of the 
working class by nationalism" (Szporluk, p i82, continuing on p i83).
620 Szporluk, pl90. Cf. Connor, ppl5-16, where he examines Engels’ writings on the 1848 revolutions 
(which “read very much like a morality play" (pl5)). The indictments of entire peoples rely on 
stereotypes “hardly consonant with a class analysis" (pl5). According to Connor, classical Marxism 
would dictate against the existence of class-transcending national traits: “Even more fundamentally 
would it dictate against group characteristics of an immutable, trans-epochal type since such
page 166
even if a future world communist civilisation would have no nations as working 
entities, the “historic*’ (or established) nations would linger on in memory and in the 
legacy of the pre-communist era, while the “nonhistone” peoples, having lost in their 
bid to win independence before the dawn of the communist age, would disappear 
from history altogether, hardly a comforting outlook for socialists belonging to the 
latter.62'
The theme of Marxism’s theoretical engagement with nations is elaborated upon 
further by Ephraim Nimni. In Marxism and Nationalism,622 he wryly comments:
“The Marxist fetish of making sense of every significant social phenomenon by 
subsuming it within the logic of the universal development of the forces of 
production, was the blueprint for ingenious but ultimately inapplicable theories of the 
national question. The heterogeneity of the national phenomenon defies monocausal 
explanations”.623 To be fair, however, he adds the qualification that this is a symptom 
of Western thought in general, which has situated reflection on socio-historical 
patterns within an “ontology of determinacy”, the assumption that ‘to be’ means ‘to 
be determined*.624
In classical Marxism, social classes are the sole and unique agents of social 
transformation. Consequently: “the diversity of national questions is the expression 
of the impact of this unique and privileged agency in a plurality of situations. Thus 
the impossibility of theorising about the national question stems from the assertion
characteristics, as part of the superstructure, should necessarily reflect only a particular economic 
stage” (pi5). Having quoted some of Engels’ effusions suggesting the opposite, Connor concludes: 
“The genetic determinism which permeates these and many other passages by Engels would probably 
appear extreme within any intellectual framework, but its appearance in the works of one of the two 
founders of a school described as ‘scientific socialism’ and predicated upon a theory of historical 
dialectical materialism borders on the bizarre” (pl6). Szporluk accepts this point, quoting it on pl75.
621 Op. cit., ppl90-l.
622 For bibliographical details, see footnote 378, p91. For a critique of Nimni, see the essay by Michael 
Lowy and Enzo Traverso, Der marxistische Ansatz in der nationalen Frage, in Ldwy’s 
Intemationalismus und Nationalismus (henceforth Lowy), Neuer ISP Verlag, Koln, 1999, pp25-44.
623 Nimni, p3.
624 As above. The phrase was coined by Castoriadis. On the influence of the modem concept of 
causality on the social sciences, see p4.
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that, ultimately, the national phenomenon has no logic of its own, but its 
transformations are only the reflection of the laws of motion of political economy”.625 
According to Nimni, the most influential European Marxist discussions on nations are 
characterized by a recurrent thematic unity and a relatively cohesive line of argument 
despite significant political and intellectual differences. These “Marxist parameters 
for the analysis of the national question” are the “theory of the universal evolution of 
the forces of production”; “the conceptualization of the economic identity and the 
determining role of forces of production” and “the eurocentric bias” in specific 
examinations of the universal process of change.626
The first refers to “an understanding of social transformation as a process which can 
be grasped in universal laws of historical development. History is understood as a 
progressive series of transformations through universal and hierarchically defined
627stages”. Local variations and historical zigzags do not undermine the validity of 
the model as a whole. The inevitable outcome of the stages is a classless society.
Classical Marxism regarded the association of its principles of social evolution with 
those of natural evolution as a sound criterion of scientificity. Marx borrowed from 
the natural sciences what he considered to be scientific criteria of objectivity with the 
result that he “was insensitive to the specificity and non-reducibility of the realm of 
the social”.629
The second parameter represents a form of economic reductionism because “it 
declares that all meaningful changes within the social arena take place in the sphere of 
economic (class) relations”.630 Marx expressed this in terms of his metaphoric 
distinction between base and superstructure.631 The superstructure is shaped and 
determined, after more or less complex mediations, by the activities and processes of 
change that occur at the level of the base. Since national identities cut across class
623 Nimni, pp5-6.
626 Nimni, p6.
627 As above.
628 Cf. Szporluk, p i85 on “Oriental despotism”.
679 Nimni, p8.
630 As above.
631 On base and superstructure, see also Rigby 1998, ppl77-207 and 251-298 and Giddens, op. cit., 
pp39-44.
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divisions and national communities did not always respond to class interests, this 
theory erected insurmountable obstacles to the analysis of the national question.
A further dimension of economic determination, the equation of material existence 
and the economy via the concept of production, rendered the privileged position of 
the forces of production unassailable. The Marxist notion of production encapsulates 
the need to obtain food and shelter to secure the basic requirements of life. As Nimni 
summarizes: “In this way, material existence (being) and production are logically 
unified in an indivisible field. If material existence compels production, this 
compulsion must be located outside the area of voluntary action, otherwise the 
‘compulsion’ fails to compel. The economy emerges as the realm in which Marx’s 
‘dull compulsion of material life’ produces the laws of motion of material production 
independently of human will. Classical Marxism thus justifies the primacy (in terms 
of existential causality) and the objectivity (in terms of its independence from human 
will) of the economic realm”.632 This leaves room for a number of permutations, 
some of which are connected with bitter methodological disputes that haunt the 
Marxist tradition. Of the latter, the clash between epiphenomenality and class 
reductionism with their differing attitudes towards the superstructural domain is of 
greatest relevance in the debate on the nation.633
The concept of epiphenomenality describes a situation where every aspect of the 
superstructural phenomena is a mere reflection of the economic base. The leading 
schools of the Second International (with the exception of the Austro-Marxists) were 
its chief exponents.634 As Nimni elucidates: “In this sense, a correct understanding of 
the dynamic of this base is a necessary and sufficient condition for a complete 
explanation of what occurs at the level of the superstructure. Every movement of the
632 Nimni, p9.
633 As above. These terms were originally devised by Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Ideology in 
Gramsci, in Gramsci and Marxist Theory, edited by Chantal Mouffe, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
Lonod, 1979, pp168-204.
634 The Second International was founded in 1889 (Szporluk, pl70). On Austro-Marxism, see Tom 
Bottomore and Patrick Goode’s collection of texts, Austro-Marxism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978, 
particularly the Introduction (ppl-44) and Otto Bauer's What is Austro-Marxism? (pp45-8). Cf. 
Hobsbawm, p33.
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superstructure is accounted for as a reaction to changes taking place at the level of the 
base; thus economic relations of production are the unique source of causality”. 
Although remaining within the same conceptual framework, the class reductionist 
approach (favoured by the Bolsheviks and the Third International)636 comprises a shift 
in emphasis: “Social classes are considered the only possible historical subjects so 
that ideologies and other superstructural phenomena (such as nationalism and the 
national arena in general) ‘belong’ to the paradigmatic area of influence of a class 
position. This does not prevent the superstructural phenomena from having a certain 
relative autonomy from the economy as a whole. While all types of contradictions are 
ultimately determined by economic (class) positions, they may not transparently and 
immediately reflect the positions of those classes. Political and other activities may 
advance or delay (according to the circumstances) the outcome of the relations 
between classes (class struggle)”.637
The final parameter, the eurocentric bias in case studies, is not a separate analytical 
tier and therefore cannot be divorced from the preceding two. Paradoxically, although 
the Marxist tradition claims to be a universal theory of social emancipation, it uses an 
ethnocentric methodology to conceptualize social formations located outside Western 
culture. Eurocentrism, therefore, involves constructing “a model of development 
which universalizes empirically observed European categories of development”, with 
more ‘advanced’ industrial societies holding up a mirror to their less developed 
counterparts in which the latter gaze upon the image of their own future.
635 Nimni, plO.
636 The founding congress of the Third International was held in 1919. It was dissolved in 1943. See 
Munck, p88.
637 Nimni, plO. Nimni calls the notion of “determination in the last instance” the most challenging 
feature of the class reductionist perspective. It argues that the national phenomenon is more than the 
effects of economic forces: “A more or less complex system of mediating stages defines the influence 
of the economic base over cultural and political levels, creating a delaying effect, which gives the 
superstructure a relatively autonomous existence” (ppl0-11). National communities are not directly 
subsumed into class ideologies and may even pre-exist a given class configuration, but the social and 
behavioural functions must satisfy the conditions of existence of the dominant mode of production and 
their concomitant ruling classes. Nationalist movements may only act as catalysts for changes that are 
about to take place, or are taking place at the level of the forces of production (pi 1). Cf. Smith 1991, 
ppl66-7 on the relationship between nations and classes.
638 Nimni, pi 1.
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The importance of these parameters is that they constitute “a coherent basis for the 
formulation of a theory of the national question which is compatible with the 
apparently contradictory positions that Marx and Engels held in relation to various 
movements of national emancipation”.639
Two decisive considerations for the founding fathers in setting out their views were 
their adherence to a universal, but at the same time, historically situated model for 
national development (the “state-language-nation” model) and the capacity of national 
communities to evolve from lower to higher stages of development of productive 
forces (historical versus non-historical nations).640
On the subject of the first: “For Marx and Engels, the modem nation was the direct 
result of a process whereby the capitalist mode of production superseded feudalism, 
causing concomitant dramatic changes in the process of social organization. The 
transition to a capitalist economy impelled a number of Western European social 
formations to evolve into more linguistically cohesive and politically centralised 
units”.641 The standardization of Western European languages responded to the need 
for efficient communication generated by the greater interaction between participants 
in the new market. This in turn led to the consolidation of “distinct and recognisable 
linguistic units based on the embryonic absolutist state”. In a nutshell, to qualify as 
a modem nation, a community must hold a population large enough to allow for an 
internal division of labour in accordance with the capitalist system of competing 
classes and “occupy a cohesive and sufficiently large territorial space to provide for 
the existence of a viable state”.643 Nimni notes that the French Revolution was Marx 
and Engels* source of inspiration here.644
Approval or disapproval of particular national movements hinged on their 
contribution within the overall historical context: “The modem nation is an
639 Op. cit., pl7. Thus Nimni rejects the findings of „a significant group of scholars and historical 
analysts” who maintain that lack of coherence and an ad hoc treatment of national movements dictated 
by fleeting political events was the order of the day. Cf. Connor, pi 1.
640Nimni, p i7.
641 Nimni, p i8. Cf. Munck, p 1.
642 As above.
643 As above. On the preference for large units, cf. Connor, pl2.
644 Nimni, ppl8-19. A useful summary of post-Revolution nation-building efforts in France follows on 
ppl9-20.
page 171
epiphenomenal result of the development of the bourgeoisie as the hegemonic class, 
and the former must be evaluated on the merits of the latter. If it represents a higher 
stage of development of the productive forces in relation to a predetermined process 
of historical change, if it abolishes the feudal system by building a national state, then 
the nationalist movement deserves support because it becomes a tool for progressive 
social change. If, however, the nationalist movement emerges among linguistic or 
cultural communities incapable of surviving the upheavals of capitalist transformation 
(because they are too small or they have a weak or non-existent bourgeoisie) then the 
nationalist movement becomes a regressive force because it is incapable of 
overcoming the stage of peasant-feudal social organisation”.645 The latter were 
reviled as allies of the forces of reaction, representatives of peoples without history, 
doomed to perish culturally and politically in order to make way for the unifying role 
of the bourgeoisie.646
Against this backdrop, it is possible to envisage a chain of events that will destroy the 
foundation of every form of class society via the emancipation of the proletariat. 
Nations were for Marx one of the specific manifestations of civil society.647 The 
abolition of the capitalist mode of production will bring about the end of civil society 
as an entity reproducing the conditions of existence of class societies; the bourgeoisie 
as the hegemonic class of the civil society and the proletariat as the subordinated 
oppressed class; the state as the instrument through which the bourgeoisie controls 
civil society and the nation as the framework for the existence of the bourgeois state.
645 Nimni, pp22. For the problems inherent in this approach, see pp26-7. Cf. Connor, pp7 and 10 and 
Kemp, pp26-8.
646 Nimni, p27. See also pp33-4. Having traced the Hegelian pedigree of these ideas (pp27-9), Nimni 
concludes: ‘The presence of important traces of Hegelian historicism in their universal evolutionary 
theory, and the related understanding of the national state as a historical construct to secure the 
conditions of existence of the bourgeoisie, make it inconceivable that their discussion of the national 
question is simply an ad hoc construct” (p34). And: “On the contrary, the systemic view of the process 
of evolution of humanity through different modes of production and their concomitant forms of social 
organization must provide the analytical tools to conceptualise the nation within definite historical 
boundaries. The emergence of every national state is for Marx and Engels indissolubly linked with the 
universalisation of the capitalist mode of production and the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. The 
viability or otherwise of every national state is tested against this fundamental theoretical assumption” 
(p34). Cf. also p42.
647 On civil society, see pp21-2; The German Ideology, p57 and Avineri, op. cit., ppl7-27.
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The nation is linked with the fate of the capitalist state because both are 
epiphenomenal expressions of civil society. The demise of the state thus heralds that 
of the nation.648
Such were the constraints, which blinkered classical Marxism, preventing it from 
gaining a full appreciation of the nature and power of the national ideal.649
3.5.2 From Marxist-Leninism to National Communism650
In The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy?51 Walker Connor 
succinctly points to the main difference between nationalism and Marxism: 
“Nationalism is predicated upon the assumption that the most fundamental divisions 
of humankind are the many vertical cleavages that divide people into ethnonadonal 
groups. Marxism, by contrast, rests upon the conviction that the most fundamental 
human divisions are horizontal class distinctions that cut across national 
groupings”.652
Marx’s predilection for an economic interpretation of history caused him “to slight 
the importance of psychological, cultural, and historical elements, and, therefore, to 
underestimate the magnetic pull exerted by the ethnic group. Since the nation was to 
Marx essentially an economic unit, the question of political legitimacy was reduced to 
economic ties. This led him to believe that ethnic minorities should and would be 
content to consider themselves members of the larger nation to which they were
648 Nimni, pp24-5. Cf. Lowy, ppl3-24 and Connor, pp7-8.
649 Cf. Nimni, p i4. For alternative accounts of the relationship between Marxism and nationalism, see 
Guibemau, ppl 3-21; Michael L6wy, Marxists and the National Question, in New Left Review, No.96 
(1976), pp81-100; Breuilly 1993, pp407-414; Gellner, pp93-4,96,114-116 and 129-30 (for the 
“Wrong Address” theory) and Munck on classical Marxism, pp9-28. Nimni’s skilled dissection of the 
main currents of subsequent Marxist thought, to which the lion’s share of his book is dedicated cannot 
be dealt with here, but I would nevertheless draw attention to his analysis of Otto Bauer’s sophisticated 
contribution to the Marxist debate on ppl 19-184 as well as in Nimni 2000. For alternative assessments 
of Bauer, see Munck, pp39-42; Lowy’s Die Nation als Schicksalsgemeinschaft in Lowy, pp87-93; 
Kedourie, ppl 11-2; Smith’s Myths, pp35-6 and Kemp's stocktaking of the flawed legacy the founding 
fathers of Marxism left behind for their successors, Kemp, p32.
650 On national Communism, see Kemp, pp80-2 and 128.
651 For bibliographical details, see footnote 379, p91. On Lenin, see also Hobsbawm, ppl24-5. For 
alternative readings of Marxist-Leninism, see Szporluk, pp213-220 and 229-30; Nimni, pp70-90; Kemp, 
pp45-54; Munck, pp69-87 and Herod, ppl00-110.
652 Connor, p5.
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economically wedded. Marx held that workers in a modem industrialized setting 
were deaf to ethnonational appeals that conflicted with their economic interests. 
Regardless, then, of dissimilarities in culture and ethnic traditions, identification with 
a given nation rested simply upon ties to an economic unit”.653 In short, the chief 
deficiency of his and Engels* formidable body of work is that it badly underestimated 
“the emotional pull and tenacity of national identity”.654
Connor discerns three strains of thought on the national question bequeathed by Marx 
and Engels to their ideological successors. The first, “classical Marxism*’, asserted 
“the primacy of class consciousness and the indispensability of class struggle, and 
was therefore irreconcilable with nationalism”.655 The second, “strategic Marxism, 
revolved about formal support for the right of national self-determination in the 
abstract, coupled with very selective support for national movements in the realm of 
action”.656 Although these were not naturally harmonious, they could be reconciled 
provided Marxists never forgot that nationalism was a bourgeois and hence ephemeral 
ideology whose progressiveness and life expectancy dwindled as society progressed 
from feudalism through capitalism toward socialism. The third, “national Marxism, 
was reflected in references to national characteristics that transcend epochs, and to the 
role of nations as the principle instrumentality of historical forces. Though potentially 
compatible with an intemationalistic, non-Marxist interpretation of history, national 
Marxism was irreconcilable with classical Marxism’s emphasis upon class and class 
warfare”.657
633 Connor, p8. He condenses what he terms “the classical position of Marx and Engels on 
nationalism" (plO) into nine propositions, to be found on pplO-11 and 14. He comments on the first 
seven that they “form a coherent, consistent stance toward nationalism” (pi 1): “Had they been 
faithfully reflected throughout all of the writings of Marx and Engels, ambiguity would be limited to 
whether or not all cultural and psychological vestiges of national particularism would be eradicated in 
the post-capitalist era" (pi 1, emphasis in the original). 1848, however, upset the theoretical applecart 
and their new appreciation for the importance of nationalism was expressed in strategic considerations 
(summarized in the two final propositions on p i4).
634 Connor, pl9.
633 Connor, pl9.
636 Connor, ppl9-20.
637 Connor, p20. Szporluk echoes Connor’s earlier conclusion that these contradictions arose in the 
wake of 1848, which had forced Marx and Engels to acknowledge that nation and nationalism were 
more important than they had initially believed. He continues: “The three strains about which Connor
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According to Connor, Lenin cultivated the second strain, coming to appreciate the 
tactical wisdom of ostensible alliances with national forces.658 The slogan of self- 
determination thus became his main weapon.659 From 1914 to his death in 1924, two 
recurring topics of his treatises, speeches and private correspondence were how to 
battle against nationalism where necessary and how to manipulate it in the interests of 
the international movement wherever possible.660 Self-determination, however, had 
become popular across the political spectrum and could not function as a specifically 
Marxist doctrine without further refinement. Consequently, Lenin deemed it 
necessary to state unequivocally that national self-determination included the right of 
political secession.661 Since he was convinced that few small nations would act 
against their economic self-interest in the longer term, Lenin did not feel that he was 
trespassing against Marx’s insistence on large states.
The reasoning underlying his espousal of secession betrayed his attitude towards 
nationalism: “Lenin conceived of nationalism in purely negative terms as the response 
of a people to past oppression and prejudice, whether real or imagined. He was
speaks form, in a sense, a chronological sequence. Marx and Engels had begun with a wholly negative 
view of the prospects of nation and nationalism. Then they modified it somewhat in practice. Still 
later, they came close to recognizing that the phenomenon of nationality contained something that 
could not be wholly ‘decoded’ or exposed in class terms. But the founders of Marxism, even at that 
later date, did not re-examine their general theoretical stand” {op. cit., p i92).
658 Cf. Kemp, pp49-50.
659 Connor, p30. On the origin of self-determination, Connor quips: “It is indeed somewhat ironic that 
this most famous credo of nationalism should make its first appearance in a public document which was 
drafted by history’s most famous internationalist” (pi 1). The reference is to Marx’s Proclamation on 
the Polish Question, endorsed by the First International in 1865. He charts the later useages of the 
principle on pp30-l. On Lenin’s idiosyncratic understanding of self-determination, see also Kemp, 
pp50-l.
660 Connor, p31. On pp31-4, Connor surveys Lenin’s merging of the colonial and national questions in 
Imperialism: The Highest Stage o f Capitalism, which he regards as one of Lenin’s major contributions 
to Marxist thought. Once again, due to the European focus of the present undertaking, its influence in 
the developing world is not dealt with here.
661 Connor, p33. Connor adds that he seems to have agreed with Stalin’s more comprehensive 
definition from 1913, which includes, but is not limited to secession and reads as follows: “The right of 
self-determination means that a nation can arrange its life according to its own will. It has the right to 
arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal relations with other 
nations. It has the right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign and all nations are equal”
(quoted on p33).
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therefore convinced that the only way to combat nationalism was by use of the carrot, 
not the stick. And hence the dialectic: by conceding all, or rather, by seeming to 
concede all to nationalism, one in fact was promoting internationalism. With specific 
regard to self-determination, this meant that the best way to avoid or to dissipate a 
grass-roots demand for independence was to proffer that independence*’.
In practice, Lenin drew a distinction between the abstract right of self-determination, 
which was enjoyed by all nations, and the right to exercise it, which was not. The 
decision to give or withhold support in a given case was left to the discretion of the 
Communist party, whose members were to be free of the taint of nationalism.663 His 
vision of party organization (later euphemistically labelled as “democratic 
centralism”), striving “to proceed from the top downward” and upholding “an 
extension of ihe rights and powers of the centre in relation to the parts” made him 
confident that all decisions concerning self-determination would be guided by Marxist 
strategy rather than by ethnicity.664 All forms of federalism and autonomy were 
vehemently opposed as inappropriate to the party and were explicitly rejected in part 
as insurance against ethnic poles of power coming into being within the apparatus.
As far as assimilation was concerned, Lenin firmly believed that it was inevitable.
The bitterness and mistrust felt by the minorities were due to a superior-inferior 
relationship long practiced by the Russians. For the purposes of removing this 
obstacle in the path of assimilation, a period of national equality would be ushered in
662 Connor, p34. On the historical background to the interaction between nationalism and Marxism in 
Russia, see Szporluk, pp206-12; Kemp, pp45-54 and 57-93 (from 1917 to the end of World War Two) 
and Connor, pp45-61 (for his sketch of the Soviet model and the strategic considerations underpinning 
the enshrinement of the principle of self-determination in the constitution). Cf. Kemp, pp48 and 50 
where he concludes that Lenin understood nationalism as largely a psychological phenomenon with no 
dynamic of its own: “One could placate national emotions by avoiding oppression and chauvinism: get 
rid of exploitation and there would be no fertile soil in which nationalist sentiment could grow. 
Recognition of the equality of nations, not national differences, had to be stressed, for the unity of 
proletarian solidarity and comradely unity in the workers' class struggle called for the fullest equality of 
nations with a view to removing every trace of national distrust, estrangement, suspicion and enmity.
He believed that the recognition of the equality of nations and languages would assuage die political 
drive for self-determination. It is worth noting that he believed that this would eliminate national 
friction and national suspicion, but not necessarily nations” (p48).
663 Connor, p35.
664 Connor, pp35-6.
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to alleviate tensions. Employing force could only have the unintended effect of 
strengthening nationalism, hence a frontal assault upon it was not on the agenda and 
the voluntary nature of assimilation continually stressed. To Lenin it was not the 
language but the message that counted.665 Granting the use of local languages whilst 
maintaining control was to surrender little, especially as the higher echelons of the 
party would be responsible for designing the general content of the educational 
curricula and the media. Broadcasting, writing and lecturing in the national mother 
tongue would increase receptiveness to the party line (including the ultimate goal of 
assimilation).666
In 1925, Stalin officially dubbed this “national in form, socialist in content”: 
“Proletarian culture, which is socialist in content, assumes different forms and 
methods of expression among the various peoples that have been drawn into the work 
of socialist construction, depending on differences of language, customs, and so forth. 
Proletarian in content and national in form -  such is the universal culture toward 
which socialism is marching. Proletarian culture does not cancel national culture, but 
lends it content National culture, on the other hand, does not cancel proletarian 
culture, but lends it form”.667
663 Connor captures the essence of Lenin’s programme thus: ‘To Lenin, language and other overt
manifestations of national uniqueness were construed, on balance, as conveyors of messages emanating
from the party. In and by themselves they were merely forms. It was the party, acting through the 
state, which would give them content” {op. cit., p202).
666 Connor, pp37-8. The policy of promoting pluralism subsequently became known as “the flourishing 
of the nations” (Connor, p201). Leninists tended to avoid the term “assimilation”, preferring “the 
rapprochement” or “coming together” of nations (see pp201-2). Lenin was extremely vague on the 
timeframe during which assimilation would be achieved (Connor, pp388-392 and 458). On balance: 
“Lenin’s implicit condemnation of all non-coercive efforts to bring about assimilation directly (non- 
dialectically) was logically at odds with his view of nationalism as a psychological phenomenon. The 
latter had accounted for his dialectical scheme for achieving assimilation via a period of the flourishing 
of nations. This scheme was based on a recognition that assimilation would require a lengthy period of 
constraint rather than activism on the part of the authorities. The incompatibility between this 
dialectical strategy and support for “non-coercive”, direct assimilation would seem to be 
irreconcilable” (p482).
667 During his speech at the University of Peoples of the East on 18* May, quoted in Connor, p240. 
Connor denotes The Communist Manifesto as the immediate source of inspiration for this phrase, 
whereas Kemp attributes the role to Marx’s Critique o f the Gotha Programme {Connor, p240 and 
Kemp, p233 respectively). Cf. also Connor, pp37 and 202 and Kemp, p38.
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Where Lenin and his successors went wrong in Connor's book was in failing to 
appreciate that “forms have a content of their own”.668 For example: “Demarcating 
the borders of the administrative unit gives geographic precision to the more shadowy 
notion of the ethnic motherland. Constitutionally declaring the unit to be ‘sovereign' 
or ‘autonomous’ legitimizes the idea of self-rule. Giving the unit an ethnic 
designation conveys the idea that the unit's proper raison d’etre is the safeguarding 
and promotion of the national interests of the people so designated. Adorning the unit 
with its own government as well as other appurtenances of political individuality 
(seals, flags, and the like) conditions the people to think in terms of their particular 
unit rather than in terms of the entire state”.669
Thus neither classical Marxism, nor Marxist-Lciiinism were able to engage with 
nationalism in a way that took it seriously. Stalin's record was hardly more
670impressive.
Although Kemp claims that “communism and nationalism may not be antithetical” in 
theory, he admits that in practice the “basic contradiction” between them was not
668 Connor, p495. He repeats this on p511: “National forms (particularly language and homeland) have 
a national content in and by themselves. Far from exerting a deadening effect upon nationalism, 
encouraging national forms reinforces that phenomenon". See also, p513 (“the overt symbols of group 
uniqueness perpetuate and reinforce that self-identification with a particular group, its past and future, 
which is nationalism”) and 583.
669 Connor, p497 (see also Kemp on this argument, pp72-4). Although Connor is talking about the 
Soviet Republics, the point applies even more forcefully when applied to the People’s Democracies, 
which were already independent nations at the time of the Communist takeovers and, as Kemp states, 
had “much richer national histories than most of the republics of the Soviet Union” (p93). Connor 
enlarges upon the forms breeding content issue on p501: “When the form is an autonomous, ethnically 
defined unit, expectations do not remain confined to specifically enumerated powers. Simply dwelling 
within one’s autonomous ethnic unit -  no matter how circumscribed the authorities declare the unit’s 
powers to be -  instills a sense of possession of fundamental proprietary rights. Form becomes the 
father of content”. The affinity with Billig’s arguments should be clear.
670 Nimni is perhaps the most charitable of the authors reviewed on the subject of Stalin. He writes: 
“The evolutionary and hierarchical perception of national development which permeated the works of 
Lenin also had its impact on Stalin’s understanding of the national phenomenon” (p93). On Stalin and 
the national question, see Nimni, pp90-5; Szporluk, pp216-7,221-2 and 230-2; Kemp, pp54-6,74-93; 
Connor, pp45-61; Herod, ppl09-l 12 and Munch, pp76-85.
page 178
bridged.671 My approach is somewhat different, as will become apparent. In my 
view, like nationalism, Communism employs a principle of classification based on an 
irreducible dichotomy, in this instance that which exists between exploiters and 
exploited, falling into standard (stereotypical) categories invested with stock 
attributes, elasticity interpreted to allow new groups to be subsumed under them 
should the political exigencies of a given moment require it:
worker (honest, contributing to the 
material well-being of the collectivity)
capitalist/bourgeois (parasitical, 
dishonest, selfishly accumulating at the 
expense of the collectivity)
working peasant Kulak
progressive intellectual (acknowledging 
and lauding the inherent superiority of the 
Communist system)
reactionary intellectual (rejecting and 
undermining the Communist system)
communist Imperialist
internationalist Chauvinist
The dichotomy has a moral dimension, synonymous with the absolute distinctions 
between good and evil, right and wrong, virtue and vice, justice and injustice, 
progress and regression and reason and superstition. There is no middle ground here, 
no room for shades of grey in this reductivist scheme, which is particularly 
susceptible to contradiction in the cut and thrust of everyday reality. Communism is a 
political identity legitimated by the moral superiority it professes.672 Proclaiming 
itself as the only system guaranteeing an equitable distribution of wealth and 
resources, it explicitly undertakes to provide the maximum benefit for the maximum 
number of citizens whilst vigorously asserting a monopoly on truth and wisdom, 
dismissing all competing worldviews as false consciousness.
671 Kemp, p206. Cf. also, pp22,82-5,128 and 173.
672 Arguments concerning historical inevitability serve the purpose of proving that submitting to 
Communist rule is no more than bowing to the dictates of rationality.
673 Cf. Szporluk, pl85; Gellner, Islam and Marxism: some comparisons (henceforth Islam) in 
International Affairs, 67, No. 1(1991), pi and Munck, p2. On false consciousness, see Martin Seliger, 
The Marxist Conception o f Ideology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977, pp19-22,28-36, 
69-77, 81-2 and 167-8.
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Once in power, Communism seeks to create society in its own image with its 
grandiose industrialisation and collectivisation projects, which it portrays as essential 
to attaining the aim of eliminating the disparities of wealth, rank and privilege that 
give rise to inequalities.674 By stripping former oppressors of their property, assets, 
titles, influence and reputations, it empties its own categories of all meaning 675 It 
cannot make sense to rail against exploitative landowners where land is collectivised 
under state supervision. In implementing its egalitarian vision, Communism 
abolishes the need for itself. Constant threats (conspiracies, rumours of backsliding 
into the iniquitous habits of the past on the inside and Imperialist encroachments on 
the outside) are manufactured to justify the Party's continued right to rule. Likewise, 
in a rhetoric of perpetual postponement, ever more ambitious targets for output are set 
to harness energy, concentrating minds un a glorious common project of benefit to all. 
The fact that Communism preaches egalitarianism whilst practicing ruthless hierarchy 
(sweeping aside one set of elites to replace them with its own, a chosen few ostensibly 
elevated by virtue of merit, though this was manifestly not the case) engenders 
cognitive dissonance.676
Particularly in its Stalinist phase, Communism exudes a pathological loathing of 
pluralism, fostering a relationship of complete dependency between itself and its 
subjects, whereby the state accumulates the surplus product to allocate amongst
674 Cf. Kemp, pp88-9.
675 Whereas Communism indubitably restructures society to swell the ranks of the industrial proletariat 
and the landless peasants, it eradicates the negative figures of hatred. Once settled in power, it is 
compelled to invent new villains who can only be drawn from within albeit fallen under the spell and 
perhaps in the pay of malevolent foreign agents. The ritualistic purges of counter-revolutionary and 
dissident elements not only compensate for the lack of traditional internal enemies, but also entail the 
added advantage of institutionalising chronic insecurity, reminding all office-holders that they remain 
in place by the grace of the Party. Ultimately the ceaseless parade of corrupted delinquents tests faith 
in the efficacy of the Communist undertaking beyond endurance as it hints at some imperfection 
reducing the resistance to temptation of those once held up as paragons.
676 Nationalism does not suffer from this drawback because it does not approve of some social 
categories and vilify others, being ..politically blind” to internal disparities. As Benedict Anderson 
explains, the nation „is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and 
exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal 
comradeship” (Imagined, p7, emphasis in the original).
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citizens, assuming the role of sole benefactor, taking care of every aspect of their 
lives, lulling them into passivity. Self-reliance and taking responsibility for one's own 
welfare are not cast as virtues. The other side of the paternalistic state coin, however, 
is that independent thought (such as that manifested by adoption of a divergent way of 
life) is frowned upon and the public and private spheres merge678 (indeed the Party 
stifled initiative by annexing all other forms of collective organisation from trade 
unions to folk dance ensembles and by placing all economic activity under state 
supervision -  henceforward titles such as “outstanding worker” would be the ultimate 
reward rather than profit).679 Every utterance and deed becomes suffused with 
political meaning to the extent that the most trivial deviations in behaviour are 
automatically suspect
Even language does not emerge unscathed from this colonisation of every aspect of 
human existence with forms of address being modified to remove social distance 
between individuals, comrade being the honorific appropriate to all, from Party 
Secretary to humble tractor driver. Where old words continued to be used their 
meanings shifted. Perhaps the most striking example of this phenomenon is the 
concept of "democracy", which came to signify Party rule, subtly reinforcing the 
doctrine that genuine democracy can only be achieved under Communist leadership. 
Moreover seemingly innocuous changes in terminology often heralded radical policy 
shifts so that language shaped social reality rather than vice versa.680 
Communist identity lacks the material component of its national counterpart 
Communists may be nobler in spirit or more enlightened than their fellow men, but 
loyalty to the Party and cause springs from conscious choice, an act of volition rather 
than an ineluctable, in-bom difference. Within Communist society, individuals are 
defined according to the work they perform, the productive function they fulfil and 
the contribution they make to society is both the measure of their solidarity and the 
source of self-esteem.
677 Verdery, National Ideology, p75. She dubs the concentration of resources appropriation of 
"allocative power". For the stifling of private initiative this entailed, see Kolar, p339.
678 Cf. Kemp, p5.
679 a .  Breuilly 1993, pp386-7.
680 This tendency was particularly apparent in the case of designations applied to the Hungarian 
minority in Transylvania.
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A further problem inherent to establishing and maintaining a Communist identity is 
that Communism has no natural metaphors to draw on. Appeals to materialism and 
the pathos of brotherhood (in the sense of a bond engendered through espousal and 
pursuit of a common cause), heroic struggle and liberation from tyranny coexist with 
vitriolic condemnation of the sworn enemies of Communism, but these concepts have 
no point of reference outside the social (manmade, artificial) world. Building, the 
most frequently used metaphor, is replete with positive, optimistic connotations, 
symbolising new beginnings, the imposition of order on chaos, re-emergence from the 
devastation and ruin of war, clearing away the debris of the past, investing in the 
future and of economic growth. Although the healthy body could be deployed as a 
symbol to revile the enemies of the people who were likened to virulent bacteria, 
venomous snakes and other infecting or contaminating agents, the cohesive, unifying 
force itself could not be explained in terms of kinship.
Similarly, in efforts to situate itself throughout past time, Communism only had a 
meagre seam to exploit compared to nationalism's mother lode, more or less restricted 
to labelling all revolts, uprisings and protest riots as its precursors.681
681 Cf. Smith 1991, pl61. The very fact, however, that Marxism possesses its own interpretation of 
history (a feature it shares with nationalism) corroborates my hypothesis that it functions as a principle 
of classification. On the use of history by post-war Communist parties, see Kemp, pp95-7,112-3 and 
125-6. Further valuable arguments on the weaknesses of Communism compared to nationalism 
complementing my own include Guibemau’s on the nature of nationalism: “while nationalism provides 
a series of goals -  the creation of a state, the reconstruction of the nation, the development and 
encouragement of the national culture and interests -  it does not indicate the direction to be taken or the 
methods which should be adopted to achieve them. In my view, nationalism does not supply an 
account of the content and means of action of a party, except during a period of extreme repression and 
complete opposition to the state. Nationalism does not determine what politics its adherents should 
support It is insufficient to know where one wants to go, one needs also to find out and decide how to 
get there” (Guibemau, pp63-4). Communism, I would add, lacks this flexibility and is limited in 
appeal to the far left of the political spectrum, or, in Szporluk’s words: ‘‘Nationalism stubbornly refuses 
to be pigeonholed in the capitalism-or-communism compartment” (p234; cf. also Kedourie, pp84-6 on 
why it is mistaken to ask whether nationalism is politics of the right or left). Guibemau also touches 
upon the “artificiality” of Communism in a world of nations: ‘The emotional charge that individuals 
invest in their land, language, symbols and beliefs while building up their identity, facilitates the spread 
of nationalism. Thus while other forms of ideology such as Marxism or liberalism require the 
indoctrination of their followers, nationalism emanates from this basic emotional attachment to one’s 
land and culture” (Guibemau, p76). Benedict Anderson {Imagined, pp9-12 and cf. pl44) and Smith
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Communism's relationship to nationalism was, as a general rule, fraught.682 It was 
not averse to encouraging nationalist movements wherever expedient in terms of 
gaining an initial foothold or calling for national minority rights where this gave it 
greater leverage. In Central Europe, the nation state was retained as an organisational 
structure: symbolically the hammer and sickle were superimposed on national 
flags.683 The precise nature of the accommodation to nationalism, how much ground 
was given, the way in which stirrings of love of country could be channelled to 
enhance Party standing and prestige reflected the mode of control and local 
circumstances. Communism was never able to ignore its rival principle of 
classification entirely: the genie had definitively been let out of the bottle.684
(Smith 1991, ppl60-l) both examine mortality and why Marxism, unlike nationalism, is unable to 
assuage the pain of personal oblivion. Gellner in Islam talks about the absence of a profane sphere in 
the secular Marxist faith (pp3-4). Finally, there is Smith’s magisterial account of the weaknesses of 
class as a source of identity (Smith 1991, pp4-6).
682 Cf. Connor, p584.
683 This is as the symbolic equivalent of the phenomenon Kemp describes as follows: “Communist 
regimes tried to promote the idea of socialist patriotism, but this did not always win the support of the 
national community at which it was directed, because it was synthetic and did not represent the 
underlying political culture. In most cases it was perceived by the people as something imposed, 
something foreign, whereas national consciousness is something that is (or has become) innate” (op. 
cit., p7).
684 Szporluk clearly outlines the nature of the relationship: “Indeed, when communism has defeated 
rival doctrines, it has owed its victory to the adoption of at least some of the principles of nationalism 
and to the fact that it has become national, indeed nationalist, itself’ (op. cit., pS). Later, he also writes: 
“the nationalization of communism is a fact” (Op. cit., p234). Although, properly speaking in his view, 
Lenin had been the first national Communist, he dates the formal birth of national Communism to 
Tito’s defiance of Stalin in 1948 (p232). To state the case slightly differently, Communist regimes 
came to power in a world of nations. Hobsbawm admitted as much when he wrote: “It is almost 
impossible for political consciousness not to be in some way or another nationally defined. The 
proletariat, like the bourgeoisie, existed only conceptually as an international fact In reality it existed 
as an aggregate of groups defined by their national state or ethnic/linguistic difference: British, French 
or, in multi-national states, German, Hungarian, or Slav. And, in so far as “state” and “nation” were 
supposed to coincide in the ideology of those who established institutions and dominated civil society, 
politics in terms of the state implied politics in terms of the nation” (quoted in Szporluk, pl82). Cf. 
Geoff Eley’s appraisal, entirely in line with our general argument: ‘The nation comes to represent an 
ideological and institutional structure of immense power, which begins to set limits on the possible 
forms of political action and belief. Almost imperceptibly, nationalism loses its character as a sectional 
creed articulating the aspirations of liberal and other tendencies within the bourgeoisie, and passes into
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3.53 The Communist Accommodation to Nationalism: An Illustration685
Hungary yields an instructive example of one possible truce with nationalism, 
throwing the dilemmas of the relationship between Communism and nationalism as 
explored above into high relief. J6zsef R6vai, one of the leading Marxist ideologists 
in the Rikosi era favoured the strategic deployment of national symbols in the 
Communist's bid for power: "We must stress the national character of our Party. 
Symbols are also important and it is also true that it is not essential for the 
Internationale to be sung without fail at every village assembly, but it is essential that 
both versions of the national anthem should be learned. It is important for us to go to 
the smallholders with flags in the national colours" and "Cur patriotism takes as its 
starting point the view that Democracy cannot be built from nothing, but must be built 
on the progressive and honest elements of the Hungarian past Hungarian Democracy 
can only be built by the Hungarian people and whoever repudiates or denies the past 
repudiates the Hungarian people who represent the sole foundation of Hungarian 
Democracy. Hungarian Democracy cannot date the existence of the nation back to 
the day it came into being".686 Compare this with Rikosi's impassioned declaration of 
loyalty to the Soviet Union once the battle had been won: "Each people may 
contribute its own path and its own special features to the ways and means of the 
building of Socialism and the form this building assumes, but there is no such thing as 
a separate "national" path to be followed in any matter of substance or on any of the 
crucial issues".687 On occasion, Rikosi felt compelled to argue the case against
the common heritage of a political culture -  becoming, as Tom Naim puts it, ‘a name for the general 
condition of the modem body politic, more like the climate of political and social thought than just 
another doctrine’” (quoted in Szporluk, p i86).
683 For an in-depth portrait of the phenomenon in Czechoslovakia, see Kemp, pp94-126. On the
Communist takeover in Hungary, see Romsics 2000, pp271-294; on the Rikosi dictatorship, idem,
pp335-395 and on the Kidir era, pp399-534.
686 Jdzsef R6vai 1947, quoted in A Kigyd Bore, Ideoldgia is  Politika, by fiva Standeisky, in A Fordulat 
tvei, pl58. On the Communist efforts to appropriate Kossuth as a proto-Communist, see Andris 
Gerd’s illuminating monograph on the anniversary celebrations of the 1848 Revolution in Az 
dllamostiott forradalom, tJj Manditum Kiad6, Budapest, 1998 and likewise on Gydrgy Ddzsa, Kemp, 
pi 18.
687 Rikosi, Visszaemlikezisek, Vol. 2, p704.
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nationalism even more strongly: "We must fight unceasingly against every 
manifestation of nationalism. We must not be allowed to forget that the Horthy 
regime688 stubbornly attempted to implant every variety of chauvinism, anti-Semitism 
and racial arrogance into the working class over a period of 25 years, and these efforts 
were not without success. Prior to that, entire generations were raised in the spirit of 
Hungarian "racial superiority". The poison of nationalism has penetrated into the 
working people"689
In the wake of the 1956 Revolution Rdkosi's successor Kidar was confronted with the 
dual challenge of re-establishing the Party's primacy (controlling definitions and 
representations), whilst visibly distancing himself both from Rikosi (destalinization, 
openly eschewing the personality cult by prohibiting images of himself from being 
displayed in public, donning a velvet glove to conceal the iron fist by moving from a 
tight symbolic-ideological to a remunerative mode of control)690 and from Imre Nagy 
(discrediting the Revolution and denouncing its ringleaders). Characteristically this 
entailed a renegotiation of the pact with national sentiment, drawing a distinction 
between bourgeois nationalism and Socialist patriotism. Rather than clamping down 
on the emotions that had inflicted so much damage on the previous regime, Kdddr's 
ideologists provided them with a legitimate outlet, redirecting them for the greater 
good of the Party: "Nationalism is the ideology of the bourgeois, expressing the 
interests of the bourgeoisie. [...] The bourgeoisie attempts to prevent the development 
of proletarian class warfare and obstruct collaboration amongst the workers of 
different nations in the fight against capitalism by employing nationalist slogans and 
fanning the flames of animosity between nations. In countries where capitalism has 
already been overthrown, the bourgeoisie, stripped of its power, endeavours to win 
the support of the masses in its assault against Socialism by using nationalism and it 
is with nationalism that it tries to obstruct the development of national unity and the 
establishment of a new, Socialist nation headed by the working class".691
688 Mikl6s Horthy (1868-1957) was elected Regent of Hungary on 1“ March 1921, a position he held 
until 16th October 1944 when, under intense German pressure, he resigned and appointed Ferenc 
Szdlasi (leader of the fascist Arrow Cross Movement) Prime Minister (Kontler, p385).
689 Op. cit., Vol. 2, p808.
690 Verdery, National Ideology, pp85-86.
691A Burzsod Nacionalizmusrdl is  a Szocialista Hazafisdgrdl, MSZMP Central Committee's Agitation 
and Propaganda Department, published in Tdrsadalmi Szemle 1959, year 14, Vol. 8-9, ppl 1-39.
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Genuine, legitimate feelings of pride are thus manipulated in an underhand effort to 
conceal the true agenda: "National sentiment, love of one's country is not the same as 
nationalism: nationalism is the corrupter of true national sentiment. Nationalism 
attempts to exploit the national sentiments of the masses to deceive the people".692 
Nationalism's obfuscating rhetoric lapses into mysticism with its pontifications on 
"blood and spirit, emotion and consciousness, tradition and vocation, world view and 
civilisation, faith and action".693 Socialist patriotism, by contrast, is the epitome of 
common sense: "The Socialist patriotism of the liberated working class does not 
emanate from some sort of mystical "national soul". Socialist patriotism is genuine 
love o f the people and the land o f birth, the battle for the social emancipation o f the 
working class and all working people and for an end to be put to every variety o f 
oppression, for the establishment o f the dictatorship o f the proletariat, for the 
building o f Socialism and the complete victory o f Communism. The homeland 
becomes the homeland of the working people; the bourgeois nation is replaced by the 
Socialist nation. Patriotism is filled with new content: active support for the building 
of Socialism. The basic tenet of Socialist patriotism is that, in our day and age, the 
path towards lasting national advance is that o f Socialism. For this very reason, 
Socialist patriotism acts as the militant protector of power vested in the people and of 
the Socialist organisation of production. The patriotic forces that support Socialism 
proclaim and effectuate solidarity and the right against the bourgeois counter­
revolution within the country and in the international sphere, with solidarity between 
the forces of Socialism and peace and the fight against imperialism."694 
Socialist patriotism was entirely compatible with proletarian internationalism and 
unity within the Socialist camp: "Internationalism of the workers is based on the fact 
that, in the right against capitalism, the proletariats of all countries share common
Reproduced in full in Helyiink Eurdpdban, Nizetek is  Koncepcidk a 20. Szdzadi Magyarorszdgon,
Vol. 2, Magvetd, Budapest 1986, edited by £va Ring, p400, hereinafter Helyiink. On this text, see also 
George Barany’s Hungary: From Aristocratic to Proletarian Nationalism, in Sugar and Lederer, op. 
cit., pp259-309, pp306-7. For Imre Nagy’s deliberations, which these statements contest, see Kemp, 
ppl40-2.
692 Helyiink, p224.
693 Op. cit., p230.
694 Op. cit, pp239-240, emphasis in the original. For an excellent overview of the dilemmas and 
pitfalls of socialist patriotism, see Kemp, pp 123-6.
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interests and afford each other mutual support in the fight to emancipate the workers. 
In the international fight against imperialism, the construction activities performed by 
the workers of the Socialist camp, the anti-capitalist and pro-democracy struggle of 
the working classes of the capitalist countries and the anti-imperialist struggle for 
liberation fought by the peoples of colonised and dependent countries coincide and 
intertwine".695 Imperialism's chief concern was to shatter this unity by spreading the 
calumny that its avowed foundation of "complete equality", territorial inviolability 
and sovereignty of the individual Socialist countries was nothing but a sham.696 In 
order to refute these allegations, the Soviet Union's dominance had to be put in its 
proper perspective, as the status due to a primus inter pares rather than the tribute 
exacted by an oppressive overlord (and the boundless adulation of the R&kosi era 
toned down to lend the arguments greater "objectivity"): "In the family of Socialist 
nations, the Soviet Union is the primary and strongest Socialist power, which has 
accumulated the greatest amount of experience in the building of Socialism and which 
has progressed furthest along the path leading to Communism, has provided and 
continues to provide the greatest assistance to the workers of the other Socialist and of 
the capitalist countries in the fight for peace and Socialism. The Soviet Union is the 
centre of the Socialist camp, the example which it sets is of inestimable value to the 
countries building Socialism".697 "Protecting and defending the unity of the Socialist 
camp and cultivating good relations with the Soviet Union are the primary 
requirements of Socialist patriotism"698 Such an unequivocal statement was designed 
to dispel any lingering doubts concerning Hungary's loyalties.
Having so firmly proclaimed Hungary's unswerving commitment to Socialism and 
taken the sting out of patriotism, K&d&r was able to relax the Party's authoritarian grip 
slightly and contain dangerous criticism through application of the "three Ts": tures 
(tolerance), tdmogatds (support for the so-called szalonellenzekiek or state-approved 
opposition) and tiltds (prohibiting), the latter reserved for those who asked more 
fundamental questions about the viability and desirability of the system. At the same
695 Op. cit., p241.
696 Op. cit., pp241-242.
697 Op. cit., p242, emphasis in the original.
698 Op. cit., p242.
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time he held out the prospect of greater prosperity for all in exchange for political 
conformity.699
The pragmatic Hungarian solution was but one amongst many. In Ceau§escu's 
Romania, a very different compromise with nationalism was arrived at.
Section Four: Representations
4.1 The Nature and Functions of Representations
I define representations as motivated statements about or depictions of a social reality 
(or specific aspects thereof), which are simultaneously constitutive of it, in relation to 
a presupposed collectivity (audience or target group, usually the nation700), seeking to 
influence thought (and often provoke debate), either with a view to maintaining 
existing classifications or to subvert or overthrow them. In many respects, 
representations merit the designation of the cultural embodiment of the dominant 
principle of classification.701
699 Cf. Kemp, pi 74: „Since the national Communist parties had been stripped of the mantle of protector 
of the nation, they had to seek legitimacy elsewhere. Increasingly they sought to stress their credentials 
of legitimation through ’substantive rationality*. (...) This policy of consumer socialism catered to 
people’s desire for material comfort* the implication was that although sovereignty would be limited, 
the state would do its best to make life relatively comfortable. In Hungary this was referred to as 
’goulash communism’”. For a critical appraisal of ’goulash communism’ (the later phase of which was 
called, with equal irony, ’fridge socialism’), see Tibor Valuch’s essay A ’gulydskommunizmus’ in Igndc 
Romsics (editor), Mitoszok, legenddk, tivhitek a 20. sztfzadi magyar tortinelemrol, Osiris Kiadd, 
Budapest 2002 (henceforth Mitoszok), pp361-390. However, as Kemp subsequently concedes, this did 
not mean that Kddir stopped currying popular favour through flirting with national symbols (pp480-l).
700 Cf. Billig, p96-9 and 105-9, especially the discussion of the “ratified audience".
701 Although this definition of representations is of my own devising, it was inspired by Durkheim’s 
collective representations, as examined at the beginning of the chapter, as well as by Billig (passim and 
pp60-l) and Serge Moscovici’s theory of social representations, particularly The Phenomenon o f 
Social Representations (in Social Representations, edited by Gerard Duveen, Polity Press, Cambridge, 
2000, ppl8-77) and Answers and Questions (in Journal for the Theory o f Social Behaviour, 17,1987, 
pp513-529). I also found the essays by Andy McKinlay, Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell
(Discourse Analysis and Social Representations), by Rob Farr (Theory and Method in the Study o f 
Social Representations) and by Michael Billig (Studying the Thinking Society: Social Representations, 
Rhetoric, and Attitudes), published in Empirical Approaches to Social Representations, edited by
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Representations are neither straightforwardly objective nor value-neutral, but involve 
position-takings within the wider sphere of public discourse (hence their natural 
constituency is the public domain) and are largely the preserve of intellectuals and 
politicians, the chief denizens of that realm.702 They always come into being with a 
distinct agenda, a practical purpose or goal to be attained. Consequently their validity 
cannot be assessed on the same basis as "objective" historical facts, they cannot 
simply be dismissed or discounted because of the dubious provenance, author bias, 
lack of historical "accuracy" or inconsistencies of their contents, but must be tested 
according to their success in sustaining identities and in reproducing culture.
4.2 Intellectuals as Producers of Representations
Intellectuals are defined for our purposes as producers of representations. Thus they 
belong to a very broad and fluid grouping, which can comprise a wide variety of 
professional occupations, from career academics to artists, filmmakers and journalists.
Glynis M. Breakwell and David V. Canter, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, (ppl34-156 and 15-38 and 
39-62 respectively) very helpful.
702 Politician and intellectual are not mutually exclusive categories. Indeed, my definition of 
intellectual below most decidedly includes politicians. The difference between them is that certain 
categories of intellectuals, for example historians place a premium on appearing “objective” (cf. 
Lorenz, op. cit., pp28-40,47-57,62-4,83-7 and 367-383 for the positivist conception of objectivity 
and the problems of applying it as a criterion to history) or “disinterested” (in the sense of 
“extraterritoriality”, as outlined by Zygmunt Bauman in Intellectuals in East-Central Europe: 
Continuity and Change, in East European Politics and Societies, Volume One (2), 1987, pp162-186, 
henceforth Intellectuals, p i64; disdain of partisanship, for which see p21 of his Legislators and 
Interpreters, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987, henceforth Legislators, and his discussion of “thinkers as 
such”, in Legislators, pp22-3) as this forms the essence of their claim to authority and special status, 
whereas adhesion to a particular ideology, world view or programme for reform is the very stuff of 
politics, taking the sting out of charges of partiality. This is not to suggest that any representation can 
in reality be free of political bias: intellectuals are not “immune” to “subjectivity-creep”, but often the 
ideological content will not necessarily be deliberate or conscious (taking the nation for granted being 
the case in point). Elie Kedourie is particularly scathing on the vanities and political ambitions of 
intellectuals. See Kedourie, pp39-40 and 43 and cf. Gellner on Kedourie’s stance, p56.
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Since we shall in subsequent chapters be focusing on textual representations created 
by intellectuals in Hungary and Romania, it is worthwhile dwelling on the specific 
context in which they carried out their work.
As Zygmunt Bauman explains, although the word “intellectual” itself is fairly recent, 
dating back to the Dreyfus affair,703 the concept behind it can be traced further back: 
“How far back depends on whether we are simply interested in the presence of a 
separate category of people assigned the role of manipulation and interpretation of the 
elusive but crucial factors of social integration called values, meanings and symbols. 
On the other hand, we might be looking for a distinct ‘intellectual mode*, ‘idiom*, or 
‘pattern’ articulated, codified and practiced by such manipulators and interpreters 
simultaneously as a tool of self-definition and as part of a bid for social power*’.704 In 
the first instance, the ancestry of the modem intellectual would be as old as human 
society itself, in the second, the birth of intellectuals occurred during the Age of 
Enlightenment.705 Originating in the West, the intellectual idiom, once established,
703 Cf. Lewis S. Feuer, Ideology and the Ideologists, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1975, pp205-6, which 
lists the 14th January 1898. On that day, the newspaper L’Aurore published a protest against the 
conduct of the Dreyfus trial in 1894, which was signed by distinguished names in French letters and 
science, including Anatole France and Zola. The editor, Georges Clemenceau, entitled it “Manifesto of 
the Intellectuals”.
704 Intellectuals, pp 164-5. In Legislators, he sets out his ideas at greater length. Here, for example, he 
makes the valuable point that the many definitions of the intellectual have one feature in common, 
which is that they are all self-definitions, in other words that they all involve an exercise in boundary- 
drawing. The underlying assumption on the part of the intellectuals is that they have the right to draw 
the boundary and, as a general rule, they remain silent about the divisive effects of the operation:
„What most definitions refuse to admit is that the separation of the two spaces (and the legislating of a 
specific relationship between them) is the purpose and raison d’etre of the definitional exercise, not its 
side-effect” (p8). Rather than any special qualities and possessions of the intellectuals as a group, it is 
this relationship, which constitutes them as a separate entity. The masked universal content of the self- 
definition is „the reproduction and reinforcement of a given social configuration, and -within it -  a 
given (or claimed) status for the group” (p9). The enthronement of knowledge legitimates the social 
superiority of the intellectuals (p i8). He therefore rejects what he tags as the „fmger-painting” method, 
which attempts to build up a collective definition by enumerating skills, occupations, attitudes, 
biographical types and so on (pl8). Instead: „We will treat the category of the intellectual as a 
structural element within the societal figuration, an element defined not by its intrinsic qualities, but by 
the place it occupies within the system of dependencies which such a figuration represents, and by the 
role it performs in the reproduction and development of the figuration” p i9).
705 Intellectuals, pl65. Cf. Legislators, pp21-37.
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became detachable. As a result, it could be grafted on to different structures, although 
substantive and functional changes accompanied the transplantation.706 In Central 
and Eastern Europe states were, according to Bauman, little more than urban based 
bureaucratic systems imposed upon peasant communes and extensive local holdings 
owned by traditional landowners. There was nothing comparable to the Westem-style 
absolutist state able to undermine the autonomy of intermediate levels of systemic 
integration with the consequence that the state could not seriously contemplate 
legislative initiatives genuinely affecting the conditions of its subjects. Hence: “The 
budding intelligentsia of East-Central Europe was, from its inception, confronted with 
the task of constructing a political body capable of effective action instead of merely 
converting the already existing state machinery to its rationalizing purposes”.707 As it 
travelled eastwards, the idiom raised its aspirations from an advisory role to the level 
of legislation itself: “Those who were to work out the shape of reason-dictated 
institutions had to shoulder simultaneously the responsibility for the construction and 
entrenchment of such institutions”.708
A second vital difference between the region and the West was the lack of overlap 
between dynastic states and the jumble of ethnic and linguistic communities. The 
unrelatedness of the two eliminated the possibility that existing monarchies could 
ever employ cultural domination as one of the key props of their political rale: “This 
circumstance put at the sole disposal of the intelligentsia the enormous realm of
70Qwould-be national integration where it encountered no competitors”. Intellectuals 
became national leaders, treating enclaves of local languages or dialects as the site of 
the true national home. In this way, political authority came to be seen as an 
emanation and supplement of cultural ascendancy rather than vice versa.
These two factors ensured that the separation between intellectual work and 
professionalized politics, the retreat of intellectuals into the cultural sphere and their 
subsequent preoccupation with the autonomy of culture were not carried over from 
the West.710
706 Intellectuals, pp 165-6.
707 Intellectuals, p i68.
708 As above.
709 As above.
710 Intellectuals, pl69.
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Socially, a very high proportion of intellectuals in Central and Eastern Europe were 
recruited from the ranks of the gentry. The majority were the sons of landowners 
whose estates were too small to provide sufficient income for a life of leisure. The 
spread of universities catered to their demand for alternative vehicles of status- 
reproduction. Whereas the limits of land ownership seemed “natural” (in the sense 
that there is only so much to go round and crop yields can only be increased finitely), 
limits on the volume of learned men society could absorb appeared “artificial” and 
called for reform. The virtual monopoly of foreign elites in the state administration 
and judiciary system was either guaranteed by law or achieved because their language 
was the official medium of communication in politics, administration or the courts. 
Pushing for recognition of local languages was the obvious strategy to pursue. This 
gave rise to a split between the aforementioned political-administrative-judicial area, 
symbolically set apart by its foreign language and “civil society”, embracing popular 
arts and ideology, with a separate tongue of its own. These peculiar circumstances 
have encouraged a “tendency to view the relation between the political state and civil 
society as one of conflict and competition rather than consensus and mutual support” 
as well as according intellectuals (whose forefathers did not have to share spiritual
71 ileadership with political elites) a degree of veneration unknown in the West. The 
intellectuals assumed the role of patrons (enjoying cultural hegemony over the 
backward, ignorant and superstitious), which ratified an asymmetry of power. In 
brief, the patrons had the right to command, the clients to obey.712 
The radical intelligentsia, which did not allow itself to be absorbed by the ancien 
regime, saw political revolution as a natural extension of its programme. Shouldering 
the burden of political rule was but a consequence of its concern with the proper 
performance of the intellectual's task. For the Bolsheviks, taking over the state was a 
ground-clearing operation for the building of a new society dictated by the precepts of 
reason and the laws of history. In order to carry out their programme, they formed 
themselves into a party and once they had succeeded in their endeavours to take 
control of the state they did not expect any disharmony between the new political 
power and the mission of the intellectuals. The divorce between the intellectuals and 
the state, which had taken place in the West, did not seem either expedient or
711 Intellectuals, pl72.
712 Intellectuals, p!73. For details on the type of power relations this entails, see ppl72-3.
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desirable in Russia, whilst in the broader arena of Central and Eastern Europe, the 
political domination of the Communist party could be viewed as a perpetuation of 
earlier traditions of patronage.713 Bauman concludes: “It is these elements of 
continuity which account for the remarkably close mutual engagement between the 
ruling party and the intelligentsia. Both could claim to be in the same business, to 
bear the same responsibilities, to share the same duties; both had to invoke the same 
legitimation in their respective bids for influence and elevated social positions; both 
had to recognize in each other’s work an activity which they could not refuse 
legitimacy without sapping the ideological foundations of their own practices”.714 
Rivalry and friction germinate in the same soil as agreement, however, and are 
ineradicable because of the “lateral, rather than processual nature of the continuity of 
idiom”. Party and intelligentsia exist side by side, as structurally separate 
categories, although the former requires the services of the latter to replenish its ranks 
and supply it with governing and managerial skills. At the same time, the party 
arrogates the sole right of initiative in the selection and dissemination of cultural 
values, the formation of opinions, the articulation of the criteria of moral and aesthetic 
judgement and decisions on the content of public education, thereby straying on to the 
intelligentsia's patch. Tension is exacerbated by the fact that a blend of coercion and 
ideological indoctrination is deployed in the everyday business of ruling: ’The need to 
indoctrinate renders the intellectual tendency to dabble with values and ideas a direct 
threat to the very source of the system of domination. As long as it lasts, this 
systemic arrangement leaves no room for an autonomous civil society, except for
• 716strictly professional areas tightly confined within politically defined boundaries”.
To summarise: for historical and structural reasons, even before the Communist 
takeovers, intellectuals in East-Central Europe have not been afraid to engage more 
directly in political activity than their counterparts in the West and this has not been
713 Intellectuals, pp 174-7.
714 Intellectuals, ppl77-8.
715 Op. cit., pl78.
716 Op. cit., pl79. The disagreement over the distribution of surplus product, which rubs salt into the 
intellectuals' wounds is dealt with on ppl79-80. On the distinction between the “intelligentsia” and the 
“educated elite”, see pp 180-2. Cf. also Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism, 
University of California Press, Berkeley, 1995 (originally 1991, henceforth Verdery), ppl5-19.
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viewed as an encroachment upon their autonomy or as a breach of professional
717propriety.
4.3 The Internal Dynamics of the Field of Cultural Production
Having addressed the issue of the producers of representations, we shall now return to 
our examination of their nature and function. Representations belong to the field of 
cultural production, or, to be more precise, are located at the intersection of the field 
of cultural production and that of politics (in east as in west). In order to understand 
how change within opinion occurs and why, in spite of protestations to the contrary 
on the part of certain groups of intellectuals representations are not impartial, we must 
turn to Pierre Bourdieu’s The Field o f Cultural Production.11*
The specific aspects of the field of cultural production arise from the mutual 
antagonism of two principles of consecration defined in opposition to one another, the 
heteronomous principle and the autonomous. As Bourdieu points out, "the 
generative, unifying principle of this "system" is the struggle, with all the 
contradictions it engenders"719 which also endows it with a temporal dimension, since 
the history of the struggle can be traced back through the past.720
Heteronomy results from demand and applies the same criteria of success as the 
"conventional" economy, in that it places a premium on high sales figures and profits 
in money. If the field were to disappear amongst others, this would be the principle
717 Bourdieu’s field theory is Western-oriented and does not take into consideration the almost 
complete erasure of artistic and intellectual autonomy under a Communist regime (although to avoid 
oversimplification we must note that the extent of the subordination of cultural output to political needs 
was historically and socially variable). In spite of this, his depiction of the field of cultural production 
can fulfil a useful function as an ideal-type from which wider conclusions on the nature of 
representations can be drawn. Cf. also Verdery’s account of the need to adjust Bourdieu’s theories to 
make them compatible with the conditions prevailing in Communist societies in Verdery, ppl7-18 and 
91-97.
718 Polity Press, Cambridge, 1993
719 Field, p34.
720 Op. cit., pl06.
721 Op. cit., p45.
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that would survive.722 The autonomous principle, by contrast, disdains commerciality 
and eschews worldly gain for the sake of a different kind of prestige, the approval of 
peers in the sub-field of restricted production, where the works of art are intended for 
the appreciation of fellow-producers rather than the public at large. Here, the 
traditional economy is reversed and material success is equated with artistic 
bankruptcy, selling out to pander to the tastes of the philistines. Although both 
groups of producers seek to accumulate symbolic capital, the logic Of the field itself 
tips the balance in favour of the innovators who vaunt their disinterestedness "through 
the denunciation of the mercenary compromises or calculating manoeuvres of the 
adversary, so that disavowal of the "economy" is placed at the veiy heart of the field, 
as the principle governing its functioning and transformation".723 Thus, the poorer 
and more obscure the artist, the greater the amount of symbolic capital he may feci he 
has at his disposal. Furthermore, "discredit increases as the audience grows and its 
specific competence declines, together with the value of the recognition implied in the 
act of consumption".724 If the field were to become completely autonomous, this 
latter principle would prevail.725
The entire structure of the field is determined by the polarisation of these rival 
principles726 and the fundamental dichotomy commercial/disinterested sets the 
parameters of what is considered legitimate and illegitimate. Within the field, the 
logic of its principles regulates the actions of agents as well as determining the 
implications of position-takings. There are only a certain number of possible 
position-takings and whenever a new style is launched, for example, this alters the 
significance of them all, without exception. This leads automatically to change: 
"change in the space of literary or artistic possibles is the result of change in the 
power relation which constitutes the space of positions. When a new literary or 
artistic group makes its presence felt in the field of literary or artistic production, the 
whole problem is transformed, since its coming into being, i.e. into difference,
722 Op. cit, p38.
723 Op. cit., p79.
724 Op. cit., p48. Emphasis in original.
725 Op. cit., p38.
776 Op. cit., pi 15.
page 195
modifies and displaces the universe of possible options".727 Thus the internal 
dynamics of the field itself dictate that change is both inevitable and permanent (since 
entry into the field can only be achieved by means of position-taking). Moreover, 
changes in one field can have repercussions on developments outside its specific 
confines.
The field of cultural production is but one amongst many fields of social activity. As 
we have seen, it takes a rejection of the established values of the field of economic 
production as its starting-point, reversing the criteria of success and failure applied 
there as a means of asserting its own independence. Cultural power in the form of 
symbolic capital can be acquired through participation in the cut and thrust of combat 
in the field without this being accompanied by an increase in the material prosperity 
of the producer concerned, disguising the fact that he continues to belong to the ranks 
of the dominated rather than the dominant group in the spectrum.728 Because the 
logic of the autonomous principle pervades the field as a whole, the rewards of 
symbolic capital are imbued with greater moral and indeed absolute worth in the eyes 
of the agents themselves. However, habitus and field interact, predisposing 
individuals to discern their "vocation", the most appropriate position-taking for them 
in the field. It is in the propensity to take economic risks that the relationship between 
the field of cultural production and another field (that of power) is revealed: 
"economic capital provides the conditions for freedom from economic necessity” and 
can be "the basis of self-assurance, audacity and indifference to profit" which is 
essential for a would-be innovator of the avant-garde.729 An individual who, in spite 
of low status embarks on a trajectory within the field, may feel more inclined to try 
his hand at writing a best-seller or painting in a populist style simply because of the 
potential for profits. By the same token, a high concentration of economic and 
educational capital may make a career in cultural production more attractive in the 
first instance because of the freedom it confers. Conversely, a lack thereof may act as 
a deterrent because the pressure to earn a living will be correspondingly greater,
727 Op. cit., p32.
728 Op. cit., plOl.
729 Op. cit., p68. It could equally be argued that those who have so little income or social status that 
they have nothing to lose as it is, or that very young artists who wish to make a name for themselves are 
also impelled towards the avant-garde. Cf. pp 59-60.
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outweighing other motivations. Necessity can be a major disincentive. Whereas it is 
impossible to draw generalised conclusions about the precise impact of the interaction 
of the fields, as this will depend on the individual, it is sufficient to note the 
interaction itself, since it affords us with an insight into how concerns which, on a 
superficial level, are the preserve of one specific realm easily intrude into another 
with which it denies having anything in common yet whose interests coincide with its 
own and with which it actively colludes.
The best illustration of this in the field of cultural production is the collective bad 
faith, which sustains the illusion of disinterestedness, the public repudiation of self- 
interest. Without this illusion, the field would be indistinguishable from the field of 
economic production. The conceit of cultural producers is to court fame and 
reputation, which pave the way for obtaining privilege and even the most sought-after 
prize of immortality in the pantheon, whilst denying that these attributes are what they 
aspire to, that pursuit of them would not only sully them, but would also be beneath 
their professional dignity.730 Thus, the concerns at stake are similar to those at stake 
within the field of economic production: how to glean the maximum advantage from 
the investment of one's personal resources and abilities. The two concepts of power, 
cultural and economic, do not pose a threat to each other. Quite the opposite: 
acquisition of one type may actively enhance possession of the other, therefore they 
can be mutually reinforcing. One of the standard trappings of success in the economy 
is collection of artworks to give an air of respectability to wealth.731 Cultural 
competence in the form of taste can considerably boost one's standing, compensating 
for many inadequacies just as symbolic capital can be used to command its 
"economic" counterpart.
Although Bourdieu restricts his analysis to art, literature and aesthetics, his model of 
change as the cumulative effect of minor displacements in position-takings stimulated 
by competition over resources and his recognition that even the espousal of 
disinterestedness hides a claim to status and power can usefully be extended to the 
output of intellectuals in general, including “serious” or academic historians. The
730 Op. cit., pp 74,75 and 78-9.
731 Outline, pp 196-7.
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professional ethos, which separates the academic historian from the dilettante, 
functions as an entrance barrier to the field. Only those who pass the test of poring 
over documents buried in the recesses of archives and satisfying other standards set by 
the corps of adepts are granted admittance. Regulating access in this manner upholds 
the reputation of the peer-recognized experts and is the justification for their exalted 
status.732
In reality, none of the historian’s acts of representation are disinterested since they 
stake a claim to consecration (acknowledgement of value by those members of the 
artistic or professional community enjoying prestige and authority and elevation to the 
ranks of the elite as well as possible inclusion in the canon733), recognition (by the 
public at large and by colleagues) or financial reward whether under the autonomous 
or heteronomous principle. Moreover, since the past can never be reconstructed in 
full some selection of what is likely to be of interest will occur, but such choices are 
always influenced by the more mundane considerations of attracting sponsors (grants, 
fellowships and the like), of what stands a reasonable chance of being published and, 
on a subtler level, by the dominant principle of classification, which acts as a 
background filter, suggesting what knowledge is "worthwhile" as well as roughly 
outlining its contents. Expressed in slightly different terms, the principle of 
classification limits the repertoire of what is produced as well as what is likely to be 
presented to the literate public by means of publication and dissemination. 
Representations, even those claiming scientific neutrality, cannot help but be imbued 
with its preferences, shoring it up.735
Once the immediacy of the lived moment has faded, historical writing becomes the 
repository of public memory. Therefore on a further, less obvious level, history, 
particularly those prestigious works that make up the accepted canon (its volumes 
gracing the shelves of public libraries and educational establishments alike and
732 Cf. Igndc Romsics' delightful essay A tortinetirds objektivitdsdnak mitoszdrdl is  a mult 
mitizdldsdnak elfogadhatatlansdgdrdl. In Mitoszok, pp24-25.
733 Cf. Bourdieu, Field, pp50-52.
734 In democracies. The tighter control of representations and their contents under Communism is dealt 
with in Chapter Three below.
735 Cf. Billig, ppl6-8 and 49-55 and, specifically on the effects of nationalism on history writing, 
BreuiUy 1993, pp55-64.
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cannibalized for textbooks), is inextricably entangled with the dominant principle of 
classification, deeply implicated in upholding the prevailing value-system.736 
One further reason for singling out historians for particular scrutiny is that they have 
been particularly active participants in the construction of nationhood. In 
Hobsbawm’s words: ‘Tor historians are to nationalism what poppy-growers in 
Pakistan are to heroin addicts: we supply the essential raw material for the market. 
Nations without a past are contradictions in terms. What makes a nation is the past; 
what justifies one nation against others is the past and historians are the people who 
produce it. So my profession, which has always been mixed up in politics, becomes 
an essential component of nationalism. More so even than the ethnographers, 
philologists and other suppliers of ethnic and national services who have usually also 
been mobilized”.737
Before concluding, it is worthwhile stressing a point, which might seem so obvious 
that it scarcely bears mentioning: intellectuals are not made overnight. They must 
gradually absorb knowledge, acquiring the skills of articulacy, participation in 
reasoned debate and critical analysis. Without these tools of the trade, they cannot go 
about the business of producing representations. Training through higher education is 
the swiftest route to obtaining them. This requires resources, both infrastructural
736 Cf. Szporluk, p i66 and Billig’s discussion of “common sense” in sociology (Billig, pp51-55). I 
would also briefly add a few speculations of my own on the nature of history as an academic pursuit: 
history contributes to the understanding of what is by showing how it was arrived at, mapping the path, 
which led to i t  It is not the explicit role of history to criticize what is (although historians frequently 
do). Instead, its subject matter is the past which needs to be explained and critically analyzed. 
Furthermore, historical writing always combines a list of “raw” facts (dates, lists of participants) with 
interpretations. The latter entails adopting a stance or viewpoint which is open to contestation.
737 Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today, in Balakrishnan, p255, emphasis in the original. 
Having reviewed the relevant literature, I feel safe in concluding that almost the only issue upon which 
scholars of nationalism can agree is the importance of shared historical memories in creating a nation. 
Smith’s prolific writings on history, memories and nationhood are unmatched in depth and excellence. 
See Ethnic, pp25-6,177-183,191-200; Smith 1991, pp65-8,91-8,161 and 163-4; Myths, p l6  for his 
definition of “ethno-history”, pp29-55 for Nationalism and the Historians, 60-1,163-186 for 
Gastronomy or Geology? The Role o f Nationalism in the Reconstruction o f Nations. Cf. Kedourie, 
pp71-4 and Hutchinson, Modem Nationalism, p3. See also Historians as Nation-Builders, edited by 
Dennis Deletant and Harry Hanak, Macmillan Press, Houndmills, 1988 and Historians in Politics, 
edited by Walter Laqueur and George L. Mosse, Sage, London, 1974.
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(universities, colleges) and cultural (fluency in the mother tongue and any other 
language of teaching). Depriving a collectivity of the means to nurture its own 
intellectuals to replenish the ranks of the retired and deceased severely inhibits its 
ability to reproduce itself. Such an effect is magnified if the collectivity in question is 
submerged within a larger, ethnically, linguistically or culturally divergent 
community. The situation faced by the Hungarian minority in Romania is emblematic 
in this respect. Exposed to constant suspicions of disloyalty, the open use of 
Hungarian symbols by its members could risk being interpreted as a blatant 
provocation, leaving language and representations as the primary means of cultural 
reproduction. As a result, they assumed even greater significance than they would 
have under more “normal” circumstances.
Conclusion
In the case study which follows, we shall endeavour to pursue the core theoretical 
issues raised, namely the link between identity and the dominant principle of 
classification; the effect of the national principle of classification on representations 
of identity, particularly minority identity; how collective identities evolve and are 
reproduced; the strategies designed to undermine identities and the counter-strategies 
to preserve them in a hostile environment; the relationship between representations 
(and identity) and politics (the contextuality of representations) and the impact of both 
principles of classification and representations upon perceptions.
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Chapter Two: Hungarian Minority Identity in 
Transylvania from the Treaty of Trianon to the Vienna 
Awards
Introduction
.it matters a lot what a nation imagines itself to be; in other words, the significance 
lies in the content of its nationalist self-image. It matters whether that image defines 
the nation as naturally peaceful or warrior-like, naturally democratic or authoritarian, 
sympathetic to new economic methods or traditionally agrarian, open to all who wish 
to join it or defined by racial (and therefore impenetrable) criteria”.
Roman Szporluk.738
In this chapter, we shall examine representations of Hungarian identity in both 
Hungary and Transylvania (dealt with chronologically) to show how they diverged 
after Trianon. Throughout I shall be focusing in depth on the work of individual 
intellectuals whose contributions explicitly address the issue in hand and whose work 
is emblematic of wider currents of thought. Before proceeding to the analysis, 
however, a brief sketch of Hungarian history is required to set the scene.
The Hungarian tribes arrived in the Carpathian Basin around 895.739 According to 
historian Lajos Kontler, Transylvania appears to be the first portion of land where 
they gained a foothold, each of the seven chieftains having erected an earthen “castle” 
(hence the German designation for Transylvania, Siebenbiirgen).140 Founder of the 
Hungarian state, Saint Istv&n (around 975-1038) received his royal insignia from Pope 
Sylvester n, his coronation symbolising the full conversion of the country to 
Christianity and its inclusion amongst the monarchies of the West.741 At the same
738 Szporluk, p i64. Emphasis in original.
739 See L6szl6 Makkai, The Hungarians’ Prehistory, their Conquest o f Hungary and their Raids to the 
West to 955, in Sugar 1994, pp8-14.
740 Kontler, p43.
741 Kontler, pp52-3. As one of the most symbolically-charged figures in Hungarian history, Saint Istvdn 
has proven particularly attractive to historians with a correspondingly large corpus of works assessing 
his role. Of these, I would recommend the following: Bdlint H6man, Szentlstvdn, Kairosz Kiadd,
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time, his establishment of an institutional framework modelled on existing Western 
patterns signalled the transition from a nomadic to a sedentary lifestyle with an 
emphasis on property and security.742 Due to its geographical location, the medieval 
kingdom constantly had to fend off expansionist challenges from foreign powers. 
Initially the Germans constituted the main threat, but from the early fifteenth century 
onwards the Ottoman Turks proved the greater menace.743
The golden age of Hungary (reaching its zenith during the reign of King Mdty&s from 
1464 to 1490)744 came to a bitter end at the Battle of Mohdcs on 29th August 1526 
where the cream of the Hungarian nobility and their king, Lajos II fell, leaving the 
road to Buda wide open to Suleyman the Magnificent’s troops.745 The Hungarian 
estates elected two kings simultaneously after Lajos IT s death, a state of affairs, 
which eventually led to the division of the kingdom into three parts. Most of the 
nobles rallied around Jdnos Szapolyai, whilst a smaller group of magnates favoured 
Habsburg Archduke (and Bohemian king) Ferdinand I.746 The Ottomans profited 
from the wranglings to persuade the Szapolyai faction that they were true allies. On 
29th August 1541, Siileyman’s armies entered Budapest on the pretext of protecting 
the now deceased Szapolyai’s infant son’s rights against Ferdinand. Two days later, 
he assigned the lands east of the Tisza river and Transylvania to Jdnos II and so the 
life of the latter as an independent (at least as far as internal matters were concerned)
Budapest, 2000 (originally 1939); Zoltln Magyar, Szent Istvdn a magyar kultdrtortinetiben, Helikon 
Kiadd, Budapest, 1996; Llszld Veszpidmy (editor), Szent Istvdn is  a magyar dllamalapitds, Osiris, 
Budapest, 2002; Ivin Bertdnyi, Szent Istvdn is  oroksige 1000-1440, Vince Kiadd, Budapest, 1997; 
Gyula Kristd, Szent Istvdn kirdly, Vince Kiad6, Budapest, 2001 and GyOrgy Gydrfly, Istvdn kirdly is  
muve, Balassi Kiadd, Budapest, 2000 (third edition). On the early history of the Hungarian state, see 
Llszld Makkai, The Foundation o f the Hungarian Christian State 950-1196, in Sugar 1994, ppl5-22 
and his Transformation into a Western-Type State, 1196-1301, in idem, pp23-33.
742 Kontler, p53.
743 Kontler, p65.
744 On Mltyls, whose epithet “the Just” testifies to his popularity amongst his subjects, see Kontler, 
ppl 18-128. See also Andris Kubinyi, Mdtyds kirdly, Vince Kiadd, Budapest, 2001 and Jlnos Bak, The 
Late Medieval Period, 1382-1526, pp70-76 in Sugar 1994, pp54-82.
745 Kontler, p i 36 and Jlnos Bak, op.cit., pp80-82.
746 Ferenc Szaklly, The Early Ottoman Period, including Royal Hungary, 1526-1606, p83 in Sugar 
1994, pp83-99.
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Principality began.747 Ferdinand, having set up court in Pozsony (Bratislava), 
repeatedly attempted to retake Buda, to no avail. When in 1547 envoys of Emperor 
Charles Vth negotiated a five year armistice with Suleyman at Edime, the situation in 
Royal Hungary settled down somewhat.748 Ottoman Hungary stretched from Lake 
Balaton northward to the Danube and eastward to the Tisza and the Transylvanian 
border, moving further east and west after the conquests of 1566 749 
It was not until 1686 that the tide turned against the Turks with the liberation of Buda 
by Christian forces led by Charles of Lorraine. A series of victories followed and on 
18th October 1687, the Hungarian nobles at Pozsony (Bratislava) recognised the 
House of Habsburg’s hereditary right to the Hungarian throne by way of gratitude to 
Leopold L In an edict, which became known as the Diploma Leopoldinum of 
October 1690, the latter bestowed upon himself the title of Prince of Transylvania,
751reconfirming its separate constitutional status.
Having quelled the uprising led by Ferenc R£k6czi II,752 the Habsburgs consolidated 
their position in Hungary and did not have to respond to a serious challenge until the 
1848 Revolution and Hungarian War of Independence. The Revolution followed 
similar events in Palermo, Paris, Piedmont and Vienna. Prompted by public unease 
over the monarchy’s financial difficulties, Lajos Kossuth, a deputy in the Lower 
House of the Hungarian Diet (still in Pozsony) and enemy of feudal privileges took 
the floor on 3rd March to insist upon the immediate realisation of the opposition’s full 
reform programme (the German translation of which contributed to the atmosphere in
747 Kontler, pl42 and Szak£ly, op.cit., pp83-5. The truce only lasted for four years, however. Turkish 
aggression expanded their territorial gains on Hungarian soil, the war only ending when the second 
Peace of Edime was signed in 1568. Szaldly, op.cit., pp86-7 and Kontler, ppl46-7.
748 Ferenc Szakdly, op.cit., p86 and Kontler, pl46.
749 SzakAly, op.cit., pp86-7. On the period up to the Peace of Szatmdr/Satu Mare, see Pdter Katalin, 
The Later Ottoman Period and Royal Hungary, 1606-1711 in Sugar 1994, pp100-120 and Kontler, 
ppl48-190. On semi-independent Transylvania, see Peter Sugar, The Principality o f Transylvania, in 
Sugar 1994, ppl21-137.
750 Kontler, ppl82-3 and Katalin, op.cit., ppl 16-7.
751 Kontler, pl83.
752 When Ferenc Rdk6czi II was vanquished Habsburg domination of Hungary was placed on a secure 
footing. See footnote 778 below.
page 203
Vienna sparking revolt there).753 An address to the crown summarising the petitions 
was drafted and with the approval of the Upper House a delegation set off for Vienna 
on 15th March to present the document to the ruler. On the same day revolution broke 
out in Pest with Jdzsef Irinyi's Twelve Points going beyond Kossuth's impassioned 
speech printed along with poet Sdndor Petofi’s National Song. At the head of a 
crowd numbering around 20,000 Irinyi, Petofi, the novelist M6r J6kai and other 
radical intellectuals made their way to the city halls of Pest and Buda and then to the 
Gubemium (Viceregal Council), all of which agreed to the demands. Count Lajos 
Batthy&ny was appointed Prime Minister of Hungary on 18th March.754 His 
government (with Kossuth as Minister of Finance) lasted until September. On 11th 
April, a new constitution (which included the reunion of Hungary and Transylvania) 
was accepted by Ferdinand Vth. Two intractable problems plunged Hungary into war 
against Austria. The first was the lack of clarity over finances, foreign affairs and the 
military, the second centred on Hungary's relations with Croatia-Slavonia and the 
national minorities.755 His appreciation of international developments spurred 
Kossuth to make another important speech in July, where he was able to persuade 
deputies to vote over 40 million forints of credit and 200,000 recruits for a national 
army, the honved. On 31st August the Austrian Wessenberg administration issued a 
memorandum arguing that the setting up of separate Ministries of War and Finance in 
accordance with the April Laws (the new constitution) were contrary to the Pragmatic
733 Kossuth (1802-1894) became both a national hero and an international celebrity. He founded the 
daily Pesti Hirlap in 1841, agitating for reform in its columns. Again, the literature on Kossuth is vast 
due to his iconic status, but I have found the following volumes on Kossuth, the Revolution and the 
War of Independence useful: Domokos Kosdry, Kossuth Lajos a reformkorban, Osiris, Budapest, 2002 
(originally 1946); Gyorgy Didszegi and Mdnika Bakos, Kossuth Lajos is  a Pesti Hirlap a tdrsadalmi 
vdltoztatdsokirt, Variant-Mddia Rekldm 6s Kiadd KfL, Budapest, 2001; Istvdn NemeskUrty, 1848-49 
“Kik irted haltak, szent vildgszabadsdg”, Aquila Kdnyvek, LAP-ICS Kiadd, Budapest, 1998 (original 
1977) and Sdndor Pethd, A szabadsdgharc eszmei, Holnap Kiadd, Budapest, 2000 (original 1916).
734 Batthydny (1807-1849) was executed on 6th October 1849 as part of the Austrian campaign of 
reprisals against the insurgents.
733 Hungary refused liability for paying any share of state debt and wanted to enjoy the right to issue its 
own banknotes (which it proceded to do on 6th September). There was no clear demarcation between 
the powers of the respective Ministers of War (Kontler, p250). On Croatia-Slavonia and the minorities, 
see Kontler, pp250-l and Istvdn Dedk, The Revolution and the War o f Independence, 1848-1849, 
pp216-7 in Sugar 1994, pp209-234.
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Sanction, declaring them null and void. A 50,000-strong army crossed the Hungarian 
border at the beginning of September.756 Hungary held out against the Austrians until 
5th October 1849.757
Suppression of the Revolution ushered in the period of neo-absolutism, but the 
Hungarian spirit was not completely broken. Having been expelled from the German 
Confederation after its defeat at the Battle of Koniggratz, Austria was finally forced to 
adopt a more conciliatory stance towards Hungarian calls for a greater say in the 
running of their possessions. The Compromise of 1867, passed by the Hungarian 
Parliament on 20th March stipulated that the two halves of the empire were to be self- 
governing states as far as domestic issues were concerned with their own responsible 
ministries. Defence, foreign affairs and the finances needed to cover these were to be 
managed by joint ministries answerable to the emperor and to delegations consisting 
of sixty members of each Parliament. The ruler was supreme warlord and reserved 
the right to grant prior approval to any bills destined for Parliament Transylvania 
was reincorporated into the kingdom of Hungary and Franz Joseph was crowned king 
on 8th June 1867.758
The final demise of the historic kingdom of Hungary came with the Treaty of Trianon 
(entry into force 26th July 1921), which reduced Hungary’s territory from 282,000 to
93,000 square kilometres and its population by 43% from 18.2 to 7.6 million, giving 
rise to what has gone down in Hungarian history as the ‘Trianon trauma”.759
736 Kontler, p252. The Pragmatic Sanction, dating from 1713 proclaimed that all Habsburg lands were 
indivisible, their inheritance was based on primogeniture, including the female line should the male die 
out and strictly defined the practicalities of the female line’s succession (Horst Haselsteiner, 
Cooperation and Confrontation between Rulers and the Noble Estates, 1711-1790, pl44 in Sugar 
1994, ppl38-164).
737 The famous unconditional surrender of Hungarian troops to the Russians at Vildgos/$iria in August 
did not mark the end of the conflict (see Istvdn Dedk, op.cit., p233).
758 Kontler, pp277-9. See also Tibor Frank, Hungary and the Dual Monarchy, 1867-1890, in Sugar 
1994, pp252-266.
739 Romsics 2000, pl45. That the Trianon trauma has become deeply ingrained in the Hungarian
psyche is attested to by the sheer volume of literature on the subject In Trianon utddlete. Vdlogatds a
magyar nyelvu irodalom bibliogrdfidjdbdl 1920-2000, XX. Szdzad Intdzet, Kairosz Kiadd, Budapest
2000, Archimddesz Szidiropulosz lists a total of 1538 items on the subject published in Hungarian (and
Hungary) alone, a further 1785 in the Carpathian Basin for the period 1948-88. Between 1989 and
2000,228 new works were printed. On the popular myths that began to surround Trianon and the
signing, see Baldzs Ablonczy, Trianon-legenddk, in Mitoszok, ppl32-161. Pdl Teleki, one of the
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2.1 Hungarianness
Never before had the national doxa been issued such a challenge and the pervasive 
conviction of an injustice having been committed at Trianon was coupled with 
introspection in an attempt to refute the charges and slanders levelled against the 
Hungarians by representatives of the successor states.
Redefining and reasserting Hungarianness took place against the backdrop of the 
upheaval the treaty caused and amidst the ferment of notions concerning race and 
destiny, superiority and inferiority and fitness to rule or be ruled circulating in the 
broader European context. The undertaking assumed a variety of forms, of which we 
shall examine three: Hungarianness as vocation, as characteristics and as essence.760
2.2 Hungarianness as Vocation: Tibor Joo
In his The Concept o f the Hungarian Nation (A Magyar Nemzet Eszme) from 1939,761 
Tibor Jod reviews the peculiar features of the indigenous Hungarian idea of what 
constituted the nation and how Hungary's enthusiastic embracing of an alien 
nationalism imported from the West in the name of progress sowed the seeds of the
leaders of the peace delegation and later Prime Minister, called the conditions created by the Treaty 
unbearable and untenable (idem, pl48).
760 For the historical evolution of the concept of national character, see Smith 1991, pp84-91. Cf. 
Eduard Spranger, Wie erf asst man einen Nationalcharakter? Verlag von Quelle und Meyer, Leipzig, 
1939; Mih&ly Szegedy-Maszdk, The Idea o f National Character: A Romantic Heritage, in: Peter 
Boemer (ed.), Concepts o f National Identity, An Interdisciplinary Dialogue, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1986, pp45-61; Ivo Banac and Katherine Verdery (eds.), National 
Character and National Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe, Yale Center for International and Area 
Studies, New Haven, 1995; Frederick Hertz, Nationality in History and Politics, Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner and Company, London, 1944; Erich Kahler, Der Deutsche Charakter in der Geschichte 
Europas, Europa-Verlag, Zurich, 1937; Graf Hermann Keyserling, Das Spektrum Europas, Niels 
Kampmann Verlag, Heidelberg, 1928 and Ernest Barker, National Character and the Factors in its 
Formation, Harper, New York and London, 1927.
761 Franklin Tfrsulat, Budapest. On this work, see Barany, op. cit., pp291-2. Bom in 1901 in 
Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca, Jod wrote on the philosophy of history and in the field of the history of ideas, 
earning a living as a librarian at the University of Szeged and later the Szdchenyi National Library. A 
contributor to journals such as Nyugat and Magyar Szemle and opponent of the spread of German 
Fascism to Hungary, his life was cut tragically short when he died of wounds sustained during the siege 
of Budapest in 1945.
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country's destruction and dismemberment. The origin of a nation is to be found in its 
consensual subscription to a unifying concept:
"The nation is a human community. The human intellect organises it from the natural 
state of instinctive cohabitation over a long period of development within a series of 
intermediate conditions. What renders the community a nation is a concept accepted 
by the community from its existence as a nation and which governs its life as an ideal 
and an aim. Its members are soldered together into a nation through the faith they 
place in this concept.
Both the idea and the national community itself are historical formations and as such 
undergo change and development. A further concomitant of being situated within 
history is that development has different implications for individual national units and 
hence the accepted concept of what makes up the nation can vary from one nation and 
one era to another".762
The ancient Hungarian model of national belonging had its roots in the nomadic way 
of life of the honfolgaldk [the settlers who occupied the Hungarian homeland],763 
characterised not by divisive insistence on homogeneity, but on tolerant incorporation 
of diversity, as exemplified in Saint Istvdn's "Exhortations"764 where the King set out 
the benefits of a conscious policy of extending hospitality:
"' Because as guests come from different lands they bring with them different kinds of 
language, customs, weapons and learning, all of which adorns the kingdom, exalts the
762 Op. tit., pS. Throughout all translations are my own except where otherwise acknowledged. 
Emphasis in original. In Jod's opinion Hungary's naive espousal of Western ideals merely speeded up 
the inevitable decline of the native ideas as the country had been progressively weakened by the 
bloodshed of the previous 200 years to resist, see p22.
763 On the origins of the Hungarians, see Kontler, pp33-43 and Gdbor Vdkony, Magyar ostortinet, 
magyar honfoglalds. Nap Kiadd, Budapest, 2002. The term honfoglaldk dates from the post-1848 
period, with Mdr Jdkai using the verb hontfoglalni in the 1850s. Having made it into the Hungarian 
dictionary of the 1860s, the historian Kdroly Szabd popularised it further. The lack of early sources on 
Hungarian origins meant that even Anonymous and Simon Kdzai, authors of the two most famous gesta 
in the 13* century had to resort to speculation (Vdkony, ppl98-9). The seven tribes made their way 
across the Carpathians to their new homeland in 896.
764 Szent Istvdn (Saint Stephen) (ca. 975-1038), whose pagan name had been Vajk, was converted and 
christened at Esztergom, receiving royal insignia from Pope Sylvester II. He was canonised in 1083. 
The Exhortations were addressed to his son, Imre who died in a hunting accident in 1031 (Kontler, 
pp52-59). The precise date on which they were written is unknown (On the Exhortations, see Gdza 
£rszegi, Arpdd-kori Legenddk is  Intelmek, Osiris Kiadd, Budapest, 2001, pp47-55).
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court and discourages the audacity of foreigners. Verily the country with but one 
language and morality is weak and fragile. Hence I enjoin upon you, my son, to 
nurture them with benevolence and honour so that they prefer to reside with you than 
elsewhere' ”.765
The nomadic lifestyle of the Hungarian tribes, warrior shepherds, whose natural 
community was that of the empire, required a radically different set of characteristics 
from those of settled, agrarian peoples:
"constant vigilance, weighing up circumstances, the ability of keen discernment, swift 
and practical decision-making, consistency in carrying out decisions, flexibility, 
resoluteness and ingenuity, virtue and authoritative will, unfaltering intellectual 
alertness".766
The endless steppes were open, unbounded (and consequently unboundaried), a 
landscape in which peoples mixed, literally and metaphorically, and where rulers 
fought their way to power, deposed by internal strife or an overwhelming external 
force. The conquerors had neither the strength nor the time to concern themselves 
with the niceties of the language and customs of their subjects, to meddle with them 
by experimenting in assimilation. Instead the only viable method of domination was 
for them to place themselves above their subjects whilst allowing the latter to retain 
their distinctiveness. In this way diversity became the basis of pride and self-esteem. 
The strategy of the nomad was that of accepting new elements into the community, 
which subsequently identified themselves with it, accepting its traditions and serving 
its interests and the entire empire was held together by the figure of the ruler. 
Obtaining a share in his power and prestige was not the exclusive preserve of 
members of his tribe, but open to all with the relevant qualities and abilities.767 
This represented the heritage of the Hungarian tribes at the time of the blood pact and 
the adoption of the name of the leading tribe to designate the whole (magyar), both of 
which symbolically united them as brothers.768 This is recognised as the birth of the
765 A Magyar Nemzet Eszme, p27.
766 Op. cit., p33.
767 Op. cit., pp 34-37,39.
768 The virszerzodds (blood pact) is recorded by the chronicler Anonymous, according to whom the 
decision to leave the ancestral homeland of Scythia was motivated by overcrowding. The leaders of the 
seven Hungarian tribes (Almos, Eldd, Ktind, 6nd, Tas, Huba and T6t6ny), unable to bear the lack of 
space any longer, held a council at which they agreed to set off in search of more congenial
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Hungarian nation.769 During the Middle Ages, Hungarian kings were all too happy to 
appropriate the myths of shared genealogy with Attila and the Huns, extended later to 
include the magyar people.770
In establishing a centralised state, Saint Istvdn perpetuated the notion of the ruler 
embodying or personifying the unity of his subject peoples, who were all Hungarian 
simply by virtue of being under his sovereignty. Awareness of being a nation 
awakened gradually, although not every inhabitant of the territories of the Hungarian 
crown was considered to be a member of the nation, however. That was a privilege 
reserved for the nobility, whose ranks were continually added to as a token of 
appreciation for loyalty shown irrespective of whether the individuals thus rewarded 
were magyar or from another of the subject peoples.771
When the Arp&d dynasty died out the concept of national unity was transferred from 
the person of the king to the Holy Crown itself.772 The wearer of the crown continues 
to reign above all peoples, belonging to none and rights, freedoms and privileges stem 
from nobility.773 With the fragmentation of Christendom and the increasing 
secularisation of the state, dynastic and national interests were perceived as 
converging, the monarch acting in their defence. The Hungarian nobility gained a 
sense of forming an independent entity with a set of responsibilities and a degree of
surroundings. They chose Pannonia, rumoured to have belonged to Attila, from whom Almos, father of 
Arpld, was descended. Before departing they elected Almos leader and commander, swearing loyalty 
to him and his line, opening their veins and mixing the shed blood in a vessel as confirmation of their 
oath (Anonymous, A magyarok cselekedetei; K6zai Simon A magyarok cselekedetei, Osiris, Budapest, 
2001, ppl2-13).
769 Op. cit., p43.
770 Op. cit„ pp43-46.
771 Op. cit., pp54,55,58,60,61.
772 Arpdd was Almos* son. The 23 kings and five Grand Dukes of the house of Arpdd ruled from the 
beginning of the 9th century until the death of Andrds III in 1301 (his daughter Erzsdbet, the last of the 
female line, passing away in 1338). For biographical sketches of each member of the dynasty, see 
Gyula Krist6 and Ferenc Makk, Az Arpddokfejedelmek 4s lardlyok, Szukits K6nyvkiad6, Debrecen, 
2001.
773 Op. cit., p64.
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sovereignty. Their calling was to repel pagan incursions, be the bastion of the West 
against the raging storms from the East.774
Rejections of foreign interference were aimed at protecting the territorial integrity of 
the kingdom; the criterion for Hungarianness was fidelity to the shared vocation and 
the freedom of the nation was equated with the freedom of the nobility.775 
Hungarianness was blind to extraction. In Jod's evocative phrase: "It is a nation 
above ethnicity".776 What forged the Hungarian nobles together was no longer 
basking in a glorious past and triumphant present, but the experience of having no 
allies to turn to, no outside resources to draw on and the threat of impending 
annihilation.777 Following the Turkish occupation and the bloody struggles between 
kuruc (supporters of Thokoly and R4k6czi) and labanc (pro-Habsburg) factions yet 
another task emerged: protecting Hungarian liberty.778 The true Hungarian was
774 Op. cit., pp68-74. Apart from the Mongol invasion of 1241 during the reign of B61a IV, Hungary 
had to defend itself against the Turks from the early 15th century onwards (Kontler, p65; on the Mongol 
invasions, pp77-8 and for the struggle against the Turks, pp103-190).
775 Op. cit., pp85-92.
776 Op. cit., p91. Jo6 delights in the unsullied intellectuality of the Hungarian nation, in its derivation 
from human artifice rather than nature.
777 Op. cit., p93.
778 The Battle of Mohdcs (29th August 1526), a disastrous defeat against the Turks sealed Hungary’s 
fate. The 25,000 Hungarian troops were outnumbered three to one and within two hours at least 10,000 
infantry, almost the entire cavalry and 35 barons and prelates lay dead on the field. King Lajos II fell 
from his horse whilst in flight and drowned in a stream {Kontler, p i36). Twelve days later, the Sultan’s 
army marched into Buda, the Hungarian court having evacuated to Pozsony (Bratislava). Two 
claimants to the throne emerged, Jlnos Szapolyai (who had himself elected as monarch by the diet at 
Szlkesfehlrvlr on 11® November 1526) and Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria (elected as Ferdinand I 
on 17® December at Pozsony). The balance tipped in favour of the latter with the intervention of 
German mercenaries in 1527, pushing Szapolyai first to Transylvania and subsequently Poland. 
Szapolyai sought the help of Suleyman against Ferdinand and in the Treaty of Istanbul was recognised 
as the sole lawful ruler of the lands conquered by the Sultan, lulling the nobility into the belief that the 
Turks were allies. Realising that his insistence on reigning only benefited the Turks, Szapolyai became 
reconciled to bequeathing the country to Ferdinand. The Treaty of Vlrad, signed by representatives of 
both kings on 24® February 1538, stipulated that Ferdinand would inherit the throne after Szapolyai’s 
death. However, Szapolyai’s new wife bore him a son in 1540 and on his deathbed he took an oath 
from his barons to disregard the Treaty. The bishop of Vlrad had the infant proclaimed king Jlnos II 
and acknowledged by the Porte. In 1541 Buda was taken over by the Ottomans and occupied for the 
next 145 years. On 31st August the royal household moved to Transylvania, assigned to Jlnos II for
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governance in return for an annual tribute. Together with the Riszek (or Partium, the Eastern 
Hungarian counties) the Principality of Transylvania had begun to assume its definitive contours. 
Although dependent on the Ottoman Empire, it enjoyed autonomous control of its internal affairs.
(Kontler, pp139-142). Leopold I, Habsburg king of Hungary, by way of retaliation against repeated 
acts of disloyalty on the part of the Hungarians (including an abortive revolt by Ferenc R£k6czi I in 
1670) declared that they had forfeited the right to govern themselves, setting up a seven-member 
Gubemium and suspending the constitution. Two-thirds of the Hungarian fortress soldiers were 
disbanded upon the confiscation of the garrisons by the German military. Having withdrawn to 
Transylvania, these soldiers first dubbed themselves bujdosdk (outlaws) before adopting the name of 
kurucok. The kuruc movement received a boost following the Treaty of Warsaw between France, 
Poland and Transylvania in 1677. Louis XIV offered Mih&ly Apafi, Prince of Transylvania, an annual 
subsidy in return for supporting the kurucok. Their commander was Imre Thokoly (1657-1705), who 
headed an uprising in 1678. During that year and in 1680, he took several fortresses and towns in 
Upper Hungary, although the lack of infantry meant he could not hold them for long. In 1682, he 
married Ferenc R£k6czi I’s widow Dona Zrfnyi (whose vast estates enhanced his power base) and the 
Porte appointed him Prince of Upper Hungary. Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa’s army had been besieging 
Vienna in 1683 when an alliance of Christian troops came to aid of the Habsburg capital, routing the 
Turks and pursuing them as far as Esztergom. The Holy League organised in March 1684 attacked 
Buda and Th5k61y’s Upper Hungary. By the end of the following year most kuruc fortresses had fallen 
into Habsburg hands (with the exception of Munkics, which they clung on to thanks to Ilona Zrfnyi 
until 1688). Thdkbly was arrested by the Pasha of Vfrad in October. Although released shortly 
afterwards, he was compelled to leave Hungary along with the Turkish forces. Buda was liberated on 
2nd September 1686. When Apafi died in 1690 and Vienna refused to recognise the succession of his 
son, Thokoly seized the opportunity and was elected by the Diet as its Prince. Defeated by Ludwig 
Margrave of Baden, he was exiled to Asia Minor and died in Nicomedia in 1705. The Diploma 
Leopoldinum of 16th October 1690 settled the constitutional status of Transylvania until 1848: it was 
administered as a separate province of Hungary with its own laws (Kontler, ppl75-184). Ferenc 
Rdk6czi H (1676-1735, son of Dona Zrfnyi by Ferenc R£k6czi I) issued a manifesto calling for the 
liberation of Hungary from the Habsburg yoke from the castle of Brzeiany in Poland on 6th May 1703. 
A month later he arrived in Hungary under banners adorned with the slogan Cum Deo pro Patria et 
Libertate. After the patent of 28* August, promising exemption from taxes and manorial obligations to 
serfs who joined his army, commoners flocked to his cause. In the autumn, Habsburg forces were 
expelled from the north-western areas of Hungary and R4k6czi was elected Prince of Transylvania on 
8th July 1704 then Commanding Prince of Hungary in 1705 (the year in which Joseph I succeeded to 
the Habsburg throne). Changes in the international situation led to the isolation of the kuruc state and 
the defeat its armies suffered at the Battle of Trencsdn in 1708 was a taste of things to come. While 
Rlk6czi was absent in Poland conducting talks with the Russian tsar, his general, S£ndor Kdrolyi 
signed the Peace of Szatmdr on 30* April 1711. The kuruc army surrendered the next day (Kontler, 
ppl85-189).
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willing to lay down his life in defence of the traditional freedom, which was no less 
than the safeguard of national existence. Jo6 concludes from this:
"Being a Hungarian therefore is not an easy and natural thing. It is not a state, which 
can be obtained free. It is not enough to be bom Hungarian. We can be so bold as to 
say that you cannot simply be bom Hungarian. You must become Hungarian. Being 
Hungarian is not synonymous with happiness. It does not mean an advantage, safety, 
a gift. The Hungarian state of being is eternal anxiety and the bitter self-esteem of a 
past that has fallen into ruin".779
Indeed even in the darkest hour Hungarians did not fall prey to the temptation of 
resorting to assimilation out of loathing for the foreign in their midst. Even 
Transylvania's brief spell as an independent state did not unleash such destructive 
emotions. Nor did it entail an abandonment of the national ideal:
"Transylvania's secession and move towards independence as a state did not affect the 
national consciousness of its sons. Bocskai deemed its temporary independence 
necessary purely in the interests of the nation.780 From beginning to end the 
Hungarians of Transylvania and of Hungary felt they were the sons of the same 
nation. The nation was not bound to the state then either".781 
The turning point, when national minorities became an issue, came when the 
Hungarians adopted the contents and the form of Western nationalism thereby renting 
asunder what had been one. In Jo6's eyes the primary flaw of the new concept of 
social organisation was its reliance on externalities:
779 Op. cit., pp95-96. Emphasis in original.
780 Istvdn Bocskai (1557-1606) was Prince of Transylvania from 1605-6. Having been staunchly pro- 
Habsburg, he became disillusioned after being interned in Prague for criticising General Giorgio 
Basta’s reign of terror in Transylvania. He was then persuaded to resist the Habsburgs, winning a 
victory against them on 15th October 1604 at the head of an army of hajdus, irregular reserve units of 
the imperial forces, originally herders of cattle. Basta gradually withdrew westwards. Following his 
election as Prince of Transylvania on 2111 February 1605, Bocskai decided to compromise on the issue 
of accepting a crown from the Porte. Requiring assistance to depose his brother Rudolph I, Archduke 
Matthias agreed, in the Peace of Vienna (23rd June, 1606) to observe the rights of Protestants, to fill the 
office of Palatine, to refrain from appointing foreigners to posts in the Hungarian administration and 
from taking legal action that violated the law. Bocskai was confirmed as Transylvanian Prince, 
endowing the hajdus with privileges (Kontler, ppl65-6).
781 Op. cit., p97.
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"This school of thought regards shared origin, language, home country, state, culture 
and fate as the factors creating the nation (...) the main point being that it sees the very 
essence of the nation in such external, material traits".782 
He dismisses their validity thus:
"blood descent and race belong to the world of nature, whereas nationality belongs to
the world of the intellect".783
Similarly language is not a valid argument:
"The same difficulties are encountered in the relationship between language and 
nation. There can be no doubt as to the great power possessed by a shared language 
in forming and holding together a community. It would be sheer foolishness to deny 
this. However the power is based on the simple, practical fact that to create and 
maintain a community the individuals concerned must understand each other. The 
nation, however, is brought into being by that, which takes shape in the course o f 
mutual understanding: the shared mentality. This is conveyed by more than the 
language alone. Is nationality not also expressed by the international language of art? 
Language is doubtlessly one of the manifestations of the national essence as well. But 
this is the relationship, not the reverse. A language only becomes a national language 
when the national community has already become established and selects that very 
language as its vehicle of expression (...) Until the connection between national 
community and language emerges in the course of development the language is 
simply an instrument of communication with no national value whatsoever".784 
Nor is the state vested with the magical power often attributed to language:
"Only by deploying the most exaggerated rationalism could someone contend that 
nationality (allampolgdrsdg) could automatically make anyone at all into a member of 
the nation or its loss exclude him from his nation. There are times when the great 
exiled are the most faithful to their nation and truly the most representative of their 
national community. The state is an external, institutional formation, based on laws, 
commands and violence; the nation is an entirely emotional community, belonging to 
it and loyalty towards it are not manifested in the observance of external rules and its 
existence does not depend on whether it has sovereignty in the legal sense at its
782 Op. cit., p7.
783 Op. cit., pi 1.
784 Op. cit., ppl 1-12. Emphasis in original.
page 213
disposal. Nations can also exist without a state (...). If we identify nation and state, 
we exclude the Hungarians living in Transylvania or America from the ranks of our 
nation (...). Statehood is not a vital component of a national community".785 
If indeed state and nation are divorced from one another the national heterogeneity of 
the population at large becomes a matter of indifference because the state itself is 
neutral in terms of nationality. The national communities to which its inhabitants 
belong no longer pose a threat to it, they do not jeopardise its continued existence.786 
However what we witness is the drive to compel reality to reflect the ideal:
"One of the methods of achieving this is assimilation. It demands of the inhabitants 
of the country of foreign extraction and tongue that they (...) not only adopt 
citizenship, but also the language of the nation lending its name to the country and 
what lurks behind this demand is the assumption that in so doing they will assimilate 
in spirit as well because the nation resides in its language.
The other solution is that the inhabitants of the country, who are not included in the 
dominant nation's community of origin and language, are kept outside of it - tolerated 
to a greater or lesser extent, but whether this is explicitly acknowledged or not, as a 
foreign minority to be exterminated. They are citizens - though often not even that - 
but not members of the nation".787
Once the Western concept had taken root the voices of the few far-sighted thinkers 
such as Count Istvdn Szdchenyi who viewed Hungarianness as devotion to the 
Hungarian spirit of freedom788 were drowned out amidst the chorus calling for the
785 Op. cit., ppl3-14.
786 Op. cit., pp 19-20.
787 Op. cit., pl9.
788 Op. cit., pl47. Count Istvdn Szdchenyi (1791-1860) played an important role in the modernisation 
of Hungary, which earned him the epithet of “the truest Hungarian”. Offering one year’s income from 
his estates to establish an institution for the promotion of national culture, he was instrumental in the 
setting up of the Hungarian Academy of the Sciences. In 1822 he introduced horse racing into the 
country and in 1827 he founded the National Casino in Pest as a venue for exchanges of political views. 
The Danube Steamship Navigation Company owed a great deal to his enthusiasm and he supervised the 
regulation of the Danube and the Tisza. The Chain Bridge linking Buda and Pest was also one of the 
projects he inspired. From 7th April to 11th September 1848, he was Minister of Transport and Public 
Works in the Batthydny government. The Viennese ultimatum to the revolutionaries proved too much 
for him to bear and he was taken to an asylum in Ddbling where he remained until his death (Kontler, 
pp231-3 and 252-3).
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imposition of Hungarian identity in accordance with the precepts of Western 
nationalism on understandably recalcitrant national minorities. The demise of the 
"community of vocation" (hivatdskozosseg)789 paved the way for the discontents that 
led directly to Trianon.
Jo6’s ideas were never able to compete in terms of popularity with those of the 
irredentists. He attempted a return to source, a restoration of the nomadic (Eastern) 
values of tolerance and inclusion based on loyalty to the crown (as a unifying symbol) 
rather than on blood or ethnicity (vocation as opposed to materiality). However, even 
his view takes the national principle of classification for granted, assuming that the 
act of adhesion in itself brings about a qualitative transformation.
2.3 Hungarianness as Characteristics: Mihaly Babits
Also in 1939 Mihdly Babits’790 essay "On the Hungarian Character" was published as 
part of a collection on the subject of What is Hungarianness? {Mi a Magyar?), edited 
by the eminent historian Gyula Szekfu.791 The author begins by stressing the 
historical, as opposed to the biological definition of Hungarianness, as a phenomenon 
that evolved over time and is not physical, but spiritual, although it is alive.792 Hence 
the need to take account of the forms it assumed in the past:793 
"Hungarianness, as I know it from life and from books and which I feel within myself 
as well, is to be frank not vague and even less insubstantial. Its substance is national
789 Op. cit, pl89.
790 Mihdly Babits (1883-1941) was one of the most eminent members of the Nyugat circle. His first 
volume of poetry was published in 1909.
791 Magyar Szemle Tdrsasig, Magyar Szemle Kdnyvei IS, Budapest, 1939. Reprint of the first edition 
by Helikon Kft, Gyomaendrod, 1992, referred to in the following as Szekfu. Babits, along with other 
authors in the volume such as L£szl6 Ravasz, define their stance on Hungarianness in opposition to 
Lajos Prohdszka's A vdndor is  a bujdosd, The Wayfarer and the Exile from 1936, in which he states 
inter alia that Hungarians do not comprehend the European mentality because they are lacking in 
certain qualities. Their Eastern temperament fosters supercilious idleness and Hungarian achievements 
are not the fruit of rational, expedient activity. In the eyes of the West the Hungarians are somewhat of 
an exotic curiosity, an anachronism. See: Helyilnk, p355. On Mi a Magyar? and Babits’ contribution 
to it, see Ambrus Miskolczy, Szellem is  nemzet, Napvildg Kiadd, Budapest, 2001, pp67-144.
792 Mi a Magyar?, pp37-39.
793 Op. cit., p39.
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tradition itself: in other words the aggregate of memories of fate and intellectual and 
emotional experiences. It appears externally as the Hungarian character and 
demeanour, which can be empirically observed and indisputably circumscribed in 
words”.794
Its thousand faces and the endless changes it undergoes make it hard to pin down and 
this tantalising impalpability has helped it to elude rigorous analysis.795 The crisis 
brought on by the recent trauma of the peace treaty has inspired a wave of 
investigations into the national character, which fail to convince because they take as 
their source material ready-made pronouncements on the issue tailored for the 
consumption of a specific audience rather than sifting through the oeuvres of the 
poetic greats, which subconsciously betray its contents.796 Moreover the true focus of 
the researchers' interest is not the national character itself so much as the national 
destiny. Therefore any pretension to dispassionate objectivity on their part is 
precisely that. They involuntarily bend the facts to fit the theory 797 
For the Hungarian, seeking greater insight into his innermost being is not related to 
similar endeavours elsewhere in Europe, nor is it a misguided nationalistic gesture 
intended to separate him from all others:
"He feels too isolated, too lonely as it is. If he searches after his national character he 
is looking for precisely the spiritual link that joins every Hungarian together, the few 
people in the world who are Hungarian! And he looks for his place amongst the
7QO
European nations, not to separate himself from them, but to stand amongst them”.
The methodological difficulty of the enquiry is presented by the sources themselves. 
The biography of the Hungarians, history, and the diary of intellectual events, 
literature, are saturated with external influences. The exercise is comparable to
7QQ . . • •isolating an element, which only occurs in compounds. Pnmitiveness is not 
necessarily synonymous with authenticity or undiluted purity. The simple peasant 
way of life is remarkably international in terms of the way of thinking it encourages:
794 Op. c it, p40.
795 Op. cit, pp 40-41.
796 Op. cit, p42.
797 Op. cit, pp 42-43.
798 Op. cit, p46.
799 Op. cit, pp47 and 49.
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variations tend to be restricted to the trappings alone.800 A final pitfall to avoid is 
overloading the fragments of information of the medieval chronicles with significance 
by giving free reign to the imagination and reading too much into given words.801 
Nevertheless the notion of materiality clearly surfaces:
"A nation's character, like that of an individual, is a unified and organic thing; the 
substance, which I wish to grasp, is present everywhere and binds everything 
together".802
The world of concepts open to the national soul is moulded by the country, the land, 
the colours of the climate and the racial temperament. Tradition and culture have 
welded the countless, disparate racial elements into a single, unified entity and the 
language has a crucial role to play in the process:
"First of all this language took over the role of the vanished, intermingled ancient 
race, that of preserving and shaping the intellectual formation we designate as the 
Hungarians. "The nation resides in its language" according to the old saying and as 
far as the Hungarians are concerned this is almost literal truth (...). Knowledge of the 
Hungarian language is certainly still not enough in itself to make someone into a 
Hungarian. The wire does not make the electric current. The Hungarian language is a 
medium and a wire in which the living, spiritual current of the Hungarians pulsates 
onward. This current has its point of departure in the depths of the race and was 
induced there, but it is the language that picked it up and transmitted it further. In 
performing this service culture, literature and art attach themselves to language,
o n i
representing a kind of extension and polyphonic amplification of the language".
Given that a thousand years have elapsed since the arrival of the Hungarian settlers, 
Babits is sceptical towards theories emphasising the Eastern aspects of 
Hungarianness:
"We are a people of our local surroundings, it is here that we blended into a nation 
from the types that congregated in this place. Our way of life also developed into 
what it is now. Our imagination, our emotional universe and our entire culture were 
woven from the landscapes, colours produced by the climate to be found here and
800 Op. cit., p49.
801 Op. cit., pp49-50.
802 Op. cit., pp50-51.
803 Op. cit., pp51-52 and 53-54.
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from the impressions and moods they created. Not only does this land keep watch 
over the memories of our life and history, but from our earliest childhood we too 
inseparably carry within ourselves thousands of different memories of this land. We 
ourselves are this memory. If a profound correlation and spiritual connection exists 
between people and country then it certainly exists between our people and our 
country! Of course I am referring to the thousand-year-old country, the land wreathed 
by the mountains in a semi circle...Every part of it participated in the relationship; 
random political events do not count here. This beautiful, rounded territory is the bed 
in which it was bom, the mattress on which it can stretch out in comfort; it is the 
vessel in which this Hungarian blood was mixed and the palette for the colours of our 
culture".804
The rich variety of landscapes within a single geographical unit left their mark on the 
Hungarian soul, although inferences about the Hungarian character cannot be made 
from the environment alone,805 as the vicissitudes of history must be added to the 
equation. Hungary's location at the frontier between East and West meant that it acted 
as a crossroads, a point of impact between cultures. Under such circumstances any 
nation would have been forced to count a fierce martial spirit amongst its 
characteristics. Fighting could simply not be avoided.806 In the face of constant 
change, unwillingness to show wonder or surprise became engrained in Hungarian 
behaviour, though this did not preclude a weakness for splendour and displays of 
grandeur noted in the earliest records. This should not be confused with world-
807weariness.
Hungarians do not brood excessively, they do not wallow in any single emotion or 
feel bitterness without due cause:
’This sober and matter-of-fact self-assurance signifies a realism of outlook. First and 
foremost it is a contemplative rather than a practical realism (...). It is the realism of 
seeing. The behaviour of a people that has learned to watch continuously the 
thousand different influences and impressions flowing over it fully aware that it is 
powerless against them just as it is powerless against the weather. The Hungarian is
304 Op. cit., pp54-55.
805 Op. cit., p57.
806 Op. cit, p57.
807 Op. cit, pp59-60.
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the man who lazily stands at the gate looking around as he smokes his pipe, keeping 
an eye on the clouds. Seeing is self-assured, pure, calm and there is no darkness in it, 
no mysticism or metaphysics, but all the more colour and reality".808 
The Hungarian's natural detachment, his reluctance to get carried away in the heat of 
the moment ideally suits him to the political and diplomatic careers. Without this 
ability to weigh up the significance of events the nation would have died out long ago. 
To dub the Hungarians a warrior or a political nation is to overlook the dignified 
wisdom they show in knowing when to refrain from action. Prudent caution is as 
much a part of Hungarianness as manful demonstrations of prowess. This apparent 
lethargy is perhaps the sole remaining trace of the Hungarians' origins in the East and 
it is precisely this characteristic, contemplative disregard, unconsciously sceptical 
shrewdness, #hich distinguishes the Hungarians from all their neighbours.809 
From this passive contentment with his allotted portion flows the Hungarian's acumen 
in and passionate attachment to the law, representing a search for permanence, for 
durability in human dealings:
"Firstly the permanence of his country. This "territory of the sacred crown", unified 
and unchangeable for a thousand years. Other nations may either add to or lose their 
possessions. Hungary is like a living body, which cannot be hacked at or extended. 
History bears witness to the fact that every expansion or act of conquest has quickly 
withered on the vine and conversely its severed parts have sooner or later knitted back 
together, but whilst this had still not yet happened the Hungarian has always been able 
to look upon this unified and complete piece of land as his own and no other. This 
thousand-year-old legal state of affairs is a greater and truer reality in his eyes than the 
changing situations created by the chance operations of politics.
The same ideal permanence is attached to the constitution, the moral territory and 
holdings of the Hungarians as it were. Once again it provides a fixed point of 
reference in the cosmos. The constitution can be breached a thousand times over,
808 Op. cit., pp61-62. In this passage, Babits is contesting Prohdszka’s condemnation of what the latter 
called “finitism”. ProMszka described this character flaw as follows: M[finitism is a trait, which] steers 
clear of everything, which is problematic, insoluble and induces suspense, but which is resolutely 
drawn towards the narrow, the safe, the permanent and is only translated into deeds when it may 
manifest its own existence in a clearly delineated fashion, be entrenching itself behind defined lines” 
(op.cit., pl21).
809 Op. cit., pp63-65.
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governments can ignore it or deliberately violate it. Even if this is true for hundreds 
of years at a stretch the true Hungarian will continue to consider the constitution alive 
and in force. He insists on the "fiction of constitutional law". In the same way as 
Hungarian families, clans and certain individuals incessantly cling to their rights and 
privileges".810
It is the principle that counts and the validity of laws does not depend on whether they 
can be enforced by applying penalties or on whether anyone else recognises them as 
applicable. Defending legal permanence is Hungary's true vocation, rather than 
defending European culture against the barbaric incursions of the East, an honour to 
which other nations can lay claim,811 even if it is a house built on the shifting sands of 
self-delusion. Hungarian "rebelliousness" stemmed merely from the desire to protect 
w'hat was his and it would therefore be misleading to cast it as a peculiar
• Q I Ocharacteristic. Revolt for the Hungarian is more opposition than action, passive 
resistance the archetypically Hungarian way of life and his forbearance is not 
subservience. What finally prods him out of his inertia is being molested, having his 
tranquillity transgressed and thereby his freedom impinged on.813 
Jealously guarding his own, the Hungarian is nevertheless not intellectually blinkered 
and parochial:
"...the Hungarian people is open-minded as well as open-eyed. For nine hundred 
years its culture has been progressing together with that of Europe. Its openness 
springs from deep causes drawn from history and life. Even our race is an open one 
and has embraced the foreign into its bosom with hospitality for a millennium. Our 
language has been able to absorb the most disparate elements without having lost its 
fundamental character (...). We accept intellectual experiences with the same 
openness. One of the glories of our literature is the abundance and high quality of 
literary translations. We are perfectly entitled to maintain that the receptiveness of 
our intellectual culture does not lag behind that of the German for example".814
810 Op. cit., pp69 and 70.
811 That the Romanians vied for the title of „bulwark of Christendom” is demonstrated by Mitu (op.cit., 
pp 195-8).
812 Op. cit., pp71-72.
813 Op. cit., pp76-77.
814 Op. cit., pp73-74.
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Once goaded into defensive action, the Hungarian looks back on his immobility with 
bitter regret, the stuff of which his national literature, suffused with tragedy, is made. 
The moral reprehensibility of missed opportunities. Hence Hungarian rhetoric exudes 
the seriousness of the voice of conscience rather than the exuberance of intellectual 
fireworks display or the pathos of outpourings of sentiment. It would be wrong to 
describe the Hungarians as moralising or fond of oratory, however, because their true 
being is contemplative. They feel it is their duty to aspire to the former qualities. 
Indeed all the fertile contradictions of the Hungarian character lend it vitality. Even 
its pessimism is not a slough of despondency, but a source of renewed vigour.815 
According to Babits, the nation is bound together by shared characteristics, a common 
inheritance founded on historical experience, geographical situation and local 
landscape. Although not conceived as biological, its materiality is not questioned.
2.4 Hungarianness as Essence
Hungarianness as essence, as soul, is a unifying spiritual force expressed through 
culture, characteristics and language, prior to them, yet dependent on them for 
survival. They are its very lifeblood. Any restriction or attack on these is therefore 
tantamount to an assault on the innermost self and the cohesion of the community.
The relationship between essence and its mediations is both intimate and mutually 
reinforcing:
"Language therefore outwardly separates one nation from another, whilst inwardly it
is one of the most fundamental factors constructing the nation. It is not a subsidiary
matter, but a reality deeply rooted in the body and soul of the nation, part of its
organism to which its existence, its life is linked. It is far more than a mere vehicle of
thoughts. Every peculiar characteristic, thought process, perception, emotional
experience, nerve fabric of the national soul and the workings of its imagination are
expressed in language: it is the most personal repository, preserver and container of
its character. Take away the nation's language and it ceases to be what it was; it fades
816away, amalgamates and expires in the sea of surrounding nations".
815 Op. cit., pp79, 80 and 83.
816 Vilmos Tolnai, The Immortal Hungarian Language in: Virzjo Magyarorszdg. Magyar frdk 
Magyarorszdg teriilet44rt. Edited by Dezs5 Kosztoldnyi, Helios Nyomda, Budapest, 1928, p55.
page 221
Such musings on the true nature of Hungarianness had a wider significance beyond 
their value as intellectual explorations or exonerative statements regardless of whether 
this was consciously intended by their authors or not. Any pronouncement on the 
subject was politically charged in a context where identity had been wielded as a 
criterion in the redrawing of frontiers. Self-determination had been the principle 
justifying the excision of two thirds of Hungary from the heartland yet its application 
had glaring deficiencies:
"...the case of Greater Romania. Of the increase in population brought about by the 
national principle, of the 5.8 million only 2.8 million, or 53% are Romanian, 47% 
non-Romanian, of which 1.7 million are Hungarians and 560 thousand Germans, 
together making a total of 2.3 million representatives of nations belonging to the 
Western cultural type"817.
Indeed:
"The result of Hungary's dissection has been that three mixed nationality states have 
been created in place of one and this has been achieved in such a way as to make the 
situation perceptibly far less advantageous. This dissection broke up an existing, tried 
and tested geographical and economic unit without being able to replace it and seeks 
to force geographically separated and economically incoherent regions and 
populations into new units (...).
The self-determination of peoples and the nationality principle were the leading 
principles of establishing the general peace. If the application of one principle occurs 
to the detriment of the other or if the other is ignored it can degenerate into the 
greatest of injustices, however. Those who blindly adhere to the nationality principle 
ascribe exclusive importance to the language community. Yet it is unjust to decree in 
advance that this principle is the sole decisive factor under all circumstances and it is 
unjust to assume in advance that every interested party thinks in the same way and 
that they are not consulted as to their opinion as a result. In this day and age the 
economic factors are equally strong as the linguistic ones, if not stronger. Because 
people feel most firmly attached to their immediate environment: their surroundings, 
which are formed by a variety of elements, not therefore by language alone, but by
8,7 Count Albert Apponyi. The Historical Vocation of Hungary and the States Enlarged at its Expense 
in Justice for Hungary, Budapest Hfrlap press, Budapest, 1928, pplS-16.
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traditions, customs, extraction and language, by economic ties and the regular, 
ordinary course of life. Difference in language alone cannot justify political and 
economic disruption when nature, the historical community stretching back over a 
thousand years, the traditions and institutions attached to it and the close ties of 
economic activity prescribe unity as an imperative. Linguistic differences only make 
recognising the language and individuality of different national minority communities 
and guaranteeing their free development into a duty. By no manner of means, 
however, do they require the dismemberment of regions making up a coherent 
whole".818
Transylvania and the connecting territories yielded the most distressing instance of 
the imperfections of the principle. In spite of the fact that the Romanians made up the 
absolute majority demographically when the Treaty of Trianon was ratified:
"The Hungarians were the original inhabitants of Transylvania, the Romanians, 
however, were later immigrants. Hungarians and Transylvanian Saxons live in the 
older and more developed repositories of civilisation, the cities, are engaged in 
industry and trade, have always taken an active part in the effervescent life of Western 
civilisation and have always played a leading role in Transylvania. It is impossible 
for the Hungarians and Saxons to renounce the higher level they have attained over 
centuries of exertion and melt into a commonwealth with a far lower Eastern 
civilisation and Balkan morals820 and which is not capable of governing elements 
from a more advanced civilisation and of guaranteeing them a national life of their 
own. The Hungarians and Saxons are in possession of all the intellectual and material 
weapons, which assure any race predominance and they can therefore only be stripped 
of their leading role by means of persecution and brutal violence, which the new 
overlords, the Romanians from the Regat821 practice in abundance.
818 Op. cit, in the essay by Gydrgy Lukdcs, The Injustices o f the Treaty o f Trianon, ppl22-123.
819 Comprising part of Ugocsa (north east of Szatmdr), Szatmdr/Satu Mare, Szildgy/Salaj, Bihar/Bihor, 
Arad, Krass6-Szdreny/Cara§-Severin, Temes/Timi§ and a small section of Torontdl (to the west of 
Temes/Timif) counties and southern Mdramaros/Maramure§. In all later passages I refer to these as 
Transylvania, in line with current colloquial usage, which considers them a political unit See Hetven 
iv. A romdniai magyarsdg tortinete, 1919-1989 edited by L£szl6 Didszegi and Andrea R. Stile, 
Budapest 1990, p5
820 On the .JBalkan spirit” in Romanian self-perception, see Mitu, pp82-4.
821 The Kingdom of Romania.
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Everything in Transylvania which means civilisation, progress, improvement and 
effort is the work of the Hungarian and Saxon minorities. The superiority of the 
Hungarians and Saxons is neither the result of artificial support from the Hungarian 
state, nor of oppression of the Romanians nor of brute force used against them. All 
such speculations completely deny the fact that Transylvania lived a separate national 
life for three hundred years so that the Hungarians of Transylvania could not have 
been in a position to draw benefit from the numerical superiority of Hungarians in 
Hungary and they thus have only themselves to thank for the position they occupy in 
the life of Transylvania.
The inferiority of Transylvanian Romanians in relation to the Hungarians and Saxons 
is not the consequence of oppression. The Romanian people are a young nation 
without traditions and which only attained self-awareness towards the end of the last 
century. It adopted its religion from Byzantium, the language of its observance was 
Slavic and the Romanian church obtained independence only in Transylvania with the 
support of the Protestant princes.822 Its national literature is also new (...).823 The 
Romanian people - far removed from the ebb and flow of historical events - lived the 
quiet life of shepherds and serfs. The Hungarians by contrast meshed into Western 
civilisation at an early stage and for ten centuries was a participant in all European 
events from the crusades through the Reformation to today's date. The backwardness 
of the Romanians in terms of civilisation and economy can therefore not come as a
822 Lukdcs is referring to Istvdn Bdthori’s reign from 1571-1586. In 1572 he agreed to the Romanian 
Orthodox Church establishing a metropolitan at Gyulafehirvdr/Alba Iulia. In 1574 he had the Diet at 
Torda/Turda recognise the right of the Orthodox community to elect bishops, the first of whom, 
Ghenadie assumed office the same year. See Bdla Kdpeczi (editor), Erddly Tortdnete, Volume One, 
Budapest, 1986, pp497-8 and Georges Castellan, A History o f the Romanians, Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1989 (henceforth Castellan), plOO.
823 In 1544 the first book in Romanian, a catechism was published in Nagyszeben/Sibiu by Filip 
Moldoveanu. In 1582, §erban Coresi published the Szdszvdros/Ora§tie Bible. Between 1520 and 
1600,364 books were printed by Transylvanian presses. Of these 178 were in Latin, 131 in Hungarian, 
23 in Old Slavonic and 10 in Romanian (Castellan, ppl00-l). On the development of Romanian 
language literature in Transylvania, see also Constantin C. Giurescu, Transylvania in the History o f 
Romania, The Garnstone Press, London, undated, ppl01-8. Prior to 1637 all books printed in 
Romanian were from Transylvania (idem, p i06). On the relative lateness of Romanian literature, 
Ofetea writes: “Modem Romanian literature began in the latter half of the eighteenth century and was 
the product and the expression of the Age of Enlightenment” (op.cit., p470).
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surprise to anyone824 and it is only natural that within a shared state alongside other, 
more cultured peoples they would not be capable of reaching the same level as the 
latter for a long time".825
The best solution according to the irredentists would be complete restoration of the 
connecting territories and political and regional autonomy for historical Transylvania 
within the framework of the Hungarian state.826
The superiority argument was one of the mainstays of the Hungarian title-deed claim 
to Transylvania. Whereas the Hungarian state had come into being with the 
coronation of Saint Istvdn in 1000, Romania* s independence from Ottoman rule came 
only in 1878 (in accordance with the Treaty of San Stefano, the principalities of 
Wallachia and Moldavia having been united in 1859).827 
In Transylvania, the Romanians had not been included amongst the privileged 
“nations” of the Unio trium nationum (the Hungarians, Szdkelys and Saxons) in 1437, 
which formed the basis of constitutional organisation in force until 1848, thereby 
excluding them from political influence.828 The “Leopold Diploma” of 4th December
824 Sorin Mitu convincingly demonstrates that this view had been taken up by the Romanians 
themselves: ,,The most frequent negative theme accompanying almost any description of current 
realities is that of the Romanians’ cultural backwardness. It governs the whole cultural discourse 
growing in the wake of the Transylvanian School [for which see below], by means of the leitmotif of 
the ’darkness’ and ignorance in which Romanians struggle. It is, nevertheless, more than a mere 
particular, that is, Romanian instance of some of the universal obsessions of the Enlightenment. The 
lack of modem culture is considered, in the Romanian case, to be a defining feature, a characteristic, 
which tells the Romanians apart from other peoples because they are not simply backward, they are the 
most backward of all, both among neighbouring nations and in the whole of Europe” {Mitu, p67. For 
illustrative quotations, see idem, pp67,68 and 69). Mitu continues: ,Jn fact, the very concept of 
cultural backwardness makes no sense outside the terms of a comparison. Consequently, the worst part 
was not that the Romanians were simply backward, but that they appeared more backward than others, 
particularly as compared with their political and national adversaries who were thus entitled to justify 
their own domination” {Mitu, p71).
825 Lukics in Justice, ppl33-134.
826 Op. cit., ppl40 and 141.
827 loan Aurel Pop, Romanians and Romania: A Brief History, Columbia University Press, 1999, 
ppl05-126 and Castellan, pl39.
828 Lukics in Justice, p i35 and Ofetea, p i89. See also Castellan, pp47-8 and Zsolt Tr6cs£nyi, Hdrom 
nip, hdrom nemzet, nigy vallds, in Erdily a Histdridban, edited by Nlndor B&rdi, Pro-Print 
K5nyvkiad6, Csfkszereda, 1998 (henceforth Bdrdi), pp87-93.
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1691 confirmed the position of the three “nations” (with public office reserved 
exclusively for them) and the Catholic, Calvinist, Lutheran and Unitarian 
denominations.829 Two later imperial charters (16th February 1699 and 30th March 
1701) gave acknowledgement to the Greek Catholic Church (which had recognised 
the authority of Rome in October 1698), the latter regulating the legal status of its 
clergy.830
The pioneer of the struggle for political rights on the part of the Romanians in 
Transylvania was Greek Catholic Bishop Inochentie Micu-Klein (1692-1768). Over a 
fifteen year period he sent a constant stream of memoranda and requests to the Diet 
and the imperial court in Vienna to bring about the application of the 1701 charter, 
which had remained a dead letter. His case for the granting of equal rights to the 
Romanian “nation” was based on its numerical superiority over all ether peoples in 
Transylvania, the greater burden of obligations it had to bear in comparison with the 
privileged “nations”, its antiquity and its continuous residence since the days of 
Emperor Trajan.831
The latter statement appears again in the Supplex Libellus Valachorum, a petition sent 
to Emperor Leopold II in March 1791 by historian Samuil Micu, Ion Budai-Deleanu, 
Petru Maior and Gheorghe §incai832 amongst others calling for full enjoyment of
829 Castellan, pp 103-4. See also D. Prodan, Supplex Libellus Valachorum, Publishing House of the 
Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Bucharest 1971 (henceforth Prodan), pp62-3. See also 
Ofetea, pp251-2.
830 Castellan, p i05; Prodan, ppl 13-33 and Ofetea, pp252-3.
831 Cf. Castellan, pl07; Prodan, ppl34-187 and Ofetea, pp275-7. For Micu-Klein’s successors, see 
Prodan, ppl95-228.
832 These writers formed the Transylvanian School. Micu (1745-1806) was Inochentie’s grandson. His 
most important works were a grammar of the Romanian language, completed by §incai and published 
in Latin in Vienna under the title Elementa linguae daco-romanae sive valachiae and Istoria $i 
lucrurile $i intimplarile Romdnilor (The History, Affairs and Events o f the Romanians) passages from 
which were published as an appendix to the Buda Calendars for 1806 and 1807. §incai (1753 or 1754- 
1816) spent 34 years writing a Hronica Romdnilor §i mai multor neamuri (Chronicle o f the Romanians 
and Other Peoples), part of which featured as an appendix to the Buda Calendars of 1808 and 1809 
(the complete version only appearing in print in 1853). Petru Maior (1760-1821) was outspoken in 
disputing the allegations of earlier historians concerning the Romanians. His main work, Istoria pentru 
inceputurile Romdnilor tn Dacia (The History o f the Beginnings o f the Romanians in Dacia), was 
published in 1812 (Giurescu, Transylvania in the History o f Romania, ppl 08-110 and for the later 
output of the Transylvanian School, ppl 10-116). Budai-Deleanu (1760-1820) was most famous for his
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rights in place of mere toleration, equality with the other “nations”, identical 
entitlement to benefits for members of the clergy, nobility and commoners in both 
town and countryside, proportional appointment of Romanians to the various 
institutions of government and administration and use of Romanian designations for 
the counties, districts and urban communities where they outnumber the other 
“nations”.833 The text reads as follows: “The Romanian nation is by far the oldest of 
all the nations of the Transylvania of today, as it is common knowledge and has been 
proved by historical evidence and by a tradition never interrupted, by the resemblance 
between the languages, the customs and habits, that they descend from the Roman 
colonies repeatedly brought here in Dacia at the beginning of the second century by 
the Emperor Trajan, with a very large number of veterans, to protect the province.
The descendants of Emperor Trajan were the masters of Dacia for several centuries. 
Under their uninterrupted rule, the Christian faith, the rite of the Eastern Church, 
spread to these parts due to the endeavours of bishops Protogenes, Gaudentius, 
Nicetas and Theotinus, especially in the fourth century, as shown by the whole history 
of the Church”.834
Although rejected by the Diet, it is regarded as the first major articulation of 
Romanian national consciousness.835
In his speech to the Royal Foreign Affairs Society in 1933, Istvdn Bethlen, Prime 
Minister of Hungary from 14th August 1921 to 24* August 1931,836 reiterated many 
of the points raised above, fleshing them out with statistics: “In 1910 the total 
population of the 29 towns of Transylvania comprised 350,268. Of these, 205,728
comic epic, the Jiganiada. See Zoltdn I. T6th, Az. erdilyi romdn nacionalizmus elsd szdzada, 1697- 
1792, Pro-Print Konyvkiadd, Csfkszereda, 1998 (originally published by the Teleki Pdl Tudomdnyos 
Intdzet, Budapest, 1946), p323.
833 Prodan, pp464-5 (and for a detailed analysis of its contents, ppl0-20). On the Supplex, see also 
Castellan, ppl 11-2; Ofetea, pp280-l and Zoltdn I. T6th, op.cit., pp325-339.
834 Prodan, p455.
835 Castellan, pi 12. On the petition’s fate, see Prodan, pp21-61.
836 On 22nd May 1932, Bethlen had accepted the offer to become honorary President of the Magyar 
Revfzids Liga 0Hungarian Revisionist League). See Trianon, pp423-4. It had been founded in the 
wake of the Rothermere campaign (on 21s* June 1927, Lord Rothermere published an article, 
Hungary’s Place in the Sun, in the Daily Mail. In it he maintained that peace in Central and Eastern 
Europe could not be guaranteed in the long run unless the Trianon frontiers were modified). See 
Romsics 2000, pp236-7.
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(58.7%) were Hungarian, 56,347 (16.1%) Saxon and only 81,939 (23.4%) Romanian. 
However the Romanian inhabitants of the towns were not or were only in very small 
part members of the middle-classes, made up instead of workers who had immigrated 
and of domestic servants.
This is also thrown into high relief by the statistics concerning the professions 
engaged in by the populations, since in Transylvania in 1910 of those employed in 
industry and artisanal activity172,270 (52.5%) were Hungarian, 52,108 (15.9%) 
German and 88,808 (27.1%) Romanian; in commerce (including the credit branch) 
35,533 (59.8%) were Hungarian, 13,285 (22.3%) German and 9,520 (16%) 
Romanian”.837
As far as “cultural advancement” was concerned, Bethlen again sought to create the 
impression of objectivity by quoting numbers: “In 1910 the proportion of the 
population over the age of six able to read and write was:
410,439 (27.9%) of the Romanians 
550,111 (59.9%) of the Hungarians 
117,580 (75.9%) of the Saxons”.838
In order to prove that the high illiteracy rate amongst Romanians was not due to a lack 
of teaching facilities in their mother tongue, Bethlen was keen to emphasise that of 
the 2663 primary schools in Transylvania, 1145 (43%) had Romanian as the language 
of instruction.839
In spite of acknowledging the prodigious growth of the Romanian population in 
Transylvania, he attributed it to large-scale immigration to escape the hardships of life 
under the Ottoman yoke. He writes for example: “It is true that the Romanian people 
in Transylvania in the space of one century from 1700 to 1811 increased in number 
from 200,000 by almost 400% to 950,000, but this was as a result of immigration. In
837 The speech is reprinted in Bethlen Istvdn vdlogatott politikai (rdsok 4s beszddek, Osiris, Budapest, 
2000. The quotation is to be found on p295. Cf. Zoltin Szdsz, op.cit., p i25. At that time the 
population of Transylvania, the Banat, Mdramaros/Maramure§ and the Kdrds/Cris river region totalled 
5,265,444, of which 53.2% spoke Romanian, 32.4% Hungarian and 10.6% German. According to 
Szdsz, 17.9% of urban dwellers were Romanian. Whilst 86.3% of the Romanians worked the land, 8% 
laboured in industry and 1.4% belonged to the intelligentsia (mostly clergy). Cf. also Kolar, p i06.
838 Bethlen, op.cit., p296.
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the following century, however, from 1811 to 1910 the increase was only from
950,000 to 1,470,000, in other words a mere 50 and a few percent because by then 
they were dependent on their own natural reproduction”.840 In common with his 
contemporaries (and Hungarian nationalists ever after) he fails to make the connection 
between the sheer weight of numbers of the Romanians (greatly exceeding that of the 
Hungarians) and the rightfulness of their claim. What counts is priority and historic 
rights: although the population balance had been upset by the constant influx of 
Romanians from the Regat, the Hungarians had been there first and thus their claim to 
Transylvania was morally vindicated.
The fate of the Hungarians of Transylvania, the largest of the minorities, became 
emblematic of the sufferings imposed on Hungarians everywhere. Aggrieved 
nationalists followed developments with ceaseless vigilance, storing up ammunition 
for condemnations of Romanian policy in the hope that the victorious powers would 
eventually acknowledge the error of their ways.
The interpretation of history, the concepts of nationhood and musings on the 
Hungarian essence formed the intellectual heritage of the Transylvanian 
Hungarians.841 Their self-image had been steeped in the doxa and although it had lost 
its self-evident quality (becoming orthodoxy), the nationalist principle of 
classification still held sway. The Hungarians of Transylvania continued to consider 
themselves materially different (as did the Romanians) and any representation or 
reappraisal of who they were can only be fully understood against the backdrop of 
Hungarianness.
2.5 Transylvanianness
839 As above. Bethlen makes no attempt at analysis of the data, which might, for example, take account 
of social factors, such as the occupational background of the children’s families, preferring a racial 
explanation.
840 Bethlen, op.cit., pp305-6.
841 Although the Transylvanianist deliberations pre-date the Hungarian debates examined above, the 
contents of the latter make the older, previously hidden assumptions about Hungarianness shared by the 
Transylvanians explicit and as such form the screen upon which the separate Transylvanian identity 
was projected.
page 229
Under the Kdrolyi administration,842 Oszklr JSszi843 was appointed Minister of 
Nationality Affairs. On 13th and 14th November 1918, he met the leaders of the 
Central Romanian National Council844 in Arad offering concessions to autonomy 
along the lines of the Swiss cantonal system in the hope of averting the loss of 
Transylvania to Romania.845 His conciliatory efforts were in vain. Hungary’s 
prospects of keeping Transylvania were diminished further by the proclamation of 
secession on the part of the Romanians on 20th November.846 In the meantime, 
Romanian troops were drawing steadily nearer. On November 13th, Klrolyi had 
signed a military convention with General Franchet d’Esperey, commander of the 
French forces in the Balkans who did not accept the terms of the armistice of 
Padova.847 The Belgrade Convention established a demarcation line along the course 
of the river Maros/Mure§> thereby splitting Transylvania in two.848 Franchet gave the 
official go-ahead to advance as far as the demarcation line on 17th November.849
842 Assuming power in the wake of the Aster Revolution, for which see footnote 392, p95 above.
843 On Jdszi (1875-1957), see Lee Congdon, The Moralist as Social Thinker: OszkdrJdszi in Hungary, 
1900-1919, in Laqueur and Mosse, op.cit, pp273-313.
844 The Council had originally been formed in Budapest with six representatives of the Romanian 
National Party and an equal number of Social Democrats at the end of October, moving to 
Transylvania shortly afterwards. See p277 of Constantin C. Giurescu, Greater Romania, 1918 in 
Romania A Historic Perspective, edited by Dinu C. Giurescu and Stephen Fischer-Galafi, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1998 (henceforth Giurescu 1998), pp275-292. It organised local 
Romanian councils, whose members ousted Hungarian officials, taking over power. See Emd Raffay, 
Erd&ly 1918-1919-ben, Magvetd Kiadd, Budapest, 1987 (henceforth Raffay), pp82-3.
845 Zoltin Szdsz, Gyulafehirvdr, Alba Iulia, 1918: Transylvania’s Union with Romania, ppl25-135 in 
Hungarians and Their Neighbours in Modem Times, 1867-1950, edited by Ferenc Glatz, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1995 (henceforth Glatz), ppl32-3. See also Romsics 2000, pi 13;
Kontler, pp329-30 and for a detailed discussion of the negotiations Raffay, pp86-l 14.
846 Raffay, ppl27-9; Kontler, p330 and Zoltdn Szdsz, op.cit., pl34.
847 Romsics 2000, pi 13; Kontler, p330 and Raffay, pp84-5 and 103-4 The Padova armistice dated from 
3rd November (Romsics 2000, pi 12).
848 As above. Zoltin Szdsz, op.cit., adds that Iuliu Maniu, the most prominent of the Transylvanian 
Romanian politicians at the time sent a memorandum to Paris during the Arad talks requesting 
permission for the Romanian army to cross the demarcation line (which he also wanted moved north) 
on the pretext that the Hungarians had committed atrocities (p i33). On the latter issue, cf. Raffay, 
pl07.
849 Raffay, pl41. On troop movements, see idem, ppl33-9 and 146. As Romsics points out, the 
demarcation line had not been respected as it was (Romsics 2000, p i 15).
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Against this backdrop, a flurry of preparations was held for an assembly at 
Gyulafehervar/Alba Iulia,850 at which the famous decisions were adopted on 1st 
December. In front of a crowd approximately 100,000 strong, the 1228 official 
delegates called for union with Romania for the territories in and around Transylvania 
inhabited by Romanians.851 Provisional autonomy would be granted until the election 
of the national assembly, which would be followed by a constitutional assembly 
empowered to take a definitive decision. The following principles would hold sway 
in the new Romanian state and were actually enacted as a decree: complete national 
freedom for all the peoples living within its boundaries. Every national group would 
be entitled to govern itself and provide education in its own mother tongue with its 
own public administration and judiciary whose members would be elected from its 
own ranks. Representation in the legislative bodies and national government would 
be in proportion to the size of the population concerned. All ecclesiastical 
denominations would be placed on an equal footing and enjoy autonomy. Democracy 
would be the order of the day in all areas of public life with universal direct suffrage 
for voters over the age of 21 in local, county and parliamentary elections with secret 
ballot, again respecting proportionality. Complete freedom of the press, assembly and 
association would obtain. Land reform would ensure more equitable access to 
resources and promote social equality by abolishing the entailed estates, reducing the 
size of the latifrmdia and establishing holdings that could viably be run by a family 
and industrial workers would be guaranteed the same rights as their counterparts in 
the most advanced countries of the West. A national council would be set up to 
represent all the Romanians of Hungary, Transylvania and the connecting 
territories.852
850 Raffay, ppl55-8.
851 Raffay, pl58 and Constantin C. Giurescu, op.cit., p277.
852 Op. cit., pp27-28. For a fuller version of the text see also Mikd, pp265-267. The significance of the 
Gyulafehdrvdr/Alba Iulia decisions is explored in Raffay, ppl58-167; Erdily rdvid tortinete, 
Akad6miai Kiad6,1993, pp568-570, edited by B61a Kopeczi and Gdbor Barta; Zoltdn Szlsz, op.cit 
Constantin C. Giurescu, op.cit., pp277-8 and Andrei Ofetea, The History o f the Romanian People, 
Twayne Publishers, New York, 1970 (henceforth Ofetea), pp460-462. The Romanian National Council 
acted as a parliament, setting up the Consiliul Dirigent to carry out the practical work of government 
These initiatives could have been a blueprint for autonomous government for the Hungarians as shown 
by the deliberations below. Representatives of the Hungarian and Saxon populations were neither 
invited to take part in the assembly, nor were they consulted about the decisions taken.
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As of 2nd December, the demarcation line ceased to have any real meaning as the 
Romanian army set about annexing the territories listed in the Treaty of Bucharest of 
17th August 1916.853 By Christmas Eve, it had reached Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca, 
which it subsequently occupied.854
With the arrest of chief commissioner Istv&n Apdthy in Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca on 
14th January 1919 on the pretext of agitating for Bolshevism, the Hungarian 
administration in Transylvania ground to a halt.855 On 24th January, a decree was 
passed obliging civil servants to swear an oath of loyalty to the Romanian state. 
Many Hungarians refused, citing the Belgrade Convention and lost their posts with 
immediate effect. Deprived both of severance pay and a pension, they were plunged
• * 856into penury.
During the same month, the flow of information between Transylvania and Budapest 
was deliberately cut off by the Romanians with the banning of all but local telephone 
calls and the censorship of Hungarian-language newspapers.857 On the 23rd and 24th 
January a general strike was held by way of protest against the occupation. It was 
quickly suppressed.858
833 Romsics 2000, p i 13. Had the Treaty been honoured in hill, Romania’s borders would have 
extended right up to the Tisza, as far west as Debrecen and including Szeged and Orosh&za (Zoltin 
Szdsz, op.cit., pl29 and Zsuzsa L. Nagy, The Peace Treaties, 1919-1920, in Glatz, pp91-7, p92). See 
also Ofetea, p444.
854 On the strategic importance of Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca, see Raffay, ppl68-9; on the attempt to 
organize a major assembly of Hungarians in Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca on 22nd December, see idem, 
ppl81-3 and on the occupation, ppl86-8.
855 Raffay, ppl91-2. For further details on the Romanian takeover of the administration, see idem, 
pp214-225.
856 See Mikd, ppl5-17 (for bibliographical details see footnote 401, p98); Bdla Pomogdts, A 
transzilvanizmus. Az Erddlyi Helikon ideoldgidja, pp42-43, Akaddmiai Kiadd, Budapest, 1983; 
Benedek Jancsd, A romdn uralom berendezkedise Erdilyben in Magyar Szemle, October 1928, p i27 
and Emil Grandpierre in Az erdilyi magyarsdg politikai kiizdelmei az egysiges magyar pdrt 
megalakuldsdig, pp 130-132, Magyar Szemle, October 1928, Magyar Szemle Tdrsasdg, Budapest. Cf. 
also Kolar, pp91-2.
837 Raffay, pp229-231. In Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca postal deliveries had been stopped on Christmas day 
1918. The letters arriving from the Hungarian capital by train were sprinkled with petrol and set alight 
(p232). On the harassment of the civilian population, the committing of atrocities and the setting up of 
internment camps, see pp234-8.
858 Raffay, pp250-2.
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In spite of the turmoil, political activity did not cease altogether. On 24th March 1919, 
Elem6r Gydrfds859 drafted a memorandum to Iuliu Maniu, which he intended to 
deliver personally. Having arrived in Nagyszeben/Sibiu, however, he changed his 
mind, partly because the prevailing mood convinced him that it was too late for such 
initiatives: the notion of an independent or an autonomous Transylvania had been 
overtaken by events. In May, Gyarfas once again felt that his plans might stand a slim 
chance of acceptance, passing the document on to a colleague who in turn transmitted 
it to the Romanian authorities. Although nothing ever came of it, Gydrfds consoled 
himself with the knowledge that his efforts constituted proof that the Hungarians had 
not shirked the responsibility of approaching the Romanians at a juncture when a 
glimmer of hope remained that Transylvania’s fate had not been definitively sealed.860 
In the accompanying letter, Gydrfds attributes the inaction of the Hungarians to the 
uncertainties of the political situation: “Until now, the Hungarians of Transylvania 
have been watching the struggle between Romanian nationalism and Hungarian 
Bolshevism with a certain lethargic indifference. They were aware that they could 
expect nothing much by way of good from either (...) But they also sensed that 
neither was directly and primarily aimed against them and so with mixed feelings they 
nurtured the hope that one or the other might prove to be more considerate towards 
them”.861
In his view, the sole means of preventing the destruction of Transylvania’s cultural 
and economic assets was to arrive at an equitable peace with the local Hungarians on
859 Lawyer, journalist and politician Elemdr Gydrfds (1884-1945) became a civil servant in 1910 and in 
1917 to 1918 in charge of the administration of Kiskiikiillo county. He was elected to the Romanian 
Senate as a representative of the Hungarian National Party in 1926.
860 Elemdr Gydrfds, Erd&lyi problimdk 1903-1923, Erddlyi Irodalmi Tdrsasdg, Kolozsvdr, 1923, 
ppl43-4. Gydrfds does not reveal the identity of his friend, whom he describes simply as “a highly 
esteemed, elderly Hungarian gentleman” (pi43). On the memorandum, see Igndc Romsics, Afliggetlen 
vagy autondm Erddly terve a magyar 4s a nemzetkozi politikdban (1919-1945), in Gyongy Kovdcs Kiss 
(editor), Erd&lyrol Eurdpdban nUtosztalanul, Korunk Bardd Tdrsasdg, Komp-Press Kiad6, Kolozsvdr, 
2003 (henceforth Kovdcs Kiss), ppl 15-131 and Piroska Balogh, Transylvanism: Revision or 
Regionalism? in Romsics 1999, pp243-262.
861 Gydrfds, op.cit., pl46. Emphasis in original. Bdla Kun’s Soviet Republic came into existence on 
21st March 1919, lasting until the 1st August when its leaders fled to Vienna (where they were given 
political asylum) and a Social Democrat government under Gyula Peidl was left to pick up the pieces 
(Cf. Kontler, pp338-9 and Romsics 2000, pl30).
page 233
the basis of the Wilsonian principles and the constitutional system that had evolved in 
the course of the region’s history.862 Lasting harmony between the Romanian and 
Hungarian populations could not be achieved if either side were to resign itself to a 
given government in the belief that it might be transitory. It would be far preferable 
to agree upon a mutually acceptable solution, which would rouse the enthusiasm of all 
and which the peoples of Transylvania would not seek to undermine, but on the 
contrary rigorously defend against all moral or physical attacks from the outside.863 
Gydrfds outlined his vision for an autonomous Transylvania in twelve points, which 
included the following: in the light of their common interest in law and order, the 
safety of life and property, freedom of conscience and religion, undisturbed cultural 
and economic development, genuine liberty and democracy and the future happiness 
of its “soil sanctified by blood”, its three nations, the Hungarians, Romanians and 
Saxons would conclude a close and indissoluble union and alliance.864 Both 
Hungary’s territorial integrity and the creation of Greater Romania would be treated 
as foreign policy issues and, as such forwarded to Transylvania’s legal bodies for 
ultimate resolution, which would have to respect the autonomous rights of its nations 
in full as well as ensure their institutional protection. A Governing Council, 
comprising 24 members in total (10 Romanian, 10 Hungarian and four Saxon 
delegates appointed by each community on a temporary basis) and with its seat in 
Gyulafehervdr/Alba Iulia would submit proposals to the Transylvanian National 
Assembly. The latter would be convened within a fortnight of the formation of the 
Governing Council so that it would be in a position to meet for the first time within 
three months at the latest (after elections to be held in the existing constituencies). 
Apart from the elected deputies, the bishops of the Transylvanian churches and one 
prominent secular figure from each diocese would be entitled to attend and cast votes 
at sessions of the Assembly. All of the laws and other provisions in force in 
Transylvania on the 31st October 1918 would continue to hold sway unchanged with 
the exception that the rights, functions and authority previously vested in the crown 
and the Hungarian government would be transferred to the Governing Council until 
further arrangements were put in place and that the Hungarian coat of arms and other
862 Gydrfds, op.cit., pi 46.
863 Gydrfds, op.cit., pl47.
864 Op.cit., pl49.
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emblems would be replaced by their Transylvanian equivalents. Similarly, all civil 
servants in office on 31st October 1918 would retain their posts, responsibilities and 
salaries and the regulations pertaining to their promotions, pensions and so on would 
remain valid. The Governing Council would approve and confirm en bloc all the 
appointments made by its Romanian counterpart in Nagyszeben/Sibiu. The members 
of the Governing Council and all new functionaries would be required to swear an 
oath of loyalty to Transylvania and its constitution, pledging to uphold the union and 
freedom of the three nations and respect their rights of self-government. The 
Governing Council would submit proposals to the Assembly concerning the 
organisation of Transylvania’s legislative bodies, the Transylvanian coat of arms, the 
national colours and the use of symbols by the three nations, the rules of entitlement 
to vote, agricultural reform, modification of the 1868 law on the equality of national 
minorities to bring them in line with Transylvanian realities,865 the harmonisation of 
county with linguistic boundaries as well as of administrative and judicial districts 
with electoral constituencies and the amendment of the criminal statute to outlaw the 
sowing of racial discord between the nations on penalty of high treason. Finally, all 
those bom or holding office in Transylvania prior to 31st October 1918, those 
naturalised by law and the legitimate descendants of the above categories would be 
regarded as its citizens.866
Gy£rf£s’ plan to substitute Hungarian (or Romanian) symbols with their 
Transylvanian equivalents (which did possess a certain degree of historical resonance)
865 In its preamble, the 1868 Law set out the principle of legal equality for all: “Inasmuchas all the 
citizens of Hungary form a single nation from a political point of view as well as in accordance with the 
fundamental principles of the Constitution, the indivisible, unified Hungarian nation, of which every 
citizen of the homeland is an equal member, regardless of which nationality he belongs to” (Imre Mik6, 
Nemzetisigi jog is  nemzetisigi politika, Minerva, Kolozsvdr, 1944, reprinted by Optimum Kiad6, 
Budapest, undated, p501. The text of the Law is reproduced in full on pp501-6). As Kontler remarks, 
this wording denies the political existence and thus the claims to political rights and institutions of the 
national minorities (nationalities). At the same time, as he goes on to comment, by granting individual 
rights it was liberal, providing extensive opportunities for the use of the mother tongue in the 
administration, courts, schools and churches (Kontler, pp282-3). See also Ldszl6 Katus, Jdzsef Edtvds 
and Ferenc Dedk: Laws on Nationalities, in Romsics 1999, ppl33-160. For the Parliamentary debate 
on the Law, see Istvdn Schlett (editor), A nemzetisigi tdrvinyjavaslat orszdggyulisi vitdja 1868, 
Termdszet- 6s Tdrsadalombardt FejlSddsdrt Kdzalapftvdny-Kortdrs Kiadd, Budapest, 2002.
866 Gydrfds, op.cit., ppl49-152.
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was not overly far-fetched to at least consider building upon. It revealed that he was 
aware of their role in creating and consolidating a collective identity. The region had 
been regarded as a distinct geographical unit in the past with its own traditions and 
culture and a resumption of autonomy could have allowed the Hungarians, Saxons 
and Romanians to make a fresh start with full respect for each other’s differences. 
Delegates at the Paris Peace Conference looked upon the declaration of a Soviet 
Republic in Hungary (21st March 1919) with unease and when the fact-finding 
mission to Budapest headed by Jan Smuts at the beginning of April did not bear fruit 
(the talks with Communist leader Bela Kun foundering because Smuts did not possess 
a mandate to make concessions) a Romanian offensive in the East was launched 
against the Hungarian Soviet Republic, reinforced shortly afterwards by a 
Czechoslovak invasion from the north. By the beginning of May the Romanians were 
in control of the provinces east of the River Tisza. The initial successes of the 
Hungarian Red Army in recapturing territories in the north were undermined by an 
ultimatum from Paris (June 13th) ordering it to withdraw. When B61a Kun complied 
he not only lost much support amongst the public at large, but many officers also 
defected to the counter-revolutionary army commanded by Admiral Horthy and 
stationed in Szeged. The short-lived Gyula Peidl government (1st to 6th August), 
which marked the end of the Bolshevik experiment witnessed the march of Romanian 
forces into the Hungarian capital. Although its successor the Istvdn Friedrich 
administration only lasted from August until November it was enthusiastic in its 
reprisals against former revolutionaries.867
In October 1919 the allies dispatched British diplomat Sir George Russell Clerk to 
Budapest in order to quell the anarchy. His main achievement was to persuade the 
Romanians to begin pulling out of Hungary, although their place was immediately 
taken by Horthy* s National Army. The Admiral himself triumphally entered 
Budapest on 16th November riding a white horse. Just over a week later, on 24th the 
predominantly conservative Kdroly Huszdr cabinet was formed. Clerk recognised it
867 For details on the turbulent months in question (covering Kun to Friedrich), see Romsics 2000, 
ppl27-133 and Kontler, pp337-9. Friedrich, owner of a machine works and erstwhile military under­
secretary under Kdrolyi was not recognised abroad because he owed his position to Archduke Joseph 
(nominated by Charles IV in 1918 as his representative) who considered himself regent thereby fuelling 
fears of a Habsburg restoration (Romsics 2000, ppl 31-3 and Kontler, p340).
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on behalf of the Peace Conference the next day, paving the way for an invitation to 
participate in its deliberations to be sent (which duly arrived on 1st December).868 
The country finally settled down following the Parliamentary elections in January 
1920 (25th to 26th) and Horthy’s appointment as regent on March 1st. The Hungarian 
peace delegation, with Count Albert Apponyi at its head reached Paris on January 
6th.869 The Treaty of Trianon was signed on 4th June 1920 and ratified on 26th July 
1921.
During this tumultuous period, the Hungarians of Transylvania870 remained relatively 
politically passive,871 rigorously avoiding any gestures to the Romanian government, 
which might be interpreted as a concession to the rightfulness of the latter's claims. 
Cnee Romania’s claim to Transylvania had been definitively endorsed however, 
further inaction could prove pernicious. This was clearly recognised by the authors of 
the pamphlet Kidlto Szd (A Voice Crying in the Wilderness), Kdroly K6s,872 Dr. Istv&n 
Z&goni and Dr. Arpdd Padl,873 the first significant appeal to the Hungarians as a 
community with a distinct identity and mission.
K6s urges the Hungarians to come to terms with the reality of their new situation, 
however harsh:
868 Cf. Romsics 2000, ppl33-4 and Kontler, p340.
869 Romsics 2000, ppl34-7 and Kontler, pp340-l.
870 Elsewhere denoted as the Hungarians in keeping with the use of terminology explained in footnote 6 
on p8 above.
871 Apart from the Gydrfds initiative and the attempts to organise an assembly to rival that of 
Gyulafehdrvdr/Alba Iulia mentioned above, the idea of a Szdkely Republic was also briefly toyed with 
in November 1918. On the 28th, an assembly of 5000 Szdkelys was held in Marosvdsdrhely/Tirgu 
Mure$to discuss how the country’s territorial integrity could be defended. See Raffay, pp148-150.
872 Kdroly K6s (1883-1977), architect, novelist, politician, publisher and politician was a prominent 
figure in the cultural life of the Hungarian minority, editing the Erdilyi Helikon from 1931. In the 
autumn of 1941 he was forced to flee from his home in Sztdna/Stana which was plundered and his 
manuscripts destroyed to Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca. He resumed his political career as President of the 
Magyar Nipi Szovetsig [Hungarian Popular Alliance] in Kolozs/Cluj county from 1944-6. Following 
his retirement in 1953 he concentrated on literary writing.
873 Arpdd Padl (1880-1944) was a journalist. In 1918-19 he held the post of sub-prefect in 
Udvarhely/Odorhei county and was later elected to the Romanian Parliament.
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"Something was signed somewhere, something was bargained somewhere, something 
was portioned out somewhere and somewhere an open door was closed so that it 
would remain that way forever.
(...)
Our old flag has been ripped to shreds, our weapons are defective, our soul is 
shackled.
But I know: we must nevertheless pick ourselves up off the ground.
(...) we were tom from, thrown out of the atelier, which was built with the help of the 
sweat of our toil in times past.
We were not asked: do we want this?
We, however, have to this very day not been willing to believe that this has really 
happened, that it could have happened in the first place.
And two years have gone by without our doing any work. But we waited. We waited 
in hope, with devout faith, for the sun to rise in the West! For two years we dreamed 
and did not want to see or hear, we did not want to feel and live, we just wanted to 
believe and trust and dream and wait for miracles, which would awaken us in the 
future.
Because we had grown accustomed to the old, we loved what we had once created. 
We believed that it would be ours in perpetuity, just as we had created it ourselves. 
Now, however, everything has transpired. After two years of bitter waiting, of numb 
dreams we have discovered that everything we believed in, trusted in, hoped for was 
but a castle in the air. We have found out that the sun does not rise in the place where 
it sets.
(...)
Former Hungary is no more as far as we are concerned, but Erd61y, Ardeal, 
Siebenbiirgen, Transylvania or whatever name is given to it in any language has risen 
and exists as surely as it did exist when we ourselves believed - because we wanted to 
believe - that it did not and that there was only Hungary.
(...)
I am a voice crying in the wilderness: this is what I call out!
(...)
Let us not look for law or unlawfulness, justice or injustice, let us not expect fairness 
or mercy.
We are not even asking for them.
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Let us not enquire after what sort of beggars' alms the Treaty of Trianon - drafted and 
concluded without us although it concerns us - might have left us.
There is not much point to it.
Our truth is our strength.
What we can obtain through struggle will be our own".874
Wallowing in misery over what had been lost could only result in stagnation. What 
was needed was resolve to embrace the future. Inspiration for the daunting task ahead 
could be drawn from the knowledge that together the Hungarians made for a solid 
foundation:
"Two million Hungarians armed with the awareness of their thousand-year history 
and its lessons, concentrated in a geographically unified territory within the 
framework of a young, poor country with a heterogeneous population of 13 to 14 
million, which has been leading an independent existence for barely half a century, 
can cause major shifts in balance depending on whether it works together with the 
country or against it
The individual who extended his sovereignty to include us always has to reckon with 
us, the Hungarians of Transylvania. Romania too will have to reckon with us if it 
wants the accumulations of territory and population to mean an accumulation of 
strength at the same time rather than an extra burden, a ponderous dead weight.
We should not forget that we are not a simple group of inhabitants broken off from 
the unified body of Hungarians, but that for a thousand years we have been a separate 
historical unit with our own, separate Transylvanian consciousness, an independent 
culture and self-esteem. We have been able to face up to every situation, we have 
been able to govern and we have been able to get back on our feet after difficult 
defeats. We are familiar with our strength; we do not overestimate it, but we do not 
belittle it either: we have put it to the test to determine how much we could bear.
We, two million working, taxpaying citizens, who produce material and cultural 
assets, represent a splendid boost in strength to Romania. But we, as a non-working, 
unproductive, malignant, invidious internal adversary of two million represent a 
terrible bane to Romania.
874 Kidltd Szd; A Magyarsdg Utja; A Politikai Aktivitds Rendszere, by Kiroly K6s, Istvin Zigoni and 
Arpid Pail, Lapkiadd 6s Nyomdai Muintizet Rdszvdnytirsasdg, Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca, 1921, ppl-4. 
Reprinted by Kapu Konyvek, Budapest, undated. Emphasis in original.
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However, we admit openly and sincerely that we prefer to be loyal rather than 
rebellious, we prefer to build rather than demolish; we prefer to be open friends rather 
than secret enemies.
But on condition that within the new circumstances we are accorded the minimum we 
deem indispensable from the point of view of our national culture, ancient customs, 
racial consciousness, social sentiment and economic development as a result of the 
lessons learned from our thousand year past.
(...)
I openly and confidently cry out to the Romania that has been augmented with us:
We Hungarians, who believe firmly in our Hungarianness and are Hungarian- 
speakers, are citizens of Romania and we seek national autonomy, in possession of 
which Greater Romania will have gained trustworthy citizens in us",875 
Although Hungarianness is not called into question as such (difference remaining 
material) what we witness here is a gravitation away from Budapest and emphasis on 
a peculiarly Transylvanian tradition and outlook, an independent identity based on a 
thousand years of history. K6s does not draw distinctions between the Hungarians 
concentrated in the urban centres including substantial numbers of Hungarian- 
speaking Jews and the Sz6kely of Eastern Transylvania,876 nor does he attach 
importance to social background, but stresses the unity of the Hungarian community 
within the revised frontiers. He is keen to dispel any suspicions concerning the 
loyalty of the Hungarians to their new state, but adamant that it comes at the price of 
respect for difference as evinced in autonomy.
The second contribution to the pamphlet, The Hungarians'Path (A Magyarsdg t/tja), 
focuses on political passivity, in particular the concept of passive resistance, and why 
it has outlived its usefulness tactically:
"Because if appalling indifference gains currency it tends to spread like wildfire 
amongst people and can degenerate into national suicide. Propagating it artificially is 
an unpardonable, inhumane transgression.
We find ourselves beyond the ratification already and the current situation was 
created for us without our having been consulted as to our fate. The Treaty of
875 Op. cit., pp4-5. Emphasis in the original.
876 For statistics concerning the proportion of Jews within the Hungarian population see Pomogdts, A 
transzilvanizmus, p37.
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Trianon has become Hungarian law. It is a cold fact, which we simply have to take 
note of and make allowances for the consequences for us (...). There is scarcely a 
rational individual amongst us who did not reckon with today's state of affairs at least 
as a possibility. Our ancestral citizenship has been erased, rewritten and replaced by a 
new one without our having been given the chance to express our will. For two years 
we have been mustering the strength of mind to accept this because keeping hold of 
this land, not budging from this soil and developing Hungarian culture here are 
imperative national duties".877
Two examples of passivity, the civil servants' refusal to swear allegiance to Romania 
and non-participation in the Parliamentaiy elections, were correct, but the salient 
point was that of the implicit resistance they afforded. In the political fray it can be an 
effective weapon provided that it does not entail sacrificing results and is employed as 
a protest.878
Complete social passivity merely plays into the hands of those it is intended to thwart: 
"Renouncing everything, lulling oneself to sleep and stopping work can represent the 
most effective assistance that can be given to every anti-Hungarian endeavour".879 
Even during the state of siege brought about by the military occupation with its severe 
restrictions on freedom of movement and accusations being flung around schools, 
churches and the press conducted their business, theatres only closed down if their 
doors were physically locked and put under guard.880
Unfortunately, in spite of the constant avowals to the contrary on the part of the 
Romanian government, the treatment meted out to the Hungarians in the last couple 
of years had been diametrically opposed to the letter and spirit of the 
Gyulafehervdr/Alba Iulia decisions. No efforts were undertaken to carry the latter 
into effect. It was at this juncture that the pernicious nature of passivity finally 
became apparent: the Romanian powers that be could do with the decisions as they 
saw fit, which meant trampling them underfoot with impunity.881 Healthy self-
877 Kidltd Stj6, p7.
878 Op. cit., pp7-8.
879 Op. cit., p i8.
880 Op. cit., ppl8-19.
881 Op. cit., p29.
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criticism would lead to an acknowledgement of the sterility of remaining in denial. 
The key to survival was to be found in general education.882
Collective Hungarian identity could not be maintained, let alone perpetuated, without 
proper access to financial and other resources:
“We have to assure the Hungarians of Transylvania opportunities to earn a livelihood, 
with firm economic ground beneath their feet and the pathway towards developing 
culturally for their future. Someone might be obsessed with the morbid, fanciful 
notion that it would be better to hand over the land holdings lock, stock and barrel and 
all the properties complete with furnishings and equipment that have been gradually 
developed and relocate the Hungarians en masse to Brazil or to make them migrate to 
the wilderness of the Nordic tundra. This is quite manic lunacy. But if we do not try 
our hand at creating safeguards for the conditions needed for us to live out our lives 
then we can never know whether huge numbers of Hungarians will not be forced to 
set off on their travels. They would not do this out of madness, however, but out of 
compulsion. Yet the price of staying put cannot be that of abandoning the Hungarian 
essence. The peace treaty though does not offer us more than a few sentences, the 
contents of which set out prospects in very general terms. Practical implementation is 
above all our task, but we also have to examine and establish whether these prospects 
as inserted between the peace terms suffice to yield the opportunities to make a 
living".883
National character (material Hungarianness) would enable the Hungarians to pull 
through and agree upon a political programme: the Hungarian temperament and 
upbringing would not permit the Hungarians to shy away from an open attitude. 
Instead their very nature was prompting them to take their fate into their own hands 
rather than make do with ascertaining the lie of the land. No decisions concerning 
them could be taken without them and their self-confidence was such that it left no 
latitude for deceit, the Sz6kelys in particular being fond of thinking for themselves. 
The political lifespan of any aspiring leaders who neglected to keep the Hungarians 
fully informed would be remarkably short. Membership of the contemporary nation 
was not the exclusive privilege of a few prestigious nobles, but belonged to all as 
equals not just in the enjoyment of rights, but also in the will to make sacrifices.
882 Op. cit., p30.
883 Op. c it, pp30-31.
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There were no doubts as to who formed part of the opposing national camp, but the 
real enemies were the traitors ready to give ground on the matter of precious rights.884 
Adopting such an approach would not constitute a radical departure from the familiar: 
“Freedom of national organisation is nothing new in this region. This is what 
Transylvania's past history is built on and the fact that it was able to transform into a 
historical foundation is by no means the result of a sudden inspiration on the part of 
some ancient predecessor, but of the necessity of natural cause and effect perceived 
through experience and of the ethnic distribution".885 
Such freedoms were not only the foundation of the strong modem state, but 
permeated the passages in the peace treaty referring to minority rights. The state 
possessed statutes, which constituted nations had an obligation to respect, but these 
laws were not permitted to hamper or interfere in the internal organisation of the 
nation gratuitously. The Hungarians wanted no more than to organise themselves 
nationally along the same lines as the other national groups in Transylvania.886 The 
composition of the national assembly with its seat in Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca had to 
be as democratic as possible since it was called upon to express the will of the 
Hungarians as a whole. National autonomy would encompass everyone within the 
boundaries of Romania who declared themselves Hungarian and some means of 
collectively accommodating the Jewish Hungarians had to be found, perhaps by 
drawing up a survey of the nation's members. Inclusion in the register under a given 
category would be based on self-determination and open to appeal with a court ruling 
settling cases of dispute, hi mixed population areas the information in the register 
would entitle the national assembly to levy a tax for cultural and other purely national 
aims and could not exceed in total the amount paid by the individual in state and local 
tax unless the person concerned voluntarily contributed more.
Autonomy would apply to areas where the population was not mixed. Self- 
government would start at local level with the Hungarian national assembly and its 
executive heading and monitoring public administration at village and municipal level 
in areas where Hungarians were in the majority or dominated entirely. Minority rights 
would be rigorously enforced. In Hungarian areas not only the public administration
484 Op. cit., p31.
583 Op. cit., p32.
886 Op. cit., p32.
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would have to be Hungarian, but the judiciary as well. No restrictions could be 
placed on the free selection of civil servants. Similarly, local authorities would be 
empowered to adopt guidelines for language usage, but these would have to guarantee 
full equality for minorities meaning that legislative, administrative and judicial 
dealings would be conducted in Hungarian where the Hungarians were involved and 
they would therefore be informed about all legal decrees and other instructions 
applying to them in their native tongue.
Custodianship of national assets was a purely national responsibility and local 
government would draft directives for the economy accordingly, with free trade as the 
point of departure with implications for customs frontiers and railway infrastructure 
improvements.
As far as education was concerned, national autonomy precluded the state from 
running Hungarian schools. Maintenance costs would have to be covered by local 
government from the tax revenues paid into the treasury. Drawing up parallel 
curricula would be the subject of prior consultation and agreement, but the state 
would not be entitled to intervene in the employment of teachers. Wherever there 
were at least twenty pupils of school age the Hungarian local authorities would be 
able to provide them with a school. There would be no restrictions on who could 
found a school: all establishments would be supervised and inspected by the body 
brought into being by the Hungarian national assembly for that purpose.
In short, organisation was the key to salvaging the present and influencing the 
contours of the future.887
The final contribution by Arp&d Pa&l focused on the organisation of political activity. 
The peace treaty had given rise to a new set of parameters:
"The Hungarians attached to Romania were transformed into an internationally 
recognised separate nation within the new state situation with constitutional rights in 
its own new state and may call for the defence of these before the League of Nations. 
First and foremost the Hungarians must attain their demands by hard work 
themselves, regardless of whether the demands are made internally or externally, and 
the expression of that struggle can only take place within the prevailing state 
situation, not via the former state (...). The communities of the Hungarians arising 
from ideas, race and tradition may all endure beyond their division into several states
887 For the section outlining these rights see Kidltd szd, pp32-35.
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and we must attend to this by showing affection towards each other and achieve 
understanding for this community belonging to spiritual regions within the scope of
  . . ii 888our own state .
Against this backdrop it is clear that liberties have to be fought for within the state 
concerned and that any interference by the anyaorszdgiak would not be tolerated 
internationally. The Hungarians had only themselves to rely on in an unenviable set 
of circumstances brought about by a peace settlement riddled with deficiencies 
leading to the complete and counterproductive subjugation of the defeated peoples. 
Democracy was the remedy, as it encouraged increased collective self-awareness. 
Political activity could take as its starting point the desire to improve the treaty in the 
course of its practical implementation by awakening sympathy between peoples and 
fleshing out the paragraphs with forgiveness and freedoms. The first step towards 
realising these goals would be to form the Hungarian National Coalition {Magyar 
Nemzeti Szovetseg) in Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca. It would provide a framework for 
political activity on the part of the minority in all areas of state operation and 
represent their interests both inside and outside of parliament and at international 
level. A network of provincial boards would be linked to the central office and 
management committee. Until such a stage as it had gained official recognition from 
central government its mandate would be to attempt to arrive at solutions to a number 
of pressing issues, examples of which were resolving the problem of the destitute 
Hungarian civil servants and of sorting out the return of expelled persons and of other 
individuals exiled from their homes in Transylvania.889
Account would have to be taken of difference, such as the special case of the Sz£kely 
in the light of the compactness and contiguity of the region they inhabited, their rights 
to educational and ecclesiastical autonomy as acknowledged in the minorities 
convention and the peculiarities of land ownership in their heartland. A separate
890Szdkely branch within the Coalition would be best suited to addressing their needs. 
The question of political parties inevitably had to be broached:
"I admit that it is justified and warranted for a variety of parties differentiated 
according to professional branches and world views to be founded. This has to be the
888 Op. cit., pp41-42.
889 Op. cit., pp42 and 44-45.
890 Op. cit, p46. For the provisions of the convention see below.
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case. However the Hungarian parties must stick together in fighting for their national 
individuality. For this reason party business has to be subordinated to or at least be 
brought into harmony with the general guiding principles of the National Coalition 
and the parties must stand side by side as allies in the view of the outside world”.891 
The pamphlet eloquently throws the dilemmas of minority existence into high relief, 
chief amongst them the absence of a genuine alternative to standing up for rights to 
cultural and linguistic self-determination. The materiality of Hungarianness itself is 
not doubted, but a reorientation from Hungary to Transylvania as a distinct 
geographical and historical entity (rather than to the wider Kingdom of Romania) is 
incorporated into arguments about identity, with history occupying a prominent place 
alongside temperament and character. The preoccupation with presenting a united 
front to the outside world in order to assert claims to autonomy more effectively 
became a permanent feature of the rhetoric of playing within the system and 
scrupulously obeying the rules to deflect charges of disloyalty. The 
Gyulafehirvdr/Alba Iulia decisions left an indelible imprint on the consciousness of 
Hungarian campaigners, partly because they had been drawn up by the Romanian side 
and as such possessed a legitimacy untainted by Hungarian authorship, partly because 
they afforded a benchmark, a set of standards against which progress could be 
measured.892 Hungarian identity in Transylvania was politicised and the business of 
politics for the minority centred on a defence of the unique identity and securing the 
means and resources to both maintain and reproduce it.
At the Peace Conference, the Allies were anxious to ensure that a balance was struck 
between acceding to the wishes of the successor states to the Dual Monarchy in terms 
of territorial aggrandisement and affording protection to the ethnic minorities created 
as a result. The population increases that the settlement brought about would only be 
a source of strength to the beneficiaries if the national minorities felt genuine loyalty 
towards the new states. Therefore providing international guarantees of their civic 
rights and formal equality was regarded as the most effective means of consolidating
891 Op. cit., p47.
892 Rather than as the wedge used to drive Hungary and Transylvania apart, although this was certainly 
an aspect Hungarians were aware of. For an anyaorszdgi view, see A romdn uralom berendezkedise 
Erdilyben by Benedek Jancs6 in Magyar Szemle, 1928 September, ppl23-129, Magyar Szemle 
Tdrsasdg, Budapest
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the post-war order.893 On 28th April at its plenary session, the Conference adopted the 
founding charter of the League of Nations. The treaty presented to the representatives 
of the German government made it clear that self-determination (the ethnic principle) 
was deemed less important than economic and strategic considerations.894 In May 
1919, the Commission on New States and Minorities was instructed to draw up a 
minority protection treaty for Romania. On 23rd of the same month, the Commission 
invited Prime Minister Bratianu to express his opinion on the draft. Br&tianu gave 
assurances that his country would guarantee the rights and freedoms of the minorities 
on the basis of a generous policy of administrative decentralisation and by allowing 
them full economic, cultural and linguistic development. Whereas Romania would be 
willing to adopt the provisions, to which all members of the League of Nations 
committed themselves, but that it would under no circumstances accept the 
interference of foreign powers in its internal affairs and the loss of sovereignty this 
implied.895 His opposition did not soften at the next plenary, held on 31st May at 
which he was adamant that as long as the offending passages remained in the text, the 
Romanian government would not put its signature to it.896 The deadlock was finally 
broken when the Allies sent a note to Bucharest in November threatening to declare 
Romania’s territorial claims null and void unless it backed down. Br&tianu resigned 
in protest, leaving his successor Vaida-Voevod to comply.897 
Thus the Treaty of Paris on minority rights was finally signed on 9th December 1919 
(entering into force on 4th September 1920), Romania committed itself to enshrining a 
number of fundamental freedoms for its citizens irrespective of birth place, 
nationality, race, language or religion in the constitution and to ensuring that no law, 
decree or official measure subsequently enacted violated them. Article Three 
stipulated that optants choosing to become citizens of another country would have to 
change their place of permanent residence within twelve months, but that they would
893 J6zsef Gal&ntai, Kisebbsigvidelem a pdrizsi bikekonferencidn, 1919-1920 (henceforth Galdntai) 
p272, in Bdrdi, pp270-277. As Galdntai comments, this took precedence over granting the minorities 
autonomy, in other words their rights were implicitly confined to the cultural sphere, thereby 
confirming the “national” character of the new states (p273).
894 Galdntai, p273.
895 Kolar, p62 and Galdntai., pp274-5.
896 Galdntai, p275.
897 Kolar, p62.
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retain their property on Romania soil and could take any movables with them. 
Romanian citizenship would be open to all individuals in the territories annexed or to 
be annexed from Hungary provided that they were the children of parents whose 
permanent domicile was in these territories even if they themselves did not live there 
permanently at the time of entry into force of the Treaty. Within two years of the 
entry into force they could declare to the Romanian authorities their intention to 
renounce Romanian nationality. Romania would not take any steps to impede the 
acquisition of Romanian citizenship or exercise of the right to option. Article Eight 
specifically accorded equality in terms of civic and political rights to the Hungarians, 
including access to public office. All restrictions on the use of minority languages in 
private life, business transactions, churches, the press, publications and public 
meetings were prohibited. In court proceedings, whether orally or in writing, 
allowances had to be made for non-Romanian speakers. Equal treatment was to be 
guaranteed to linguistic, racial or religious minorities who were to enjoy comparable 
rights in setting up, managing and supervising charitable, religious or social 
institutions, schools and other educational establishments in which their mother 
tongue could be spoken freely. In cities and districts where a substantial proportion of 
the population were not native Romanian speakers the government would be obliged 
to facilitate state schooling for children in their own language although this did not 
prevent the Romanian government from making Romanian a compulsory subject.
The minorities in these areas were entitled to receiving a fair share of central and local 
government budget allocations for educational, religious or charitable purposes. The 
Sz6kely and Saxon communities were to be granted local self-administration on 
religious and educational issues monitored by the state. The provisions of the Treaty 
were subject to international guarantees by the League of Nations and could not be 
amended without the approval of the majority of members of the League's Council. 
Every member of the Council was entitled to draw its attention to actual or potential 
breaches of the undertakings of the Treaty so that the Council in turn could issue 
corrective instructions. Furthermore, Romania would be expected to cooperate in 
instances where differences of opinion existed between itself and members of the 
Entente (as co-signatories) or the Council by referring the dispute to the Permanent 
Tribunal.898
898 For the full text see Mikd, pp267-271.
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Although Hungary was not a contracting party to the Treaty of Paris, the latter* s 
international dimension alone meant that the states from whose bosom the minorities 
had been plucked were entitled to keep a vigilant eye on the fate of their former 
citizens and if they noticed ill treatment or discrimination they could turn to the 
League of Nations for remedy.899 More generally, the Treaty enshrined the difference 
between material (ethnic/cultural) and functional (citizenship) identity in law, 
endorsing the minority’s right to cultivate and express its Hungarianness within the 
framework of the new state (doing so was not an act of sedition, treason, subversion 
or disloyalty). Forcible assimilation was not condoned.
Although its wording was vague the deeper significance of the Treaty was not lost on 
the Hungarians. In the words of Emil Grandpierre, Deputy President of the Hungarian 
Coalition:
"...the Minority Treaty, however cautious in its definition of the term minority, 
nonetheless called a new personality in public law into being in the shape of the 
concept of a minority as the subject of the minority rights established in the Treaty. 
From this it followed logically and automatically that minorities as such had a right to 
found their organisation. The most expedient form for this organisation was the 
alliance, which would embrace all Hungarians and as a legal person represent the 
minority in the country and before the League of Nations".900 
The Hungarians were furnished with an outlet for airing their grievances with at least 
a prospect of redress: the fact that submitting complaints to the League resembled 
clutching at straws was entirely due to the deficiencies of that organisation and its 
procedures. However, Romania was anxious to parade its credentials as a civilised 
and cultured nation, to boost its prestige and often the threat of turning to the League 
was enough to dissuade successive governments from some of their more extreme 
plans.
After initial complications caused by the foundation of the Hungarian People's Party 
{Magyar Nippdrt) in Bdnffyhunyad/Huedin on 5th June 1921 (in which Kdroly K6s 
was secretary) a programme for the Coalition was finally drafted and the constituent
199 Cf. Artur Balogh, JogdUam is  kisebbsig, Kriterion Kiad6, Bukarest, 1997, pl49. On ppl44 to 209 
his essay A kisebbsigek videlme, originally published in 1930, is reproduced. It contains a detailed 
analysis of the Treaty of Paris, its deficiencies and how these could have been remedied.
900 Emil Grandpierre, op. cit. p 132.
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assembly was held on 6th July.901 Baron Sdmuel Jdsika902 became its first President, 
Kdroly K6s its secretary and from the very outset unity as an ethnic minority and 
loyalty to the state were highlighted in the statutes and the working programme put 
forward by Istvdn Z&goni.903 The Coalition immediately set about extending its 
organisational network and tackling the problems besetting Hungarian churches and 
schools. These efforts came to an abrupt and premature end when the activities of the 
Coalition were suspended prior to its dissolution on the flimsiest of pretexts: on 21st 
October a gala performance was scheduled in the National Theatre in Kolozsvdr/Cluj- 
Napoca (recently wrested from Hungarian hands) in honour of Queen Maria, who was 
paying an official visit to the city. J6sika was originally not invited to attend, but 
when the prefect, Metes, woke up to his faux pas he scribbled a few hasty lines on a 
visiting card in pencil. As a gentleman of the old school who had spent his prime in 
the court of Franz Josef, J6sika did not feel that the necessary proprieties had been 
followed and therefore did not turn up. The Romanian press castigated him for this 
perceived snub, viewing it as an expression of inedentism on the part of the 
Hungarians. J6sika's response was to clarify his stance via the office of the royal 
household steward. Metes retaliated by demanding that the Hungarian Coalition 
present its articles of association as approved by the Minister of Home Affairs. It was 
unable to comply and Metes, citing a ministerial decree from the days of Hungarian 
rule, which prohibited political organisation on the part of national minorities, shut it 
down as of 30th October, confiscating its documents and launching proceedings 
against its leaders.904 Although it might appear trivial and petty this act of vengeance 
is quite revealing and in some ways typical of the high-handed contempt displayed by 
many Romanian bureaucrats.
901 For a more exhaustive account of the wranglings see Emil Grandpierre op. cit. ppl33-134.
902 Jdsika (1848-1923) owner of extensive land holdings could look back upon an illustrious career. 
From 1885 to 1888 he had been the highest-ranking official in the administration of Kolozs county, 
from 1888 President of the Erdilyi Gazdasdgi Egyestilet (Transylvanian Economic Association), from 
1891 a member of the Hungarian Parliament, a permanent secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs in 
1893 and from 1895 to 1898 a minister in the Bdnffy government. In 1911, he was Deputy-Speaker 
and the following year Speaker of the Upper House of the Parliament.
903 For further details see Mikd, pp23-26.
904 Grandpierre op. cit. p i35 and Mikd p25.
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2.6 Reproduction and Resources: The 1921 Land Reform
The official Romanian attitude towards the Hungarians was betrayed in a series of 
discriminatory and oppressive laws tailored to systematically strip the minority of the 
material and intellectual assets indispensable to sustaining and nurturing an 
independent identity as part of an unrelenting drive to impose national homogeneity 
where none existed. The penalty for deviance (in this case being Hungarian) was 
chronic insecurity and relegation to second-class citizenship (where citizenship was 
not refused altogether). In other words, a split between functional identity 
(citizenship) and material identity arising from a non-inclusive application of the 
national principle of classification on the part of the Romanian authorities was already 
apparent.
One of the first measures imbued with this spirit was the notorious land reform of 
1921905 (which consisted of four separate pieces of legislation applying to separate 
territories within Romania) with its blatant double standards. At the time of its 
publication in the Monitorul Oficial on 23rd July the Hungarians did not have even 
one single deputy in the Romanian Parliament and the Coalition could only adopt a 
stance in a manifesto, which condemned the absence of consultation and fulfilled the 
role of a formal protest.906 That the objections fell on deaf ears is indicated by point
907c, section 131 of the 1923 constitution, which codified a number of its clauses. 
Heralded as a social reform in the spirit of the Gyulafehervar/Alba Iulia decisions its 
ostensible purpose was that of storming the last bastions of outdated Hungarian feudal 
privilege, putting an end to the inequities of the past by sharing out land amongst 
smallholders, a far healthier arrangement. This explanation conveniently sidestepped 
the historical reality of the high proportion of smallholdings, which before the war 
made up 69.9% of the total cultivated area (46.32% of which was the property of
905 For a complete analysis of the text including a full comparison with the law as applied to the Regat 
see Az erdilyi fold sorsa. Az 1921. dvi romdn fdldreform by Dr. Miklds Mdricz, Az Erd61yi F6rfiak 
Egyesiilete Budapest, 1932. This work contains a meticulous rebuttal of David Mitrany's The Land and 
Peasant in Rumania. The War and the Agrarian Reform 1917-1921, Carnegie Foundation, 1931. See 
also Kolar, ppl30-143.
906 Mikd, p30.
907 Op. cit., p30.
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Romanian smallholders), compared with the 11.6% medium and 18.5% extensive 
holdings. Moreover, of the major holdings, only 32.5% were in private hands, the 
remainder owned by the state, local communities, churches, schools and other legal 
persons or held in joint tenancy.908 The concentration of large and medium holdings 
in Hungarian and smaller holdings in Romanian hands was likewise the result of 
historical development, the exceptions to this rule being the Romanians who had been 
elevated to the ranks of the nobility and the descendants of the Naszdd/Nasaud 
frontier guard regiment909 In short the Romanian peasants in Transylvania were 
already considerably better off than their counterparts in the Regat. In spite of this, 
the law for the Regat stipulated that "The expropriation only affects holdings 
comprising at least 100 hectares of arable land".910 Such a lower limit did not feature 
in the Transylvanian equivalent. Similarly, the maximum amount of land to be 
expropriated in the Regat was fixed at two million hectares whereas no such ceiling 
was agreed for Transylvania. Therefore whilst only a quarter of arable land in the 
Regat fell under the relevant provisions, nothing in Transylvania was exempt911 
Section one of the laws for both the Regat and Transylvania list the objectives of the 
expropriation. Whilst the former mentions increasing the extent of peasant holdings 
and creating common pastures alongside the general interest and economic and 
cultural considerations, the latter covers expanding and supplementing peasant 
holdings in villages, common grazing land and forests, facilitating the development of 
national industry by keeping hold of land necessary not only for existing industry, but 
also for industry, which will doubtlessly be established in future for geographical, 
ethnographic and geological reasons, easing life in cities, mining and spa centres by 
keeping back areas for workers, civil servants and other persons of limited means to 
give them the opportunity to set up small farms and satisfying demands for cultural, 
economic, social and physical education in the public interest thereby embodying a 
radically different philosophy.912
The optants were classified as absentees (individuals who dwelt abroad between 1st 
December 1918 and the tabling of the land reform bill except those on official
908 Op. cit., pp28 and 29.
909 Op. cit., pp28-29.
910 Mdricz op. cit. p84.
9,1 See Mdricz op. cit., pp84-85 and Hetven 6v, p34.
912 Mdricz op. cit., pp82-83, Mikd, p31.
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business) and their entire holdings were seized by the state, a serious breach of the 
Paris Treaty. The 348 persons concerned lost approximately 390,000 hectares, 4.91% 
of which were so-called dwarf holdings, making a nonsense of the declared motive of 
benefiting the worse off at the expense of the proprietors of sprawling estates.913 
Since the law was promulgated after the dates quoted there was nothing that the 
optants could do to avoid falling foul of these provisions and to add insult to injury 
many of the victims had been hounded out of Transylvania by the authorities and 
deliberately not permitted to return to their homes.914
Perhaps the most flagrant abuse pertained to the csiki magdnjavak (the property of the 
descendants of the First Szdkely Frontier Guard Infantry Regiment gifted to the 
original families by Josef the Second on 27 May 1783 following the settlement of an 
old frontier dispute between Transylvania and Moldova in 1769), which came under 
the heading of kozbirtokossdg or joint tenancy.
Until 1851 both the Szdkely families of Csik/Ciuc and their Romanian counterparts 
from the Naszod/Nasaud regiment were able to make full use of their award when 
Franz Josef the First confiscated the Sz6kely land by way of retaliation for their 
involvement in the Hungarian War of Independence. At the same time he granted the 
Naszdd/Nasaud regiment's lands to their families in perpetuity.
In the wake of the Compromise, the king returned the land and properties to the 
communities of Csik/Ciuc and Hdromszek/Trie-Scaune also in perpetuity, indivisibly 
and as private property for the purpose of fostering agricultural activity, industry and 
trade with a view to raising the level of prosperity of the Sz6kely people.
Most of the 35 647 hectares of land in Csik/Ciuc consisted of forest best suited to 
supporting livestock and as such not a prime candidate for being divided up. The 
csiki magdnjavak were, however, deemed to belong to the state whilst the 
Naszdd/Nasaud properties were left untouched. The loss of not only the forests, but 
also the pastures, the barracks in Csfkszereda/Miercurea-Ciuc, girls' school, 
orphanage and many other valuable buildings was devastating for the 15,000 families 
suddenly deprived of all means of sustenance.915
913 Mdricz op. cit,. ppl01-103.
914 Luk£cs op. cit., ppl64-166.
9,5 For this section see M6ricz op. cit., ppl 15-118; Hetven iv, p35 and GyOrgy Ladihay, Az erdilyi 
agrdrtdrviny is  vigrehajtdsa in Magyar Szemle, October 1928, ppl52-153, Magyar Szemle T£rsas£g, 
Budapest
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Eungarians who had settled in the region after 1st January 1885 916 were to forfeit all 
holdings above 3.99 hectares - although the expropriation committees often arbitrarily 
reduced this to a mere 2.85 hectares - and since the average size of the Hungarian 
holdings affected was between 9 and 12.5 hectares the motives behind the 
expropriation were questionable to say the least. The victims turned to the League of 
Nations for redress.917
The National Hungarian Party (Orszagos Magyar Part) later assessed the work 
carried out by the district and country committees as follows:
'As a general rule the members of the expropriation committees were the embodiment 
cf racial hatred, national intolerance and corruption. The majority were composed of 
mqualified individuals who did not even have the most elementary knowledge at 
tieir disposal. Thus apart from the implementation of the law in bad faith the losses 
suffered by the landowners were increased due to the members of the committees 
leing ignorant and uninformed. The committee members from the Regat were not 
hmiliar with the cadastral register system, but they were equally unfamiliar with the 
Talue of the land, which ought to have been the basis for making decisions.
According to the provisions of the law the most important role was supposed to be 
hat of the designated engineers, but their places were occupied by lay civil servants. 
Host of the members of the committees came from the Regat and were not only 
uifamiliar with our legal system but also with our language and were therefore not 
tven able to communicate with the landowners undergoing expropriation. The result 
vas that enforcement of the law varied not only from one province but from one 
committee and one landowner to the next.
Amongst landowning circles a movement got under way to urge that Transylvanian 
nembers be appointed alongside the Regat officials who were entirely unfamiliar 
with the set up. By way of response the landowners received a firm promise from the 
:ompetent authorities, but instead - to their utmost astonishment - the Minister of
9,6 These individuals had moved mainly to Temes/Timi§ and Krass6-SzJoriny/Cara§-Severin in 
accordance with the laws of 1886,1894 and 1911 and had purchased the land at the going rate. See 
Mdricz op. cit., ppl 18-120.
917 See Ladihay op. cit. pl53 and Mikd, pp 35-36.
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Agriculture withdrew the mandate of those Transylvanian members who were already 
members of the committees, delegating officials from the Regat in their stead".918 
The glaring discrepancy between the prices set for expropriated land in the Regat and 
Transylvania rubbed salt in the many wounds. Whereas the reference years for the 
Regat were 1917-1922, the cut off point for Transylvania was 1913: the price in 
(paper) lej could not exceed the average in (gold) korona for the period up to then, 
which fluctuated between 600 and 1000 gold korona. An insight into the actual value 
was provided by Petra Suciu in a piece on Torda-Aranyos/Turda-Arie§ county in 
which he pointed out that the value of the land to be expropriated there was fixed at 
104.5 million lej, but that its market value was at least 800 million lej.919 The erosive 
effects of inflation meant a hefty loss was incurred anyway, but the compensation was 
paid out in nominal value 5% annuity bonds on which interest would be paid over 50 
years rather than in cash. To all practical intents and purposes this meant that the land 
was confiscated without recompense.920
The impact of the law on the Hungarian churches, schools and foundations was 
financially devastating, rendering it virtually impossible for them to continue the vital 
educational and cultural work expected of them at a juncture where need for it had 
never been so pressing. 84.54% of all ecclesiastical holdings were expropriated921 
with no account taken of the fact that the role of the church was often that of steward: 
"The bulk of the Hungarian ecclesiastical estates were not the property of the church, 
but belonged to various funds administrated by the church. Hence all the holdings of 
the Transylvanian Roman Catholic Officials were the property of a foundation. The 
estate in Kolozsmonostor (is in the outskirts of Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca) was owned 
by the educational fund, those in Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca and VdralmdslAlma§u by 
the bursary fund, one third of the Radndt/Iemut estate belonged to the religious fund 
and a further third to the bursary fund and the Alsdbajom/Boian estate was similarly 
divided between three funds. The situation of the Protestant churches, whose 
foundations for the most part originated from the era of the Transylvanian
918 Quoted from Dr. Jdzsef Oberding, Gazdasdgi Sirelmeink is  Ktvdnsdgaink, Kolozsvdr, 1931 in 
M6ricz op. cit., ppl42-143. No indication is given of the page number in the original.
919 Quoted in M6ricz, p i36 from Suciu’s Judetul Turda.
920 See Mdricz, ppl35-141; Mikd, p37; Hetven iv, p35; Ladihay, 154 and Kolar, ppl37-8.
921 Mikd, p33 and Kolar, p i40.
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principality, was no different. Right up to the expropriation they were in the service 
of education".922
In Marosszentimre/Sintimbru the reformed church along with the arable land and 
manse built only a decade previously were earmarked for expropriation on the pretext 
that its congregation had declined. In spite of the compilation of documentary 
evidence to the contrary the committee elected to go ahead with handing it over to the 
Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church and was only thwarted by the refusal of the 
Baldzsfalva/Blaj archbishop to accept it. This was but one example of many and not 
all churches were so fortunate.923
The Hungarian Cultural Society of Transylvania EMKE (Erdelyi Magyar 
Kozmuvelodesi Egyesiilet) holdings, including the Agricultural School at 
Algydgy/Geogiau complete with movables, were expropriated with the exception of a 
modest portion of forest land (leaving just under 39 hectares of the original 973.5). 
Had the law been applied properly, 57 hectares of arable land would have been kept 
for the model farm alongside a further 114 hectares of arable land and an appropriate 
quantity of forest and pasture for the purposes of supporting the school plus 17 
hectares of arable land for EMKE's orphanage. Although EMKE appealed against the 
decision it never reached the courts, leaving the society crippled with all the 
implications that entailed in terms of the impoverishment of Hungarian cultural 
life.924
Section 40 of the law empowered the state to hold land in reserve for general cultural, 
economic, social, military, educational and other unspecified purposes contributing to 
the common good. Once again an upper limit was imposed on such reserves for the 
Regat without corresponding provision for Transylvania. In 1925 the state reserve in 
Transylvania comprised some 527,449 hectares. These were in the main leased out 
for a pittance by way of rewarding political cronies. The 11th December 1925 edition 
of Romania wryly remarked:
"If some day the country's situation takes shape along the lines of the new land 
ownership system it will certainly be possible to ascertain that not even half of the
922 Quoted from Dr. J6zsef Oberding, Gazdasdgi Sirelmeink is  Ktvdnsdgaink, p378 and following, 
Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca 1931 in M6ricz, p97.
923 Mdricz, pp97-98 and Mikd, pp32-33.
924 M6ricz, pp97-100 and Mikd, p33.
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total expropriated area will have ended up in the hands of farmers and that the aim of 
the expropriation was not in the slightest to allow the greatest number of impecunious 
peasants access to land, but its ambition was to create a capitalist bourgeoisie. This is 
the only means of explaining the sudden appearance of a new landowning class in the 
place of peasants running farms. Its new recruits are lawyers, doctors, civil servants, 
engineers, lecturers, teachers, priests, machinists, cereals merchants, horse-dealers and 
so on, individuals who have nothing to do with farming the land, village life or 
livestock breeding".925
2.7 Reproduction and Resources: Laws on Education
With its undeniable role in consolidating and reproducing identity, the realm of 
education was predestined to become an arena of conflict. Indeed any encroachment 
on mother tongue schooling potentially put the future of the minority at risk by 
lowering their level of attainment and thereby narrowing their occupational and 
cultural horizons. On a slightly more subtle level, robbing the Hungarians of a new 
generation of intellectuals would deprive them of an independent voice to articulate 
their identity (through producing representations for either a Hungarian or a 
Romanian audience) and speak up about their concerns in public. The battle for 
rights in education was a battle for control not only over minds, but also over hearts 
and souls.
In Transylvania the church-run denominational schools had traditionally been a 
formidable presence within the context of a Hungarian state that contented itself with 
determining the type of schools it wanted, defining the syllabus and performing 
inspections rather than interfering in every minute detail of day to day operations or 
asserting a monopoly over education.926 Indeed state schooling in Transylvania only 
dated back to 1873 and even then it was conceived of as providing assistance to rather 
than usurping or supplanting the denominational schools.927 Whittling down the 
influence of the latter not only curtailed opportunities for receiving education in
925 Quoted in Ladihay, p i55.
926 See for example Oliver E6ttev6nyi A trianoni szerzodis kulturdlis Icovetkezmdnyei in Igazsdgot 
Magyarorszdgnak, pi 80.
927 Hetven p27.
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Hungarian, but also eliminated competition with state schools thus placing the 
minority in a relationship of complete dependency on the good graces of the 
government. Eliminating their secure source of income by means of the land reform 
was but the first skirmish in what was to evolve into a war of attrition. According to a 
decree of 1921 from the Ministry of Education all pupils and teachers at such schools 
had to be members of the denomination concerned meaning that parents with a 
different religious background were barred from them.928 As of 1922 teachers at the 
Hungarian denominational schools lost their entitlement to half price rail tickets. 
Moreover their rights to a pension were not recognised and they were required to sit a 
Romanian language examination with failure leading to immediate dismissal. 
Applications for state funding were continually turned down when addressed by 
Hungarian church-run schools, though the same was not true of their Saxon 
counterparts.929 A network of state schools with Hungarian as the language of tuition 
was built up in Hungarian villages, recruiting the teachers formerly employed at 
denominational schools. The loss of staff incurred by the latter was enough in itself 
to close many of them down. In order to overcome the reluctance of Hungarian 
parents to send their children to the state schools, the teachers - fearing for their jobs 
as they were contractually obliged to fill classes - enlisted the aid of Romanian school 
inspectors to bring pressure to bear on the vulnerable families of low-ranking civil 
servants and the retired to set a good example.930 Once they had outlived their 
usefulness these state schools were not spared. Between 1932 and 1937 in 
Udvarhely/Odorhei county 74 Hungarian schools or sections were romanianized or
931shut permanently.
In spite of promises made prior to the parliamentary elections in 1922 to the effect 
that denominational schools would not be persecuted, but on the contrary be 
guaranteed the conditions in which to flourish more than they had even under 
Hungarian rule, the Liberal Minister of Education Anghelescu soon revealed his true 
intent. Apart from reiterating the provision about denominational homogeneity
928 Op. cit., p24.
929 See Hetven iv, p24.
930 Endre Barabds: A magyar iskoldk a romdn uralom alatt, pl44 in Magyar Szemle, October 1928, 
Magyar Szemle Tdrsasig, Budapest
931 Hetven iv, p25, quoting Arpdd Kiss: Az dllami magyar tannyelvu elemi iskoldk is  a magyar 
tagozatok in Magyar Kisebbsig, 1936, p205.
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amongst pupils, he stipulated that the state curriculum be introduced into the church- 
run schools. From the beginning of the 1923-1924 school year in state and 
denominational schools alike Romanian language, literature, history, geography and 
constitutional studies were to be taught in Romanian and Romanian would be the sole 
language of tuition in the first year at monastic, village, town and guild or society-run 
secondary schools. Inspectors were issued instructions to demand meticulous 
implementation of all decrees, orders and the like hitherto adopted from the 
denominational schools as well as the relevant primary legislation. If they were to 
stumble upon any slackness or recalcitrance they were expected to submit a proposal 
to have the offending institution closed down or to have its right to issue valid 
certificates withdrawn. As a result the inspectors vied with each other in sniffing out 
deficiencies although in most instances requests for closure or forfeiture were not 
accompanied by due justification.932
On 26th July 1924 a law on primary school education containing a number of highly 
controversial provisions was passed. It began by stating that compulsory primary 
education be uniform throughout the country, that directing and supervising it was the 
task of the state and that no school could be founded without a permit from the 
Ministry of Education. The language of teaching would be Romanian and in non- 
Romanian-speaking communities the Minister would be empowered to set up 
minority language primaries in identical proportion to the number of equivalent 
schools in Romanian-speaking areas.933 Although nursery schools for five to seven 
year-olds were also included under the scope of application of the law, the provision 
on minority languages did not extend to them (nor for that matter to adult education 
courses).934
Article eight stated that citizens of Romanian origin who had forgotten their mother 
tongue were obliged to enrol their children in state or private schools where the 
language of tuition was Romanian. Article 19 supplemented this by making it 
mandatory for parents whose children attended private schools to inform the 
headmaster of the state school of this fact in writing. At no juncture was any
932 Mikd, p50 and Barabls op. cit., pl45.
933 Hetven iv, p25 and ESttevdnyi op. cit. ppl80-181. This principle was never put into practice. Cf. 
also Kolar, ppl 14-5.
934 Hetven iv, p25.
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indication given as to what precisely signified Romanian origin, leaving it very much 
to the discretion of local officials to pass judgement and they zealously set about 
analysing names and scrutinising family trees to uncover relatives in the ascending 
line who might have been Romanian or members of the Orthodox church.935 
Article 159 created a so-called "culture zone", covering counties such as Csik/Ciuc 
where 85.7% of the population was Hungarian, Hdromszek/Trei-Scaune (86.6%) and 
Udvarhely/Odorheiu (95.1 %). Teachers from the Regat willing to settle there
would be paid a salary 50% higher than their Transylvanian colleagues. They would 
furthermore be eligible for promotion one to two years earlier and if they made the 
move permanent would be awarded ten hectares of land from the state reserve.937 
Instead of championing Romanian culture these teachers were inadvertently 
responsible for promoting illiteracy as they were entirely unable to communicate with 
their charges. An official report by the inspector for Maros-Tor da/Mure$-Turda on 
the work of the schools in his district in 1924-1925 points out that the 120 young 
teachers unable to speak a word of Hungarian had not achieved anything and were 
like fish out of water socially with only the registrar and the gendarmes for company. 
Similarly in Csik/Ciuc the school council arrived at the conclusion that the reason 
why the children were unable to read or write in the third year of their education was 
attributable to the complete absence of mutual intelligibility between themselves and 
their teachers following the abolition of Hungarian as the language of tuition in the
938county.
The costs of the state schools (construction, fittings, teaching equipment, 
maintenance, headmaster's accommodation and so on) were, moreover, to be borne by 
the local community with the exception of teachers' wages, which were the 
responsibility of the state. This placed a dual burden on the Hungarians who had to 
sustain the denominational schools as well.939
On 22nd December 1925 a separate law on private schools entered into force 
following a stormy passage through Parliament and was little more than a summary of 
the various decrees dealt with above. Denominational schools were deemed to fall
935 Hetven iv, p25; Mikd, p50; E6ttev6nyi op. cit., pp205-206; Barabds op. cit., pl45 and Kolar, p i 15.
936 On the “culture zone”, see Mikd, pp50-l and Kolar, ppl 15-6.
937 Hetven iv, p26; Mikd, pp50-51; E6ttev6nyi, pp204-205 and BarabAs, pl45.
938 Barab&s op. cit. ppl45-146.
939 Eottev6nyi, pp 181 and 204; Hetven iv, pp26-27 and Mikd, p50.
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into this category, which represented a substantial demotion. Henceforward only 
Romanian citizens could found private schools on the basis of a permit from the 
Ministry of Education and were subject to its supervision and inspections. Teacher 
training colleges and universities could no longer be private with the exception of 
teacher training establishments in continuous operation prior to 1st December 1918. 
As far as language was concerned, Romanian was the sole instrument of tuition in the 
institutions of recognised monastic orders and in schools attended by children whose 
parents were of Romanian origin. Where all pupils shared the same mother tongue 
the language used for teaching purposes could differ from that of the state. 
Hungarian-speaking Jews, however, were relegated to either Romanian or Hebrew- 
language schools. Moreover in all private schools of whatever type Romanian 
language, literature, history and geography had to be taught in Romanian by qualified 
teachers fluent in that tongue. Private schools did not have the right to issue valid 
certificates, but had to make do with attestations of studies completed. The former 
could be obtained from the Ministry of Education, but the procedures were laden with 
red tape and a favourable response was by no means a foregone conclusion.940 
The threat to the denominational schools was so great that representatives of the 
Hungarian Roman Catholic, Protestant and Unitarian churches had done their utmost 
to prevent its adoption. They each convened extraordinary assemblies on 14 May at 
which they unanimously approved bringing the matter to the attention of the League 
of Nations, having failed to persuade Anghelescu to remove some of the more severe 
measures. In September two supplementary petitions were sent to Geneva. On 6th 
November a 19 point agreement on the subject of private education was reached, but 
the government did not stick to its side of the bargain, regarding the exercise as 
nothing more than a convenient means of taking the wind out of the sails of the 
complaints lodged. When invited to submit its observations on the issue to the 
Secretary General's office, the Romanian government took the opportunity to present 
its views at length, denying that there was any substance to the grievances. Instead 
Hungarian educational policy of the past was denounced by way of exoneration, 
although the relevant texts were deliberately misquoted. On the subject of the
940 Hetven iv, pp27-28 and Eottev6nyi, p207.
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Apponyi regime's 1907 law,941 Anghelescu's stock argument, concerning how there 
were certain strings attached to receipt of financial assistance from the state with 
Hungarian history, geography, study of the constitution, arithmetic and other subjects 
having to be taught in Hungarian, was advanced. Although instruction in these 
subjects was indeed mandatory there was no clause insisting on use of Hungarian.942 
On 18th March 1926 the relevant committee within the League concluded its 
deliberations on the matter with a report in which it expressed certain doubts about 
the final text of the law, but basically endorsed the Romanian approach.943 
In March of 1925 a decree on baccalaureate examinations was published. Any pupils 
with aspirations to proceed into higher education were required to sit an examination 
in Romanian language and literature, the history, geography and constitution of 
Romania, French language and literature, science and two other subjects designated 
by the Ministry in front of boards appointed by the state, whose members did not 
understand Hungarian and made it their business to set the hurdle unreasonably high. 
Of the 401 Hungarian candidates in 1925 only 100 passed and between 1925 and 
1927 the figure for students from the denominational schools was 32%.944 
General provisions pertaining to state secondary education were contained within the 
law of 15th May 1928. The minority language could be taught as an optional subject 
and special sections for pupils with a mother tongue other than Romanian created 
(although, as we saw earlier, this did not mean that all lessons were held in 
Hungarian) in areas where non-native speakers formed the majority of the local 
population. Since it was not compulsory to do so, however, Hungarian-language 
teaching in state secondary schools all but completely disappeared by the end of the 
1920s.945
As far as higher education was concerned, only the state could run universities and 
existing universities were appropriated by the state in a series of separate laws. 
Eleven months prior to the signing of the Treaty of Trianon on 23rd September 1919,
941 Albeit Apponyi (1846-1933) was Minister of Religious Affairs and Education in Hungary from 8th 
April 1906 to 17th January 1910 (and again from 1917 to 1918). Angelescu was Minister of Education 
in Romania from 1922 to 1926 and from 1933 to 1937.
942 Mikd, pp51-52 and Barabds op. cit., ppl46-147.
943 Mikd, p52.
944 Mikd, p51; Hetven iv  p29 and Kolar, ppl 17-8.
943 Hetven iv, p29.
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the Governing Council (Consul Dirigent) declared the University of Kolozsvdr/Cluj- 
Napoca Romanian in a law published in the Official Journal and Romanian became 
the language of teaching at those institutions, which were not closed down leaving 
only aspirant men of the cloth with the option of training for their vocation in their 
mother tongue.946
Politically the Hungarians were hampered at the local and national elections by fraud, 
intimidation, bribery, arrests947 and manipulation of the administrative boundaries 
such as set out in the standardisation law of 14th June 1925, which lead to the break 
up of counties in such a way that established economic and cultural units were 
shattered and the minority populations were reduced (thereby cutting the potential 
number of minority representatives in local government bodies). Hungarian villages 
were attached to Romanian-dominated areas and the same tactic was followed in 
relation to the Romanian villages on the fringes of the Sz6kely regions. A similar law 
from 14th August 1938 divided the country into ten provinces named after rivers, 
mountains or the sea. The Hungarians in the Sz£kely regions were split amongst 
provinces where the Romanians were in the majority with for example 
Hdromszdk/Trei-Scaune and Brass6/Bra§ov counties subsumed under Bucegi 
province, which had its administrative seat in Bucharest948 At the 1939 elections the 
constituency frontiers matched those of the provinces.949 
In the wake of the dissolution of the Magyar Szovetseg, two rival parties, the 
Hungarian People's Party {Magyar Neppdrt) and the Hungarian National Party 
{Magyar Nemzeti Pdrt) seemed poised to scrabble for Hungarian votes at the 1922 
elections. In the end, however, they fought together.950 Recognising that the 
Hungarian interest could be defended most effectively by a single party, the National 
Hungarian Party {Orszagos Magyar Pdrt) was founded on 28th December 1922 in 
Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca with Samuel J6sika as its president, Gusztdv Haller as its
946 Op. cit., p32. On the fate of teacher-training institutions, see Kolar, ppl24-5 and on the University, 
idem, pl25.
947 See for example Maniu's denunciation of the practices employed at the 1922 elections, which he 
described as a blot on the national copybook and a European scandal, quoted in Mikd, p28. On 
dubious electoral practices, see also Kolar, pp70-2,78 and 82.
948 Hetven iv, pp37-38.
949 Op. cit., p36.
950 Hetven iv, p38 and Mikd, p26.
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deputy president and Istv&n Naldczy as its secretary.951 Its programme called for 
constitutional recognition of the Hungarian minority along the lines of the 
Gyulafehervdr/Alba M ia decisions and the peace treaty and national autonomy. This 
would entail self-government in the mother tongue for the minority with its own local 
administration and judiciary. It also urged that the most flagrant abuses of electoral 
procedure be remedied and the rule of law be fully enforced. Importance was 
attached to freedom of religious expression and defence of the rights of churches to 
establish and maintain schools at all levels, to the reform of land ownership and the 
exemption of ecclesiastical holdings and similar estates run by foundations to fund 
schools from the provisions of the 1921 law as well as full compensation being 
awarded to those who had lost their land through expropriation.952 
Until it was disbanded on 31st March 1938 (as part of the constitution instituting the 
royal dictatorship, which scrapped all political parties bar one, retaining an entirely 
impotent Parliament to give a veneer of democracy) it loyally stood up for the 
Hungarians, submitting no less than 15 complaints to the League of Nations.
Between the demise of the Magyar Part and the outbreak of the war the Hungarians 
were represented within the National Regeneration Front, but this was a shotgun 
wedding rather than a marriage of convenience and achieved little.953
2.8 Transylvanianism: The Erdelyi Helikon
On the cultural front, the reorientation away from Hungary and the production of 
representations of the new identity that this implied was undertaken by the 
Transylvanianists.
In 1924, on the initiative of Kdroly K6s, the Transylvanian Artistic Guild (Erdelyi 
Szepmives Ceh) was founded and following the gathering of leading literary figures at 
Marosvecs/Brancovene§ti at the instigation of J&nos Kem6ny on 17th June 1926, was 
taken over by the disparate group of writers collectively referred to as Helikon (their
951 For further details see Mikd, pp40-41.
952 Mikd, pp271-274.
953 See Mikd, pp218- 249.
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journal Erdilyi Helikon was launched in 1928).954 The authors divided into two 
principle groups: one centering on Alad£r Kuncz (who became the editor of 
Helikon)955 and counting G6za Tab€ry,956 Emo Ligeti,957 Kdroly K6s, Sdndor
q c o
Remenyik and S£ndor Makkai amongst others in its ranks and one with a more 
pronounced Sz6kely character including Jdnos Bartalis,959 L£szl6 Tompa,960 J6zsef 
Nyfro,961 Sdndor Kacs6962 and Aron Tam&i.963 The purpose of the meeting was to
934 On Jlnos Kem6ny’s role, see A Mecinds -  Keminy Jdnos is  a Helikon, Helikon-Kem£ny Jdnos 
Alapftvdny, Marosvds&rhely, 2001.
953 Kuncz (1886-1931) worked as a teacher from 1909 and was a regular contributor to Nyugat, writing
essays on aesthetics. His novel Fekete kolostor (1931) dealt with the years he spent in internment
camps in France during the First World War. Having moved to Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca in 1923, he 
edited the Helikon from 1929.
936 Tabdry (1890-1958) held posts in the civil service during the Kdrolyi government and the short­
lived Soviet Republic.
937 Ligeti (1891-1944) worked mainly as a journalist, founding the weekly FUggetlen tJjsdg in 
Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca in 1934. He moved to Budapest in 1940 where he wrote for the daily Magyar 
Nemzet until murdered together with his family by supporters of the Arrow Cross Movement
938 The poet Remenyik (1890-1941) was editor-in-chief of the literary journal Pdsztortuz from 1921 
and published irredentist verses under the pseudonym of V6gv£ri.
939 Bartalis (1893-1977), also a poet published his first pieces in Nyugat in 1916. He returned to 
Transylvania in 1941 after spending a number of years in Hungary. His memoirs appeared in 1972.
960 Tompa (1883-1964) became chief archivist of Udvarhely/Odorhei county in 1918, giving up his 
post following the Romanian takeover. Editor of Szikely kozilet from 1920, he also wrote for 
Pdsztortuz, Ellenzik and Helikon.
961 Nyir6 (1889-1953) was ordained as a priest in 1912. On leaving the priesthood in 1919, he worked 
for Keleti tJjsdg until becoming a farmer in 1931. In 1938, when he went back to journalism, he edited 
the newspaper he had formerly written for. After moving to Budapest in 1941, he became a member of 
the Arrow Cross Parliament in Sopron. At the end of the war he escaped to Germany, then Madrid 
where he returned to the cloth.
962 Kacsd (1901-1984) wrote for Keleti tJjsdg (1923-5) and tJjsdg (1925-7). Within the Helikon circle, 
he belonged to the so-called Szikely group. From autumn 1927 he was a member of staff at Brassdi 
Lapok, becoming its editor from 1940 until it was banned. Released from internment camp following 
the formation of the Groza government, he edited Falvak Nipe and was President of the MNSZ (for 
which see Chapter Three) from 1947-1951.
963 Tamisi (1897-1966) lived in the USA from 1923-6. He was involved in virtually every 
Transylvanian intellectual and literary movement, his main theme being the Szikely, especially the 
struggle of the poor against nature and their betters in the aristocracy in scraping a living.
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take stock of the state of Hungarian literature in Transylvania and discuss its future.964 
In the course of its 20-year history, the coalition produced a steady stream of works in 
a humanist vein with the explicit aim of fostering greater mutual understanding 
between the majority and minority populations through their representations of 
Hungarian identity in Transylvania, whether in poetry, ethnographic studies or 
historical novels. The first Marosvecs/Brancovene§ti resolutions were adamant that 
for the Hungarians to have a future their leaders must concentrate on cultural life. 
Educating the people and tackling the problems of literature and art had to be given 
the same priority as political objectives, which required greater involvement of the 
natural representatives of intellectual and moral forces in decisions affecting the 
minority's fate as they were best suited to putting the spiritual preconditions for 
peaceful economic and political cooperation in place.965 The essence of their 
philosophy, which came to be known as Transylvanianism,966 was eloquently 
summarised by Aladdr Kuncz in an article from 1928. Transylvania itself possessed 
distinct natural boundaries:
"Its geographical character is that of the wild flarings of natural forces frozen into 
tangible form. The Eurasian ranges of the Carpathians stand guard over its eastern 
and southern frontiers. Their eyes survey the scene from endless and inscrutable 
distances; they are the symbolic giants of the ancient changes that took place in 
Europe and Asia in prehistoric times and symbolise a protective presence for Eurasian 
universality and in particular for the human and natural dramas played out in 
Transylvania within the forbidding ring they form with their evergreen pine-crowned
9fV 7slopes and eternally snow-capped peaks".
With its rich salt and mineral deposits, Transylvania was a living textbook on the 
earth's evolution, a self-contained unit that had attracted various civilisations since its
964 See Pomog&ts, op. cit., p71 and Jend Szentimrei: Erdily rtzdves magyar irodalma. In: Nyugat,
1930, issue seven. Source: CD-ROM: Nyugat 1908-1941. Egy irodalmi legenda digitdlisan, Arcanum 
adatbdzis, Budapest Henceforward Arcanum. No page numbers are indicated throughout On 
Nyugat, see Sugar 1994, p326; Molndr, p237 and Kontler, pp317-8 and 358-9.
965 Pomog£ts, op. cit., pp73-74.
966 For an alternative account of Transylvanianism in culture and politics, see Piroska Balogh, 
Transylvanism: Revision or Regionalism? in Romsics 1999, pp243-262.
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mention by Herodotus. It had been crossed by all the Asian peoples in their search for 
a place to settle; the Dacians, Romans, Goths, Huns, Gepids, Avars and Southern 
Slavs had all found a home there for shorter or longer periods until the Hungarians 
finally made it theirs. Just as Transylvania's natural landscape had always retained its 
own enchanting and special harmony with its variety of scenery and capricious 
formations so the peoples who had become established in its tracts had been 
compelled to seek a unifying, cohesive idea beyond the conflicts and antagonisms or 
else they perished. Transylvania had always been a variegated panorama in the 
history of peoples as well as nature. Its historical destiny had been that of a gateway 
through which barbarian peoples headed westwards in search of their golden calves. 
The surging population movements eventually calmed:
"The Hungarians gradually caused what was to become the defensive bastion of 
Western European culture and at the same time its last outpost to crystallise from the 
chaotic state of affairs in Transylvania. Of course they did not put an end to the 
changing composition of the people of Transylvania, but that was never their 
intention. They only intervened to quell attacks, which threatened their culture, 
religion or the organs of state they had founded, but otherwise, as they also 
demonstrated with their large-scale settlements of Romanians and Saxons, they 
always preserved and respected the diverse ethnic character of Transylvania as 
ordained by historical fate".968
Even in the most despotic phases of the Hungarian monarchy ancient privileges such 
as those enjoyed by the Sz6kely and the Saxons remained unmolested and from the 
16th century onwards when Hungary was groaning under the weight of centralising, 
monolingual and single faith Austrian imperialism, Transylvania was the refuge of the 
Hungarian monarchy's ideal and the defender of religious freedom. This was its 
golden age, when it did not try to obstruct religious or ethnic aspirations.
In terms of its culture Transylvania could boast similar diversity. Every single 
Western European intellectual and artistic trend had left a mark there, from 
Romanesque and Gothic to Renaissance and Baroque all styles were represented in
967 Alad£r Kuncz: Az erdelyi gondolat erdelyi magyar irodalmaban. In: Nyugat, 1928, issue 20. 
Arcanum. For another account of Transylvanianism, see Artur Balogh, Az erdilyi szellem (originally 
published in 1941), op.cit., pp266-276.
968 Kuncz, op. cit.
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monuments of stone and the ideals of the Enlightenment and democracy had their 
flock and martyrs.
The Union with the Hungarian crown in 1867 introduced radical changes.969 Serious 
errors were committed, although everything was in transition when the war 
interrupted developments. Hungarian centralism absorbed many of Transylvania's 
time-honoured unique features along with vast amounts of the Hungarians' cultural 
strength, which weakened them whilst the national consciousness of the Romanians 
and Saxons became inordinately stronger. What was missing from Hungarian policy 
during the fifty years was precisely the input of Transylvanian inspiration.
In short, the Transylvanian idea consisted of the wise and ingenious balance of the 
interests of nations, religions, world views, folk customs, social classes and external 
powers, tolerance incarnate and was equally immanent in the region's natural beauty 
as it was in its history, culture and literature. That careful balance was not 
synonymous with blandness or monotony had been amply corroborated by its vibrant 
intellectual life from the Bolyais970 and Jdnos Apdczai Csere971 on the Hungarian side 
through the Transylvanian School and Eminescu972 on the Romanian and Honterus 
and Brukenthal on the Saxon. The culture of each of the three nations developed in 
dose contact with that of the respective mother countries.
959 The Leopold Diploma had determined Transylvania’s status as a separate province of the kingdom 
of Hungary in 1690, remaining valid until 1848 (Kontler, pi 83). The period of neo-absolutism known 
is the Bach era (named after the imperial Minister of the Interior), which began after the 1848 
Kevolution had been crushed preserved the separate administration for Transylvania (Kontler, p265). 
Once he had been crowned King of Hungary on 8th June 1867, Franz Joseph re-enacted the 1848 
Constitution, which had proclaimed the reunion of Hungary and Transylvania (Kontler, pp249 and 
179).
170 Farkas Bolyai (1775-1856) taught mathematics, physics and chemistry at the Calvinist college in 
Marosvdsdrhely/Tirgu Mure§ from 1801 until his retirement in 1851. His son, J&nos Bolyai (1802- 
1860) was a child prodigy, whose talents outstripped even those of his father and is considered one of 
the most original mathematicians of all time. See Samu Benkd, Csillag a magyar tudomdny egin: 
Bolyai Jdnos, in Gyfingy Kovlcs Kiss, op.cit., pp 109-114.
971 Apdczai Csere (1625-1659) was awarded his doctorate in theology in the Netherlands, returning to 
GyulafeMrvdr/Alba Iulia in 1653. His Hungarian Encyclopaedia was published in the same year. His 
inaugural speech in Gyulafehdrvdr/Alba Iulia, De studio sapientae (also 1653) deplored cultural 
backwardness and called for a new education system to be introduced (Cf. Kontler, p i59).
972 Mihail Eminescu (1850-1889) is considered to be the greatest Romanian poet (Castellan, pl50). 
See also Ofetea, p474.
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The manifestation of the Transylvanian idea politically had gone through many 
vicissitudes and ordeals. Since Transylvania had been placed under Romanian rule 
the ancient homeland of liberalism had been afflicted by a virulent strain of 
nationalism. The Hungarians had been particularly hard hit not merely because they 
had been toppled from power, but also because in spite of having an independent set 
of cultural and religious institutions at their disposal, Budapest had been the source of 
their supply of lifeblood economically, politically and culturally. With sustenance 
from Hungary cut off the minority was forced to cope with the onslaught of a policy 
of assimilation from Bucharest.
In the most desperate hour the Transylvania idea, the separate Transylvanian soul 
became the minority's comfort and salvation. Even though all else had been lost, the 
ancient Transylvanian lands remained:
"It [the Transylvanian soul] beheld the contours of our mountains, our forests as the 
man who has got lost in the darkness of the night storm first finds his bearings from 
the outline of the mountains gradually taking shape against the greying horizon. A 
mystical power radiates from the land of our birth, which we obviously only sense in 
our times of great crisis. It is at times like this that we become aware of the intimate 
community we share with the land we were bom in and to which fate has tied us.
And if this land has survived, if nothing has changed in the edifices formed by our 
cliffs and mountains, if our waters continue to flow, our forests rustle and the 
shepherd still takes his ewes to graze then we too must go on living because we and 
the land are one. The storm has passed, rays of sunlight pierce through the clouds". 
Here what we encounter is a statement of an alternative material identity to traditional 
Hungarianness.
Transylvanian lyric verse was the poetry of nature and nature the first element the 
Transylvanian idea perceived itself in. Its further components, memory, tradition, the 
past and the life of the people, shone through in prose works and explained their 
predilection for historical and rustic narratives. The people of the region, the 
Sz6kelys in particular, were a living archive, the repository in flesh of a thousand 
years of tribal existence, of legend and superstition and as such a magnet for authors. 
The final area in which the Transylvanian idea found expression was in examining the 
problems of the present day from a consciously Transylvanian vantage point, sifting
973 Kuncz, op. cit.
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through the concepts that had directed the region's fate through its historical 
development with a view to pinpointing those, which were eternally valid.
Thus a separate Transylvanian identity and consciousness had solidified alongside the 
literary endeavours. Two institutions were needed in order to safeguard the healthy 
development of literary policy: an independent journal and an independent publishing 
house with both financial and readership backing, both of which now were now in 
place with the Szepmives Ceh and Helikon.
The romantic pathos and vivid descriptions of the landscape became hallmarks of the 
Transylvanianist writings, which were an experiment in redefining Hungarian 
identity, to recast the principle of classification in such a way as to accommodate both 
an acknowledgement of material difference and the realities of Romanian citizenship. 
Transylvanianist representations of the Hungarians focused identity firmly within the 
regional borders, emphasising the firm friendship and community of interest with the 
Romanians and Saxons, which stretched back over hundreds of years and could serve 
as a model for improving relations between minority and majority in die present. The 
Transylvanianist historian Mikl6s Asztalos974 stressed the importance of historical 
awareness and pondered the duty of historical researchers, rejecting the irredentist 
frame of mind with its talk of historical rights so beloved of official Hungary:
"...there is a need for a kind of historiography, which brings to light the thousands of 
factors defining the internal, unchangeable way of life belonging to hybrid societies, 
which have developed here and there in the course of the centuries and not a 
historiography, which is preoccupied with historical rights. Minority historiography 
can only build understanding, not partitioning walls! From the minority standpoint it 
can only serve the purpose of legitimate defence in relation to the state, but never 
attack”.975
In 1929 Kdroly K6s published a sketch of Transylvania's cultural history, which 
remains one of the most important representations of the Transylvanianist ideal of 
identity and is therefore worth considering at length. Its positive image of the region
974 Asztalos (1899-1986) obtained his doctorate at the University of P6cs in 1922. Working in the 
Hungarian National Library and as a government expert on minorities, he produced several important 
works on Transylvanian and Hungarian history.
975 Miklds Asztalos: A kisebbsigi tortinetirds feladatai is  mddszere. In: Magyar Kisebbs4g, 1927. 
Quoted (without page reference) in Pomogdts, op. cit., p88. Emphasis in original.
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portrayed it as a crossroads and a meeting place between nations, a hospitable shelter 
for the refugee:
"From a geographical point of view Transylvania is a unit because mountain ranges 
markedly border its upland region, which is enclosed from the West by the Great 
Hungarian Plain, from the North by the Bukovina Basin dropping down into the 
Dneister Valley, from the Northeast and East by the Moldovan and from the Southeast 
and South by the Wallachian Lowlands (the deep lowlands of the Lower Danube), 
surrounded on every side therefore by deep expanses of lowland. The inside of the 
Transylvanian Basin, which apart from the Mezoseg/Cimpia Transilvaniei only 
comprises the lower valleys of the Maros/Mure§, Szcunos/Some§u and the 
KUkiillo/Timava rivers lies on average 300-400 metres above sea level, whilst the 
bulk of the remaining cultivable areas are on average 500 metres above sea level 
whereas the Great Hungarian Plain and the Wallachian Lowlands average height 
above sea level is a mere 100 metres and the river valleys of Moldova and Bukovina 
do not exceed a height of 200 metres above sea level.
This closed and high location predestined this land to be a distinct economic unit as 
well.
History proves however that Transylvania was a doorstep marking the threshold 
between East and West over which every cultural current surging from West to East 
or East to West stumbled willy-nilly and in the process of stumbling had to drop 
something of itself here. Since time immemorial peoples and faiths, races and 
cultures have blended in this land, where peoples advancing from any direction, 
anywhere on Europe's perpetually bloodthirsty soil, if they collapsed in mortal combat 
then some of the small band of survivors from the defeated side, bleeding, frightened 
and seeking a hideout crossed the pass between Hungary and Transylvania and the 
Eastern Carpathians to the wonderful citadel of its secret, concealed valleys and its 
vast forests. And if in later times happy coincidence or a new misfortune meant that 
any people had to leave this land some trace of them always remained.
This natural and irrevocable aptitude of Transylvania predestined it, even against 
human will, to the cultural character of the peoples of this land and to difference from 
all neighbouring cultures".976
976 Kdroly K6s: Erdily. Kulturtort&neti vdzlat. Erd61yi Sz6pmfves C6h, Kolozsv£r, 1934 edition, p7.
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On arriving in Transylvania the Hungarian tribes found a sparse, mixed population 
speaking a wide range of languages including what was to evolve into Romanian:
"The primitive life of a primitive society was carried on in the territory of 
Transylvania. The only more important and carefully organised and supervised state 
activity here was salt and ore mining. Agriculture was quite rudimentary, livestock 
breeding consisted of primitive ewe and goat herding. Any civilisation, social activity 
or shared cultural consciousness in any higher sense of the word could hardly have 
roots here. Everything from which independent and state life, political consciousness 
and shared will in pursuit of important objectives could have sprung was present only 
in embryonic form. But the possibility of a uniform and national culture was also 
present in embryonic form in the Greek-Christian religion accepted from Byzantine 
hands, in the Eastern Church and the uniform Romanian language in the making.
The occupying Hungarians by contrast categorically represented a superior culture 
and civilisation. Because even if they did not bring ready-made cultural attainments 
with them on horseback and in their covered wagons they did bring with them 
memories of the former Khazar empire, its erudition and its broad knowledge of the 
world. [...]
The Hungarians therefore did not bring ready-made cultural attainments to their new 
home, but a state of preparedness, which made them capable of calling culture to life 
and in the circumstances of organising and governing the territory and people they 
had conquered correctly according to their way of thinking".977 
Having been moulded by the Hungarians, Transylvania from the days of Saint Istvdn 
became the site of the clash between East and West. By the end of the 16th century, it 
was a flourishing multicultural society:
"The three autonomous political nations of Transylvania and the non-political, but 
ethnic Romanian nation lived their separate lives within their groups therefore: they 
constructed their own social and cultural edifices separately neither mingling nor 
disturbing each other, rarely getting in each other’s way, yet communicating with each
978other, learning from each other and influencing each other".
By the 17th century the Sz£kely-Hungarians, the Romanians and the Saxons had come 
closer together in spite of their differing traditions:
977 Op. cit., ppl6-17.
978 Op. cit., p64.
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"But these in many respects radically different cultures, instilled into the souls of 
different races and of different origin were marked with the consolidating stamp of 
centuries of constantly living together, of contact, a shared fate, shared joys and woes 
and shared spiritual experiences, which had become ever more apparent during the 
democratic broadening of intellectual life in principality era and the era of popular 
deepening. This process of internal consolidation was likewise strengthened in this 
period by the uniform current, which affected all three Transylvanian peoples and 
cultures in the same way, which brought the Asian way of life, mentality, world view, 
philosophy and artistic culture flooding into Transylvania via the neighbouring Turks 
and in so doing enriched the consolidating unity of the three races and the shared 
Transylvanian characteristics of the three cultures".979 
For a thousand years three peoples and three cultures had existed side by side 
retaining the individuality that distinguished each from the other, yet displaying 
characteristics that set them apart from all other foreign and related peoples and 
cultures:
"A thousand years is a long time even in the life of peoples and cultures, but during a 
thousand years on Transylvanian soil not one people or culture could or indeed 
wished to transmute the other into its own image. Outside powers sometimes tried to 
do this at the cost of immense sacrifices, but with meagre results and no success 
ultimately. On the other hand the three cohabiting cultures had an unconscious and 
never entirely extinct aspiration whilst keeping their ethnic nature intact, to adopt 
communities, which in spite of their separate realities made them typically 
Transylvanian. The Transylvanian Hungarian people is different from the Hungarian; 
the Transylvanian Saxons are different from the Germans in Germany and the 
Transylvanian Romanians are different from those of the Regat; they are different 
physically, but all the more so mentally. And if the Romanians stayed Romanian, the 
Saxons German and the Hungarians and Sz6kelys Hungarian they and their every 
manifestation of culture are alongside their differences also characterised by the 
community, which aside from the irrevocable and eternal natural attributes was 
determined by shared fate, and the shared forms of the struggles fought together in 
life. This community manifesting itself is the particular Transylvanian psyche, which
979 Op. cit., p69.
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the sister nations of any of the Transylvanian peoples living beyond the region's 
frontiers has not been and will never be able to understand.
As to the course the peoples and cultures of Transylvania will follow in future this 
will depend to a large extent on the peoples of Transylvania themselves. History has 
proven that Transylvania belongs to the peoples who take this fate and this psyche 
upon themselves and it will belong to those in the future who make the same 
commitment. Transylvania's lot was at its happiest and its culture blossomed most 
richly and completely when its peoples with one will embraced the distinct 
Transylvanian fate and built it with their distinct Transylvanian intelligence".980 
Geographical boundedness, features of the landscape and the historical experience of 
living side by side had forged a separate material identity amongst the Hungarian, 
Saxon and Romanian populations. Encouraging greater awareness of this could only 
increase mutual understanding and tolerance.
2.9 The Young Transylvanian (Erdely Fiatalok) Movement
1930 marked the inception of the Young Transylvanian (Erdilyi Fiatalok) movement 
with a periodical of the same name edited by Bdla Jancsd981 and Dezs5 Ldszld.982 It 
aspired to include the rural population in the project of preserving and developing 
Hungarian identity and carried out valuable studies of life in the Hungarian villages 
(for example Imre Mikd's The Transylvanian Village and the Nationality Issue from 
1932).983
Since Ldszld’s chief concerns were how to reconcile anyaorszdgi with Transylvanian 
identity and clarifying the relationship between them in the prevailing political 
circumstances, his deliberations will also be examined in depth. Although staunchly
980 Op. cit., pp87-88.
981 Jancs6 (1903-1967) studied medicine in Kolozsvdr and was a regular contributor to the newspapers 
Ellenz6k and Ujsdg as well as writing essays for Nyugat.
982 Protestant theologian Ldszld (1904-1973) studied briefly at Glasgow University before returning to 
Transylvania to edit Erddlyi Fiatalok. On his significance as a writer and thinker, see Pdter Cseke’s 
preface to his A kisebbsigi ilet ajdndikai. Publicisztikai irdsok, tanulmdnyok, 1929-1940, Minerva 
Muveldddsi Egyesiilet ds a Szabadsdg napilap kiaddja, Kolozsv&r, 1997, pp3-14.
983 Az erdilyi falu 6s a nemzetisdgi kdrdis, Pro-Print Kdnyvkiadd, Csfkszereda, 1998. See Mikd, 
ppl88-189 and Pomogdts, op. cit., ppl95-196.
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Transylvanianist, his representations were not as Utopian as those of K6s and the 
Helikon collective:
"We have to acknowledge that Transylvanian soil possesses some kind of power that 
influences the peoples who live here in a special way. Anyone who fails to notice the 
difference that exists between Hungarians living in Transylvania and those who live 
elsewhere is devoid of a feeling heart, an open eye, a sense of history and a thoughtful 
mind. Anyone who has spent any time amongst the Romanians will have 
immediately noticed the difference between the Transylvanians and the Wallachians.
It is also beyond doubt that there are differences between the Transylvanian Saxons 
and the Germans of the Reich. We have to acknowledge that the different 
geographical and climatic conditions, the different economic situation, the 
development of a characteristic political and social situation, the historical struggles, 
interest groupings and balance of power are factors, which leave their mark on those 
who live under their influence. No one can shake off this influence. If we term the 
aggregate and resultant of these influences the force we regard as the Transylvanian 
mentality or soul then we must recognise as a fact that there is such a thing as a 
Transylvanian mentality or soul. This is, however, not a Hungarian racial peculiarity, 
but a universal manifestation of Life exercising an influence over all the peoples who 
live in Transylvania”.984
Thus the Hungarians are materially different from their anyaorsz&gi brethren. 
However, L£szl6 does not sever the ties between the separate Hungarian communities 
altogether
“From the above it clearly emerges that we cannot call this force operating in 
Transylvania a soul, but we can call it a mentality. We maintain that there is a 
Transylvanian mindset that influences and moulds one aspect of the ethnic soul of the 
Hungarians as a whole [in other words the anyaorszdgiak and all other Hungarians 
scattered throughout the successor states], but this Transylvanian mentality does not 
just influence the Hungarian ethnic soul, but that of the Romanians and Saxons as 
well. The Transylvanian mentality is but one of the active intellectual influences, 
which have an impact on certain branches of the Hungarians as a whole to a greater 
extent and other branches to a lesser extent. There is no such thing as a Transylvanian 
Hungarian soul, there is only one Hungarian soul, that of all Hungarians. There is a
984 Dezsd Ldszl6, Az erdilyi szellem (The Transylvanian Mentality), 1929. In L£szl6, op.cit., pp72-3.
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Transylvanian mentality, which can be either a Transylvanian Hungarian, 
Transylvanian Romanian or a Transylvanian Saxon mentality depending on the 
relationship to and influence of which particular ethnic soul we happen to be looking 
at in the same way as there is Hungarian Protestantism, German Protestantism, 
etc.".985
Acknowledging this reality was the most rational course of action in the 
circumstances:
"With the peace settlement at Trianon we have been severed from the body of the 
Hungarians as a whole politically, economically and also to a degree intellectually. 
We have ended up in different political and economic circumstances. These 
segregating factors urgently called for a new Transylvanian Hungarian mindset to be 
found. Contemporary Hungary's ideology, its general mentality, is not suitable today: 
indeed it would represent a downright dangerous intellectual climate for the 
Hungarians of Transylvania. On the one hand, living our lives in accordance with the 
precepts of the national ideology prevalent in Hungary today would bring us into 
eternal conflict with the authorities whilst on the other we would be accepting an 
ideology unable to satisfy the vital interests of the Hungarians of Transylvania. The 
primary cohesive forces holding peoples together are intellectual. If these intellectual
986forces do not serve these vital interests then decay sets in”.
Ldszld fully grasped the role played by culture and history as the stuff of which 
collective identities are made:
“The most important pillar of the Transylvanian Hungarian mentality is the link with 
historical traditions. Transylvania is a historical land and also enjoys the attribute of 
being able to give account of its entire past via these traditions. Could there be a 
healthier mentality for us in the shifting circumstances of today than this spirit of 
admiration for historical traditions? The 150 years of the independent Transylvanian 
Principality were the formative years and the golden age of the Transylvanian 
mentality. During that period "Hungarian" was virtually synonymous with 
"Transylvanian". The self-preservation instinct that swept the Hungarians of 
Transylvania back to this original source cannot be incorrect. The Transylvanian
985 Op.cit., p73.
986 L£szl6, op.cit., pp73-4.
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mentality is that of ethnic and religious tolerance987 [...]. The typical trait peculiar to 
the Transylvanian mentality is the confidence placed in intellectual forces. The 
Transylvanian was never able to become rich enough to be materialistic and never 
lived peacefully enough to indulge in sport as a leisure activity. Now, in the days of 
being squeezed financially and in terms of external success we can take first place and 
be strong through immersion in and consolidation of the intellectual. In this respect 
as well the Transylvanian mentality is a gift from God to the Hungarians of 
Transylvania".988
Although he saw the Transylvanian and anyaorszdgi identities as distinct, Ldszld saw 
no advantage in denying their interdependence:
“We must bear witness that the Hungarians collectively form one single spiritual body 
and one spiritual and one cultural community and organism even today [...].
We make up various parts of the Hungarian spiritual body. Without us the body 
cannot live, but our prospects of living without the entire body are even less. On the 
one hand we must have a clear picture of our own particular role within the Hungarian 
spiritual organism as a complete entity. What the soul of the Hungarians expects of 
us is that we counterbalance other opposing intellectual influences. Our 
Transylvanian Hungarian mentality is not just suitable for ensuring our survival, but 
we must also permit it to have an effect on all other Hungarians. If it does not mesh 
with the Hungarian soul in its entirety it will remain incomplete. Important demands 
relevant to everyday life will go unfulfilled. On the other hand, however, we must 
stay in permanent and close contact with all other Hungarians in order to be truly able 
to withstand the temptations concealed within Transylvanianism, which I touched 
upon earlier.989 We do not lend credence to the statement according to which the 
Hungarians of Transylvania are capable of an independent Hungarian life without the
987 Already in 1568 the Transylvanian Diet at TordaJTurda passed a decree placing the Unitarian faith 
on an equal footing with the recepta religio or ..established” denominations (Catholic, Lutheran and 
Calvinist). During die reign of Istvdn Bdthori (1533-1586), Prince of Transylvania, the Orthodox 
Church was granted the right to elect metropolitan bishops.
988 Op. cif., p74.
989 These were undermining national unity amongst the Hungarian minority by propagating 
Transylvanianism, driving a wedge between the Transylvanian Hungarians and their counterparts 
elsewhere and becoming overly parochial in outlook as a by-product of having become a big fish in a 
small pond whether in literature or other fields of creative activity. Op. cit., pp74-75.
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spiritual influence of all Hungarians living elsewhere. Putting this principle into 
practice would fraught with serious risks. Since the partitioning, Hungarian culture 
has surged ahead and Hungarians have undergone major advances economically and 
socially [...]. As far as we are concerned if we were to break ourselves off from this 
developing Hungarian spiritual life and if we were to fail to foster the relationship 
within the legally authorised framework it would mean retrogression, a narrowing of 
horizons and painful backwardness".990
In The Gifts o f Minority Life from 1931, L£szl6 was eager to highlight the positive 
aspects of the Hungarians' new status:
"Every day we hear a great deal about how life as a minority is a curse, onerous 
indigence and a slippery slope leading to death for the Hungarian nation. Speaking 
about the Hungarian minority is the same as speaking about a heap of injustices, 
recounting acts of aggressive intervention. These pronouncements are entirely true. 
The fate of belonging to a minority can indeed mean being dispersed and tom apart as 
a people, gradual decline and ultimately death. Minority fate will only lead to this 
magnificent death if and when the people relegated to minority existence can envisage 
no other outcome but death, if they prove incapable of mustering the strength to 
sustain themselves under the new circumstances.
The fate of the Hungarian minority will hinge on whether it recognises itself, its lot 
and its destiny in the mirror of Death or the mirror of Life.
I would venture to say that the branches of the Hungarian tree destined for the lot of a 
minority are richly laden with ripe fruits.
It is true that talking about these fruits is somewhat of a thankless task. The 
Hungarian who can perceive life, an enchanting future and opportunities to live life 
freely even in such conditions where officially only mourning and weeping are 
accepted is branded as a bad, as an opportunist".991
On the contrary the Hungarian who refused to imagine that there could be anything 
positive to salvage was myopic and suicidal. History, language and culture forged all 
Hungarians together and the greatest threat to Hungarian life derived from the infinite 
variety of influences with the potential to shatter the nation's spiritual unity. Amongst
990 Op. cit., pp75-76. Emphasis in original.
991 DezsS Ldszl6, A kisebbsigi ilet ajdndikai, 1931, op. cit. p77.
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these the most powerful centred on the issue of how the minorities were supposed to 
retain their Hungarian identity whilst cut off from free interaction with mainstream 
Hungarian culture. It was as damaging to refuse to consider new paths towards 
maintaining unity as it was to fail to recognise the real danger of unity crumbling. 
That political unity had been tom apart and that cultural relations had been partially 
paralysed did not mean that the racial unity of Hungarians [anyaorszdgi and 
minorities] or the community of fate they shared had disintegrated. Tme separation 
would only occur if the various pockets of Hungarians scattered throughout different 
states were to neglect becoming genuinely acquainted with one another. Indeed the 
anyaorszdgiak had been misled as to the fate of the Hungarians living as minorities.
If spiritual Hungarian unity were really a jealously guarded treasure then the body 
made up of Hungarians everywhere would have to keep a close watch on the fruits 
cultivated by the minorities to feed all Hungarians.992 
The way ahead would involve a flexible reaction to the constant stream of new 
influences on the part of all Hungarians. In trying to salvage some hope for the 
future, L&szl6 emphasised that political changes alone could not eradicate the 
materiality of Hungarian identity:
“Hungarians living in minorities have not only been tom away from the body of the 
Hungarian state, but they have also been transplanted on to the body of a new country 
lead by another race and lo and behold they are still alive nevertheless, since their 
souls have awakened and they are looking for a path that will make it possible for 
them to remain Hungarian, to become aware of the community of fate and spirit 
within the compass of another state. I admit that life in an independent country 
governed by its own kind affords the most complete external opportunity for a race to 
develop, but minority Hungarian fate presents the heartening fact to all Hungarians 
that such primordial natural forces slumbered in the Hungarian soul that when they 
stirred, even in a foreign land, they were capable of persisting and guaranteeing 
existence. (...) The first great gift of minority Hungarian life is (...) the 
rematerialization of and return to the roots of Hungarian life and its primary facts. 
The place once occupied by external political unity has to be filled by the unity of 
ancient Hungarian bedrock, racial and spiritual unity. Today the tme Hungarian is he 
who revises his entire world and is not afraid to return to the roots of his fate. The
992 Op. cit., pp77-78.
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real Hungarian builders of today gaze into the depths, at the roots, at the ancient 
Hungarian bedrock. They look for the peculiar features, values and misfortunes of the 
Hungarians. In this quest and its fulfilment every Hungarian must be as one.
Political Hungarian unity has been rent apart In its place spiritual Hungarian unity 
must be created. This unity is more everlasting, profound, self-contained, purer, in 
other words more living than external political unity".993
Unity did not automatically preclude different shades of outlook within Hungarian 
intellectual life, but set in motion a search for specific Hungarian values in a process 
of self-discovery. Every Hungarian should be what he was, a true, living Hungarian. 
This would suffice to forge unity. The advantage of being an anyaorszdgi was that of 
living in a country where citizens of non-Hungarian race wanted to be Hungarian.
The opposite was true of the situation faced by the minorities: being Hungarian meant 
stuntedness and an open wound. In this respect the minority Hungarians were more 
Hungarian since they had to make sacrifices in order to remain what they were, they 
consciously embraced the consequences of their choice. Ldszld’s argument that they 
did not have the luxury of being continually reminded of who they were plainly shows 
that he was fully cognisant of the role of symbols in the maintenance of collective 
identities:
"In the life of every race and nation, symbols expressing their peculiar essence are of 
enormous significance. National sentiment and self-awareness themselves produce 
symbols expressing their own essence in order to safeguard and further enrich their 
own identity. These symbols, like mirrors, constantly draw the attention of peoples to 
themselves. Hungarian stamps smile at the Budapest schoolboy from letters and 
parcels, he sees "patriotic" inscriptions on the side of tram coaches, the Hungarian 
coat of arms greets him from the top of the school gate, he can sing the Hungarian 
anthem when he pleases, he can practice the Hungarian language, he can see the many 
hundred creations of Hungarian political life in buildings, statues, institutions, people, 
in spoken words and in writing. He is surrounded on all sides by Hungarian symbols, 
which remind him of his Hungarianness. There is a danger to all these external 
symbols, that their beholder looks upon his Hungarian fate as being very much 
guaranteed, very mighty from the outside, he grows very accustomed to them and 
does not look for deeper roots, more ancient and viable symbols. Very few external
993 Op. cit., p79. Emphasis in original.
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Hungarian symbols remain for the minority Hungarians. In their political life there 
are barely a handful of symbols: the Hungarian political parties and the Hungarian 
political newspapers. In the eyes of the minority Hungarians the national culture, the 
national language are far more significant and living symbols than they are to the 
majority Hungarians. A Transylvanian Hungarian song festival has a more 
captivating effect than any song festival in Budapest. Transylvania has a greater 
affection for the fruits of Hungarian literature and wider segments of its population 
consume them than is true of the Great Plain. Today the language is the "final refuge" 
for us: Szdchenyi was right; the nation does live in its language. [...]
The great danger for minority Hungarians might well be that they cannot within the 
permitted legal framework they respect and abide by erect for themselves spiritual 
symbols of sufficiently persuasive power to counterbalance the power radiating from 
the symbols of other races”.994
The most striking change to the countenance of the Hungarian minorities was the 
greater degree of democracy, which did not mean the rule of the people, but a more 
organic mutual interdependence, a receding of social restrictions into the background, 
collaboration across the class divides for the benefit of all and banding together to 
work as a team. In a nutshell: a healthier, more fertile and more genuine Hungarian 
community. In Transylvania the Hungarian aristocracy of birth, wealth and office had 
not been destroyed altogether, but its influence had been reduced to a minimum due to 
unfavourable circumstances such as the impact of the agricultural reform. Hungarian 
capital had likewise lost its independence and politically all the leading posts had 
been transferred to Romanian hands. As a result, the role to be played by the middle 
classes and ordinary Hungarians had grown enormously in importance. At the same 
time the middle class had been plunged into a crisis more severe than that faced by 
their social superiors. At least one third of middle-class civil servants had emigrated, 
another third had found alternative employment in industry or commerce or retired 
whilst the remainder had stayed on. A huge gap had opened up demographically with 
nobody between the ages of 26 and 42 left behind because of the effects of the war. 
Traditionally the Transylvanian middle-classes had earned a livelihood working for 
the state, but the carpet had been pulled out from under their feet. It would have to 
coalesce with the manual labourers. The better-off artisans and retailers of the towns
994 Op. cit., pp80-81.
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and the owners of dwarf holdings in the villages had been suddenly thrust into a 
leadership position to compensate from below the losses suffered at the top. Talent 
could no longer be squandered. Democratisation amongst the minorities had also 
been stimulated by the fact that life in the successor states was more democratic than 
in Hungary.995 Here Ldszl6 shows that, for minorities in particular, one of the most 
significant effects of national principle of classification is to encourage internal 
solidarity through emphasising innate similarity.
Four years later, Ldszld once again analysed the fundamental issues of life as a 
minority. Debate on the subject of certain aspects of minority life had in his opinion 
been based on a false premise: that of using the situation of the anyaorszdgiak as a 
yardstick for comparisons. This had resulted in three erroneous standpoints, the 
conservative, the critical and the pessimistic. The first involved a complete refusal to 
recognise that minority life was radically different to what had gone before and 
therefore placed different demands on the Hungarians. Its adherents daydreamed of 
being able to retain the old forms of Hungarian life, its institutions and esprit intact 
and deemed minority life a success only in so far as it perpetuated the old world 
within the new. The second was the exact opposite of this, according to which a 
critical attitude, blaming the Hungarians for the collapse that had followed the war 
was quite natural amongst the minority. The third had reached the verdict that 
Hungarian minorities had no future. Since they felt that even majority Hungarians 
could not guarantee an existence for themselves the days of the minorities were 
numbered. All three were tired and sterile anachronisms, however, after 15 years had 
elapsed. It was not possible to live through a new era with the instruments and spirit 
of an outmoded age:
"We can arrive at a true way of looking at minority life first and foremost by 
ascertaining our minority existence not by comparing ourselves with the majority 
Hungarians, but with the majority Romanians who live around us. We are not 
minority Hungarians because we are live in separation from majority Hungarians, but 
because in our country we are in a minority compared with the 15 million Romanians 
who form the state. The fundamental issues of our minority life are therefore decided 
in our relationship with the Romanians. To begin with we must become acquainted
995 Op. cit., pp81-82.
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with the life, system and opportunities of this country. It is amazing to see what 
serious omissions continue to weigh us down in this area. I am convinced that much 
of our backwardness can be traced back to our not knowing this country well enough 
and the roads we can and must follow and respect in living our lives here. It is above 
all knowledge of our country's constitution that convinces me that minority life is a 
constitutionally guaranteed form of life here. We are not simply tolerated, but fully- 
fledged citizens of this country, every behaviour, which infringes the exercise of our 
civic rights runs counter to the constitution and the laws of the land. We do not have 
to refer to what the fate of the Romanians in old Hungary was like or what the fate of 
the minorities in other countries is if we are being obstructed in asserting our national 
characteristics, but to the fact that those who are committing an injustice against us do 
not respect the laws of this country whereas we may expect that the laws concerning 
us be enforced since we discharge all our duties. Which one of us does not pay taxes, 
does not perform his military service, does not respect the ruler and the entire state 
system? From this conduct the Romanians will also see that we really do recognise 
the legal situation we have been living in since the peace treaty was signed. We must 
convince the state-forming race that we do not have any hidden objectives, we must 
demonstrate what the country's leaders hardly see, namely that in every aspect of our 
public life we wish to advance whilst completely respecting the law. [...] We must 
accumulate enough moral capital on the basis of our respect towards the state to be 
able to pinpoint it at any juncture with perfect confidence".996 
The first matter for the minority to clarify within its own ranks was why it did not 
wish to assimilate into the Romanian race. The right to preserve Hungarianness was 
defended by the peace treaty and the constitution alike. The Romanian political 
parties read irredentism and agitation against the territorial integrity of the state into 
the minority's desire to stand up for its rights, which could not be further from the 
truth. The actual reason for the insistence on staying in the same racial, religious and 
cultural community was that it provided the natural definition for the life of the 
Hungarians.
The agenda for the minority was to familiarise itself with the national values it was 
bom with and to protect and evolve them in a country governed by another race. The
996 Kisebbsigi iletunk alapkirdisei, 1935. Op. cit., pp88-90, quote, pp89-90. Emphasis in the 
original.
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values in question were language, folk and literary culture, the unique world view and 
moral forms founded in the national past and above these the Christian values honed 
by the church. None of these activities was incompatible with the law.
The environment in which culture exists defines its contours. The situation of a 
minority defined its culture. From this it followed that the cultural tasks to be 
fulfilled by the minority could not be a carbon copy of those to be dealt with in 
Hungary.997
History had shown that values can only be defended and developed further with a 
corresponding financial base. The Romanian state had to provide support in these 
efforts and by turning to it for assistance the minority proved that it did not aspire to 
be a state within a state, but a cultural and religious minority community. Beyond the 
aid that had already been applied for the law made available other as yet neglected 
opportunities such as resources for Szdkely cultural autonomy.998 
Sadly, Ldszl6 was wrong to assume that the discrepancy between material and 
functional identity could be overcome by living quietly as law-abiding citizens. For 
successive Romanian governments, no amount of protestations of loyalty could ever 
suffice to persuade them to abandon their assimilationist policies.
2.10 Revising Ourselves: Sandor Makkai
The career of another member of the Transylvanianist circle, the reformist bishop 
Sdndor Makkai,999 illustrates further the cultural limitations placed upon members of 
the minority. Contrasting the content of the representations he wrote whilst he lived 
in Romania with those produced in Hungary is particularly instructive in this respect.
997 Op. cit., pp90-91.
™* Op. cit., p92.
999 Makkai (1890-1951) tirelessly campaigned for the educational, literary and cultural improvement of 
the Hungarian minority. Eventually drained by the demands the struggle placed upon him, he moved 
back to Hungary in 1936 to teach at the University of Debrecen. For more detailed biographical 
information, see Kdroly Fekete’s preface to Magunk revizidja, reprinted by Pro-Print Konyvkiad6, 
Csfkszereda, 1998 (henceforth Makkai 1931), pp5-44. The original was first published by the Erddlyi 
Sz6pmfves C6h in Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca.
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Again, Makkai was a figure of sufficient prominence in Transylvanian literary life to 
warrant examination in-depth.
In Revising Ourselves (.Magunk revlzioja) from 1931,1000 Makkai analysed the 
predicament the Hungarians found themselves in and prescribed an appropriate 
remedy. He begins by citing the biblical example of Nathaniel1001 to illustrate the 
nature of prejudice, how it focuses the mind on insignificant details, blinding those 
who have succumbed to it with its prior judgements. Creativity, of the literary or 
scientific variety, has to overcome prejudice, proving itself before its merits gain 
acceptance, but it is in politics and social life that prejudices are rife, chauvinism and 
majority views of minorities being cases in point. Although life is dynamic and 
change constant, prejudice is static and resistant to modification. Against this 
backdrop, concepts, convictions and attitudes gradually become obsolete if they do 
not keep pace with developments and it is precisely this failure to revise hallowed 
notions that lies at the root of prejudice. Obstinately clinging to outmoded ideas was 
tantamount to a death sentence in the context of assessing the situation and tasks to be 
accomplished as a minority. Self-revision, engaging in a constructive reappraisal, was 
therefore a solemn duty for the benefit of individual and society alike.1002 
Although prejudice, with its insistence on the permanence of attributes, could be 
described as a form of self-defence, it was always essentially sterile and 
counterproductive, demanding neither effort nor sacrifices. In certain eras the 
temptation to seek consolation in prejudice was greater than in others and the 
catastrophe of war enveloping the entire world had called all previous assumptions 
into question. The future of humanity depended on whether revision triumphed. Far 
from entailing a radical jettisoning of familiar ideas and principles from the past, 
revision involved a return to them, bringing their content into line with the facts and 
thereby breathing new life into them. Recognising and willingly submitting to the 
imperatives bom of the facts should not be confused with culpable compromise, but 
looked upon positively as a rejection of prejudice and hence of atrophy and ultimate 
demise.1003
1000 For Mik6’s response to the work, see Mikd, pl63-4.
1001 Gospel of Saint John, Chapter 1, verses 46 to 51.
1002 Makkai 1931, pp46-51.
1003 Op. cit., pp50-55.
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The twelve years that had elapsed since the Hungarians had come under Romanian 
rule ought to have sufficed to convince them that revision was ineluctable, that 
refusing both to forget and to learn far from representing the most effective form of 
self-defence meant little more than succumbing to prejudice. Harsh reality called for 
a more constructive approach:
“We have become citizens of Romania; the contours of our lives have been defined 
by the laws and due legal order of this country. We must retain our Hungarianess 
within the framework of this order, integrating into it, not against others, but in the 
interests of the peaceful and industrious assertion of our inherited spiritual and 
intellectual individuality.
We must confront the facts, but it is indisputable that this exercise demands the 
revision of fundamental concepts and convictions more specifically first and foremost 
of those pertaining to the past. The first and most important task of the Hungarians of 
Transylvania is to revise the perception o f the past in such a way as to preclude 
prejudices inimical to life and to establish healthy forms o f self-defence and self- 
affirmation".100*
Makkai goes on to dissect the prejudices concerning the past as revealed in the 
attitudes of two opposing schools of thought. The first idealises the era in which the 
Hungarians of his generation were bom grew up in as perfect, unclouded, as the most 
glorious phase of Hungarian history, happy times of thriving culture, prosperity, 
power and self-confidence.1005 Everyone who drew attention to problems and errors, 
who made disquieting predictions about malevolent eddies beneath the calm, radiant 
surface, was driven by the frustration of ungratified vanity and selfishness and was in 
the final analysis an enemy of the Hungarian nation, whose strength had matured to 
such an extent that it was on the verge of achieving dominion over its own lands and 
of assuring a blissful future for itself. The dream of 30 million Hungarians, the vision 
of culture imparting Hungarianess to everyone ancTeverything had been hovering 
tantalisingly on the horizon. In those days there had been no such thing as 
oppression, injustice and destitution. The gleaming Hungarian traits of adherence to 
the law, truth, chivalry and honesty held sway in the government, the public 
administration, culture and education. Evil foes, such as the Social-Democrat
1004 Op. cit., p57-58, emphasis in original.
1003 In this passage Makkai is of course referring to the Hungarians as a whole.
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workers for example, did their utmost to bring ruin upon the nation with their constant 
whingeing about exploitation, penury and a plethora of other woes. Then there had 
been Austria, cutting the Hungarians off from the rest of the world in a sullen display 
of envy so that they would be misunderstood or completely unknown. None of this 
was the product of mistakes committed by the Hungarians. Instead it was the result of 
intrigue and abuse of the generous kindness Hungarians were so thoroughly imbued 
with. A nation such as the Hungarians deserved the recognition, admiration, 
friendship and support of the world rather than the lot apportioned to it, which was 
the single greatest injustice in all of human history. Its causes cannot be traced back 
to the life, soul or character of the Hungarians and must of necessity come from the 
outside.
As Makkai concludes, this argument sloughs off of all responsibility for what 
happened, with the Hungarians as innocent victims waiting for the miracle that will 
vindicate them and restore to them what was lost. In the minds of those who placed 
their faith in this doctrine, the uncomfortable and unpalatable realities of the present 
were temporary in nature and there was no reason to learn from them or change 
strategy because of them.1006
Makkai describes passively enduring until the yearned for miracle ensued as the most 
depressing prejudice. Facts had superseded the proud, smug, pristine core of national 
consciousness. The past had irrevocably slipped through the fingers and hence could 
not be resurrected. The injustice, no matter how great, had taken place. Two options 
presented themselves: the Hungarians of Transylvania could either wallow in 
prejudice with all the concomitant risks for their survival or they could accept the 
facts and adapt accordingly.1007
The second way of looking back over the past was far less romanticised. Dubbing it 
an accumulation of fatal errors and misapprehensions, this perspective disqualified 
history as a reliable source of lessons given that the blind chauvinism of every nation 
always vaunts its own achievements through the chronicles of the past. All of the 
glories history extols are superficial, consigned to the realm of appearances, 
externalities. Even the most radiant period had amounted to nothing more than the 
tyranny of the powerful, the delights of the surface concealing the putrefaction of
1006 Op. cit., pp58-59.
1007 Op. cit., pp60-61.
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corruption and oppression underneath. The nefarious lack of concern so typical of the 
Hungarian past had paved the way for the catastrophe that had struck. Both 
patriotism and the national consciousness had consisted of little more than tired, 
hollow phrases and slogans. Unemployment, emigration, indebtedness, the gradual 
demise of productive labour and the slow takeover of culture and the economy by 
foreigners had been the true hallmark of the age of Hungarian strength. That power 
and leadership had ended up being concentrated in the hands of a single class, which 
was not the repository of moral and intellectual vigour, proved disastrous. Liberalism 
and democracy had remained mere slogans: in so far as they did actually materialise, 
however, the Hungarian race had not been able to avail itself of them - the progressive 
ideals had borne fruit exclusively for outsiders. The conclusion:
"We are therefore suffering for the transgressions of a ruling class and they bear the 
entire burden of responsibility for everything that has happened. The facts indicate 
that we do not have to concern ourselves about the past and that we must adapt to the 
present in such a way as to ensure we can make individual livelihoods for 
ourselves”.1008
In Makkai's eyes the only distinction between the two groups is that the latter 
acknowledges the strictures imposed by the new reality and is willing to adjust. Both 
are nevertheless equally afflicted by prejudice, overlooking the true message of the 
facts they struggle to come to terms with, which did not call for individual 
compromise, but for a healthy and practical expression of national consciousness and 
fulfilment of the mission in hand.1009
Against this backdrop chafing over whether the facts should be regarded as permanent 
or alterable was nothing but a costly distraction. Renewal and revision could not be 
made dependent on such external circumstances. National awareness must 
incorporate acknowledgement of errors and iniquities. Basking in nostalgia and 
sentimentality must cease and a more critical understanding replace the outmoded, 
naive idealisation of what had been lost Although the events that had unfolded had 
been influenced by considerations outside Hungary, the great disaster had to be 
apprehended as the result of and punishment for internal mistakes. Continuing to
1008 Op. cit., pp 60-62; quotation, pp61-62.
1009 Op. cit., p62.
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regard it as an accidental calamity from without would serve only to perpetuate the 
wrongdoings of the past in a more rigid form:
"We must accept the teaching of the facts to the effect that the great, external occasion 
presented by the devastation simply disclosed and sealed the fate, which had been 
ordained by us through our own crimes".1010
The Hungarian soul's darker side of bias, arrogance, impetuousness coupled with the 
Eastern characteristics of somnolent apathy, inertia and selfishness that had already 
pushed the nation into the background both at home and in international competition 
had finally taken its toll. The gravest deficit had been the Hungarian inability to 
submit to intellectual or spiritual leadership, deferring only to the privileges of birth 
and wealth. Slowly but surely, slavish imitation had become the order of the day, 
blocking off the only path a small nation could viably proceed along, that of 
intellectual flexibility, sensitivity, receptiveness, progressiveness and aspiring to 
universality.1011
Denying the past, disassociating oneself with it by insisting on being an innocent 
victim of the wrongs of others was the most shameful act of cowardice and betrayal, 
the most abject lie. By contrast:
"Accepting responsibility, contrition and penitence are the greatest feats with which a 
nation can prove its right to live and its resourcefulness. Remorse is not a nation's 
disgrace, but, if it is truly ashamed of its offences and rues them, represents its glory 
and power”.1012
For the abandoned Hungarian minority, which Makkai likens to a drop comprising 
one and a half million in a vast ocean, this meant more than words alone, battling 
against its inner demons without turning its back on the past altogether:
"It is as necessary for us to see clearly, free from any trace of prejudice, and to 
ardently embrace everything of worth, all the life-affirming, enriching, precious and 
sacred assets, which the Hungarian past and the Hungarian soul have produced and 
continue to represent, which they can point to as their own unique, indispensable and 
irreplaceable possession in humanity's vast treasure house as it is for us to see clearly
1010 Op. cit., pp64-66; quotation, p66.
1011 Op. cit., p66.
1012 Op. cit., p67, emphasis in the original.
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and self-awarely the life-denying misdeeds, to condemn them so as to be able to 
extirpate them from within us”.1013
Rather than extolling the virtues of the great and glowing achievements of the 
Hungarian past and erecting richly decorated memorials to them in their souls, the 
task ahead of the Hungarians was to rediscover and reappraise the truly Hungarian 
values expressed throughout it in order to weave them subsequently into the fabric of 
their lives, dealings and futures. The major personalities, movements, institutions, 
artistic creations and fates of the past provided a rich hoard boasting countless 
examples of the Hungarian way of thinking, creative energy and specifically 
Hungarian values. Concentrating on the authentically Hungarian, the national 
disposition would reveal that the ability to thrive and develop further was as intrinsic 
to being Hungarian as it was to other peoples. The deep Hungarian attachment to the 
two fundamental values of justice and good would assure a lasting future on condition 
that they were consciously nurtured. Both the typical national disasters and heroes 
that had emerged in the course of history illustrated various aspects of the national 
character, warts and all. The appalling defeats at battles such as MohcLcs contrasted 
with individuals of the calibre of Saint Istvdn (exemplifying the Hungarian capacity to 
work, to organise and build), B61a the Fourth (broadening the intellectual horizons 
and overcoming prejudices, self-worth),1014 G&bor Bethlen (self-restraint, patience, 
self-sacrifice and insuppressibly passion for life)1015 and Istvdn Sz6chenyi (intellectual
1013 Op. cit., p68. Emphasis in original.
1014 Bdla IV (1206-1270) ascended the throne in 1235. At the Battle of Muhi on 11* April 1241, he 
narrowly escaped with his life, his armies having been decimated by the invading Mongols {Kontler, 
pp77-8).
10,5 Gdbor Bethlen (1580-1629) was Prince of Transylvania from 1613 until his death. Through his 
participation in the Thirty Years War, he enhanced the strategic importance of the Principality. When 
the estates of Bohemia rose up in revolt against the Counter-Reformation, Bethlen grasped his chance 
to enter into an alliance with the Czech Protestants. In the autumn of 1619 he launched an offensive 
powerful enough to allow him to advance all the way to Vienna, which he besieged having already 
conquered Upper Hungary. Although compelled to retreat, the Hungarian Diet proclaimed him King of 
Hungary (in place of Ferdinand II). Following the defeat inflicted upon the Czechs at the Battle of 
White Mountain in 1620, he had to abandon his ambitions. At the Peace of Nikolsburg (1621), he gave 
up the royal titles and insignia, but was compensated by being awarded ducal domains in Silesia 
(Kontler, pp169-172). See also Gyula Szekfu, Bethlen Gdbor, Helikon Kiadd, Budapest, 1983 (reprint 
of the 1929 original).
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attainment, self-reliance on the part of the nation, awareness of its inner strength and 
looking ahead with confidence to an auspicious future) with their commitment to 
renewing the nation and it was against this backdrop that the Hungarian vices were 
thrown into high relief: the reckless pursuit of cheap glory, refusal to learn the lessons 
of the relevant times and situations, the bitter ecstasy of seeking to end a wasted life 
through a violent death and the drowsy slump into a lethargy in which all concerns 
become immaterial.1016
Quoting from an earlier work (published in 1927),1017 Makkai reiterates his view that 
being in a minority added a new dimension to the Hungarian identity, bringing two 
further tasks in its wake:
" 'On the one hand it [the Hungarian minority] must everywhere concede that in the 
interests of being able to maintain its existence and in the absence of political 
independence and power the sole means of self-preservation rests on its own national 
traditions, but which involves the autonomous development of intellectual and moral 
life depending on the circumstances which prevail. On the other hand it must also 
realise that this culture cannot have the effect of secluding and constricting - 
condemned to death in other words - but must everywhere be more universal, the 
eternal heights of humanity must be more easily accessible through it and it must in 
itself be more profoundly humane than that of the mother country from which it was 
severed. Inevitably the culture of every independent country must conform to the 
political interest whereas the minority is not bound by such interest and is always able 
to place its national character in the service of universal human ideals, may search for 
and draw closer to the peaks of the great common values binding nations together. 
Minorities have a vocation by necessity, arising from the sufferings they undergo as a 
result of their situation to pave the way for a nobler mankind, a more universal 
humane mentality and for the sublime and healing future of true brotherhood amongst 
men. No suffering has been or will be without reason, indeed it will represent a 
downright act of providence in the life of the world if minorities fathom this divine 
calling, accept it and set about it with enthusiasm.'
On this basis I professed even then that the Hungarians of Transylvania must cultivate 
an intellectual life, which has its roots in the Hungarian legacy and builds on it, but
10,6 Op. cit., pp70-75.
1017 Kozonsdg is  irodabm, published in A m i utunk in 1929 (see p76).
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which is independent and self-consciously seeks out and fosters universally human 
values'}™
To gauge the scale of the undertaking, Makkai proceeds to contrast the cultural 
position of the Hungarians with their Romanian counterparts and the anyaorszdgiak 
(his analysis showing that he is aware of the need for adequate resources to reproduce 
a collective identity). The first crucial advantage enjoyed by the latter two groups is 
that they are protected and given succour by what he terms the national empire and 
have an entire arsenal of material, legal and institutional resources at their disposal. It 
still seemed natural for a country to at most tolerate minority culture and graciously 
permit it to stay alive, but affording it special protection and sustenance, particularly 
in encouraging the retention of its national characteristics, was not perceived as being 
in the general interest. One of the dominant components of the minority Hungarian 
psyche Was the awareness that they belonged to no such earthly empire. The practical 
implication of this was that the Hungarians had to be entirely self-reliant and that their 
only accomplishments would be those they achieved without external assistance of 
any kind. The degree of success would depend on the level of organisation, as this 
was the measure of the minority's strength. However its prospects appeared gloomy 
indeed if this were the yardstick applied. In order to fulfil their destiny, the 
Hungarians would have to accept that the empire of which they were subjects was an 
empire of the spirit and character and conceive of it not as a vague, meaningless 
apparition, but a magnificent reality:
"How then should we accustom ourselves to living with the spiritual empire? In our 
conceptual framework we must strip the word "Hungarian" of the geographical, state, 
legal and political meanings and focus on the eternally Hungarian: the spiritual 
nation. This spiritual nation assumes tangible form before us in the thoughts, 
Creations and character of the great figures of the Hungarian past and in the works of 
the Hungarian intellect, in the realms of science, literature, art, moral ideals, practical 
philosophy and customs. The nation, as made palpable in this way, is a spiritual 
reality, but a reality nonetheless: a living, active, formative, didactic power. 
Collectively it is the reality of a peculiar temperament, character and way of life, 
which forever binds together those who were bom and raised by this Spirit It is a 
spiritual unity, creating a shared mentality, outlook on life and way of living, which
1018 Op. cit., pp76-7. Emphasis in original.
page 292
the common mother tongue immortalises, expresses, preaches, defends and 
strengthens”.1019
Revising national consciousness consisted of the two steps of transforming temporal 
Hungarianess to spiritual and of ascribing equal strength to it in spite of the ardours 
the lack of outside support implied.1020 It also included facing the secret fear that 
unity automatically erased all social distinctions. Whereas everyone publicly 
subscribed to the legally sanctified principle of full equality in rights and obligations 
regardless of origin, rank, title or diploma, they sought refuge in these subtle 
gradations setting them apart from their fellows. In a nutshell equality was more than 
human nature could bear and it was well nigh impossible to persuade anyone to 
embrace it with open arms. Unity was not unconditional levelling: complete equality 
always had been and always would be an illusion. The real impediment to unity was 
the tendency for individuals to consider themselves qualitatively different to the 
masses below, who were somehow not fully human. This mindset had lead to the 
chronic state of fragmentation of Hungarian society. Selfishness, arrogance and 
vanity fuelled the superstition that blood, essence and constitution separated the elite 
from the herd whereas the actual disparity was of position, power and possessions. 
Similarly prestige could be conferred by professional status. The heart of the problem 
was not the existence of the differences themselves, but their effect in preventing the 
minority from establishing unified social organisations. In circumstances where the 
Hungarians had been cast to the winds and had no one else to turn to, insistence on 
privileges and cultural superiority could prove fatal. Inclusion on the basis of 
Hungarianess would have to replace exclusion and exclusivism, which called for 
moral responsibility and goodwill.1021 Thus the counter-tactic to the Romanian 
assault on resources was to stand shoulder to shoulder, ignoring divisions of rank.
The survival of the minority could only be guaranteed by the survival of the ordinary 
people, the overwhelming majority of whom were employed in agriculture. Those 
who earned a living from teaching or other white collar activities could make a 
valuable contribution by living for and amongst the people, serving them as leaders 
and assuming responsibility for the precious resource buried deep within the popular
1019 Op. cit., pp77-80. The quotation p79. Emphasis in original.
1020 Op. cit., p80.
1021 Op. cit., pp86-92.
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soul, the Hungarian essence. Its value did not diminish merely because it was not the 
exclusive property of the few and could be more readily compared to an uncut 
diamond than a worthless pebble. Makkai rejected the widespread misapprehension 
that the people were a lesser breed incapable of the finer feelings of their self- 
appointed superiors. Narrower horizons and less sophisticated means of expressing 
their innermost feelings were an inevitable by product of the social reality they 
inhabited, but this could not be construed as a difference of substance or true import 
and ironically the educated were more prone to fall prey to prejudice than their 
unschooled compatriots.1022
The daunting task ahead was to convert the Hungarian multitudes into a living 
organism whose every constituent cell functioned harmoniously alongside all the 
others for the good of the whole. This was the best route towards consolidating the 
innate strength of the minority and left scope for difference in accordance with a 
division of labour. Working the land gave rise to a permanent lifestyle with its own 
independent content and should not be regarded with condescending disdain. The 
concept of the people, burdened with connotations such as coarseness, abject poverty 
and inferior spirituality, ought to be reassessed and their lot improved by the experts, 
writers and artists who would raise their awareness in a spirit of paternal affection. In 
return the people would supply the fertile soil and the resources vital for raising future 
generations of leaders who would repay their debt by devoting themselves to 
enhancing the prosperity of their charges rather than preying on them. Establishing 
this symbiosis was the historical mission to be fulfilled.1023
At the same time industrial workers would have to be shepherded gently into the fold. 
A gulf in mentality had opened up between them and the body of the nation with 
concentration on class interests preventing them from forming part of the organism. 
The shared experience of the trials and tribulations of belonging to a minority might, 
however, suffice to bridge the gap. Extending a hand of friendship was a solemn 
obligation.1024
1022 Op. cit., pp94-96.
1023 Op. cit., ppl00-102.
1024 Op. ch., ppl02-103.
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A few trusted leading lights within the minority could assemble to pinpoint the most 
urgent tasks and draw up a programme outlining a policy for it.1025 
Since the younger generation would be the prime beneficiaries of any revision of 
national consciousness it was also essential to jettison prejudices in relation to 
education and upbringing whereby the impulse on the part of the teachers and parents 
was to write off the current system whilst cherishing fond recollections of the old, 
reinforced by the constraints, hindrances and frustrations of the previous twelve years. 
No matter how convenient a scapegoat these difficulties might be they still did not 
absolve the Hungarians of all responsibility for their children. Laws and state 
measures could provide a framework within which education could be provided, but 
the values to be instilled in tender minds emanated from the minority itself. The 
process of revision had to encompass the contradictions that had arisen where national 
sentiment was aroused, moral idealism advocated and scientific objectivity used as an 
analytical tool to dissect both. The new Zeitgeist of a more practical approach to the 
major issues in life, familiarisation with the facts rather than world views and a 
critical examination of the past and the national being replace the pre-war 
conventional wisdom that no longer seemed valid.1026
The Transylvanianist gospel of reconciliation and gravitating away from Hungary 
largely fell on deaf ears both on the Hungarian and on the Romanian side where the 
nationalist principle of classification reigned unchallenged. As far as Romanian 
representations of the Hungarian minority were concerned with a few honourable 
exceptions,1027 hostility was the order of the day. If there was one issue on which a 
consensus existed in Romanian interwar politics it was hostility towards the 
minorities, as Imre Mik6 summarised:
"The changing governments were consistent in one respect. Their minority policy 
was guided by the declaration made by Ionel Bratianu after the peace conference: now 
the world should observe how the minorities disappear from Romania! His major 
opponent Maniu also confessed: it is us or them! With this in mind the resolute
1025 Op. tit., pp 108-110.
1026 Op. dt., pp 112-120.
1027 For example Victor Eftimiu who deplored the excesses of certain newspapers. See Mikd, ppl54- 
155.
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steadfastness with which this basic principle was implemented by every government, 
irrespective of ideology and party affiliation, becomes understandable in the broader 
context of the countless instances of confusion, inconsistency and improvisation in 
Romanian domestic politics. A further factor contributed to the lack of 
comprehension concerning the minorities issue displayed by the Romanian leaders 
from the Regat and to Transylvania's descent into colonial status, which also poisoned 
the lives of the Transylvanian Hungarians. This was the Transylvanian Romanian 
middle-classes' hatred of the Hungarians. To the Romanian intellectuals emerging 
from the ordinaiy people the Hungarian aristocracy and middle class personified the 
past oppressors of the Romanians. Here not only prejudice based on nationality, but 
also a degree of class hatred flared up and the leading groups in Transylvanian 
Romanian society also endeavoured to vest their political battles against the 
Hungarians the appealing semblance of the young, popular, democratic Romania 
struggling against the obsolete, feudal Hungarians who were clinging to their 
injustices of the past. By contrast the reality was that the nouveau riche, plutocratic 
Transylvanian Romanian leaders who quickly assimilated to the corruption of the 
Regat for twenty two years opposed the Hungarian leaders whom they welded 
together - regardless of whether or not this was their intention - in a single community 
of fate with the Hungarian masses by lowering the level of prosperity of those masses
i nos i mothrough the agricultural reform, language examinations, ,,numeruses,, and 
similar deleterious provisions.
The Byzantism of the Regat and the chauvinism of the Transylvanian Romanians 
were the determining factors of Romanian minority policy. These factors intensified 
further and lent an anti-minority edge to the naturally full-blooded nationalism, which 
already fired the national consciousness of the young state whose territory had 
expanded. The Romanian petit and grand bourgeoisie therefore had a chauvinistic
1028 j j je reference js to the new system introduced by an amendment to the law on private education. 
Even teachers who had passed an examination attesting to their proficiency in Romanian could be 
required to sit another. If they failed they could be banned from exercising their profession. Mass 
dismissals followed. See Mikd, pl48.
io» numerus valachius movement was conceived in 1933 and initially sought to impose quotas on 
the minorities in education, but spread to include other professions and commerce. See Huszonkit iv, 
ppl52-153. In practice, a numerus nullus was voted for at the National Lawyers Association congress 
in 1937, although it was never fully implemented. See Mikd, pp178-179.
page 296
leaning anyway and it turned with as fierce xenophobic hatred to any segment of the 
population, which in its estimation represented a foreign body within the Romanian 
state, as it was keen to absorb without inhibition any foreigner who wanted to be 
Romanian even to the extent of pushing the country to the brink of economic crisis. 
This chauvinism was artificially exacerbated by the Romanian press in an effort to 
boost circulation with the notorious Universul in the vanguard. No newspaper wanted 
to be left out of this contest and the readership equated the most patriotic with the one 
who thumped the minority hardest. The press imputed a whiff of irredentism to every 
manifestation of life on the part of the minority, it launched the anti-revisionist 
movement from which it derived considerable profit and when it put Hungarian 
journalists in the dock for articles, which had been approved by the censors the 
Romanian press was able to promise the Hungarians of Transylvania a Massacre of 
Saint Bartholomew with impunity”.1030
On 25th August 1931 Artdr Balogh and Gdbor P£1 tabled a complaint with the League 
of Nations concerning school textbooks endorsed by the Ministry of Education, which 
contained denigrating remarks on the lifestyles of the Huns and the Hungarians. In a 
reader intended for primary school pupils the following verse could be found: "Oh 
Hungarians, rabid dogs, we have suffered much at your hands, but now it is our turn, 
to avenge ourselves”. In its reply, the Romanian government insisted that the 
textbooks dealt with Hungarians of the 8th and 9th centuries rather than those of the 
present day.1031
The situation grew worse after Gyula Gombos became Hungarian Prime Minister on 
1st October 1932 and included fair territorial revision on the basis of nationality 
distribution amongst the 95-point programme of his government. The newspaper 
Universul, owned by former Minister of Justice Stelian Popescu, headed the initiative, 
which lead to the founding of the Antirevisionist League alluded to by Mikd above.
1030 Imre Mik6: Erdilyi magyarsdg a vildghdboru utdn. In: Magyarok 4s romdnok, Volume 2, edited 
by Jdzsef Dedr and Ldszld Gdldi, Athenaeum, Budapest, 1944, pp213-214. The reference to the 
massacre alludes to an article penned by Octavian M. Dobrota, which appeared on 12th November 1936 
and advocated the destruction of Hungarian dissenters. See Mikd, pp168-170 and pp291-293 for the 
full text of the article.
1031 See Mikd, pl24.
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Membership of the League was mandatory for all civil servants, including 
Hungarians, from whose salaries the membership fee was deducted.1032
As the storm clouds gathered, Makkai published an article in the Hungarian journal 
Horizon (Latdhatdr) from the safety of the mother country he had finally succeeded in 
returning to in 1936. With its uncompromising tone, It is not possible (Nem lehet) 
dealt a severe blow to the confidence of the Hungarians with its bleak, but realistic 
appraisal of the plight of the minority. Makkai voiced his conviction that with the 
passing of time more and more obstacles would be strewn in the path of a political 
solution to the minorities issue, which would complicate the social, economic, legal 
and cultural realities faced by the Hungarians in their everyday lives, with the peace 
treaty resembling a death sentence more closely every day. Ignoring the problem 
would mean disaster in the long run. Certain individuals believed that oppression, 
coercion, compromise or downgrading could sort out the difficulties, but regardless of 
whether their intentions were good or bad they all laboured under the 
misapprehension that the problem could actually be solved. Makkai could not 
envisage any way out as he judged the category of minority beneath human dignity 
and psychologically impossible:
"There was an illusion, which was nourished by the spirit of liberalism and which 
held out the prospect to the victims of the World War who had the fate of being in a 
minority thrust upon them that humanity would soon outgrow the sad childhood 
ailment of racial and national prejudice and would be replaced by consciousness of 
humanity's oneness, universal love of mankind and respect for the spirit according to 
which the political frontiers dividing peoples would be obliterated without a trace and 
that in this heaven on earth the bitter antagonisms, which now torment so many 
million human lives to extinction, would dwindle into insignificance.
Let us not show one ounce of regret for the shattering of this illusion, as it was in 
itself the biggest possible lie. Entirely the opposite has occurred: new kind of national 
consciousness never seen before has blossomed and materialised, which declares war 
on all bland and hypocritical lies. The nations have sensed that their human nature 
consists of the deliberate cultivation of their peculiar racial and historical 
characteristics and not of sacrificing them for the sake of a universality, which,
1032 Mikd, p i35.
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whenever an attempt at achieving it has been made thus far, has only proven that 
behind its bright promises lurk the darkest tyranny''.1033 
Only within his own national community could someone feel truly human and 
although national and ethnic frontiers did not necessarily coincide, the ardour of the 
new national consciousness meant that in practice individuals could only enjoy fair 
opportunities where their national community was sovereign. The Hungarian 
minority was not doomed to overnight assimilation since it was still possible to eke 
out a meagre subsistence even in a position of inferiority, but it could not develop 
nationally, which in the new Europe meant not being able to live as a real human 
being.
However, introspection and drawing comfort from its past and its creative spirit was 
no compensation for being excluded from full participation in the life of a state.
Being confined to the cultural sphere in exercising authority over itself was no 
substitute. Seen in the cold light of day, no culture could thrive and develop cut off 
from the conditions that keep it alive. This meant that the cultural life of the minority 
was doomed to regression and slow decay. Morally as well as politically, life as a 
minority was impossible.1034
The response from those who had stayed behind is encapsulated most succinctly in 
the title of S&ndor Remenyik's critique: It is possible because it is has to be.1035
Conclusion
During the interwar years, the nationalist principle of classification held sway in both 
Hungary and Romania. This meant that whereas the national identity of the majority 
population was taken for granted that of the minority was construed as problematic. 
The Hungarians of Transylvania had to adapt their identity to fit in with their new 
political surroundings. Far from being an exercise in nationalist opportunism, it was 
the sole means of preserving their language and culture where these were under threat
1033 Makkai: Nem lehet. Originally published in Ldtdhatdr, 1937, number II, pp49-53. In: Nem lehet. 
A kisebbsdgi sors vitdja. Compiled by Pet6r Cseke and Gusztfiv Moln&r. Hdttorony K6nyvkiad6, 
Tatabdnya, 1989, ppl06-108, quotation pl08.
1034 Op. cit., ppl 10-111.
1035 Published in Ellenzik, 17th February 1937. Makkai’s pessimistic conclusions sparked a major 
debate, for which see Trianon, pp503-513 and P6ter Cseke and Gusztdv Molndr, op.cit.
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of erosion. That the various Romanian governments were never willing to accept 
them as a possible source of cultural enrichment is revealed by the discriminatory 
legislation continually passed against them and designed to undermine their ability to 
maintain their distinctiveness.
The materiality of national identity was not contested even in the case of the minority. 
On the contrary, the untenability of the latter’s position derived from the discrepancy 
between the functional and material components of its identity. What counted for 
Romanian politicians was not that the Hungarians had become citizens of their 
country, but that they were ethnically different. The increasingly vocal irredentist 
clamourings of Hungarian nationalists across the border merely confirmed their 
Romanian counterparts in their belief that assimilation was the only solution to the 
minority problem.
Counteracting the pernicious effects of the attacks on their ability to retain a separate 
identity placed a particularly heavy burden upon Hungarian intellectuals who were 
expected not merely to engage in the activity of producing representations, but also to 
provide political leadership.
Ultimately, Romania’s fears concerning Hungaiy’s desire to reacquire the territories 
lost at Trianon were justified. In the summer of 1940, Stalin issued an ultimatum to 
Romania demanding that it cede Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Anxious to 
prevent oil supplies from Romania being cut off should Hungary decide to join the 
fray on the Russian side, Hitler gave his blessing to a revision of the Hungarian- 
Romanian frontier. At negotiations, Hungary requested the return of 70,000 square 
kilometres of land (over two-thirds of the 102,000 it had been deprived of at Trianon). 
The proposed new border followed the course of the Maros/Mure§, roughly 
corresponding to the demarcation line from the end of the First World War. Since the 
bulk of the population dwelling in these tracts was Romanian it did not meet with that 
country’s approval. Nor did the counter-proposal suit the Hungarians. In order to 
stave off an armed conflict, Hitler suggested that Germany and Italy arbitrate in the 
matter. The result, known as the Second Vienna Award (30th August 1940) gave 
43,000 square kilometres and 2.5 million people back to Hungary, including the 
Sz6kely lands and half of Northern Transylvania. According to the 1941 Hungarian 
census, 52% of its inhabitants were Hungarian, 38% Romanian and 10% Saxon.
Some 400,000 Hungarians remained under Romanian rale in Southern Transylvania. 
The price extracted from Hungary was high, however: the National-Socialist German
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Volksbund became the sole lawful organisation representing its Germans, further 
discriminatory laws against the Jews were passed, the volume of food and animal 
fodder exports to Germany was increased, German troops marched into Romania via 
Hungary, Ferenc Sz&lasi, leader of the fascist Arrow Cross Movement was released 
from prison and on 20th November, Hungary officially acceded to the Tripartite Pact, 
the death knell of its policy of neutrality.1036
1036 Romsics 2000, pp245-7.
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Chapter Three: From Agitation to Assimilation
Introduction
The Trianon trauma had quite different effects on Hungarians depending on which 
side of the new borders they found themselves on. In Hungary, the left-right political 
divide became pivotal because of the defeat of Communism and Bela Kun’s Soviet 
Republic, whereas it played very little role in Romania because of the de facto 
coalition the minority members lived in. At the same time, there was a degree of 
sympathy for the Comintern line of all-out (but tactical) support for the rights of 
minorities. This became important towards the end of World War Two when the 
minority lined up behind the personalities who prepared the ground for the 
Communist takeover, an allegiance, which did not endear it to the rest of the 
population.
In its early days, the Romanian Communist Party was both weak and unpopular. Its 
membership of Comintern earned it no plaudits amongst their fellow countrymen 
(with the exception of the Hungarian minority), as the Soviets gave priority to their 
own foreign policy goals over the need for the Party to become a legitimate political 
force, forcing the Romanian Communists to support the relinquishing of Bessarabia. 
Worse still, the Romanian Party was viewed as a foreign organisation, largely 
composed of Hungarians and Jews. Less than 25% of its members were in fact ethnic 
Romanians.1037
It was also riven by internal strife between the Muscovite faction (the group around 
Ana Pauker and Vasile (L£szl6) Luka) and the home Communists (headed by
1037 For these points, see Steven D. Roper, Romania: The Unfinished Revolution, Harwood Academic 
Publishers, Amsterdam, 2000, p4. On the evolution of the Party, see also Vladimir Tismaneanu, The 
Tragicomedy o f Romanian Communism, in Eastern European Politics and Societies, Volume 3 (2), 
1989, pp329-376. Between 1924 and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej’s appointment in 1944, all RCP 
general secretaries were non-ethnic Romanians (Tismaneanu, op.cit., p349). For the Gheorghiu-Dej 
period, see also Stephen Fischer-Galaji, Prelude to Communist Totalitarianism, August 1944-March 
1964, in Giurescu 1998, pp391-440 and by the same author, Romania under Communism, in Giurescu 
1998, pp441-479.
page 302
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej). Hostility between them only ceased when the Muscovites 
were purged in 1952. Prior to that, however, Gheorghiu-Dej had already eliminated 
two of his main rivals §tefan Fori§ (an ethnic Hungarian) and Lucrejiu P£trii§canu, so 
that the fate of the MNSZ [see below] should be seen as part of a broader strategy of 
Gleichschaltung.1038
As far as identity was concerned, the advent of Communism brought with it a new 
principle of classification, which (ostensibly at least) rejected its nationalist 
predecessor. The relationship between Communism and nationalism in Romania, 
however, proved to be more complex.
3.1 Transition from Fascist to Communist Dictatorship: The 
Hungarian Popular Alliance (Magyar Nepi Szovetseg)
The Allied Control Commission insisted that Romania's annexation of Northern 
Transylvania could not go ahead unless it could dispel doubts about its democratic 
credentials and provide guarantees of equal rights for the minorities. On the surface 
there seemed to be good grounds for hope of better prospects for the Hungarians in 
the future: on 14th November 1944, law 575 created the Ministry of Minority and 
Nationality Affairs with Gheorghe Vladescu-R&coasa in charge. Its mandate was 
specified in law seven of January of the following year with the three main tasks of 
studying and registering the most important issues arising from the situation of 
minorities living in Romania, coming up with appropriate legal, administrative and 
political solutions to them in the Nationalities Statute to be drafted and to supervise
1038 On the frictions, see Roper, op.cit., ppl3-26. Fori§ was general secretary of the Party between 
1940 and 1944. During the war, he was accused by Gheorghiu-Dej of having sabotaged the 
organisation of partisan warfare in Romania after June 1941. After his arrest by an RCP commando 
unit, he was held in secret until his assassination in 1946 (Tismaneanu, op.cit., p350). PStr5§canu lost 
his Politburo seat in 1946, having been publicly excoriated by Gheorghiu-Dej for nationalism. At the 
Sixth Party Congress in 1948 he was not re-elected to the Central Committee and lost his post as 
Minister of Justice. Shortly afterwards he was placed under house arrest before finally being executed 
in 1954 (Tismaneanu, op.cit., pp361 and 365).
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and monitor the implementation of the relevant measures covering all aspects of the 
minorities' social interaction with the majority.1039
The Statute itself was promulgated on 6th February 1945 in law 86 under the Radescu 
government and represented a massive improvement compared with any policy in the 
interwar period, outlawing all discrimination against minorities and for the first time 
enshrining collective rights in respect of language.1040 
Its main provisions were that citizens of non-Romanian mother tongue, race or 
religion would receive equal treatment and the same legal and actual protection as the 
remainder of Romania's citizens (paragraph four); that direct or indirect restrictions of 
civil rights on the basis of the origin, religion or nationality of Romanian citizens and 
the establishment of privileges on such a basis as well as the propagation of racial, 
religious and national segregation, hatred and contempt were to be punishable by law 
(likewise paragraph four); that every Romanian citizen had the right to determine his 
mother tongue or nationality (paragraph five) and that in those administrative and 
judicial districts where the non-Romanian speaking population comprised at least 30 
per cent of the total the tribunals and district courts were obliged to accept any 
application drawn up and submitted by a citizen in his mother tongue without being 
permitted to demand a translation into Romanian, to arrive at a decision concerning 
the application in question in the same language and to give a hearing to the party in
1039 See: Andrea R. Stile, Romdnia politikatdrtinete 1944-1990, p205. In: Romdnia 1944-1990, 
Gazdasdg- is  politikatdrtenet, Atlantisz; Medvetdnc, Budapest, 1990 and Hetven iv , p62.
1040 Although it is fair to contend, as does Gdbor Vincze, that the provisionsof the statute represented a 
step backwards for the Hungarians of Northern Transylvania, particularly as regards the independence 
of the Hungarian university in Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca-Napoca and the 30 per cent threshold. Indeed 
prior to its adoption, the Hungarian Committee of the Romanian Social Democratic Party sent a letter 
to the Party's Central Executive Committee condemning the Statute on various fronts. It was deemed to 
be more restrictive than the 1868 Hungarian law on the nationalities, antidemocratic because more 
suitable threshold for the town clerks and registrars to be bilingual, at the lower levels of administration 
and justice the official language of proceedings should be that spoken by 80 per cent of the population 
under their jurisdiction, strict observance of proportionality should be compulsory in appointments to 
public office, 20 children should suffice to warrant a separate state school being run for the minorities 
and a canton system be established instituting autonomous local government for the nationalities. See: 
Gdbor Vincze: A romdniai magyar kisebbsig tortineti kronoldgidja, 1944-1953. Teleki Ldszld 
Alapftvdny, Budapest-Szeged, 1994 (hereinafter Vincze I), pp 23 and 21 respectively and the passage 
on the Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca-Napoca ordinance below.
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his native language (paragraphs six and eight).1041 Furthermore, in counties and 
districts with an identical non-Romanian speaking population ratio the latter rules 
applied to the public authorities with the addition that the elected or other de jure 
representatives had the right to take the floor in their mother tongue (paragraph ten). 
The judges and civil servants employed in local administrations would have to 
possess a knowledge of the language concerned [the expression contained in the text 
is "be familiar with"].1042
The statute also addressed some of the problems, which had arisen in the past, for 
example, paragraph thirteen stated that daily and periodical press publications printed 
in languages other than Romanian could denote the name of their seat and all other 
place names in the country in the language of the nationality concerned. Paragraph 
fourteen outlawed the romanianization of surnames in official documents; paragraph 
fifteen provided for street signs in the minority language (again where the proportion 
of the local population reached 30 per cent), whilst paragraph sixteen clarified that 
civil servants, regardless of rank, would not under any circumstances be compelled to 
sit a Romanian language examination provided that their appointment took place on 
the basis of a diploma or certificate issued by an educational establishment recognised 
by the state.
As far as education was concerned, paragraph eighteen guaranteed mother tongue 
instruction at state primary, secondary and higher education schools “for the 
cohabiting nationalities who have an appropriate number of pupils with the exception 
of those localities where the denominational schools already satisfy these needs”1043 
and that in allocating teaching posts in non-Romanian language state schools, 
members of the relevant nationality would be given preference. Paragraph twenty 
granted pupils of state and denominational schools with a language of tuition other 
than Romanian the right to sit examinations in the language in which the relevant 
subject was taught. The denominational schools run by national minorities were put
1041 Source: Jelentdsek a Hatdron Tuli Magyar Kisebbsigekrol. (hereinafter Medvetdnc) (ELTE), 
Budapest, 1988, pp127-128. See also: A nemzetisigek egyenjogusitdsdnak utjdn. A nemzetisdgijog 
fejloddse a nipi demokratikus Romdnidban (1944. szeptember 2-1948. dprilis 13.) Jo6 Rudolf 
beszflgetdse Demeter Jdnossal, Kossuth Konyvkiad6,1983. The text of the Statute is reproduced in 
full on ppl 13-117.
1042 Medvetdnc, pl28.
1043 Op. cit., pl29.
page 305
on an equal footing with their Romanian counterparts in terms of funding by 
paragraph twenty one. Finally, paragraph twenty two allowed for Hungarian and 
German departments to be set up within the law and humanities faculties of the 
Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca University of the Sciences (subject to demand).1044 
The Nationalities Ministry would take the necessary steps together with the Ministry 
of Justice to deal with the backlog of applications for Romanian citizenship and fix a 
new deadline for further requests.1045
In Northern Transylvania the Executive Committee of the National Democratic Front 
charged its legal section with drafting a decree on language usage, which it 
subsequently recommended to all public authorities. In Kolozs/Cluj County, it 
officially entered into force on 10 February 1945. The most striking passages 
included the following: that Romanian and Hungarian were both the official 
languages of the county (paragraph three); that if at least 90 per cent of the population 
of areas under the jurisdiction of the authority, office or public institution concerned 
spoke the same language then that language would be used for internal administrative 
purposes; if at least ten per cent of the population belonged to another ethnic group 
the minutes of the meetings would be recorded in both languages; internally every 
civil servant enjoyed the right to use freely whichever of the two languages he saw fit; 
all internal and external signs, official signs pertaining to transport and street names 
had to be in both Romanian and Hungarian; the postal, railway and other transport 
services were under a legal obligation to deliver letters, parcels and so on addressed in 
Hungarian; no authority, office or public institution was empowered to prohibit 
Romanian or Hungarian private individuals from procuring cultural products such as 
books or films, indeed it was their duty to facilitate access to such materials provided 
they did not subvert morals, or offend against the reconciliation between peoples or 
legal equality; civil servants could not be dismissed for not being familiar with both 
languages; in recruiting new officials, knowledge of both languages was not necessary 
for a successful application; knowledge of both languages could only be required if 
this was essential to the performance of duties; those civil servants who did not meet
1044 As above.
1045 Op. cit., pl29, paragraph 26. The Statute was flanked by law 630 of 6th August 1945, the full text 
of which may be found in Medvetdnc, ppl30-132, and by-laws 11 and 12 of 26th September 1946. Op. 
cit, p74.
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this condition were expected to enrol on a free language course and furnish proof
within two years of sufficient proficiency; recruitment procedures would take account
of the relative proportions of Romanians and Hungarians in the population at large
and reflect this in their staffing and this principle would also function as a guideline in
the award of industry permits and public works contracts.1046
Once Northern Transylvania was united with Romania, these provisions ceased to be
valid.1047
Although ultimately the Statute remained a dead letter,1048 constantly cited as 
evidence of the liberal approach post-liberation Romania evinced towards its 
minorities (thereby effectively depriving them of a genuine forum before which to air 
their complaints as well as insinuating that possible criticisms were inspired more by 
churlishness and impatience rather than real problems), the mere fact of its drafting 
demonstrated that laying the legal foundations for a more conciliatory application of 
the principle of classification, which would allow for the Hungarians to be accepted 
as Romanian citizens, was a matter of political will. Jcinos Demeter described its 
significance as follows: "it was the first attempt at placing the entire area of 
nationality relations on new legal foundations having repealed the expressly 
discriminatory provisions".1049
The contradictory nature of policy towards the minority during the transition to one- 
party rule is revealed by the implementation of numerous provisions with a directly 
discriminatory effect on the Hungarians, the most blatant of which was the law 
concerning the expropriation of goods and property belonging to foreign nationals 
published in the Monitorul Oficial on 10th February 1945 setting up the CASBI 
(Casa pentru Administrarera §i Supravegherea Bunurilor Inamice).1050 The text of 
the law cited Article Eight of the armistice, which obliged the government to 
appropriate all goods belonging to subjects of the countries with which hostilities had
1046 Rudolf Jo6, op. cit., pp39-40 and ppl99-124 for the full text of the Kolozs/Cluj ordinance.
1047 Op. cit., p41.
1048 The Hungarian Autonomous Province voided it of any meaning.
1049 Rudolf Jo6, op. cit., p36. Demeter was an expert on human and minority rights, was Deputy Mayor 
of Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca at the end of 1944 and one of the leading personalities in the Hungarian 
Popular Alliance.
1050 For a detailed account of CASBI and its activities, see G&bor Vincze, Magyar vagyon romdn 
kizen, Pro-Print Kdnyvkiadd, Csfkszereda, 2000.
page 307
not ended, namely Germany and Hungary. Since the Hungarian government had 
signed a ceasefire agreement on 20th January in Moscow, Hungary no longer fell 
under this category. In spite of this, the CASBI confiscated the moveable and 
immovables in Southern Transylvania and the Regat that were owned by Hungarians 
who on 12th September 1944 resided in Hungary (including Northern Transylvania) 
as well as those in Northern Transylvania whose owners had been outside the 
frontiers on 30th August 1940 or who had fled from the front on the previous date. 
Even individuals who had in the meantime returned to their domiciles were classed as 
"presumed enemies" and the total number of those Hungarians who subsequently had 
their assets seized was 30,000.1051
In the midst of the turmoil, on 16th October 1944, the Hungarians mustered the 
> strength to form the Hungarian Popular Alliance, hereinafter MNSZ {Magyar Nepi
Szovetseg) from the ashes of the National Alliance of Hungarian Workers {Magyar 
Dolgozdk Orszdgos Szovetsege) with Gy&rf&s Kurk6,1052 N£ndor Czik6, Ldszl6 
B&nyai, Bdla Cs£k£ny and Sdndor Ddvid as its leading figures. A 27-strong Executive 
Committee was entrusted with general organisation, drawing up its articles and 
preparing for its first national congress. The MNSZ aligned itself with the National 
Democratic Front's governmental programme and declared its support of the 
Romanian Communist Party. The policy crystallised further at the congress held 
between 6 and 13 May in Kolozsvar/Cluj-Napoca at which Kurk<5 was elected 
president and Csdklny secretary-general. On its final day, Petru Groza, Vasile 
(Ldszlo) Luka and others attended the assembly in the sports hall in Kolozsvdr/Cluj- 
Napoca.1053
1051 See Vincze I, pp23-24; Hetven iv, pp62-63 and Siile, op. cit., p206.
1052 Kurkd (1909-1983) was a founding member of the Magyar Dolgozdk Szovetsige (Hungarian 
Workers’ Alliance) in 1934. After the Second Vienna Award he was deported from Hungary and 
imprisoned for refusing to carry out military service. Once he had outlived his political usefulness in 
paving the way for the Communist takeover, he was arrested and jailed. Released in 1964, he lived as a 
virtual recluse.
1053 See Ddikd Lipcsey: A Romdniai Magyar N ipi Szovetsige 1944-1948 in T&rtinelmi Szemle, 1985,
1, pp96-98. On 9th March, Stalin had telegrammed to Groza following the latter's appointment as 
Prime Minister on the 6th that: "Considering that the new government, which has now taken over the 
task of ruling the country, is assuming responsibility for proper order and calm in Transylvania and 
guarantees the rights of the nationalities [...] the Soviet government has decided to fulfil the Romanian 
government's request and in accordance with the armistice signed on 12th September 1944 gives its
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The MNSZ championed the interests of the Hungarians and, although it declined to 
form part of the government, was able to bring its influence to bear on a number of 
pressing issues. In August of 1945, for example, a delegation of 30 travelled to 
Bucharest to present various proposals on culture, most of which the government 
agreed to. The denominational and state schools in which Hungarian was the 
language of teaching were recognised as being entitled to issue certificates, deserters 
who had fled northwards from Southern Transylvania between 30th August 1940 and 
23rd August 1944 were pardoned and promises were secured including exempting 
from the CASBI inventoiy persons who had been carried off by the detachments, been 
drafted for labour service or conscripted.1054
The MNSZ functioned autonomously with a mass base of support totalling 387,753 
members when its first congress was held.1055 Its leaders were sincere in their 
convictions and dedication to their cause and the eventual demise of their organisation 
had more to do with its having oudived its usefulness in the eyes of the Romanian 
Workers Party (as it became) than with its having become defunct in terms of the 
need for its agitation on behalf of the minority. Throughout its brief lifespan the 
MNSZ was anxious to give the impression that it spoke on behalf of all Hungarians 
and to smooth over dissent in order to present a harmonious united front, which 
would enhance the likelihood of its demands being met.
This approach suffused the public statements of its president and the official 
representations of Hungarian minority identity. When chaos reigned in the early 
months, Kurkd was keen to stress the blamelessness of the Hungarians and their calm 
perseverance in the face of adversity:
"We democratic Hungarians living in Romania, have never for a single moment 
shirked in our responsibilities towards the Romanian state. We have accepted all the 
difficulties of minority fate. Our people has suffered and continues to suffer.
consent to the introduction of the Romanian government's administration in Transylvania". Although 
in theory this was not the same as placing Transylvania under Romanian sovereignty, it foreshadowed 
the final verdict at Pans. Between the handover and the signing of the treaty on 10th February 1947, 
Romania had to tread carefully to avoid stacking the odds against restitutio in integrum. Sule, op. cit., 
p208. See also Hetven 6v, p65.
1054 Vincze /, p34.
1055 Vincze /, p29. By the time of the second congress in June 1946, the ranks of the MNSZ had 
swollen to 449,000. Vincze I, p47.
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Whereas only our chauvinist masters are the criminals. We, the democratic 
Hungarians, never drew anti-Romanian, racist conclusions from the torturing, 
persecutions and imprisonments we suffered at the hands of the fascist Romanian 
authorities. We hope that everyone is fully aware of how Hitler's regime of terror 
murdered Romanian and Hungarian democrats alike.
Today, however, we raise our voices in protest against the Hungarian democratic 
masses being lumped together with the Hitlerist Arrow Cross traitors with whom 
Hungarian democracy has begun to settle its score”.1056
The MNSZ had never stooped to the level of its opponents, but had remained true to 
the enlightened principles of democracy and to their identity:
"Racial hatred, the tried and tested weapon of antidemocratic politicians of any era, 
was raging full tilt when we had to nail our political colours to the mast in front of the 
broad masses of our people. This was not a matter of coincidence. Instead it was a 
cleverly calculated chess move on their part, which they did not succeed in pulling 
off. We immediately recognised and used the antidote to it.
[...] In the wake of 23rd August the Hungarians once again seemed to be a suitable 
scapegoat...1057
The country's workers were demanding higher wages, their peasant associates 
demanding land and in order to thwart them in their just battle the bogus democrats 
shouted "batter the Hungarians". They wanted to kill two birds with one stone: 
leaving the people's democracy fighting for bread and land unanswered and using 
their repressive efforts as a means of winning Romanian votes one after the other.
The intellectual writers, following Hitler's recipe, launched an onslaught. There can 
be no doubts as to the result. Romanians who a couple of days previously had been 
perfectly peaceful began carrying out attacks on their Hungarian fellow citizens with 
sticks, weapons and grenades in their hands. Armed youths, seething with racial 
hatred, executed innocent Sz6kely fathers and women in the most pitiless manner.
1056 From Gy&rfds Kurk6: Nipi Egysig, 25 October 1944. In: Kurkd Gydrf&s emlek4re. Szemilvenyek 
beszddeibol, cikkeibol 4s rdla szdld (rdsokbdL Compiled by Ildikd Lipcsey, Kossuth Kdnyvkiadd, 
Budapest, 1987, p25. The Arrow Cross Party succeeded the National Will Party (Nemzeti Akarat 
Pdrtja) founded in 1935 by Ferenc Szdlasi (Romsics 2000, p226).
1057 On 24th August the first government headed by General Constantin S&n&tescu was formed. From 
the same day onwards several hundred leading Hungarian figures in Southern Transylvania were 
rounded up and interred in various camps. See Vincze I, p i3.
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The terror-stricken Szekely smallholders opened their gates and drove their livestock 
out into the streets in the hope that their families would be left alive.
Soon the "rescuers" appeared in the midst of the terrified population and promised 
that if they were to convert to Christianity, to change religion, they would come to no 
harm. Joining one or other "historical party" could also be advantageous.
It was in these circumstances that we strengthened and broadened our coalition with 
Romanian democracy.
The "Ploughman's Front” supporters1058 did not ask us to renounce our religion. Quite 
the opposite: they are aware that whoever renounces his religion or his nationality is 
not a good Hungarian and can never become a good Romanian either.
The Romanian workers did not ask us to join their parties one by one. On the 
contrary: they were delighted to take note of the Hungarians of Bucharest organising 
within the framework of the Hungarian Popular Alliance. They approve of our 
founding both popular democratic organisations in villages with a mixed population 
and proclaiming the necessity of reconciliation in this way. Our Romanian allies are 
as aware as we are ourselves that a good friendship is not made by changing religion 
and nationality, but by showing mutual respect for each other's national and 
denominational character".1059
In his speech at the Brass6/Bra$ov assembly on 10th December 1944, Kurkd was 
careful to stress that the Hungarians were not angling for special treatment, which 
could all too easily be misconstrued:
"We are not fighting for seats in the Parliament. We only wish to give a voice to the 
beating of our people's heart From here we wish to proclaim that in democratic 
Romania even today children are thrashed for speaking their native tongue at school. 
From here we proclaim and may these words reach the ears of the county leaders that 
there are still gendarmes who beat our brothers if they have the gall to organise. 
Discrimination based on nationality still occurs.
We do not want exemptions and privileges, but we will not permit anyone to look 
upon us as second-class citizens. We want equality, free use of [our] language. The 
reopening of closed down schools, Hungarian sections in the state schools funded by
1058 Petru Groza's party rejoiced in the name of Ploughman's Front
1059 Op. cit., pp27-28. The article dates from 19th November 1944.
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the state. For our priests to hold sermons in Hungarian in the churches and for 
Romanian democracy to guarantee this for us...".1060
Kurk6 fully backed Groza's initial measures at the first congress, welcoming the 
change in the terminology describing the Hungarians. As was also the case later this 
went far beyond mere semantics and betokened a shift in status:
"Our domestic policy consists of complete reconciliation and coalition with the 
Romanian people and the peoples living here. With all our strength as one man we 
fall in behind Petra Groza and his government because [...] with it a government has 
been placed at the head of Romania, which as one of its first deeds erased the term 
'minorities' from the political dictionary.1061 La Romania there are nationalities living 
peacefully. The democratic government with Prime Minister Petra Groza at its apex 
guarantees equal rights for all the citizens of Romania irrespective of their nationality. 
[...]
Romanian-Hungarian friendship will be the pledge ensuring that in the Danube Basin 
the peoples will rind the road to safeguarding peace and shall never again be the 
instruments of any imperialism in subjugating other peoples. Romanian-Hungarian 
friendship will facilitate the fraternal joining of forces between all the peoples in our 
vicinity and their entry into the family of the peace-loving peoples of the world".1062 
Between 15th and 18th November 1945 the "100" Executive Committee (elected once 
a year and so-called because of the number of its members) convened in 
Marosvasdrhely/Tirgu Mure§. Vasile (Ldszlo) Luka made use of the opportunity to 
persuade the Hungarians that a root and branch change had taken place in Romania's 
policy towards its minorities, highlighting positive developments, such as the 
emergency funding package for the Universities in Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca and 
Marosvdsdrhely/Tirgu Mure§, the opening of the theatre in the latter, the payment of 
Hungarian teachers' salaries as of the first of the month, the amendment to the CASBI 
decision so that only those returnees who had been guilty of proven fascist activities 
would not have their property released to them and that the military authorities had 
been issued strict instructions in conjunction with the amnesty. Luca expressed his
1060 Op. cit., pp50-51.
1061 As prescribed in law 629 of 6th August 1945. See Rudolf Jo6, op. cit., p44 and for the full text of 
the legislation, pp126-129. Demeter correctly indicates that the term "minority" presupposes a ruling 
majority and suggests that not every citizen has an equal stake in political power. Op. cit., p44.
1062 Op. cit., pp53-54.
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opinion to the effect that equality for the Hungarians would continue to grow in direct 
proportion with the level of support they were willing to give to Romanian democracy 
in the course of rebuilding the country. Groza seconded this, though he did not 
attempt to sweep the problems under the carpet, reassuring the participants that his 
government would always take a stand against those who maintained that the policy 
towards the nationalities endangered the Romanians. By way of response the 
speakers from the MNSZ took stock of the difficulties. Edg&r Balogh, head of the 
culture section, gave a 25-point summary of the most important issues relating to 
education. In determining the MNSZ's stance on the vital question of the run-up to 
the peace treaty, Kurkd's view carried the day. He renounced Transylvanian 
autonomy and territorial revision, which severely dented the organisation's popularity. 
In its communication, the committee called for relations with Hungary to be put on so 
close a footing that no passports would be required to travel between the two 
countries, repudiating the idea of a population exchange and declaring that the 
solution to the nationality issue lay in consolidating democracy rather than redrawing 
frontiers.1063
The text unleashed protests from the Hungarian Committee of the Social Democratic 
Party, which deplored the steamrollering of any rival view: "A stop must be put to 
that one-sided Romanian policy, which goes far beyond the moderation demanded by 
the historical situation and attempts by means of compromises and obscuring reality 
to represent and lead a democratic multitude of almost two million from the 
nationality".1064
Kurk6 hit back by arguing that Transylvania had always belonged to the 
Transylvanians themselves and hence the accusations levelled against the MNSZ 
concerning how it had sold Transylvania down the river shot wide of the mark:
"We are aware that the Transylvanian nationality question is not a question of 
frontiers, but of the bolstering of democracy, of the genuine attainment of national 
equality, the question of the dissolving of frontiers. We do not approve of any 
ambition be it Hungarian or Romanian in origin, which would once again make
1063 Lipcsey on the MNSZ, ppl05-106 and Vincze /, p37.
1064 From 25th December 1945, quoted in Lipcsey on the MNSZ, p i06. Bishop Aron M&rton sent a 
letter to Groza objecting to the assessment on behalf of over a million Roman Catholics in January 
1946. Op. cit., pl06.
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Transylvania a hotbed of belligerent conflict using methods similar to the Vienna 
Award.
As sincerely as we acknowledge the need to cooperate with progressive Romanian 
democracy we equally openly and sincerely wish for close economic, cultural and 
political cooperation with Hungary, the abolition of the obligation to use passports 
and the dissolution of the customs frontiers. This cooperation will create the 
preconditions for the two peoples of Transylvania to be forged together in 
indissoluble unity by making centuries of animosity disappear".1065 
In an article in Vilagossdg, one of the MNSZ's dailies,1066 Edg&r Balogh roundly 
condemned the detractors of the MNSZ:
"Given that there are malicious individuals who, capitalising on the dissatisfaction, 
keep on seriously condemning the Hungarian Popular Alliance and call into question 
its raison d' etre it would be good [...] for us to cast our minds back to the significance 
of the battle and the espousal by the pioneers of this organisation of the cause through 
which they were able to guarantee survival, the mere existence of the Hungarians of 
Romania and the preservation of the population on the side of Romanian democracy 
in the face of the clamour for murder, plunder and expatriation.
In the wake of the democratic Groza government's assumption of power and the 
inclusion of Northern Transylvania under Romanian public administration the 
Hungarian Popular Alliance cannot have a different aim to the one it had at the 
beginning: it must ensure that the segment of our population that has been placed 
under Romanian administration comes to no harm, that public order returns and that 
the rights of the Hungarians to their property and work are not curtailed either 
illegally or legally".1067
Kurk6 was adamant about there being little alternative to the present course:
"...either [we go] back to the past, back to the Calvary the people of Transylvania 
lived through during the 22 years and then the four [...].
All the errors of the past must be set to rights and that includes all those mistakes 
made by Romanians and Hungarians alike, which the Count Bethlens and Manius of
i°65 T’jjggg ideas were clearly influenced by Groza's "etherialisation" of the borders between the two 
countries. Op. cit., p70 and quotation p75.
1066 The others being Nipi Egysig, Szabad Sz6, Falvak Nipe, Jovo and Utunk. See Lipcsey: A 
Rom&niai Magyar N ipi Szovetsig, p i09.
1067 Edg&r Balogh: HidverSk Erdilyben 1944-46, Kossuth Kdnyvkiadd, Budapest, 1985, p93.
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this world do not want remedied. Because if it were up to Maniu the Hungarians 
could pick up their beggar's pouches and their 40 kilo packages and walk!1068 This is 
the truth! This is the point that Maniu wants and which the Hungarian landowning 
reactionaries want to serve up to win back their old position. The democratic 
government, our government, the people's government wants something different to 
them! Our government wants it to be impossible to drive out either the Romanians or 
the Hungarians. Just as you cannot take the Transylvanian Romanian from the hills 
and settle him in Oltenia you cannot take the Transylvanian Szdkely and take him to 
the Great [Hungarian] Plain".1069
Kurkd was uncompromising in his message that the Hungarians were at home in 
Transylvania and not there on sufferance:
"It is not possible to divide Transylvania either from an ethnographic or an economic 
point of view without this damaging its peoples. We are not guests in Transylvania. 
We want to go on living here in the future and know that Transylvania will only fulfil 
its historical vocation if it once again assumes the role it played over centuries and 
becomes a warrior of that spirit in the fight for liberty, which it championed on so 
many occasions in the course of its past".1070
That the MNSZ had its finger on the pulse of the Hungarians it represented and 
sought to remedy the most glaring injustices in good faith can be illustrated by its 
ceaseless campaigning and its own proposal for regulating the rights of nationalities 
approved by the congress at Szikelyudvarhely/Odorheiu Secuiesc, which Kurk6 
presented to the Parliament on 7 December 1946.1071 Many of its provisions focused 
on equal representation of Hungarians in keeping with their relative numerical 
strength throughout all echelons of local and central government and on fair 
allocation of budgetary resources to Hungarian churches. As far as language use was 
concerned, in counties, districts and communities where at least 15 per cent of the 
local population was Hungarian, Hungarian-speakers would have the choice to 
conduct their business with the authorities in their mother tongue and where the
1068 The reference is to the baggage limit imposed on Hungarians resettled under the population 
exchange. They were forced to leave everything else behind.
1069 Op. cit., p79.
1070 Op. cit., p83.
1071 He repeated his request that it be given legal status on 12th, but to no avail. Vincze I, p51 and 
Lipcsey on the MNSZ, pi 11.
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Hungarians made up at least 65 per cent administrative transactions would 
automatically take place in Hungarian. A Hungarian Cultural Council would operate 
within the MNSZ and the specialist Ministries would be required to consult it for an 
opinion prior to the issuing of any decree or other measure related to the Hungarians. 
Similarly a National Council for the Nationalities should be set up within the 
Nationalities Ministry, half of whose members ought to be Hungarian alongside a 
network of County Nationalities Commissions once again with as many Hungarian 
members as the local population justified. These new bodies would be responsible 
for investigating and redressing grievances brought before them by the nationalities 
and would be officially recognised as the competent forum for so doing.1072 
The tide turned against the MNSZ with the publication of Vasile (Ldszlo) Luka's 
article The Path of the Hungarians of Romania in Igazsdg, the Romanian Communist 
Party's Hungarian-language daily on 22 May 1947, which decried the MNSZ and 
Hungarian aspirations to independence as isolationism from the other nations within 
Romania and wrote off the concept of popular unity from below as a delusion, indeed 
as an indication of association with Hungarian reactionaries.1073 Collective rights 
were superfluous and the various institutions aimed at defending them were 
redundant Hence the merger of the two central organisations representing 1200 
agricultural cooperatives, Szovetseg in Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca and Kaldka in 
Marosvdsdrhely/Tirgu Mure§ with INCOOP, the Romanian National Cooperative 
Institute on 24 June 1947.1074 Events in Hungary1075 exacerbated the situation, 
triggering attacks on intellectuals in the Hungarian organisations. In order to salvage 
what it could, the Executive Committee met in Bucharest where it established a
1072 Rudolf Jo6, op. cit., ppl41-143. For the full text of the draft see op. cit., ppl30-140 and Lipcsey 
on the MNSZ, pp 106-117.
1073 See Lipcsey on the MNSZ, pi 13.
1074 See Siile, op. cit., p217. In spite of a unanimous vote against such a move at the Hungarian 
Cooperatives congress in April of the previous year.
1073 The arrest of B61a Kovdcs (Secretary General of the Smallholders Party), the accusations against 
members of the Magyar Kozossdg and the Smallholders. See Lipcsey on the MNSZ, ppl 13-114 and A 
fordulat ivei. Politika, kipzomuviszet, 4pti£szet, 1947-1949, edited by fiva Standeisky, Gyula Kozdk, 
Gdbor Pataki and Jdnos M. Rainer. 1956-os Intdzet, Budapest, 1998, ppl22-128. The Magyar 
Kozossdg was the collective name given to the purported members of a plot against the republic, 
fabricated as a means of breaking up the Smallholders Party and thereby clearing the way for the 
establishment of a one-party state. It was rumoured that the conspirators had links with Transylvania.
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Political Secretariat comprising seven members. Under the new motto of "popular 
regeneration" it issued a statement declaring that "any political, cultural or economic 
isolation from the ambitions of Romanian progressive democracy can only lead to the 
atrophying of our popular strength from within, the weakening of our fighting resolve 
and the hindrance of democratic centralisation". Increased vigilance and a purging of 
the ranks was therefore on the agenda. The resolution also protested strongly against 
the Danube block policy pursued in the interests of Imperialism and directed against 
the Soviet Union1076.
Whilst the outlook for the Hungarians deteriorated the pattern, which was to become 
so typical of the decades ahead, whereby small concessions were made to sweeten the 
pill of the substantial underlying turn for the worse emerged1077.
By the time that the MNSZ moved to Bucharest on 1st January 1948, it had begun to 
lose touch with the Hungarians1078. The peace treaty had been a success for Romania 
and a mutual friendship treaty with Hungary was ratified by the Parliament on 17 
February. On the 27th, the MNSZ joined the Romanian Workers Party, the 
Ploughman's Front and the National People's Party in the National Democratic Front, 
which won 93.2 per cent of the votes at the elections on 28th March effectively 
marking the onset of one party rule along Stalinist lines1079.
The new constitution contained four passages directly relating to the nationalities: 
article 16, which stated that all Romanian citizens irrespective of sex, nationality, 
race, religion or degree of culture were equal before the law; article 17 prohibiting any 
form of racial or anti-nationality hatred; article 18 granting full rights to vote and be 
elected and article 24, which guaranteed the right of the nationalities to use their 
mother tongue and organise teaching in that language at all levels of education, 
stipulated that in districts where nationalities lived alongside Romanians the language 
of the former could also be used orally and in writing for administrative and judicial
1076 Lipcsey on the MNSZ, pi 14 and Vincze /, p56.
1077 Cf. Medvetdnc, p78.
1078 Although it was not officially dissolved until the spring of 1953, its role was reduced to rubber- 
stamping decisions taken from on high. Vincze /, p89.
1079 Ldszld Balogh, Romdnia tortinete, Aula Kiadd, Budapest, 2001, pp l20 ,141 and 148-9. The 
Ploughman's Front was never given the assistance in reorganising it had been promised by the 
Romanian Workers' Party after it dutifully cleansed itself of kulaks in 1949. The King had already 
abdicated on 30 December 1947.
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purposes and that civil servants were to be recruited from the relevant nationality or 
any other as long as they were familiar with the language spoken by the local 
population. Romanian language and literature were compulsory subjects in all 
schools.1080 According to Jdnos Demeter the socialist nature of the constitution itself 
meant that rights and duties do not accrue from national, religious or class status, but 
from the socially valued work performed.1081 The seal of approval it was given by the 
Hungarians was construed as a vindication of the Romanian Workers Party’s 
nationalities policy.1082
When Kurkd, Jdnos Demeter, Edgdr Balogh and others were arrested on trumped-up 
charges of nationalism, conspiracy, links with Ldszld Rajk and influencing the peace 
negotiations on 3rd November 1949, the new Communist principle of classification 
was being rigorously applied. With Kurkd's fall from grace, the confident, indeed 
militant tone of appeals for equality and full respect of rights abated. Whereas Kurkd 
had the opportunity to blame fascist wolves in democratic clothing for the problems 
his fellow Hungarians had to cope with, the advent of a regime, which claimed to 
embody the epitome of benign rationalism and justice, stifled open debate on 
problems. Henceforward the candour that had been Kurkd's trademark was frowned 
upon: defending rights aroused suspicions of isolationism at best and revisionist 
propaganda at worst.
3.2 Erosion by Stealth: The Hungarian Autonomous Province
"In the long decades of exploitation and national oppression the hundreds of 
thousands of workers who were condemned to political, economic and cultural 
backwardness now have ample opportunity to enjoy the protective warmth and love of 
the homeland, the enormous assistance of our Party".1084
1080 Rudolf Jod, op. cit., ppl08-109.
1081 Op. cit., pp86-87.
1082 Ldszld Balogh, op. cit., pl49.
1083 Lipcsey on the MNSZ, pi 17.
1084 Miklds Dlnos: Marossz&kx Krdnika. Riportok a Magyar Autondm Tartomdnybdl. Allami Irodalmi 
6s Muv6szeti Kiadd, Bukarest, 1953, p4. On the HAP, see also Kolar, pp268-272.
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The new Constitution adopted by the Grand National Assembly on 24th September 
1952 contained one significant innovation in its Article 19: "The Hungarian 
Autonomous Province of the People's Republic of Romania is formed from the 
territory inhabited by the compact Sz€kely Hungarian population; the Hungarian 
Autonomous Province possesses an autonomous public administration, which is 
elected by the inhabitants of the Autonomous Province. The HAP comprises the 
following rajons: Csik/Ciuc, Erdoszentgydrgy/Singeorgiu de Padure, 
GyergydszentmiJdos/Gheorgheni, Kezdivdsarhely/Tirgu Secuiesc,
Marosheviz/Toplifa, Marosvdsdrhely/Tirgu Mure§, Regen/Reghin,
Sepsiszentgydrgy/Sfintu Gheorghe, Szekelyudvarhely/Odorheiu Secuiesc. The HAP's
administrative centre shall be Marosvdsdrhely/Tirgu Mure§”.1085
That the autonomy was more by name than nature was revealed by the following
Article:
"The laws of the People's Republic of Romania and the decisions and decrees of the 
central bodies of state are mandatory in the territory of the HAP”.1086 
Finally, according to Article21: "The Statute of the HAP shall be drawn up by the 
People's Council of the Autonomous Province and submitted to the Grand National 
Assembly of the People's Republic of Romania for approval".1087 
This never happened.
Only 35 per cent of the total Hungarian population in Romania lived in the 
Autonomous Province with the remaining Szdkely regions transferred to provinces 
where Romanians were in the majority.1088 The HAP's documents and enactments 
appeared in Hungarian and Romanian language versions as might be expected, but it
1085 A Romdn Ndpkoztdrsasdg Alkotmdnya. A Romdn Munkdspdrt kiadvdnya, Bukarest, 1952, ppl6- 
17. Quoted in Ildikd Lipcsey: 35 eve alakult az erdilyi Magyar Autondm Tartomdny (1952-1968). In: 
Kritika, 1987, September edition, pp6-9, p7. Henceforth Lipcsey on the MAT. The establishment of 
the HAP had been preceded by the administrative reform of September 1950, which had reproduced 
the Soviet model of provinces and rajons, setting up 11 provinces in Transylvania in place of the 22 
counties. See Gdbor Vincze: A nemzeti kisebbsigtol a "magyar nemzetisdgu romdnok”-ig. Negyvendt 
iv  Romdniai magyarsdgpolitikdjdnak vdzlata. Limes, Tatabdnya, 1998, issue 4. The pagination cited 
throughout pertains to a manuscript copy of this article in my possession presented to me by the author: 
p ll .  Henceforward, Vincze II.
1086 Op. cit., p7.
1087 Op. cit., p7.
1088 Hetven £v, p66 and VinczeII, p ll.
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gradually became obvious that the rights enshrined in the Nationalities Statute only 
held sway within the new province, as bilingual signs disappeared and the use of 
Hungarian in dealings with the local authorities became increasingly problematic 
outside its frontiers.1089 On the cultural front, the Hungarian section of the 
Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca Institute of the Dramatic Arts was moved to 
Marosvdsdrhely/Tirgu Mure§ in the summer of 1954 and the Literary Almanack 
(Irodalmi Almanack), which had been published in Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca was 
discontinued in February 1953 only to reappear a year later in Marosvdsdrhely/Tirgu 
Mure§ under the title of Word of Truth (Igaz Szd).1090 The HAP was therefore an 
exercise in dissimulation, a Trojan horse wheeled into the midst of the Hungarians to 
convince them that they indeed had a rightful place and that they were not expected to 
surrender their identity and melt anonymously into the greater entity of the Romanian 
nation.
On 29th January 1953 in Truth (Igazsdg), the Communist Party daily printed in 
Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca, Gheorghiu-Dej summarily announced that the nationalities 
issue in Romania had been solved, a tactical masterstroke obviating the need for 
independent political representation of the Hungarians. The leaders of the MNSZ 
drew the relevant conclusion and dissolved the organisation in March of 1953.1091 
The HAP was a goldmine in terms of propaganda opportunities, affording the Party 
the perfect opportunity to blow its own trumpet and this was milked for all it was 
worth. The representations of its Hungarian minority, intended for consumption by 
the Hungarian audience in the run-up to the elections of 30th November 1952, are 
steeped in the “pure” Communist principle of classification (as opposed to its later 
nationalistically-coloured manifestation). Hence the contrast between the capitalist 
past and Communist present is expressed in conventionalised antithetical pairs such 
as backwardness/progress; ignorance/enlightenment; culture reserved for the 
elite/culture accessible to the masses; poverty/prosperity and inhumanity/paternalistic 
nurturing. Each actor in the drama is named individually to lend authenticity and 
local colour to the text, yet features only by virtue of his function, the defining 
moment of his social interaction with others, which slots neatly into the approved
1089 See Hetven 6v, p68 and Vincze //, p i 1.
1090 See Vincze II, p i2.
1091 See Vincze //, pl2.
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categories (such as outstanding worker or peasant on a cooperative). Thus in spite of 
the ostensibly Transylvanian setting the reader is presented with stereotypes. What 
matters is not nationality, but harmonious cooperation between industrial and 
agricultural workers, reaffirming the Party's monopoly on definitions. The Sz6kelys 
of the HAP are uniformly depicted as loyal Communists fully embracing the ideals of 
the Party and embodying the virtues of self-sacrifice and total dedication to the cause 
in some of the few resoundingly positive portrayals of the Hungarian minority where 
difference is not conceptualised as problematic.
The HAP represented a triumph of rationalism over antiquated bourgeois nationalism, 
which had been nothing more than grist to the mill of unscrupulous exploiters:
"The creation of the Hungarian Autonomous Province is a major success of the 
people's democracy, which consummates the legal equality of national minorities.
'A highly significant achievement of our popular democratic system - the Manifesto of 
the Central Council of the Popular Democratic Front tells us - as set out in the new 
Constitution is the guarantee of complete equality before the law of all workers, 
irrespective of race and nationality. We swept away the system of the ruthless 
oppression of national minorities. As a result of the Leninist-Stalinist policy of our 
people's democracy the national minorities, once oppressed, kept in a state of terror 
and derided now enjoy equal rights with the Romanian people with their own schools 
where teaching is provided in their mother tongue, books, newspapers and theatres, 
they use their own languages in local government and in courts. The establishment of 
the Hungarian Autonomous Province has even more firmly cemented the unity of the 
workers in our homeland, regardless of their nationality. The Romanian people is 
building Socialism in fraternal cooperation with the national minorities'. (...)
The road along which the national minorities of our country proceeded this far was, 
however, a long and arduous one. Ending the system of merciless oppression of 
national minorities is the fruit of our Party's unremitting struggle. In the era of 
bourgeois-landowner dominated Romania the Communist Party of Romania stood 
alone in fighting for the complete legal equality of the national minorities and this 
was true from the moment of its foundation. In 1933, on the occasion of the notorious
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Craiova1092 trial Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej gave the following response to the attempts 
at chauvinist agitation on the part of the stagers of the court martial:
The conscious working class does not draw any distinctions on the basis of race or 
nationality. In the workshops the Romanian worker suffers in exactly the same way 
as the Jewish or Hungarian worker whilst the factory owners do not take into account 
of whether the workers are Romanian or not when making redundancies and slashing
1093wages .
In spite of this protestation that the Hungarian, Jewish and Romanian workers were 
all united in victimhood, the ethnic designations used to describe them still point to 
the persistence of a sense of difference between them.
The earthly paradise of the HAP was the culmination of years of costly struggle by the 
Party. The emphasis on better facilities as an index of progress is typical of the 
Communist principle of classification:
"Today, when we behold the schools, children's homes, community centres, the well- 
equipped forest huts, the centres providing first aid, the canteens and libraries in the 
towns, villages and timber-producing areas of this province, we cannot help but be 
reminded of the battles fought in the Gyergyd/Depresiunea Giurgeului basin and the 
entire Maros/Mure§ valley: the strikes and agitation for higher wages at the head of 
which stood the Communists".1094
Industrialisation was the key to progress and the Party had consistently taken pains to 
spread its material benefits to the Szdkelys. For example: “One of South-East 
Europe's largest and most modem furniture factories, Giza Simo1095 has been 
completed.
14 large undertakings comprising 256 production units have been set up in the 
province. These include 40 agricultural machinery leasing parks, several fruit and 
meat processing plants, quarries, lime-kilns, brick factories, asbestos manufactuaries,
1092 In 1933, Gheorghiu-Dej and companions organized a strike amongst railway workers in Grivifa. 
They were prosecuted for this and Communist agitation. Gheorghiu-Dej was sentenced to twelve 
years* hard labour (Cf. Roper, op.cit., p5).
1093 Kdroly Balia: A Testvirisig Jegyiben. Riport a Magyar Autondm TartomdnybdL Allami Irodalmi 
6s Muv6szeti Kiadd. Bukarest, 1952, pp3-4.
1094 Op. cit., p6.
1095 Sim6 (1870-1946) was one of Transylvania’s most prominent theoretical and practical Marxists. In 
1921, he was a founding member of the Romanian Communist Party.
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wood and iron processing works of various sizes, textile and clothes mills, pig 
fattening farms and rearing facilities for poultry, rabbits and silver foxes. Throughout 
the province the sawmills have been rebuilt and considerably extended. Our national 
Five Year Plan laid the foundations of modem industry in the Szdkely lands as well, 
where previously there had scarcely been any other form of industrial production apart 
from the timber industry 1096
As if the grinding poverty and wretchedness of the dark days of tyranny were not 
enough, the poisonous tendrils of animosity between national groups spread rampant 
between the Romanians and Hungarians. This did not escape the keen attention of the 
Communists:
"On this issue, comrade Gheorgiu-Dej stated in his speech delivered in July of 1946: 
The Hungarian and Romanian forces of reaction, which had an equal interest in the 
bloody exploitation of Hungarian and Romanian workers and peasants, pursued a 
policy of chauvinism and stirring up hatred as a means of diverting the Transylvanian 
popular masses' attention from their economic, social and political demands'.
Life today, on the other hand, is ever more categorically being characterised by light 
and brightness. The electricity, which is now reaching the villages and which 
rapacious entrepreneurs are not making a fortune on, is radically altering the life of 
the villages. Ilyich's lamps are not only lighting the streets and houses, but are also 
driving away the darkness of the mind. Electrification in other words first and 
foremost paves the way for industrialisation, which in turn lends enormous impetus to 
cultural development".1097
In the eight years since the Communists had assumed power, 23 localities had been 
connected to the grid and more were due to be within the framework of the Five Year 
Plan. Between 1898 when electrification began and 1944, a period of 46 years a 
grand total of 45 local communities had benefited, a statistic clearly intended to 
illustrate that the Romanian Communist government's enlightened benevolence 
extended to the minority.1098 Undaunted by the worst excesses of the enemies of state 
and society, such as Vasile (Ldszlo) Luca, Gheorghiu-Dej's steady hand guides the
1095 Op. cit., pp7-8.
1097 Op. cit., pp9-10.
1098 Op. cit., plO.
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peasants and proletariat towards the pristine tomorrow the masses have dreamed of 
for centuries.1099
Advances had also been made in health care in the Hungarian Autonomous Province 
where the neglect and indifference of former times had been replaced with preventive 
programmes, vaccinations for children against TB and proper treatments. Whereas 
previously the number of clinics for mothers and children had been restricted to two 
(in Marosvdsdrhely/Tirgu Mure§ and Csikszereda/Miercurea-Ciuc respectively, 
although the latter had no doctor), the administrative seat of every rajon was equipped 
with a hospital and an appropriate number of beds and manned by obstetricians, 
gynaecologists and paediatricians. Infant mortality had dropped to half the 1937 level 
as a result. Typhoid, goitre and venereal diseases were being effectively combated, as 
was cancer. Many industrial plants had their own hospitals and there was even a 
mobile dental clinic with its own electric generator and on one trip alone dealt with 
800 patients.1100
As for culture, a delegation of British visitors had marvelled at Ir6n BaraMs, a 
polisher at the Giza Simd furniture factory for her erudition in the plays of 
Shakespeare. Had they stayed longer, they could have attended the performance of 
the in house philharmonic along with some 400 of the staff.1101 463 community 
cultural centres, 61 reading rooms, 297 village sport collectives and 97 Red 
Comers1102 offered study and recreational opportunities. In the third quarter of the 
year, 580,000 people had watched shows on Sundays and public holidays in the 
village cultural centres, over 90,000 had seen films in them and their books, along 
with those in the village libraries, were borrowed by over 35,000 regular readers. The 
total number of books available in the various libraries of the Province exceeded 
168,OOO”.1103
Of the 714 schools providing teaching over four and seven years, Hungarian-language 
tuition was laid on in 508. 158 of these had places for boarders. 71,055 children 
were receiving an education in Hungarian and the former premises of the military
1099 Op. cit., p ll.
1100 Op. cit., pp25-30.
1101 Op. cit., pp30-31.
1102 Within factories, cultural centres and so on, space was set aside for workers to read Communist 
magazines and journals and lectures on Communist themes were held there at regular intervals.
1103 Op. cit., p33.
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academy now housed the Marosvdsdrhely/Tirgu Mure§ Medical and Pharmaceutical 
Institute.1104 An 11-hectare park contained a paediatric and a nerve clinic and the 
one-time riding school had been converted into one of the country's most modem 
sports halls, whilst the remaining clinics were spread over different buildings. 
Between 1945 and 1951 the number of teaching departments tripled, clinics doubled 
and students rose from 632 to 909.1105 In 1950-51,530 received a state scholarship; 
in 1952-53 this increased to 670 whilst in 1953-54 736, or three quarters of all the 
students, were granted one.1106
A more theoretical approach firmly anchored the creation of the Hungarian 
Autonomous Province in the continuum of Marxist-Leninist teachings, reviling the 
insidiousness of nationalism, which had for so long been allowed to drive a wedge 
between the cohabiting peoples:
"Poll position amongst the many great achievements catalogued and sanctified in the 
Draft Constitution of our working people's PRR is occupied by the democratic 
solution to the national question on the basis of the complete legal equality of the 
national minorities with the Romanian people, a historical attainment of the people's 
democratic system.
The foundation of the Hungarian Autonomous Province of the PRR, stipulated by our 
Draft Constitution, is a further manifestation of how our Party consistently employs 
the Leninist-Stalinist national policy. It is a further measure aimed at drawing the 
bonds of friendship and fraternity between the Romanian working people and the 
Hungarian workers or those belonging to other nationalities even more closely 
together and thereby strengthening the People's Republic of Romania”.1107 
The evils of the nationalist principle of classification were plain for all to see:
1104 The statistics varied from source to source. For example, the Romanian Communist Party leaflet 
discussed below state that in the rajons of what was formerly known as Maros/Mure§ Province there 
were 318 primary schools, 14 secondary schools concentrating on technical subjects, five secondaries 
and six vocational schools. See A Magyar Autondm Tartomdny Mtrehozdsa. A Pdrt Lenini-SzJdlini 
Nemzeti Politikdjdnak Ujabb Sikere, Romdn Munkispdrt (authors unattributed), Bucharest, 1952, p23.
1,05 Romln Munkdspdrt, op. cit., pp35-36.
1106 Miklds Ddnos, Marossz&d Krdnika. Riportok a Magyar Autondm Tartomdnybdl, Allami Irodalmi 
6s Muv6szeti Kiad6, Bukarest, 1953, pl9.
1107 Romdn Munkdspdrt, op.cit., p5.
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“In the interests of executing its designs to maintain its class rule and subjugate 
peoples the bourgeoisie makes use of the policy of sowing the seeds of hatred 
between peoples and nations, that of nationalism [...]. Bourgeois nationalism is the 
principle weapon of the bourgeoisie, which it deploys in an attempt to put the workers 
of its own nation in tow to its policy, to distract the proletariat and all workers from 
the class struggle against exploitation on the pretext that everyone who belongs to the 
same nation, pillaged and pillaged alike, are "brothers" as it were. With the aid of 
nationalism the bourgeoisie at the same time strive to engender discord between 
workers of different nationalities, to pit them against each other so that they bicker 
amongst themselves and can all be kept in the chains of slavery the more easily”.1108 
The superiority of Communism resided not only in its liberation of oppressed 
workers, but in its more sympathetic insight into the problems faced by minorities: 
“The working class sets its splendid ideology of proletarian internationalism against 
the bourgeoisie's contemptible policy and ideology of nationalism in the battle fought 
to liberate all workers from the yoke of capitalism by showing international solidarity 
and brotherliness.
[...] National minorities had a dual yoke weighing on their shoulders: the yoke of 
capitalist-landowner exploitation and the yoke of national oppression.
The Romanian bourgeoisie fuelled and fomented chauvinism against the Hungarians, 
anti-Semitism and other forms of rousing national hatred and the Romanian 
bourgeois-landowner state adopted nationalism as its official policy. The objective of 
this policy was to conceal from the working people the true cause of its sufferings, to 
prevent the Romanian workers and the workers from the national minorities from 
uniting in the fight for bread, freedom and peace. Its purpose was to keep them apart 
and mercilessly oppress both of them.
The governments of the big factory owners, financiers and landowners issued over 
400 laws and decrees with which they placed the national minorities at a 
disadvantage, persecuted them and withdrew every right and freedom from them.
(...)
The bourgeois-landowner regime pursued a policy of denationalising the national 
minorities. They banned or reduced to the absolute minimum teaching in the mother 
tongue, restricted the numbers of minority students in schools and in particular higher
1108 Romdn Munk£sp£rt, op .c itp6.
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education and savagely persecuted progressive national art and literature produced by 
the minorities".1109
The Romanian Communist Party had stood alone in denouncing the divisive and 
deleterious nationalistic slogans. It understood that the way to full equality for the 
national minorities was to put the workers in charge.1110 Once in power, it had purged 
itself of imperialist agents and nationalist elements. The national minorities were 
represented in every important decision-making body, in the army, local government 
and the judiciary. Over 13,000 were members of the People's Councils and more than 
3500 primary and secondary schools were at their disposal for bringing up their 
children with instruction in the relevant native language. Not only did the new 
Constitution guarantee equal rights to work, rest, an income and fundamental political 
freedoms, but it also outlawed chauvinism, racial hatred and all varieties of nationalist 
propaganda. Small wonder then that the socialist patriotism described so eloquently 
by Stalin had taken root in Romanian soil:
"Guaranteeing legal equality unites the entire working people, knitting them together 
even more tightly into one single, unified block. This is of enormous significance in 
consolidating the popular democratic Romanian state, in the defence of the 
independence and sovereignty of our People's Republic [...].
For this reason the creation of the Hungarian Autonomous Province, like any other o f 
the achievements in the realm of coming up with a correct solution to the national 
question, are in keeping with the vital interests o f the Romanian working people".1111 
Catering for the linguistic needs of the Hungarians would not mean that those of the 
local Romanians would be trampled underfoot:
“The fact that the bodies and institutions of the Hungarian Autonomous Province will 
make use of the language spoken amongst the broad masses of the people in the 
course of its activities will contribute to the creation of insoluble spiritual bonds 
between the masses and the executive.
None of this will encroach upon the rights of the Romanian workers living in this 
territory likewise guaranteed by the Constitution. They may use the Romanian 
language in their dealings with the different bodies and institutions. In the Romanian
1,09 Romin Munk£sp£rt, op.cit., pp5-l 1.
1110 Op. cit., ppl3-14.
1111 Rom£n Munk£sp£rt, op. cit, ppl7-19. Emphasis in original.
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villages of the province Romanian-language schools, cultural centres etc. will be run. 
The Hungarian Autonomous Province must personify the unity and fraternity of 
workers of different nationality.
Providing regional autonomy within the public administration shores up the 
Hungarian working population's trust in the Romanian working people, brings the 
Hungarian working masses closer to the machinery of state, involves them in the 
work of the community and affords them even broader opportunities to participate in 
state leadership and the building of Socialism.
At the same time assuring regional administrative autonomy deals a crushing blow to 
the exploiters and their endeavours to delude the workers with the eyewash of so- 
called "national unity". All of the above leads to a strengthening of the Hungarian 
workers' class consciousness and fuses all workers together in even greater combative 
unity against exploiters of whatever nationality".1112 
Clearly, isolationism was not on the agenda.
The duality of Party policy becomes apparent through examination of the various laws 
and decrees pertaining to Hungarian-language education. In the autumn of 1954, 
Scinteia and Forward (Elore) reported that over 2500 primary and secondary schools 
offered mother-tongue tuition to the various nationalities. The corresponding figure 
for the following school year was 2250.1113 Teaching in technical subjects shifted to 
Romanian with the closure of Hungarian sections at the Mechanical Institute in 
Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca from the 1953-4 term onwards and entrance examinations for 
the city's Agricultural College (Agronomic Institute) were only held in Romanian at 
the beginning of the 1955-56 academic year.1114 In July of 1956, the Party and 
government passed a decision on improving general education introducing an eleven- 
grade system, adding a year to the final stage of secondary schooling. Primary 
schools (first to seventh grade) would have to organise a minimum number of parallel 
sections. Where this was not possible they were gradually phased out, drastically 
reducing the number of independent Hungarian-language schools in mixed population
1112 Romdn Munk&spdrt, op. cit., pp24-26.
1,13 Scinteia, 28th October, 1954, Elore, 29th October 1954 and 11th December 1955 respectively. 
Quoted in Hetven iv, p79.
1114 Vinczfi II, pl2.
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areas. The one concession made teaching of Romanian compulsory as of the second 
grade of primary school (as opposed to first grade, which had been introduced in the 
education reform of 1948).1115
The fostering of cultural contacts with Hungary, already severely curtailed by virtue 
of the ratification of the Hungarian-Romanian convention on visas, which made 
private trips across the border virtually impossible,1116 was further inhibited by a 
virtual drying up of the import of literary works, technical literature, dailies and 
periodicals.1117
Demonstrations of solidarity following the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution in 
1956 lead to negotiations being held between Hungarian intellectuals in 
Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca and Miron Constantinescu, Secretary of the Central 
Committee. To quell unrest, which might potentially have sparked calls for territorial 
revision, some of the complaints were acted upon with, for example, Hungarian 
sections reopened in several towns, Hungarian reinstated as a subject at the 
Agricultural College, new journals including Forward (Elore) and, for children, Ray 
of Sunshine (.Napsugdr) authorised for publication as of the following year and a 
Nationalities Directorate formed within the Ministry of Education with L£szl6 
B&nyai,1118 formerly Rector of the Bolyai University, at its apex.1119 
This easing off did not last beyond the suppression of the Revolution across the 
border with the arrest of sympathisers and a blanket accusation of revisionism 
levelled against the Hungarians. The blame for contamination of the young with 
bourgeois nationalism was laid at the door of the Hungarian schools, castigated as 
bastions of separatism. As a result, mergers between Romanian and Hungarian 
schools accelerated and in places where exclusively Hungarian-language schools had 
operated Romanian sections were added. The Nationalities Directorate was abolished
1115 Hetven 6v, p79.
1116 Vincze II, p9.
1117 Vincze II, pl3.
1,18 One of the leading lights of the Erdilyi Fiatalok movement, Bdnyai (1907-1981) published poetiy 
in the journal Pdsztortuz and the literary supplement of Ellenzik as well as essays in Helikon. Having 
lost his job as a teacher at the Catholic secondary school in Csfkszereda/Miercurea-Ciuc in 1933 
because of his Communist convictions, he switched allegiances to Korunk and Brassdi Lapok. From 
1934 to 1940, he was secretary of MADOSZ and after 1945 he was a member of the Magyar Nipi 
Szdvetsig's Executive Committee.
page 329
in 1959 and in July of the same year Bolyai University in Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca was 
combined with the Romanian Babe? University thereby losing its independence. 
Professor Ldszld Szabedi (Hungarian language and literature), Deputy Rector Zoltdn 
Csendes and his wife, Professor of Economics Miklds Molndr and student leader 
Sdndor T6th committed suicide in protest1120
In 1958 two further developments contributed further to the worsening outlook for the 
Hungarians: the withdrawal of Soviet troops on 27th July1121 and an official visit by a 
high profile delegation from Hungary, comprising Jdnos Kdddr, Gyula Kdllai, Antal 
Apro and Kdroly N6meth. Its conclusion: "We have now gained first-hand experience 
of how legal equality for the nationalities has been achieved in every area of political, 
economic and cultural life, something we were already aware of and held in high
1127esteem". This verdict was taken as a signal that Hungary had washed its hands of 
the minority and would not oppose stringent assimilation.
On 19th December 1960, Ceau?escu presented a bill proposing what were described 
as improvements to the administrative boundaries, a reform entailing the elimination 
or absorption of some rajons, the transfer of certain districts from one rajon to 
another, the granting of rajon status to selected cities and so on, affecting 18
1177provinces in all. The Hungarian Autonomous Province was rechristened the 
Maros/Mure§ Autonomous Province. The Sdrmds/Sarma§ and Ludas/Ludu$ rajons 
were added to it from Temesv&r/Timisoara in entirety and Disco rajon in part, 
alongside a complete village from Brasso/Bra$ov Province. At the same time 
Sepsi/Gheorghe and Kdzdi/Secuiesc rajons were moved to the latter. The area of the 
Province thus increased from 759,000 to 802,000 square kilometres, but its Hungarian 
population shrank from 564,000 to 473,000 whilst the number of Romanian residents 
grew from 147,000 to 266,000. In 1962 the language of tuition at the Medical and 
Pharmaceutical Institute was changed to Romanian. The rate of industrialisation was
1119 Hetven 6v, p80 and Vincze II, ppl3-14.
1120 Vincze II, ppl4-15; Stile, pp231-232 and Hetven £v, pp73 and 79-80.
1121 The way had been paved for this during the meeting of Soviet and Romanian heads of government 
between 26th November and 3rd December 1956 as a means of rewarding the latter for not rocking the 
boat and for their political support as evinced by holding Imre Nagy and his companions in 
confinement for several months. See Stile, pp229-230.
1,22 Quoted in Vincze II, pl4  and Hetven 4v, p80.
1123 Lipcsey on the MAT, p8.
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slowed in order to encourage outward migration and at an extraordinary session of the 
Grand National Assembly on 27th April 1962 the early completion of the 
collectivisation process was mentioned.1124 The death knell for the Province came in 
1968 with the passing of a law prescribing that the average size of provinces should 
be around 6786 square kilometres and the average population 509,000.
Haromszek/Trei-Scaune became Kovdszna/Covasna, the bulk of Udvarhely/Odorhei 
was attached to Csik/Ciuc and dubbed Hargita/Harghita and the remainder subsumed 
under Maros/Mure§ and Kovdszna/Covasna.1125
3.3 From Cohabiting Nationality to Romanian Workers of 
Hungarian Nationality
"We can joyfully say that our Party, which already at the time of its foundation 
emblazoned the words " fraternal unity of all workers without distinction of 
nationality" across its banner has forever solved the national question in Romania, 
guaranteeing equal rights for all the citizens of the homeland throughout every sphere 
of activity" Nicolae Ceau§escu, 20th September 1968.1126
In our appraisal of the Ceau§escu era, we shall be concentrating primarily upon the 
utterances of the Conducator himself because his speeches functioned as a blueprint 
for subsequent representations, the contributions to “debate** made by Hungarian 
minority politicians at public gatherings slavishly regurgitating the official line. 
Moreover, Ceau§escu*s pronouncements usually heralded legislative programmes, his 
words quite literally becoming law.
At the Ninth Party Congress in 1965, Ceau§escu was installed as Gheorghiu-Dej's 
successor following the latter's death on 19th March. He profited from the occasion 
to give a speech, which ushered in a new ideological era:
"Owing to the difference in circumstances in which Communist and Workers' Parties 
carry put their activities - which are determined by the level of socio-economic
1124 Lipcsey on the MAT, p8; Vinczfi II, pl5.
1125 Lipcsey on the MAT, p9 and Hetven (v, p68.
1126 From his speech at the Temesvdr/Timi§oara assembly, quoted in Medvetdnc, p i41.
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development and the historical and national peculiarities of their countries - it is 
natural for differences of opinion to arise as to the path to be followed in attaining 
political power and the building of Socialism and also that a wide variety of forms of 
action and methods should exist. The manner according to which each individual 
Party undertakes its tasks cannot be the object of dispute; each individual Party has an 
exclusive right to outline its political guidelines, the form and methods of its 
activities, to designate its aims and to apply creatively the universal truths of Marxist- 
Leninism whilst taking account of the specific circumstances of its country and in so 
doing contributing to the shared treasure trove of revolutionary thought and 
experience".1127
In the light of this, fostering relations based on mutual trust, respect and esteem 
between Parties was of the utmost importance. Romania's international policy was 
therefore founded on national sovereignty, independence, equality and non­
interference in domestic affairs. The Socialist nation would promote greater unity 
rather than engendering strife:
"For a long time yet to come the nation and the state will form the foundation of the
development of Socialist society. The development of the nation and the
strengthening of the Socialist state corresponds to the objective demands of social
life; not only is this not at odds with the interests of Socialist internationalism, but
quite the opposite: it is entirely in keeping with these interests, with the international
11solidarity of the workers, Socialism and the cause of peace".
Alongside this declaration of the Romanian Party's intention to draw on the traditional 
nationalist source of legitimation (the cautious diplomacy of the wording with its lip- 
service to the internationalist principle was a sop to the Soviet Union to avoid 
incurring its displeasure), a new constitution was adopted by the Grand National 
Assembly on 21st August 1965, which mentions the minorities at three junctures: in 
article two where it states that all the country's workers without distinction of 
nationality build the Socialist system; in article 17, which talks of how all Romania's 
citizens, irrespective of nationality, race, sex or religion enjoy equal rights in every 
area of economic, political, legal and social life and in article 22, which reads:
1127 A Romdn Kommunista Pdrt 9. kongresszusa. Bukarest, 1963 julius 19-24. Politikai Kiad6, 
Bukarest, pp82-83, quoted in L£szl6 Balogh, op. cit., pp243-244.
1128 Op. cit., plOO. Quoted in L£szl6 Balogh, p244.
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"In the Socialist Republic of Romania the cohabiting nationalities are guaranteed the 
free use of the mother tongue and in addition books, newspapers, journals, theatres 
and all levels of education in their own mother tongue. In territorial-administrative 
units where apart from the Romanian population other nationalities also live, every 
body and institution shall also use the language of the nationality concerned orally and 
in writing and shall appoint officials from their ranks or amongst other citizens who 
know the language and lifestyle of the local population".1129 
The commission for examining the problems of national minorities was resurrected 
under the supervision of the Central Committee secretariat1130 with Ceau§escu 
formally presiding, although its actual running was in the hands of Miron 
Constantinescu initially and then Paul Nicolescu-Mizil. For the next three years its 
Hungarian members (G6za Domonkos, Lajos Takdcs and Andrds Siito amongst 
others) travelled to the provinces on several occasions to familiarise themselves with 
problems relating to teaching in the mother tongue, culture and so on. Having 
completed its survey, the commission submitted its draft proposals to the Central 
Committee, but no decisions of substance were taken and the commission faded into 
nothingness.1131
Ceau§escu's response to the events in Prague in 1968 with his stem condemnation of 
the breach of independence and sovereignty they implied and his insistence that 
Romania would not tolerate any encroachment on her territorial integrity, left the 
country isolated and in need of internal unity. In the interests of broadening its basis 
of support the Party took steps to win over the Hungarians. Ceau§escu met • 
representatives of the Hungarian and German minorities who were able to speak 
frankly about their difficulties, calling for a new Nationalities Statute (even though 
the 1945 one was still in force) and during an official visit to the Sz6kelys promised 
that the current Five Year Plan would make up for the inactivity of the past and tackle 
the economic backwardness that blighted their everyday lives.1132 At the Party 
plenary in April, a pledge to extend use of minority languages in certain areas of 
culture and education, resulting in the foundation of the Kriterion publishing house
1129 Hetven 6v, p68.
1130 It had ceased to function in 1959.
1131 Vincze II, pi 7.
1,32 See Lipcsey on the MAT, p9. For this section, see also Side, pp239-243 and Vincze II, ppl7-20.
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(although other publishers also printed books in Hungarian), the launch of the 
national weekly A Hit alongside local county newspapers, use of bilingual signs 
spread, Nationalities Secretariats were created within the Ministries of Education and 
Culture and television broadcasting in Hungarian began in 1971. Perhaps the most 
significant decision was that of setting up the National Councils for Workers of 
Hungarian Nationality as consultative organs taken at the meeting of the Central 
Committee at the end of October1133 to contribute to the work carried out by Party and 
state bodies in political education, to encourage scientific, artistic and literary 
creativity in their mother tongues amongst the cohabiting nationalities and ensure ever 
more active collaboration on their part in formulating and implementing Party and 
state foreign policy. However, the Council did not have either the right of initiative or 
the right of veto.1134 Their leaders were appointed by the government (the few 
prominent Hungarian intellectuals who had taken part were gradually squeezed out to 
make room for more compliant Party faithfuls) and they were convened erratically 
(with gaps between 1971 and 1974 and 1979 to 1983 for example). From 1974 
onwards, their proceedings were conducted entirely in Romanian and became 
increasingly ritualistic, with the mandatory baroque displays of sycophancy towards 
Ceau§escu. Genuine problems encountered by the minority became invisible as their 
function was reduced to that of endorsing the political course steered at a given
1135moment
At the 1971 plenary of the National Council, Ceau§escu struck a positive note, 
reaffirming the importance of the forum as an opportunity for all workers to debate 
the main domestic and foreign policy issues. The 1966-1970 Five Year Plan had 
succeeded in more equitably and rationally distributing industrial capacity throughout 
the country, with neglected counties such as Kovdszna/Covasna, Hargita/Harghita, 
Szildgy/Sdlaj and Szatmar/Satu Mare as the main beneficiaries. By comparison to the 
urgency of eliminating the exploitative classes and transferring ownership of the 
means of production to the workers and peasants the number of pupils attending 
Hungarian-language schools paled into insignificance, although use of the mother 
tongue was not completely immaterial. Opportunities for the Hungarians to master
1113 Identical forums were established for the Germans, Serbs and later Ukrainians.
n* Vincze II, pl9.
1135 Cf. Hetven iv, p69.
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the achievements of science, culture and education had expanded with over 2290 
Hungarian-language units at pre- and primary school level and more than 1060 
Hungarian sections within the framework of other school types. Indeed the 
Hungarians were better off than the average in terms of access to schooling beyond 
the eighth grade. Over 11,500 teachers of Hungarian nationality were employed 
alongside 1430 headmasters and their deputies. All of this indicated that the Party 
took its duty to carry the constitution into effect so that individual ability and 
diligence would be the keys to broadening educational and professional horizons. Not 
content to rest on its laurels, the Party was striving to put the organisational 
preconditions in place for the nationalities to participate in the machinery of the state 
and in the running of companies.1136
Ceau§escu then acknowledged that the Hungarians had been an integral part of 
Transylvanian society for some considerable time whilst downplaying their actual 
historical role:
"On other occasions I have already spoken about how we have raised the national 
issue and consequently the problem of the Romanian nationalities as well. In this 
regard we take the socio-historical realities as our starting point and these realities 
verify that for hundreds of years Romanians, Hungarians and Germans have lived and 
worked together in Transylvania, together creating everything that been attained in 
these surroundings, fighting together against the exploiters and oppressors, regardless 
of whether they were Romanians, Hungarians or from other nationalities. As I 
pointed out at the Council of Workers of German Nationality already it is difficult to 
distinguish between or accurately measure the contribution and successes of each 
individual nationality as they blend into an organic oneness. Even if a cultural 
establishment or monument bears the imprint of one or other nationality to a greater 
extent, these establishments and creations were nevertheless fashioned through the 
joint toil of those who lived and continue to live in these environs. Indeed it is in the 
final analysis very difficult to divorce Mihai Viteazul's victories1137 [...] from the fact
1136 Nicolae Ceau§escu: Beszdd a Magyar Dolgozdk Orszdgos Tandcsdnak Plendris Clisin. 1971, 
mdrcius 12. Politikai Konyvkiad6, Bukarest, 1971, pp6-14.
1137 On die subject of Michael the Brave (ruler of Wallachia from 1593 to 1601), Lucian Boia writes: 
‘The way in which the myth of Michael the Brave took shape illustrates better than any other historical 
model the mutations which have taken place in Romanian consciousness. The prince, who managed for 
a short time (1599-1600) to rule the three territories that were to be united some three centuries later in
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that thousands upon thousands of Szdkelys and other nationalities, Hungarians or 
Germans fought on the Romanian ruler's side [...]. The inhabitants of this region have 
always known that their interests are intertwined and that in order to create a life of 
freedom and independence everyone must cooperate and fight together against both 
the external oppressors and their own exploiters. This is the shared primary 
characteristic of this form of cohabitation. Historical scholarship must bear these 
circumstances in mind and must reflect the facts as they unfolded in all their 
complexity with the role played by the people and the masses in the development of 
society since we can only write a truly Marxist-Leninist history if we study and 
accentuate everything, which contributed and contributes to strengthening friendship 
and cooperation between the workers of our homeland! Let us take on board 
everything from our historical past, which is progressive, which unites the peoples 
and let us get rid of everything, which stands for the influence of the former ruling,
modem Romania, begins to be perceived as a unifier only towards the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Such an interpretation is completely lacking in the historiography of the seventeenth-century 
chroniclers, and even in that of the Transylvanian School around 1800. What they emphasized, apart 
from the exceptional personality of Michael himself, were the idea of Christendom and his close 
relations with Emperor Rudolf’ (Boia, p39. For the shift in meaning, see pp40-2). On 20*h May 1595, 
the Wallachian boyars drove Michael into signing an alliance with Zsigmond Bdthori placing 
Wallachia under the control of the Transylvanian Prince. Sinan Pasha was sent by the Porte to re­
establish its authority in Wallachia, engaging Michael at QUug&reni. The Turks withdrew having 
incurred severe losses. In October, Bdthori's Transylvanian troops, bolstered by units of the imperial 
army and Tuscan cavalry defeated the Turkish garrison at Tirgovi§te. Michael and BMiori crushed the 
Turkish rearguard, pushing it back south of the Danube. Having abdicated in favour of Rudolf II in 
return for ducal estates in Silesia in 1598, B&thori changed his mind, reoccupying his throne, only to 
leave it again in 1599. Under Polish pressure, he was replaced by his nephew, Cardinal Andris 
Bithori. Displeased by the latter’s intention to bring Transylvania back into the Porte’s fold, Michael 
successfully fought against him at Nagyszeben/Sibiu (§elimbar) in October. Having taken the citadel of 
Suceava in May 1600, he was entitled to call himself “prince of Wallachia, Transylvania and 
Moldavia’’. Such glory was short-lived. The Transylvanian nobility rose against him, supported by 
Rudolf II’s general Giorgio Basta. Beaten in battle at Miriszld/Miraslau, Michael pulled out of 
Transylvania. At this juncture, Zsigmond Bdthori reappeared on the scene, breaking his promise to 
Rudolf II to stay away. He was re-elected as prince, but expelled by Basta and Michael now fighting 
on the same side. On 19th August 1601, Michael met his death at the hands of Basta’s Walloon 
mercenaries at Aranyosgyires/Cdmpia Turzii (Castellan, pp58-61 and Kontler, ppl63-4). See also 
Ofetea, pp220-227 and Prodan, pp82-91.
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exploiting classes. As one comrade here declared, let us set aside the myths, the 
nostalgia, the prejudices and look at the realities!"1138 
Returning to education, the Party Secretary dressed assimilation in the garb of 
rationality, giving assurances that the deficiencies that had cropped up would be 
appropriately tackled:
"We must respect the freedom of choice for young people to decide which type of 
school they wish to attend and which language they wish to pursue their studies in!
[...]
The reason I have broached this matter is that there are opinions - it is true that they 
have not been expressed here, but elsewhere - according to which we ought to compel 
young people to study in a given language. For example young Hungarians should 
only go to Hungarian schools. I believe that would be a serious error, a violation of 
the freedom and democratic right for everyone to select the form of education he 
wishes. Our responsibility is - and the Ministry of Education and the local bodies 
must live up to it - to generate the corresponding financial basis and make the 
necessary textbooks available so that young people may carry out their studies in the 
language they are most familiar with. [...] There is no "danger of isolationism" 
involved in this as some comrades have stated here, because in practice neither the 
Romanians, the Hungarians, the Germans nor anyone else can become isolated as they 
will go on living and working in the same county, town, village, company or 
cooperative! [...] Young people themselves will understand what would be 
advantageous for them to learn in their own language and what would be better to 
learn in Romanian because all social activity and the achievements of science and 
culture will become inaccessible to them if they do not know the language of the 
country they live in. [...] The question of mastering the Romanian language ought not 
therefore to be treated as it being compulsory to learn an extra language, but at the 
end of the day mastering Romanian is linked to guaranteeing equality proper. If a 
young person cannot make himself understood on leaving his community or county he 
will not feel genuinely equal and free".1139
Within the domain of political education, greater attention had to be paid to the 
problems encountered in the course of developing a Socialist society in Romania,
1,38 Op. cit., ppl5-17.
1139 Op. cit., pp21-22.
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including the role and the future of the Socialist nation and the national question, 
particularly since nations would survive well into the Communist age, maintaining 
their position as an important socio-historical category and as one of the determining 
factors of social progress:
"In this context we must tackle the issue of the cohabiting nationalities. Given that 
the nation has a long future ahead of it, the same consequently applies to existence of 
the nationalities. [...] Let us examine the part that the nationalities will play in the 
long term within the framework of our state. As I mentioned earlier the nationalities 
will continue to occupy their own clear and well-defined place and role and for a long 
time yet to come will retain their own individuality as is also true of the nations".1140 
Romania's problems could only hope to be solved by the country's own workers 
without any outside interference from whichever quarter, although this was not a sign 
of exclusiveness or isolationism from other states. On the contrary, Romania sought 
to foster multilateral cooperation with other Socialist nations founded on mutual 
respect and non-intervention in domestic affairs.1141
That the underlying trend favouring enforced assimilation had not been jettisoned was 
made apparent by statements such as the following dating from a year earlier 
"In the work and the common battle fought for the building of Socialism, the 
friendship between the Romanian people and the cohabiting nationalities has 
ascended to a higher level. Every major success in the development of Socialism is 
the opus of all the workers of our homeland without distinction of nationality. The 
constant strengthening of this fraternity forms an inseparable part of the process of 
homogenising our Socialist society".1142
Similarly the decision by the Communist Party's 1972 national conference stated: 
"The National Conference appreciates that these new features [crystallisation of 
higher ethics and evolution of the new Socialist man, shortening of the distance 
between town and country, gradual disappearance of the classes, social 
homogenisation and the blurring of the major distinctions between physical and
1140 Op. cit., pp24-25.
1141 Op. cit., p26.
1142 In: Az Egysiges Romdn Nemzeti Allam Megteremtise. (Romdnia Eln&ke Tdrsadalompolitikai 
Gondolkoddsdbdl), Bukarest, 1984. Quoted (without page reference) in Stile, p243.
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intellectual work] will not entail the disappearance of the nation, but will lay down 
the foundations for its elevation to a higher level and will lead to the emergence of a 
new type of nation, the Socialist nation, which is incomparably stronger and more 
homogenous than the bourgeois nation".1143 
Also, echoing Ceau§escu's 1971 speech:
"The National Conference takes as its starting point the fundamental principle that the 
prospects for the long-term existence of the Socialist nation mean that the 
nationalities will retain their distinguishing features for a long time to come and that 
simultaneously the historical process of moving closer together is unfolding, which 
will become more pronounced in the future. For this reason work must be carried out 
unwaveringly to guarantee the complete equality of all workers, with no distinction 
based on nationality in the interests of ensuring that society should become ever more 
emphatically homogenous in terms of both social and national character on the road to 
building a uniform, Communist system".1144
3.4 Nationalist in Form and Content: The “July Theses”
The turning point came with what has been nicknamed the "mini cultural revolution" 
in the wake of Ceau§escu's visit to China in 1971, spawning the "July theses". One of 
the tasks prescribed for the Party was resolutely repelling all manifestations of 
nationalism, although state-sponsored majority nationalism was exempted in 
practice.1145 The floodgates had now been opened for blatantly discriminatory laws, 
one of the first of which, decree 273 of 13th March 1973, laid down the parameters 
for setting up classes for children to be taught in their mother tongue in primary 
schools. Whereas at least 25 such pupils had to be enrolled to justify the creation of a 
separate class, Romanian sections had to be opened in all schools where Hungarian 
was the language of instruction independently of the number of Romanian-speaking
1143 A Romdn Kommunista Pdrt Orszdgos Konferencidjdnak Hatdrozata a Szpcialista Nemzet 
Felvirdgoztatdsdrol is  a Nemzeti Kirdisrol Romdnia Szpcialista Kozfdrsasdgban. In: A Romdn 
Kommunista Pdrt dokumentumai. A romdn nip is  az egyiittlakd nemzetisigek testvirisige. Politikai 
Konyvkiad6, Bukarest, 1973, pl6. Also quoted in Medvetdnc, pl44.
1144 Op. cit., p20. Also quoted in Medvetdnc, pl44.
1145 Vincze H, p21.
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pupils enrolled. For secondary school classes to be taught in Hungarian, 36 pupils
,  • • 1146was the minimum.
At the plenary of the National Council in 1974, on the 30th anniversary of Romania's 
liberation from the clutches of fascism, Ceau§escu returned to the issue of language 
and education:
"...in today's circumstances we should not merely and not in the first instance be 
looking at how education is progressing in one language or another - although this 
does have its own significance - but mainly at the content of education, independently 
of the language the knowledge is being expounded in. At the same time we must 
make allowances for the fact [...] that the young people of today and tomorrow, the 
builders of Socialism and Communism, must have unlimited and unimpeded 
opportunities to work in any part of the country in any branch of activity. (...) It is 
also a necessity for the citizens of Romania to know the Romanian language. If 
someone would like to be a metalworker, he obviously has to go to 
Hunyad/Hunedoara or Galaf to find employment. We cannot build foundries in 
every county! If someone wants to work in a nuclear power station, if we build one, 
let's say in Hargita/Harghita - which is as a matter of fact an intention of ours in the 
long term - he will have to speak a language there. We cannot organise factory work 
with the collaboration of interpreters. I would like you to interpret my words 
correctly. I have already spoken on the subject, but I get the impression that certain 
comrades, although their intentions are good, are still prisoners of the old mentality 
stemming back from the old days of inequality. They do not understand that 
something has changed in this country; that something is ceaselessly changing. 
Taking care to provide for the conditions necessary for teaching in the relevant native 
language should not be allowed to lead to a situation in which young people are 
inhibited from learning Romanian because the acquisition of a language really does 
offer them a means of working in any field of activity".1147 
The cohabiting nationalities were almost spoilt for choice when it came to 
publications. The various Hungarian-language newspapers had a print run in excess 
of 500,000 and literary works were also produced in sizeable editions. Where
1146Medvetdnc, ppl33-134.
1147 Nicolae Ceau§escu: Beszid. a Magyar is Nimet Nemzetisigu Dolgozj6k Tandcsainak Egyttttes 
Olisin. 1974, dprilis 5. Politikai Konyvkiad6, Bukarest, ppl3-14.
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complaints had arisen was in conjunction with technical and specialist books, 
although many of these were only available in English, Russian or other foreign 
languages and even translations into Romanian were not commissioned without due 
justification as it was often more expedient to read them in the original. There were 
further problems to grapple with:
"As far as the paper question is concerned, I do not know whom I should listen to 
first, the Hungarian or German nationalities or the Romanians as every one of them is 
calling for more paper. One must comprehend that paper is not a language question, 
but an economic problem and has to be looked at accordingly, bearing the current 
position on the world market in mind. We import paper [...]. On the international 
market paper is put up for sale at prices, which would demand that we raise the price 
of our newspapers and journals several times o ver. I do not think anyone wants that. 
One has to understand therefore that there are also issues, which go beyond national 
peculiarities, which are linked to the raw materials crisis and this includes paper. [...] 
It is self-explanatory that if we reduce consumption of paper in general then this 
measure applies to everyone. [...] Nobody can complain that the good and popular 
works appear in editions, which are too small. It is natural that books intended for the 
smaller Hungarian or German audiences should be printed in fewer copies, but 
perhaps we should not mechanically draw a comparison between the number of books 
and the size of the population".1148
Once again, assimilation was depicted as objective rationality.
Nor did intellectuals escape the Conducator’s notice. His brand of Communism had 
its own particular vision of what the most appropriate tasks for writers were, as the 
1972 Party conference made explicit:
"The creative activity of the cohabiting minorities in their native tongues in science, 
art and literature has to be stimulated in close unison with the development of the 
creations of the Romanian people, present socio-political life and the Socialist 
advance of the country. Literature and art, regardless of what language it sees the 
light of day in, must reflect the new reality of our country; it must be conducive to 
bringing the workers, without distinction based on nationality, closer together
1,48 Op. cit., ppl5-16. Typewriters for private use were also strictly rationed (Kolar, p312).
page 341
fraternally and promote the intellectual development of the entire people in the
struggle to build Socialism and Communism".1149
In a similar vein, Edg£r Balogh discussed the obligations of the publicist:
"The scope of political journalism has expanded under Socialism, its range of subjects 
proliferated and it covers every area of political, economic and socio-cultural life. 
Since, however, the Socialist state system multi-faceted perfection serves the public 
affairs of the working masses, its role has been taken over to an ever increasing extent 
by the documents drafted by the joint bodies, the Party decisions, legislation, the 
literature of central provisions, in writing therefore, which has a million roots and 
affects millions. During my lessons on political journalism we have after all also 
analysed and interpreted such party documents, excellent political speeches, broken 
them down into principles of law and practical duties, referring to the fact that the 
members of the press have to see to it that they are applied, that they are enforced at 
local level and that they are explained to the masses and thus the most part of political 
journalism today is taken up with instruction and popularisation".1150
More aggressive assimilatory policies towards the minority followed in the wake of 
the 11th Romanian Communist Party Congress held between 24th and 27th 
November 1974. Point seven of its agenda was dedicated to "The nationality issue in 
Socialism". It confidently predicted the ultimate triumph of the functional principle 
of classification espoused by Communism:
"...the unity of workers without distinction of nationality will ascend to a higher stage; 
the workers, without distinction of nationality, will integrate more and more into the 
process of building multilaterally developed Socialist society and Communism, into 
the uniform working people of Communist society. At the same time in the prospects 
of this future certain individual features will continue to persist, primarily between the 
different categories of workers in production, differences, which depend on their role
1,49 A Romdn Kommunista Pdrt dokumentai. A romdn nip is  az egytittlakd nemzetisigek testvirisige. 
Politikai Kdnyvkiadd, Bucharest, 1973, pp21-22. For Ceau§escu’s interference in setting research 
agendas in history and science, see Kolar, pp297-8 and 302-3.
1150 Edg£r Balogh: A kdzfr&s tortinetibol. In: Koppdndi, op. cit., pp442-443.
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in social activity, but all of these will only stress the democratic character of the new 
social order, the dialectic unity of the working people".1151
Contacts with Hungary (and exposure to the mother tongue in conversation) were 
hampered by the implementation of decree 225 of 1974 banning natural persons 
domiciled in Romania from providing accommodation for foreign nationals visiting 
Romania as tourists or for other purposes with the exception of immediate family.
The penalty for breaking the law was a fine of between five and 15 thousand lej.n52 
Two years later this was modified to exempt individuals of Romanian origin and 
those who had settled abroad, were no longer in possession of a Romanian passport, 
but who had not renounced their Romanian citizenship1153 betraying its true intent. 
Moreover Romanian citizens were only permitted to telephone abroad only four times 
a year, only a fraction of parcels sent between the two countries actually arrived and 
letters addressed in Hungarian were often not forwarded. The import of Hungarian- 
language records, books, films and so on was prohibited and private travel to Hungary 
so restricted as to be virtually impossible.1154
The 1976-77 school year brought further changes to the education system with the 
four grades normally taught at lyc6es split, so that ninth and tenth grade were attached 
to primary schools. Proceeding to the final two grades was made dependent on 
passing an entrance examination. In many places, no opportunities for completing 
them in Hungarian existed, facing youngsters with the choice of transferring to 
Romanian classes (not a viable option for everyone) or learning a trade, thereby 
barring the path of many to higher education. In 1978-79 a mere three per cent of all 
pupils in the eleventh and twelfth grades were Hungarian.1155 To make matters 
worse, although the 1956 decree allowing university entrance examinations to be 
taken in minority languages had not been repealed, its validity was undermined, 
making it clear that only candidates who had gone through the education system in
1131A Romdn Kommunista Pdrt Programja a Sokoldaluan Fejlett Szpcialista Tdrsadalom 
Megteremtise is  Romdnia Elorehaladdsa a Kommunizmus Feli. A Romdn Kommunista Pdrt 11. 
kongresszusa. 1974. november 24-27. Quoted in Medvetdnc, ppl44-145.
1152 For the full text see Medvetdnc, ppl34-136.
1153 For the full text, see op. cit., pl36.
1,54 Hetven iv, pi 11 and Vincze II, p26.
1155 Hetven iv, p85 and Vincze II, p22.
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Romanian stood a chance of success. However, even this was no cast-iron guarantee 
since a numerus clausus was applied in some fields of study and numerus nullus in 
others. Consequently in the 1977-78 academic year only 7497 of the 180,000 
students in higher education were Hungarian.1156
Another means of watering down Hungarian identity was the policy enshrined in a 
decree from May 30th 1975 on placements, dispersing fresh graduates across the 
country, usually far from their towns of origin in Romanian-speaking districts where 
they were cut off from their native tongue environment with no facilities for their 
children to attend Hungarian-language schools. It was compulsory for them to work 
at the designated place of employment for three to five years depending on the 
profession exercised. Given that the penalty for refusing was to pay back the money 
spent on acquiring a degree and the loss of the qualification they had little alternative 
to obeying.1157
This practice became so widespread, particularly for graduates of the Medical and 
Pharmaceutical Institute in Marosvdsdrhely/Tirgu Mure§ that Lajos Takdcs, Andrds 
Siito and J&nos Fazekas sent a memorandum on the subject to Ceau§escu in 1978 and 
mild protests were voiced in the plenaiy of the National Council the same year. 
Ceau§escu attempted to allay their fears: "In general efforts must be made to direct 
graduates - particularly teaching staff, but also those destined for the health care 
sector and agriculture - to their birthplace and not send them to the other end of the 
county or even the country".1158
At the 1978 National Council, P&l Bodor, then the Editor in Chief of Romanian Radio 
and Television spoke sincerely about the phraseology deployed in conjunction with 
the Hungarians:
"To be perfectly honest, I do not feel that the formulation 'irrespective of nationality' 
is entirely appropriate [...]. A Communist cannot refrain from taking account of 
someone's nationality. The peculiar psychology of the nationality, a certain past, a 
good few customs and memories constitute a context. We quite rightly abandoned the 
concept of minority a number of years ago already. But putting it in the language of
1.56 Hetven iv, p86 and Vincze II, p22.
1.57 Hetven iv, p60 and Vincze II, p23.
1158 Romdnia Szocialista Kdztdrsasdg Magyar is Nimet Nemzetisigu Dolgozdi Tandcsainak Plinumai 
1978 mdrcius 13-14. Bukarest, 1978. Politikai Konyvkiadd, pl9. Quoted in: Vincze II, p23.
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figures the Hungarian nationality has been a national minority for 60 years.
Numerous sensitivities arise from it [...] today's inferiority complexes, which will not 
vanish without trace overnight, are matters we have to be very familiar with and we 
must take account of them in the course of our political, educational and cultural 
work".1159
Ceau§escu's reply kept minority identity firmly subsumed within the greater project of 
realising a true Communist identity:
"We are creating a new, revolutionary humanism, which places the person and the 
multilateral development of individuality before anything else, but we do not 
encourage individualism, instead increasing the individual's responsibility towards the 
community, society. Our starting premise is that it is possible to achieve and enforce 
the material and intellectual prosperity and freedom of the individual only within the 
framework of the general prosperity, freedom and independence of the people as a 
whole.
The national question and the problems linked to guaranteeing complete equality for 
the workers of Hungarian, German and other nationalities has to be made sense of 
within this context. Only within the framework of the community, the general 
development of the homeland and the raising of the degree of civilisation of the 
country can better conditions for the success of the nationalities be guaranteed. Any 
other way of approaching the problem can only give rise to incomprehension and 
upset and can only impede collaboration in the unbroken implementation of our 
homeland's multilateral development programme".1160
Representations of the Hungarian minority destined for the Hungarian readership 
consisted of little more than an obedient rehash of the official Party tenets, as 
illustrated by Sdndor Kopp&ndi's contribution to a collection of essays from 1981 by 
Hungarian and Romanian authors.
Kopp&ndi begins by focusing on the inherent ambiguity of minorities, how they could 
be a positive or negative factor in the life of a state:
1.59 Romdnia Szpcialista Kdztdrsasdg Magyar is  Nimet Nemzetisigu Dolgozdi Tandcsainak Plinumai. 
1978. mdrcius 13-14. Bukarest, 1978. Politikai Konyvkiad6. Quoted (without page reference) in 
Medvetdnc, p i49.
1.60 Op. cit.. Quoted in Medvetdnc, ppl49-150.
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"It is part of historical experience that the presence of nationalities can serve the 
interests of bringing peoples closer together and developing friendly cooperation 
under favourable conditions, whilst it can be the source of permanent rivalry and 
antagonism otherwise. Given that the nature of relations between nations and 
nationalities is historically determined it is self-evident that they cannot be judged 
exclusively on the basis of abstract general principles.
The stance adopted by the Romanian Communist Party takes as its point of departure
the historical reality that in the centuries preceding the emergence of the homogenous
nation state Hungarians, Germans and smaller numbers of people of other
nationalities settled down alongside the Romanians”.1161
Kopp&ndi then quotes directly from Ceau§escu to lend greater authority to his
argument:
“Comrade Nicolae Ceau§escu indicated in his speech at the congress on political 
education and socialist culture on 2nd June 1976 that:
'As I already remarked, as time went by through the centuries and millennia peoples 
developed, settled down, became nations and independent states. This is an objective 
historical reality and nobody can alter it regardless of whether certain historians like it 
or not. The problem cannot be couched in terms whereby peoples are judged 
depending on the juncture at which they settled in a given territory and it cannot be 
couched in terms of distinctions being drawn between them as regards the rights they 
enjoy on this basis, but setting out from historical reality, which nobody can modify, a 
policy of complete equality and mutual esteem between peoples, nations and 
nationalities has to be consistently applied, every national entity has to be respected, 
assuring their harmonious cooperation, fraternity and solidarity in the common battle 
for the cause of social and national freedom and justice and of the peaceful 
cohabitation and cooperation of all nations'.
[...]
The solution to the national issue is primarily a political question and as such 
dependent on the character and essence of the politics that prevail. As is the case in 
social relations in general, political directives and standards also have a role in 
defining the establishment and evolution of national relations. In our country, the
1161 S&ndor Koppdndi and L£szl6 Lorincz: A nemzetisigi k£rd€s megolddsa. In: A Romdniai magyar 
nemzetisig, edited by Sdndor Kopp£ndi, Bukarest, Kriterion, 1981, p7.
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policy of the Romanian Communist Party, which is the expression of the common 
social interest, is simultaneously state policy. The source of its standards and 
directives is the Party Programme, its rules and the decisions and instructions of its 
leading bodies. These determine the formation and development of social and 
political relations - including national relations. Just as solving all problems linked to 
economic and social development in our country is the inalienable right and duty of 
the Communist Party and Romanian state it follows that the formulation of 
nationalities policy also falls within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Party and the 
state".1162
As was acknowledged in the Programme adopted at the 11th congress, close bonds of 
cooperation had been bom of centuries of living and working side by side often under 
difficult circumstances, which in turn laid the foundations for present day unity. The 
qualitatively superior policy pursued by the Party eclipsed all that had gone before as 
it had permanently eradicated oppression and inequality. In building a socialist 
society the Party had taken full account of Romania's historical, social and national 
realities, adapting the general principles to suit the country's specific needs.1163 
The Hungarians were the largest nationality, numbering 1,705,810 or 7.91 per cent of 
the overall population at the most recent census [1977], 98 per cent of whom lived in 
Transylvania.1164 From this information the authors conclude that:
"...Romania is a homogenous nation state in which citizens of other nationalities live 
alongside the Romanians who constitute the overwhelming majority. Therefore we 
cannot speak of a multinational state in the case of our country.
As a general rule when designating the aggregate of specific characteristics defining 
the various ethnic groups living and working together with the Romanian people we 
employ the expression "cohabiting nationality". This is not a purely formalistic 
disavowal of the concept of "national minority", but at the same time encompasses the 
efforts aimed at signalling qualitative differences. In the past - both before and after 
the First World War - what was meant by national minority was any group in a 
politically, economically or socially disadvantageous situation compared with the 
citizens forming the majority. At home, the solution to the national issue took place
1,62 Koppdndi and Ldrincz, op.cit., pp7-8.
1163 Kopplndi and Ldrincz, op. cit., pp9-10.
1164 For a detailed breakdown by county, see idem, plO.
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as an integral part of the process of radical social, political and economic 
transformations, which means that the complete legal equality of all citizens 
irrespective of nationality is democratically and consistently guaranteed as one of the 
substantial components of Party and state policy. Both the Romanian workers and the 
members of the cohabiting nationalities benefit identically from this legal equality in 
every area of economic, political, social and cultural life regardless of the size of the 
ethnic group concerned".1165
The more democratic the state, the more comprehensively it will act in the shared 
interests of all its inhabitants regardless of nationality (the implication being that the 
Socialist state, as the most enlightened and advanced expression of democracy 
devised by mankind, will outstrip all others and hence the position of minorities in 
them is the envy of the rest of the world). The Romanian experience testified to this: 
"The complete integration of the nationalities into society is achieved by their 
participation in the production of material and intellectual assets in all areas of social 
and economic life through their labour. This integration does not involve the 
renunciation of their unique characteristics; on the contrary, it creates enhanced 
opportunities for them to be asserted. In the process of resolving the national issue 
the determining role played by the social factor does not assume a nature, which is 
directed against the unique features of the nationality as expressed in language, 
culture, traditions, consciousness and so on. Legal equality is uniform and 
indivisible: it cannot be assured for the nation and the nationalities separately. 
Recognition of the specific issue of the nationalities is not the result of cyclical 
calculations or concessions, but of realpolitik democratic in spirit and grounded in 
reality in the same way as the solution to the national issue is not a matter of narrow 
nationality interests, an instrument of self-defence or a compromise, but is naturally a 
matter of national-nationality interest and the general democratic interest at one and 
the same time".1166
The solution was a socialist one, which meant that in the course of "the deliberate 
stimulation of social homogenisation" relations between the nation and nationalities 
had become socialist, but this did not mean that vigilance could be relaxed or that the 
solution was permanently valid as "amalgamation" would continue to be an ongoing
1165 Kopplndi and Ldrincz, op. cit., pplO-11.
1166 Kopp&ndi and Ldrincz, op. cit., pl2.
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process bound up with economic and social advance and the creation of a new model 
of civilisation, in short the undertakings of common interest to all workers.1167 Indeed 
one of the main causes of inequality had been the uneven distribution of economic 
resources. Major investments had been made in Transylvania with its 16 counties 
receiving over 28 per cent of the money earmarked for developing the national 
economy between 1965 and 1979. Putting industrial infrastructure in place was the 
most effective means of improving living conditions and the degree of civilisation and 
thereby a fundamental precondition of equality.1168 Road construction projects had 
made Transylvania more accessible to modem traffic and the 513,926 new homes 
built during the same 1965-1979 period had visibly shifted the population balance 
between town and village. In the two counties with the densest concentration of 
Hungarians, Hargita/Harghita and Kovdszna/Covasna the urban population has 
swollen from 10 per cent to 43.7 and from 12 per cent to 50.7 respectively between 
1948 and 1979. There were now 40 towns in Transylvania with over 20,000 
inhabitants, of which seven boasted a population of over 100,000.1169 
Furthermore, Hungarians were well represented in the Grand National Assembly (7.8 
per cent), in the Central Council of Trade Unions (8.6 per cent) and all other 
significant organisations, including the Writers' Union making up 147 out of its 1296 
members.1170
Not only was Hungarian-language education amply provided for in sections and/or 
teaching units in 1079 nursery schools, 1276 primary schools, 120 lyc6es and four 
technical schools, but almost 70,000 workers of Hungarian nationality had taken part 
in 4310 theatre and dance groups and choirs in the Song of Romania Festival. Of the 
8505 titles published in over 163 million copies in 1976-1977 alone, 1063 were in 
one of the minority languages.1171
The conciliatory message of equality and inter-ethnic harmony glossed over the 
material differences, but their persistence was attested to by the unflagging 
assimilatory efforts of the regime.
1167 Koppdndi and Ldrincz, op. cit., ppl2-13.
1168 Koppdndi and Ldrincz, op. cit., pl4.
1169 Koppdndi and Ldrincz, op. cit., pl5.
1170 Op. cit., ppl6-17.
1171 Op. cit., pp24 and 26.
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3.5 The Gloves Come Off: Systematic Erosion of Rights in the 
1980s
Internationally, Romania's policy towards the Hungarians had taken flak since the 
CSCE had begun monitoring events in Transylvania and memoranda and letters from 
prominent Party figures had been leaked to the outside world.1172 Political opposition 
to Ceau§escu amongst the Hungarians surfaced in underground publications such as 
Counterpoints (Ellenpontok) in Nagyvdrad/Oradea. In September of 1982, its editors 
(the writer Attila Ara-Kov&cs, the poet G6za Sz6cs, the actor Attila Kert6sz, teacher 
Kdroly T6th amongst others) managed to forward a memorandum to participants at 
the Madrid Conference of the Helsinki Council, which gave an accurate assessment of 
the reality:
"The natural development of our identity is being obstructed by every possible means. 
One generation of Hungarians after another is growing up in an atmosphere, in which 
our values are being disparaged, of chauvinism propagating the superiority of 
Romanian history and culture, without being given an opportunity to become familiar 
with the real history of Transylvania or its own ethnic community. The state treats us, 
first and foremost the intelligentsia and workers, like hidden enemies. The security 
services carry out acts of terror. If we raise our voices in defence of our culture we 
are branded as chauvinists. In practice we live in Romania as second-class citizens 
and our opportunities for professional advancement are restricted by the fact that we 
are Hungarian11.1173
After the arrest of authors and their departure from Romania, the baton was passed to 
the illegal Transylvanian Hungarian News Agency {Erdelyi Magyar 
Hiriigyndkseg)}174
1172 The most notable being by Gyorgy Ldzdr, Lajos Takdcs and Kdroly Kirdly as published in the 
influential volume Witnesses to Cultural Genocide, First-Hand Reports on Romania's Minority 
Policies Today. Published by the American Transylvanian Federation and the Committee for Human 
Rights in Romania, New York, 1979.
1173 Memorandum a Helsinki irtekezlet megdllapoddsainak betartdsdt ellenorzo madridi konferencia
risztvevoihez. Irodalmi tJjsdg, 1983,1. Quoted (without page reference) in Ldszl6 Balogh, pp337- 
338.
1174 Hetven iv, p i A.
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In his 1983 speech to the National Council plenary, Ceau§escu was anxious to 
reiterate that the nationality problem had been solved (thereby denying the minority 
any entitlement to a distinct identity or culture whatsoever) and that none of the 
country's sons were more equal than any other. This had been brought about in three 
ways. Firstly, everyone enjoyed the right to work and to equal pay for work of equal 
value in harmony with the principles of Socialist dignity. These rights were not 
simply proclaimed in the Constitution, but had been realised in everyday life with the 
even distribution of the forces of production throughout the country. Secondly, the 
right to free education and opportunities for the cohabiting nationalities to learn in 
their own languages, to familiarise themselves with the latest scientific 
accomplishments and learn the language of revolution. Thirdly, intensive cultural, 
artistic and other activities were in progress to shape the Socialist consciousness of 
the people, who were purposefully creating their own history, their free, worthy and 
independent Communist future. The requisite budget had been allocated for 
supporting this artistic and cultural work in the languages of the nationalities, as 
testified by the literature, press, theatres, radio and television broadcasts and the large 
number of flourishing amateur ensembles.1175
The democratic solution to the problem was irrefutable proof of Socialism's 
superiority, which had triumphed in putting human relationships on a new footing 
based on friendship, fraternity and equality:
"We would like [...] the nationalities in other countries to enjoy as many rights as the 
Romanian ones. We do everything in our power to ensure that we at all times develop 
and guarantee the best conditions for making equality effective, for allowing every 
son of the homeland to take part in the entirety of the work, in the creation of worthy,
1176free life, in the strengthening of Romania's sovereignty and independence!”.
He then ridiculed those who had the temerity to grumble about the adverse effects of 
industrialisation:
"Ever since we began vigorously developing industry, people have started saying that 
there is a danger of denationalisation, that it was better when you sat at home in the
1175 Nicolae Ceau§escu: Beszdd a Magyar 4s a N4met Nemzetisigu Dolgozdk Tandcsainak Egyuttes 
Ul4s4n. In: Romdnia Szocialista Koztdrsasdg Magyar 4s N4met Nemzetis4gu Dolgozdi Tandcsainak 
Pl4numai. 1983. mdrcius 30-31. Politikai K6nyvkiad6, Bukarest, 1983, pp9-10.
1176 Ceau§escu, op. cit., pl5.
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village, cut off from the world, not knowing about anything than it is now when you 
go into the factory, the educational or research institute, enter a new environment, 
acquire new knowledge. They say that it was better once upon a time than it is now 
when new horizons come into view in the world and in life for each and every citizen, 
when new friendships, new relationships are being established, when people are 
beginning to understand better and more directly that they only have one enemy: the 
exploiters, the imperialists and the reactionaries. That every worker is their friend, 
irrespective of nationality and that he has to work and collaborate with them in 
complete unity.
It is really true that there are some people, although they are few in number, who 
believe that another danger looms large: that Romanian girls are marrying Hungarian 
lads and vice versa, that Hungarian girls are marrying Romanian lads [...]. This has 
happened in the past as well - as a matter of fact for centuries, ever since Romanians, 
Hungarians, Germans and Serbs have been living side by side in this region, young 
people have married within the same nationality, but there have also been marriages 
between the various nationalities, but where is the bad in that? Does such a marriage 
damage a nationality or infringe its rights? In the worst possible case they will 
produce healthier, more beautiful and more intelligent children, which will be good 
for our people".1177
Behind these remarks lay the romanianization of Transylvanian towns accelerated by 
the industrialisation programme. On the one hand there was a large-scale influx of 
Romanians from the surrounding villages as a natural concomitant of urbanisation 
and on the other a centrally controlled "population redistribution" policy was put into 
effect. In practice Romanian citizens were not permitted to choose their place of 
residence and employment freely and it became virtually impossible for Hungarians in 
rural areas to move into the nearby cities. At the same time workers from Wallachia 
and Moldova were brought into the Transylvanian towns and industrial centres en 
masse. Romanian white-collar workers who were willing to move into primarily 
Hungarian areas were entitled to a settlement allowance of between 15 and 30,000 lei. 
All of this was clearly designed to wear down Hungarian identity by means of what I
1177 Ceau§escu, op. cit., pp21-22.
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would call “ethnic dilution”,1178 exacerbated further by the drain caused by 
emigration. According to official Hungarian statistics, 197,000 Hungarians left 
Romania for Hungary between 1918 and 1924 and 169,000 between 1924 and 
1940.1179 In 1985 1709 applications for permanent residence permits were lodged 
with the Hungarian authorities from Romania. In 1986 the number had increased to 
3284 and in 1987 it was 6499. From mid-1985, the (Transylvanian) Hungarians 
seized the opportunity to escape to the West via Hungary. Once the Austrian border 
had been closed they were allowed to stay in Hungary if their passports had expired. 
On the surface the Romanian authorities did not approve the emigration yet they 
began issuing passports en masse even to intellectuals who had previously been 
prohibited from travel on many occasions.1180
At the end of 1984 an anything but innocuous change in terminology came into 
circulation with Hungarianness demoted lower than ever in the phrase "Romanian 
workers of Hungarian nationality".1181 The 13th Congress of the Romanian 
Communist Party held between 19th and 22nd November concluded in its report:
"In our country we have solved the national problem once and for all on the basis of 
the Marxist-Leninist outlook and the principles of scientific Socialism and we have 
guaranteed complete equality for all citizens of the homeland. Regardless of 
nationality, the language that they speak each one of them is the son of the same 
homeland, we are all citizens of the Romanian Socialist Republic".1182 
In January of 1985 cessation of radio broadcasts in the provinces was ordered, putting 
an end to the seven hours a day of Hungarian-language programming in 
Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca and Marosvdsdrhely/Tirgu Mure§. The same fate befell 
television output, which had increased from an initial half hour a week to 300 minutes
1178 Siile, op cit., pp255-256 and Vincze II, pp24-25. See also: Andrds A  Gergely: Nemzetisig is  
Urbanizdcid Romdnidban. A magyar kisebbsig is  a vdrosfejlesztis, a Korunk harminc ivfolyama 
tiikreben. Hdttorony Kdnyvkiadd, Tatabdnya, 1988.
1179 Medvetdnc, p i l l .  Cf. also Borderland, p32.
1180 Medvetdnc, pi 13.
1181 Vincze II, p30.
1182 A Romdn Kommunista Pdrt Kdzponti Bizottsdgdnak Jelentise. A Romdn Kommunista Pdrt 13. 
kongresszusa. 1984. november 19-22. Quoted (without page reference) in Medvetdnc, p i50.
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arith documentaries and portraits cataloguing Hungarian life.1183 Within a radius of 
10 to 100 kilometres from the Hungarian border where reception conditions were 
favourable for receiving Hungarian (anyaorszdgi) transmissions, the authorities 
imposed fines and dismantled antennae rather than allow information to seep 
icross.1184
\s  if these measures were not enough, Ceau§escu also planned the complete physical 
jradication of all visible Hungarian monuments from the Romanian landscape. This 
otal denial of a historical Hungarian presence was preceded by its symbolic 
equivalent in April of 1988 as of when place names could only be referred to in their 
Romanian form in the Hungarian press and in literary works.1185 Had the 
'systemisation" or resettlement programme gone ahead some 8000 mainly Hungarian 
and German villages would have been razed to the ground and their uprooted 
inhabitants scattered in predominantly Romanian areas.1186 
The threat alone was so great that it sparked off a mass protest rally in Budapest on 
27th June 1988.
1183 Hetven iv, pp99-100.
1184 Hetven iv, plOO.
1185 Hetven iv, p99; Vincze II, p30 and Dinu Giurescu, The Razing of Romania's Past, The Bath Press, 
London, 1990.
1186 Hetven iv, p60, Vincze II, p30 and Hoensch, op. cit., pp286-7.
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3.6 History as a Battle Ground: The Heyday of Daco-Romanian 
Continuity1187.
One of the most perceptive summaries of the agonising dilemma faced by producers 
of culture in Ceau§escu's Romania originates from the pen of a Hungarian historian 
who could not have foreseen the impact of the Communist experiment at controlling 
the contents of knowledge:
"...the idea of continuity took up position at the centre of the entire Romanian 
conception of history, during the last two centuries it cast its spell on the historians 
and thinkers originating from the Romanian people and this brought into being the 
intellectual formation which we call today Romanian nationalism. We can assert with 
confidence therefore that the Daco-Roman (more correctly Dacian Roman-Romanian) 
doctrine belongs to the ranks of the world's most productive fictions. No matter how 
fertile it has proven in the past it nevertheless remains a fiction and this fact lends 
Romanian historical contemplation a certain fateful quality. Today's entire Romanian 
national consciousness1188 is built on it intellectually. Consequently the Rom anian  
historian is faced with a grave dilemma from the very outset. He either lets himself 
be swept off his feet by his national sentiment and remains blind to the truth or he can 
see the historical truth and comes into conflict with national public opinion. In the 
first scenario popularity and laurels are his reward, in the second disparagement and 
persecution. In the light of that knowledge it is easy to comprehend that scarcely any 
Romanian historian is willing to play that role in the face of youthful and in its bias 
impatient national public opinion. But they cannot assume this role for another
1187 According to Istvdn Kocsis, Daco-Romanian continuity and Daco-Romanianism are two easily 
confused kindred doctrines. Daco-Romanianism, a racial theory positing innate Romanian superiority 
over all other nations in the Carpathian Basin, employs Daco-Romanian continuity as its legitimating 
ideology. What is of immediate concern to us is the function fulfilled by both. See Istvdn Kocsis: A 
meztelen igazsdgtrt. A Ma.gyar-R.omdn Viszpny Megromldsdnak Tdrtinete, Piiski Kiad6, Budapest, 
1996. On the dispute between Hungary and Romania over history, see Borderland, pp25-48. By far 
the best study of mythical elements in Romanian history and the way it was rewritten and reinterpreted 
under Communism is Lucian Boia’s History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness, Central European 
University press, Budapest, 2001 (henceforth Boia). He deals with Daco-Romanian continuity on 
pp85-106 and with uninterrupted geographical settlement on ppl 13-128. On the parameters of the 
production of history under Ceau§escu, see Verdery, pp218-224 and 248-255 and on its politicisation 
see also Kolar, pl8.
1188 Although the original is nemzetisig the meaning is not that of nationality.
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reason anyway since the load bearing columns of contemporary nationalism would 
come crashing down in front of their very eyes, plunging the entire nation into 
intellectual pandemonium and strife.
Romanian nationalism therefore strews virtually insurmountable moral barriers in the 
path of Romanian historical scholarship in its investigations, which ultimately derive 
from the fictitious nature of the Roman-Romanian continuity theorem and render it 
virtually impossible for Romanian historians to bring to the light of day certain parts 
of Romanian historical reality. The ambition to uncover reality in historical enquiry 
has not ceased to exist elsewhere, however, and the Romanians have thereby ended up 
in the peculiar situation of frequently being less able to examine the question of their 
origin objectively than foreign peoples. The seriousness of this situation inevitably 
inspires Romanian historical scholarship to plough disproportionately large amounts 
of energy into rescuing the fiction of Roman-Romanian continuity. This is the 
explanation behind the explosion in Romanian historical propaganda literature aimed 
at salvaging the unsalvageable. At the same time, however, the historians of other 
peoples who are at an advantage in terms of their ability to pass objective judgements 
are slowly unearthing the Romanian national body from beneath the layers of topsoil 
and presenting it to the world's public opinion in a form, which more closely 
corresponds to reality. It is clear that sooner or later the viewpoint of scientific 
criticism will gain the upper hand and the stance of Dacian Roman-Romanian 
continuity will gradually be discredited in the eyes of its well-meaning 
supporters".1189
The resurgence in popularity of the Daco-Romanian continuity genre within 
Romanian historiography was an offshoot of Ceau§escu's recourse to the nationalist 
principle of classification as a source of legitimisation, offering his regime a solution 
to the problem of "weak state control".1190 In Verdery's view:
"...the Party was forced onto the terrain of national values (not unwillingly) under 
pressure from others, especially intellectuals, whom it could fully engage in no other 
manner. These intellectuals were drawing upon personal concerns and traditions of
1189 Zoltdn I. T6th: Erddly Romdn Nacionalizmus. In: Magyar ok is  RomdnoL Volume II. Edited by 
Jdzsef Dedr and Ldszld Gdldi. Athenaeum Irodalmi 6s Nyomdai R t, Budapest, 1944, pp75-76.
1190 Verdery, op. cit., p85.
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inquiry that made the Nation a continuing and urgent reality for them despite its 
official interdiction. They were also engaged in conflicts amongst themselves for 
which, as before, the Nation provided a basic idiom. To use a different phrasing, 
Romanian intellectuals were utilizing something - the Nation - that we might call a 
master symbol, one having the capacity to dominate the field of symbols and 
discourses in which it was employed, pressing the meanings of other terms and 
symbols in its own direction. In addition, I see the national ideology as having an 
elective affinity, beyond any leadership's conscious manipulation, with certain 
inherent characteristics of Romanian socialism".1191
The Daco-Romanian representation of the origin of the Romanians enjoyed the 
privileged status of mainstream orthodoxy in Ceau§escu's Romania and articles and 
books written by its advocates were translated into Hungarian, a prime example being 
§tefan Pascu's What is Transylvania? (Ce este Transilvania?) appearing in a 
Kriterion edition in 1984.
The function of the theory of Daco-Romanian continuity in relation to the Hungarians 
and Transylvania was twofold: firstly, it posited the absolute supremacy of the 
Romanians over the Hungarians based on their distant origins as a noble, cultured, 
agrarian people thereby installing them as the undisputed lords of their own homeland 
and secondly by refuting the Hungarian version of Transylvanian history, it places the 
Romanian claim to the territory beyond all doubt Oblique reminders to the 
Hungarians that they were relative newcomers, the offspring of interlopers were also 
reminders of their inferior social status, that their continued presence in Transylvania 
was the result of Romanian tolerance and kind-heartedness rather than a preordained 
right. This in turn had ramifications for policy towards them, as it could be used to 
justify anything from an accelerated drive for absorption into the superior Romanian 
people to expulsion on the grounds that the Hungarians were a destabilising factor, 
guilty of irredentism until proven innocent. As with all the direct or indirect 
representations of the Hungarians the foundation of the contents in objective reality is 
of little import The Daco-Romanian doctrine may or may not be backed by 
archaeological remains, but wrangling over the evidence is not relevant to our 
discussion except as an indication that the imposed definition was being contested.
1191 Verdery, op. cit., p i22. Emphasis in original.
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3.7 History in the Vitriolic Mode: Ion Lancranjan
One example of such a text intended for mass consumption with a print run of over 
50,000 copies is Cuvint despre Transilvania by Ion Liincranjan1192 provoked a 
response across the border in Hungary with its offensively anti-Hungarian passages. 
Tacitly endorsed by the regime by virtue of having been printed in the first place, it 
puts forward a vision of Romanian Transylvanian identity interwoven with a 
consideration of Hungarian identity primarily geared to a Romanian audience.
Its idealised version of Transylvania is an uncanny mirror image of Transylvanianist 
sentiments (confirming that collective identity is indeed a social construct drawing on 
a number of stock elements): Transylvania had been the Muse of great poets from the 
Romanian pantheon, its soil had been transformed into holy ground because their feet 
had trodden there and it had been the birthplace of precursor revolutionaries such as 
Horea, plucked from obscurity to veneration.1193 The author embarks on a fanfare to 
the common man, an ode to the unknown Romanian, the salt of the earth before 
contrasting him with the vile oppressors, the Hungarians:
"I must nevertheless pause to consider one of our great ancestors, primarily because 
he was present at the most important historical events and directly or indirectly 
causing them to unfold or accelerating the process. He was the one who rose in revolt
1192 The title has religious overtones; hence Sermon on Transylvania would be an accurate rendition. 
The Hungarian translation balks at this, preferring Oration on Transylvania. My translation is based 
on the Hungarian edition: Szdnoklat Erd&lyrol translated by Levente G. Borbely, Aramlat Kiadd, 
Budapest, 1990. The original work was published in 1982 and divided into four parts with a collection 
of articles written between the 1950s and the 1980s. Henceforward: Lancranjan. On L&ncr&njan, see 
also Kolar, p366.
1193 L&ncr&njan, op. cit., pp8-9. Horea was one of three leaders of an uprising in 1784. Peasants 
recruited into Romanian and Szdkely regiments intended to fortify the Eastern frontier against the 
Ottomans were given plots of land and exempted from feudal obligations. An imperial decree allowing 
the Martontelke/Moti§ miners to serve in the border guards was misunderstood as applying to all 
peasants. When the authorities attempted to arrest Cri§an, heading one of the groups converging on 
Gyulafehirvdr/Alba lulia to join the regiments, all hell broke loose. Within six days 230 manor houses 
had been burned and the rebels tried to take Diva/Dev a. Joseph II resorted to force to restore order, 
suppressing the revolt in December. Horea and Cloaca were condemned to death and put to the wheel, 
whilst Cri§an committed suicide (Castellan, ppl 10-1). See also Ofetea, pp277-280 and Prodan, 
pp250-271. On Horea’s meteoric rise in Party-inspired historiography, see Verdery, pp215-255.
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when he could not longer endure, for the most part he worked indefatigably, very 
often he died in other people's wars and rose again for all eternity through the legends 
and folk tales, through the songs of pain and lament, which are sung in his memory 
from the days of their childhood onwards by his descendants condemned to the same 
fate. I do not know what this ancestor was called. He was proud, yet modest, 
majestic, yet simple, kind, yet implacable, coarse, yet sensitive with it, wholeheartedly 
devoted to his work yet ready to burst into song or to dance, brave, yet demure. I do 
not know what his name was, whether it was Ion or Gheorghe, Nicolae or Simion, 
Patru or Vasile, Todor or Nicodim, Visalom or Mihai, Traian or Romus, Pavel or 
Aurel, Iosif or Avram, Axente or Zevediu, §tefan or Clement, Zanovie or Jilu, but 
what I do know is that he was a peasant and that he made a major contribution to the 
birth of a people, the creation of a new language, which he conjugated over many 
hundreds of years and enriched in a myriad of ways. (...) His customs, his entire 
bearing are the proofs of ancient lineage and genuine nobility, an irrefutable argument 
in favour of kinship with the land, from which he took so much and to which he 
nevertheless gave as much in return, leaving his mark on it without the merest hint of 
duress as he did with the Homeland [...] he shared his own crusts of bread and thereby 
very often ended up empty-handed. It was not because of his boundless kindness, 
which in itself is proof enough of ancient origin and strength in past and present alike, 
but because of the voraciousness of those to whom he extended a hand of brotherhood 
and who on more than one occasion robbed him, who very often crucified him, shot 
him down, broke him on the wheel, tore him to pieces so that he would never be able 
to recover, so that he would never again be in possession of the will or entertain the 
thought of obstructing those who wished to be the absolute rulers of these legendary 
lands. For a while after every series of reprisals, after every wave of violence flaying 
the people it seemed as if there were no sign of resistance and that the reign of 
repression sweeping over the land was total and final. Then, however, when nobody 
could have suspected it, he - His Majesty the Peasant, the rightful and actual voivod 
of Transylvania, the uncrowned king of the entire Homeland - once again made his 
presence felt in his own way, whilst of course choosing the most appropriate juncture. 
First he turned to the land, then so that it would not lie fallow, he gave it the seed it 
desired, caressing the grass in mind so that it would grow all the faster, looking with 
joy at the ewe and cow, which grazed upon it, as if he had eaten it himself and had his 
fill [...]. Here in Transylvania everything has that extra ounce of resonance - tears are
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heavier and saltier; the soil is better; the mountain is prouder and greyer, the slopes 
are more lyrical and dreamier; the people are more sedate and resolute than people are 
in general when they know that they are the brothers of the land on which they walk 
and which they love”.1194
Transylvania had never consisted of villages alone, but could exhibit a long list of 
towns and citadels from Roman and Dacian times:
. .there could not have been any survival, our continuity - which we have quite 
justifiably spoken out about in the past and continue to do so and which is founded in 
fact - would have crumbled in the wind. The invasions would have destroyed him if 
this hearth - the village - had not existed, which lived and lasted through the peasant 
and it is thanks to the peasant who began anew after every incursion, every wave of 
vengeance and every misfortune [...]. In the beginning he was Dacian, then Roman 
and later still Romanian in a natural continuity, which archaeological and philological 
research will shed light on from an ever-wider variety of perspectives without ever 
being able to fully chart every facet of the problem. And this is not because this - 
incontrovertible continuity - is enigmatic or miraculous, but because it is so real and 
natural, it is so inextricably linked to these places that there is virtually no need for 
proof; it belongs to the natural circle of fundamental and defining elements, which are 
the intimate components of an entire people's way of existence”.1195 
These ancient bonds between Transylvania and her Romanian people continued to be 
topical in the radically different political climate of today:
"But these, I will be informed, are sentimental arguments, simple poetic 
exaggerations. My reply is that I am more than aware of the circumstances I am 
speaking in, taking into account that I live and work in a new Socialist home country 
in which the nationalities enjoy equal rights. And I replied that the brotherhood we 
have been and are moving towards cannot truly be attained unless they genuinely (in 
other words not on a purely formal level and not merely as part of a fad) recognise a 
few extant and important facts: our survival and continuity, the significance of the 
Romanians of Transylvania permanently being in the majority and the irreversible 
character of our great Union, as something which naturally belongs to this list of facts 
[...]. Irredentism, however, no matter how cunning and perfidious it may be, cannot
1194 L&ncr&njan, op. cit., pp9-13.
1,95 L&ncr&njan, op. cit., pp!4-15.
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beget anything other than trouble and indignation and will turn the clock back to the 
old days of discord. This in turn is grist to the mill of imperialism and will be 
detrimental to the national interests of the Romanians and indeed to the national 
interests of everyone who lives and works together with them in the same free and 
proud homeland, which was legitimately called and is still known as Romania, from 
whose body not a single part or province may be tom without opening up deep and 
unforgettable wounds, copious and traumatic bleeding such as occurred in 1940, such 
as occurred on several occasions previous to that and which never has to happen ever 
again”.1196
Transylvania was predestined to be the battleground of bitter conflicts, the locus of 
social and national awakenings:
"A territory where other nations arrived and settled - Hungarians, Germans, SzSkelys - 
with whom we Romanians yearned to live in positive and fruitful understanding. Our 
rage only flared up when they trampled our old rights underfoot, when they made an 
attempt on our very life, when they wanted us never to have existed, to disappear, to 
die out for the greater good of others. The target of the settlements was not just 
Transylvania as a matter of fact, but also the Homeland as a whole, the shattering of a 
more than self-evident compact unit, inducing a dispersal. The reason behind other 
peoples being made to settle in certain "points of vital importance" - around 
Szebert/Sibiu and Beszterce/Bistrifa and in the Barcasag/Jara Birsei - was that of 
crushing the main strongholds of the Romanian people, to deprive them of their link 
with the Carpathians, so that the natural communication between brothers would be 
cutoff'.1197
The long centuries of being ground down had left an indelible mark on the disposition 
of the Transylvanians (once again echoing the regionalist reorientation of the 
Transylvanianists):
"Transylvania was a permanent and inexhaustible centre of energy and in that sense 
too was a component part of a complete entity, part of the Homeland, with which it 
was in constant communication, to which it gave everything of its best and in so 
doing endowing itself with hope and self-confidence, forming and hardening a certain 
temperament for itself, based on the many hundreds of years of waiting and
1196 L&ncr&njan, op. cit., pl6.
1197 L&ncr&njan, op. cit., pl7.
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struggling. This temperament is more intrepid and steadfast, stormier and harder, 
difficult and darker, visibly different from that of the Romanians in the other 
provinces - Oltenia, Dobrudja, Moldova and Bukovina. This is only on the surface, 
however, because in reality, the reality of two thousand years of existence in these 
landscapes, the Romanian temperament is one and the same throughout the entire 
length and breadth of the Homeland as the single language spoken by all Romanians 
proves. The differences, which have existed and still exist between the Moldovan and 
Banat, the Mdramaros/Maramure§ and Dobrudjan Romanians, never were and still 
are not differences of substance, indeed they are different sides of the same likeness, 
together creating a unique quality, which, without being superior to others, is 
unmistakeably made to persist through the millennia".1198
Consequently the contention that the Romanians consist of two groups, one of which 
is more Western due to its exposure to the Hungarians, the other more Eastern as a 
consequence of its history is entirely arbitrary, bom of the phantasmagoria that the 
Hungarians had a civilising mission in Transylvania. Indeed, LSncrSnjan is anxious to 
point out that the Romanians were the more civilised at the time of the Hungarian 
migration to the Carpathian Basin, since they were Christian, farmers, skilled 
metalworkers like their Dacian ancestors and retained certain administrative forms 
from the Roman empire whilst the Hungarians were still living in tents in the mid- 
twelfth century, true to their nomadic origins.1199
Although Socialist Hungary's political system did not in the slightest resemble that of 
the Horthy era, its leaders still flirted with the daydream of Greater Hungary, 
labouring under the misapprehension that the collapse of 1918 had been imposed 
from the outside rather than being the inevitable outcome of internal decay. The 
Hungarian state had been an artificial construct held together only by suppressing the 
subject nationalities, whose only crime was to want to speak their own languages and 
retain their own national way of life, ambitions, which were not directed against the 
Hungarians themselves, but against the ruling classes, against feudalism and 
reactionaries who balked at no excesses.1200 The iniquities of the past could not be 
laid to rest whilst they were still being raked over by certain quarters camouflaging
1198 Lancranjan, op. cit., pp34-5.
1,99 Lancranjan, op. cit., pp35-6.
1200 Lancranjan, op. cit., pp20-22.
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the old complaints with modem terminology. Lancranjan categorically rejected the 
Hungarian founding myth of the honfoglalds:
"...so-called historians dug up dead propositions, which had never been proven up to 
then, something, which indeed could never be proven, namely that Transylvania was a 
wilderness when the Hungarians came here and that the Romanians only arrived later 
on. It is impossible to know when, how and whence since there is not the slightest 
trace of this so-called arrival either in their folklore, their fables, in heaven or on 
earth. Following in the footsteps of the publicists and the historians [...] trooped the 
politicians, the representatives of the most reactionary circles who were capable of 
allying with anyone on the off chance that they might just be able to get back to the 
privileges they possessed, but had lost, the castles and sprawling estates".1201 
When they partially succeeded in their schemes (by which Lancranjan is referring to 
the return of Northern Transylvania in the Second Vienna Award),1202 their atrocities 
eerily coincided with those contained in anti-Romanian propaganda as they attempted 
to eradicate the Romanians who as a people had always been too tolerant and 
indulgent for their own good.1203
Transylvania assumed mystical proportions in the author's mind, again echoing the 
ardent professions of the Hungarian Transylvanianists: it was a country in its own 
right, the hearth of the homeland, a soul from its greater soul, communicating through 
language, the rustling of the leaves, the legends and beliefs of the people, landscapes 
that were not merely the meeting point of roads, but of civilisations. The Carpathians 
had never functioned as a dividing line, a frontier between peoples, but as a pillar and 
a refuge for the Daco-Romanians then referred to as vlachs. Although they did not 
feature in historical records and no mention was made of their conversion to 
Christianity this did not mean that continuity was a fiction. The only conclusion that 
could be drawn was that the Romanians had become Christians at a far earlier stage 
and more gradually under the influence of the settlers trickling in. The very birth of 
the Romanian people was interwoven with this occurrence as was the language and 
mentality. The tradition of labelling the Dacians pagans was misleading as the 
Dacians were a civilised race who could not be tarred with the same brush as the
1201 L&ncr&njan, op. cit., pp23-24.
1202 Of 30th August 1940.
1203 L&ncr&njan, op. cit., pp24-25.
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throngs of invading barbarians. Had there not been a stable society with a clearly 
developed mindset of its own then the hills, mountains and rivers, the towns and cities 
would bear different names. Indeed at one time an attempt was made to abuse 
administrative jurisdiction to erase all trace of the ancient and glorious Romanian 
people's presence from history, a futile undertaking, which only served to poison 
relations between the two peoples. If the Romanians had taken part in the mass 
migrations so typical of the third to ninth centuries, if they had gone on the rampage 
with an insatiable appetite for the spoils of conquest or sought a homeland, if they had 
all become Christians as of a specific date this would have repeatedly occupied a 
prominent place in the chronicles.1204 The logical explanation as to why silence 
surrounds their deeds is that they had taken up permanent residence in the Carpathian 
Basin long ago where they thrived as shepherds and livestock breeders. The 
advantage of the mountain ranges was that the plains-loving nomadic tribesmen 
inundating Europe on horseback from the steppes preferred to give them a wide berth 
and press on westwards. The mountains and the forests, which clad them, bound the 
geographically dispersed Romanians together. The voivodships sprang up from the 
sense of community instilled by these contacts and from the common language and 
way of thinking and the embryonic states formed by them were taken over and 
renamed as principalities by the occupiers. Transylvanian Romanians often moved 
eastwards beyond the Carpathians into the Brother Countries [Moldavia and 
Wallachia] where entire villages of Transylvanians still dwell.1205 The scale of such 
migrations increased after 1867 when the Hungarians became a minority within their 
own country [the reference being to the Compromise] and, acutely aware of this 
uncomfortable reality, began systematically eradicating all "alien" elements. Those 
courageous Romanians who stayed behind suffered as their forbears had over a 
thousand years of having their land snatched from them and being brutally 
denationalised, treated like cattle and denied recognition. The righteous anger and
1204 Throughout this passage, LSncr&njan is alluding to Hungarian history and the Hungarian founding 
myth.
1205 As the Hungarian translator points out, L2ncr&njan is reiterating the fallacy endorsed by official 
Romanian historiography that the csingds of Moldova are the descendents of Hungarianised Romanian 
refugees from Transylvania. See for example Dumitru M&rtina§, The Origins o f the Changos, The 
Centre for Romanian Studies, Ia§i and Oxford, 1999. For the view from the Hungarian side, see Ferenc 
Glatz, Csdngdk, in B£rdi, pp94-5.
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spilt blood of the martyrs such as Horea cried to the heavens, causing the counts and 
rulers to quake with trepidation. Such stirrings of unrest ultimately paved the way for 
the inevitable unification of 1918.1206
Cataloguing the peculiar features, which set Transylvania apart from the rest of 
Romania without this detracting from the essential unity between the two, L&ncr&njan 
lists character, conduct, traditional costume, princely bearing, psychology, the 
concentration of the population in villages and the specif, intense and often tragic 
relationship between the peasant and the land as well as the corpus of literature 
penned by the cream of Romania's lyrical talent vividly exploring the recesses of the 
Transylvanian soul with its uncompromising morality and its incredible resilience in 
the face of adversity. Transylvania's contribution to Romanian culture had been 
priceless and it had acted like a magnet in attracting the most gifted of writers not just 
because they wished to demonstrate solidarity towards their less fortunate brothers, 
but because they saw in it the cradle of Romanian identity, the setting for the original 
fusion of Dacian and Roman.1207
Once Transylvania had finally been united with the Regat, the feeling of relief was 
overwhelming, the body had been joined with the soul at last and creative energy 
overflowed.1208 Any effort to denigrate the event as imperialism had an ulterior 
motive lurking behind it, since the unification was but the culmination of a natural 
process, which had already taken place throughout the rest of Europe, that of the 
setting up of nation states.1209
The situation of the Hungarians in Romania could not be deemed identical to that of 
the Romanians in the Dual Monarchy. The Hungarians, furthermore, had not become 
a minority in 1918 as they were eager to insist, but at a far earlier stage, sometime 
around their initial appearance on the scene when they came into contact with the 
indigenous population with its stable social and political structure with the one 
weakness that it was not geared to predatory forays or the subjugation and domination 
of others. A more serious objection against any notion of equivalence, however 
putative, was the false and provocative conclusion that the Hungarians of Romania
1206 LSncr&njan, op. cit., pp25-34.
1207 L&ncr&njan, op. cit., pp36-45.
1208 L&ncr£njan, op. cit., p51.
1209 LSncrSnjan, op. cit., pp52-53.
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were as entitled to agitate for the secession of Transylvania from Romania as the 
Romanians had been in demanding Transylvanian unification with the Regat.
Between the World Wars territorial revision and belligerent revanchism had been 
officially espoused as Hungarian foreign policy aims and although the lie of the land 
was somewhat different this did not mean that the old irredentist and revisionist 
cravings had disappeared without trace, only that their outward form had altered in 
response to the changed circumstances:
"Hence it often occurs that they [the Hungarians] assiduously speak of unity and 
fraternity on the one hand whilst on the other they lapse into exaggeration whilst 
highlighting the Hungarian contribution to the formation of the Transylvanian 
intellectual legacy, formally recognising continuity whilst drawing attention to the 
deep roots the Hungarians have struck in Transylvanian soil. The same causes give 
rise to their evincing demanding behaviour in the cultural sphere, but not exclusively 
there [...]. In such instances their point of departure is separatist and with 
premeditation they deliberately ignore the interests and problems of the country as a 
whole. It is not possible to label these manifestations chauvinist or irredentist, but nor 
can they be considered fraternal, which is what they purport to be because as I made 
clear fraternity and unity demand a complete loyalty towards the Homeland where you 
live and work, towards the concept in other words as Socialism can only be attained if 
relations between individuals and nations are improved upon and made more 
humane".1210
Transylvania had extended hospitality and given a home to other nations, regardless 
of whether their intentions had been hostile or not. The newcomers had become 
established as locals, living side by side with the Romanians, sometimes in equally 
appalling conditions, which made a nonsense of the "national pride" that might 
otherwise consoled the Hungarian serf, convincing him that he was superior to his 
companions in adversity not bred of the same stock as the rulers. Hungarians, 
Romanians and others had been brothers in misfortune. Beyond the by no means 
idyllic and harmonious solidarity of the lower classes, it would be absurd to postulate 
that Romanian and Hungarian capitalists flocked together since the rise of the 
Romanian bourgeoisie took place later and more falteringly because the Romanians, 
branded as riff-raff, were long excluded from the towns. Amongst Hungarians,
1210 LSncrSnjan, op. cit., pp57-59, the quotation is from p58-59.
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regardless of whether they were workers, peasants or capitalists, natural national 
sentiments degenerated into an unshakeable belief that they were the lords in a 
country in which the Romanians were put up with, but forced to experience national 
sentiment in an entirely different manner. At the root of most of the clashes between 
the indigenous majority and the Hungarians lay this unfair and brutal refusal to 
concede due recognition.1211
The Hungarian minority had been handled with kid gloves:
"The Gyulafehervar/Alba M ia  Union [...] had from the very outset proclaimed equal 
rights for all the nationalities; the Peace Treaty, which ratified the Union, held out the 
prospect of special obligations in this respect. To maintain that these rights, 
obligations and provisions have been implemented one hundred percent would be a 
major exaggeration in the direction of idealising realities, but to stray too far in the 
other direction, blackening the realities by claiming that the nationalities had no rights 
whatsoever at their disposal, that they were subjected to constant persecution is 
tantamount to wilfully mangling and violating an obvious truth, which is as complex 
and contradictory as Romanian society itself between 1920 and 1940, but which 
nevertheless was an indisputable reality. In this era replete with inequalities and 
inconsistencies, which in general was productive and imparted strength because the 
collective national energy boiled into one - newspapers were printed in Hungarian and 
in the languages of the other nationalities in Romania, there were schools since 
freedom of religion and use of the mother tongue were completely unrestricted. The 
hardening, which set in, and which naturally also afflicted the Romanian nation in 
exactly the same way, was related to the oppression and the rise of the Romanian 
right-wing forces who acted as the zealous accomplices of German Nazism and Italian 
Fascism. When the Legions assumed power in 1940 matters took an immediate turn
1211 LSncrSnjan, op. cit., pp60-62. Here LSncr&njan resorts to his customary tactic of apparently cutting 
the Hungarians some slack - in this instance by entertaining the idea that there might have been a 
degree of solidarity between the two populations - merely to refute his own tentative hypothesis in the 
next breath. Only the Hungarian serfs, the lowest of the low, may actually have empathised with their 
Romanian counterparts from whom they were indistinguishable in terms of the miserable conditions in 
which they eked out a subsistence.
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for the worse for the minorities in Romania, but this also held true of the Romanian 
people".1212
The ensuing atrocities, the murders and beatings and the camps affected the deeply 
anti-fascist Romanians every bit as much as the minorities, the Romanians had never 
spat on Hungarians for being Hungarians and had not delivered the Jews into the 
Gestapo's hands. Romanian soldiers fought side by side with their Soviet comrades in 
liberating Northern Transylvania, thereby erasing the frontier, which had slashed 
Transylvania's body and soul in two. Against this backdrop, revisionism equalled 
imperialism, bringing hatred, anger and pain in its wake.1213 
In the years between 1948 and 1958, the days of the intensification of the class 
struggle, the old social structure was demolished. This process was far harsher on the 
Romanians in places where the Party and state bodies were headed by chauvinist or 
neo-chauvinist Hungarian elements who did not support or indeed directly opposed 
the establishment of fraternal relations through their work. Although it could be 
argued that the same applied where Romanians were at the helm, this was only valid 
in part since the primary concern even in the midst of stepping up the class struggle
1212 Op. cit., pp65-66. The Legion of Archangel Michael was the brainchild of Comeliu Zelea 
Codreanu. Its activist political section became notorious as the Iron Guard. In 1934, Codreanu also 
founded a political party, Totul Pentru Jari. On the Guard’s role in the 1930s and the fascist military 
dictatorship under Antonescu, see Stephen Fischer-Gala^i, The Interwar Period: Greater Romania, in 
Giurescu 1998, pp293-319.
1213 Op. cit., pp67-68. The presentation of the statement concerning how the Romanians did not hand 
their Jewish citizens over to the Nazis is typical of the omissions and misrepresentations L&ncranjan's 
work is riddled with. As P31 Kdteles remarks in his critique of LSncr&njan's essay, although it is true 
that Romania did not deport its Jewish population the Iron Guard implemented its own "final solution" 
to the "Jewish question" butchering almost half a million in the space of two years without German 
collaboration, a figure, which does not include those executed in Transylvania. LSncr&njan also 
conveniently overlooks the fact that Romania, committing a million troops from 1942 onwards to aid 
the German effort on the Eastern front, was Hitler’s staunchest and most devoted ally in the hope of 
persuading the Fuhrer to quash the Vienna Award and return Northern Transylvania, not that the 
Romanian lust for territorial gain ended there, as witnessed by Ribbentrop's note to Mihail Antonescu, 
the then Foreign Minister concerning a protective buffer stretching to Odessa and Transistria's spell as 
a Romanian province. Source: Pdl Kdteles: Toprengis egy torzkdp elott. Ion Lancranjan: Gondolatok 
Erdilyrdl. In: Tiszatdj, September 1982, p54. For a comprehensive list of the errors, falsifications and 
misquotations, see the footnotes in the Hungarian translation of L&ncr&njan, Kdteles and Szdraz (see 
below for full bibliographical reference).
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was to guarantee the rights of the cohabiting nationalities "which were not even called 
'minorities' so as to eradicate even the slightest trace of discrimination [...]. This 
solicitude naturally dovetailed with the right then going on against every 
manifestation of chauvinism. It was nevertheless a little excessive because it sought 
to give the nationalities preferential treatment over the Romanians. In so doing the 
ardently hankered after unity and equality was undermined, the necessary and 
mandatory balance was upset [...1. This lead to a state of affairs in which for example 
more printed matter (publications and books) was published for the Romanian 
Hungarians in their own mother tongue than we Romanians had available for us, of 
course defined in relation to the proportion of Romanian Hungarians in the general 
population. Perhaps it is no bad thing, but it is bad that certain real, undeniable rights 
are frequently artificially extended and the demands and requests constantly 
proliferate as soon as they are acceded to. (But if one day we are asked in the most 
democratic possible way to pick up our rivers and move out of our Homeland, what 
will we Romanians do then? Shall we grant this request as well or what should we 
do!?)".1214
Transylvania had never been a simple " 'mixture of nations'" with the Dacian 
character initially predominating in economic, intellectual and spiritual relations, as , 
proven by archaeological rinds, followed by the Roman, then the Daco-Roman and 
ultimately the Romanian character shared by the Homeland. Hence the Romanians 
had never been compelled to have recourse to a myth accounting for their sudden 
arrival as if by magic. Neither mysticism nor mystification were integral to the 
Romanian style of thinking and operating. All that Transylvania and the Homeland 
had craved was objective, impartial research to reveal the past. The Hungarian 
presence in Transylvania assumed significant proportions for the first time following 
the Battle of Mohdcs.1215 Prior to that, they had relied on the Sz6kelys and Saxons 
they had imported to shore up their rule. The annals of histoiy charted the persistent 
Hungarian reluctance to give the Romanians of Transylvania the credit they deserved 
with all the distortions this implied. Similarly, Hungarian attitudes towards events in 
Transylvania were diffracted through a faulty lens. The agricultural reform, decried
12.4 IincrSnjan, op. cit., pp73-74.
12.5 Of August 1526.
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by Hungarians as exploitation, had in fact swept away the last bastions of Hungarian 
feudalism.1216
Socialist Romania perpetuated the ancient Daco-Romanian traditions. Peaceful 
cohabitation with other nationalities had been elevated to a principle of law. All 
citizens had the same rights and duties and at all levels of the state and Party 
apparatus, proportional representation was guaranteed. Never before had such 
strenuous efforts been made as through the policy pursued by the Romanian 
Communist Party. Hence the fears voiced by certain quarters in Hungary concerning 
the fate of the Hungarian minority were unfounded and represented a kind of 
unwarranted and unwanted interference in another sovereign state's affairs:
"The reason why this is the case is that Romania is a homogenous nation state, within 
the framework of which nine tenths of the population is Romanian (three quarters in
1* 1*7
Transylvania), alongside whom other nationalities also live and work".
Honest work was the sole arbiter of affinity and brotherhood, only it was capable of 
dealing a crushing blow to prejudice and Transylvania could proudly point to episodes 
of fraternal cooperation from its past.1218
Unsurprisingly the reception given to the work in Hungary was cool to say the least 
P£1 Kdteles accurately summarises L&ncr&njan's message that the threat to Romania 
posed by Hungarian irredentism has not vanished, indeed that Romania has been in 
danger from its neighbour since the dim and distant days when Arpdd and his fellow 
chieftains attempted to subjugate the highly cultured Romanians:
"According to the author's preconception the wild, conquering nature of the 
Hungarians bears no resemblance to the Romanian people's 'deeply humane and 
understanding' character. To the author's mind drawing distinctions between 
Hungarian "peasants, workers and middle-classes" is completely unjustified. Every 
social stratum and individual has a propensity for oppressing others, for playing the 
role of the lord and master. We allegedly stubbornly preserve this aspiration within 
us even today, but we cannot help ourselves since what we are dealing with is a racial 
trait of our people. As a matter of fact we feature in European history books by virtue 
of this bent of ours to oppress others. Nobody on the other hand - the formula is
12,6 L&ncr&njan, op. cit., pp77-83.
1217 L&ncr&njan, op. cit., pp84-85, quotation on p85.
1218 LSncrSnjan, op. cit., pp84-87.
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simplified to a black and white pair of polar opposites - wrote about the Romanians 
because the descendents of the Dacians always desired peace".1219 
The fundamental difference in character meant that the duel between the two peoples 
had become permanent.1220
The author and playwright Gyorgy Szdraz1221 felt compelled to join the fray:
"Who is not aware of - and who would deny? - the fact that there are discrepancies 
between Romanian and Hungarian conceptions of history? These are reflected in the 
different academic publications, the debates at conferences and they even filtered 
through to educational literature as well. Daco-Romanian continuity, the honfoglalds, 
the history of Romanian and Hungarian ethnic settlement and - of course - certain 
issues of Transylvanian history. These are, however, scientific issues, about which 
we can only expect an answer from science. Every people has a light to devise 
hypotheses concerning its ancient history obscured in darkness or even concerning 
later times. Like others, we have done this and still do so. The suppositions then 
either stand up to the test of scientific proof or not. (...)
It is a most understandable paradox that the more closely linked the histories of two 
peoples are the greater the tension, the debate, the scientific quarrels and the more 
distant they are from one another the greater the understanding. Historical 
consciousness is indeed an important constituent of national self-knowledge, of 
socialist patriotism. In this particular sense it is obviously political as well. But is it 
wise to reduce science to the "servant maid" of laboured politics in some measure 
according to the recipe of medieval theological thinking?
IJLncrSnjan is obsessed with priority: priority in the territory, in religion, in culture, 
priority even in the "national character" and in physical and spiritual beauty. Let there 
be no misunderstanding: I am not disputing the Romanian view of history. I am not 
competent to do so, let the qualified experts deal with that, as indeed they are doing.
In scientific issues Lancranjan is as little unqualified as I am. What he is up to is 
journalism and politics - and this is my business as well. His somewhat immoderate 
national pride, proclivity to idealise, his unhistorical and subjective romanticism, his
1219 Kdteles, op. cit., p 52, quotation p53.
1220 Kdteles, op. cit., p53.
1221 L&ncr£njan quotes from his piece Itiletido. LSncrSnjan, op. cit., p82. Szdraz (1930-1987), 
received the Attila Jdzsef prize for literature in 1985.
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priority, indeed, exclusivity complexes and even his mysticism wouldn't bother me 
sine they are his own affair, as long as they really are his own affair. Except that he 
does something I cannot abide in Hungarian authors or those of other nationalities: 
vindicating his inclinations at the expense of others, insulting them and what is more 
with pretensions to shaping awareness. What he does in it - regardless of subjective 
good intentions towards his own people - is irresponsible not just towards others, but 
also towards his own. He has his own opinion and a firm conviction that if a 
Hungarian historian has the temerity to hold a different view from his Romanian 
colleague then he can be nothing other than a bad neighbour, an irredentist, or, to use 
his favourite word, ''scum'' [...].
Today the continuity theories - irrespective of whether Romanians, Hungarians or 
others were in the Danubian Basin first! - are worthless from a practical point of view 
and they can only be the vehicles of politics if stretched.
[...]
LSncr&njan projects cultural and political nationalism, racial imperialism, ethnic 
separatism and denationalisation back into the distant past and accuses the 
Hungarians of these crimes going back over the centuries".1222 
With customary perspicacity, Sziraz penetrates to the underlying logic:
"But something else lurks within this liistorical' line of argument: that for the late 
arrival' - if his ^elatedness' and quality as 'occupier' means to be frank a thousand 
year past - there can be no equal rights, or if there are nevertheless then his equality is 
at most based on the generosity of the 'indigenous majority' and is exposed to the 
possible 'mood swings' of tolerance. In other words, even whilst equal he is still only 
a second-class citizen. In so far as he feels that he has a grievance and sees fit to raise 
his voice in protest he is guilty of a veritable crime against the state".1223 
Sz&raz also dissects Lancranjan's idiosyncratic interpretation of loyalty:
"The concept of loyalty is more or less unambiguous. It encompasses civic 
allegiance, respect of the laws and beyond all this the positive emotional bond, in this 
particular case towards the Romanian people, its culture and history and the shared 
Socialist state. Lancranjan wants more. In the name of loyalty he demands that his
1222 Gyorgy Szdraz: Egy furcsa konyvrol, Magveto Kiad6, Budapest, 1983, pp31-35. Emphasis in 
original.
1223 Szdraz, op. cit., p93.
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fellow citizens of a different nationality recognise that their ancestors were intruders, 
that their physical and intellectual creative activity stretching over several centuries 
are superfluous as they have nothing to do with Transylvania's becoming a cultural 
landscape. They themselves, however, if I translate L&ncranjan's definition of the 
state of affairs into the vernacular, are not evictable, but under any circumstances 
mala fide squatters”.1224
3.8 Bela Kopeczi’s History of Transylvania
In 1986, Bela Kopeczi edited a three volume history of Transylvania under the aegis 
of the Hungarian Academy of the Sciences, which became an instant best-seller in 
Hungary. In the introduction, the authors stated their aim of widening intellectual 
horizons by turning their backs on the narrow provincialism, which had for so long 
been characteristic of Hungarian historiography and nurtured a nationalist 
consciousness.1226 By disputing the central proposition of the Romanian title-deed 
claim (Romanian priority in Transylvania), however, they incurred the wrath of the 
Conducator}221
That any deviation from the official Romanian version of Transylvania's past was 
reviled as malicious slander with an ulterior motive emerges clearly from Ceau§escu’s 
attack on the History:
"I am not particularly worried, nor have I ever been worried, by certain reactionary, 
imperialist circles deliberately misrepresenting the accomplishments and activities of 
our people. In so doing they are merely acting in accordance with their class interests.
1224 Szdraz, op. cit., ppl03-104.
1223 Erdily tdrtinete, Akad&niai Kiad6, Budapest, 1986. On the Kdpeczi history, see Borderland, 
pp43-4 and Verdery, pp219-210 and 244-6.
1226 KOpeczi, op.cit., Volume One, p4.
1227 See Volume One, pp87-8 (on use of Latin in Dacia); p91 (absence of proof that Dacia was ever 
Romanised); p92 (the indigenous population not being urbanised and therefore not assimilated); p99 
(ancient sources, such as Eutropius, testifying to the Roman withdrawal from Dacia and its 
abandonment); pp 100-3 (thoroughly planned evacuation of the province, comparison with its more 
Western counterparts, which did not remain Romanised, even though they were under Roman rule for a 
considerably longer period and impact of the migratory waves) and pp 104-6 (place names as indicators 
of ethnic persistence not betraying traces of continuity).
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It is, however, incomprehensible that such things can crop up in one or other Socialist 
country. We do not demand that they should necessarily acquaint people with 
Romania's attainments. However I do believe that the absolute minimum demand 
should be that they do not sketch out a distorted picture of the work our people, the 
workers, are carrying out together with the Party leaders for the sake of socio­
economic development and the construction of the Socialist and Communist order.
Of course it is possible to argue about historical issues a great deal. But can anyone 
actually change history?! Can anyone alter the fact that 2500 years ago Herodotus 
described the Dacians inhabiting these lands, including today's Transylvania, 
Moldova and Muntenia, as "the most just and courageous of the Thracians"?1228 Of 
course there might be some people who do not agree with Herodotus 2500 years on! 
But it is difficult for them to change something, which people who lived then saw 
first-hand and understood! Can someone change history, the fact that Burebista 
created a centralised state,1229 that Decebal developed it further,1230 that the Dacians
1228 The quotation is from his Histories IV, describing Darius’s expedition of 514 B.C. against the 
Scythians to the north of the Danube delta (Castellan, p8). On Herodotus’s writings, see Ofetea, pp42- 
4 and 54-6.
1229 Burebista (circa 70 to 44 B.C.) was the first known king of a Dacian proto-state. Strabo wrote: 
‘When Burebista, the Getian, assumed power, the nation was exhausted as a result of constant wars, but 
he strengthened it with military training, abstemious living and strict discipline, to such an extent that 
he created a powerful kingdom and subjugated most of the neighbouring populations to the Getians, so 
that even the Romans were afraid of him” (Geography, VII, quoted in Castellan, p9). He established a 
capital at Sarmizegetusa (Gredistye/Gradi§tea Muncelulut). Ofetea is categorical about his role: 
<<Burebista’s intention to change the shaky confederation of Geto-Dacian tribal unions -  built in haste 
and rather as a transitory alliance -  into a durable, well organized state is evidenced by his deeds”
Cop.cit., p65). On Burebista, see Ofetea, pp64-8.
1230 Tiberius set up the Roman province of Moesia in 15 A.D., to which Dobrudja was annexed a few 
years later. It was used as a base for forays against the barbarians. In the winter of 85-86 A.D. the 
Dacians, in league with other peoples invaded the province and killed its governor. Do mi ti an decided 
to restore order, dividing the province into Upper and Lower Moesia for purposes of defence. General 
Cornelius Fuscus was put in charge of a punitive expedition, marching on Sarmizegetusa in the summer 
of 87 A.D. Durus (Diurpaneus), king of the Dacians, abdicated in favour of Decebal us, son of Scorilo 
who had ruled before him. Decebalus ambushed Fuscus, slaughtering his forces and capturing the 
standards of the legions. From then until Trajan’s ascent to power in 98 A.D. Decebalus employed war 
and diplomacy in his dealings with Rome. Trajan wished to put an end to the threat the Dacians posed, 
eventually subduing them in 105 A.D. when his adversary Decebalus chose to commit suicide rather
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fought against the Romans for centuries on end until the latter - it is true - defeated 
them? But in the absence of civilisation, in the absence of a state organisation, which 
were things the [Roman] notables of the time appreciated, they could not have done 
so. Who benefits from denying these realities? Is this not in actual fact the kind of 
policy, which runs counter to all kinds of interests of two peoples, the Hungarians and 
the Romanians, who have lived together over a long period of time and who have to 
go on living together?
Of course nobody can alter the reality of when the first Hungarian tribes arrived 
within the framework of the then general migratory movements of entire peoples and 
settled on the territory of today's Hungary or that part of the population also settled in 
Transylvania. But why should this otherwise well-known historical fact be indicated 
in such a way as to deny the existence of another people, although it had lived in these 
tracts for over 2500 years and had not departed elsewhere to make way for the 
itinerant tribes, but had fought and defended its lands and its existence? Why would 
they deny even the 12th century scholar, or as some consider him Hungarian leader, 
who wrote his well-known work about how a well-organised population lived in these 
regions?1231 Why do matters proven by science - the archaeological finds, which the
than being taken prisoner. His head was put on display in Rome (Castellan, pplO-12 and Ofetea, pp77- 
90).
1231 The reference is to “P dictus magister”, or Anonymous who wrote his Gesta Hungarorum around 
the middle of the thirteenth century. Consensus has been reached amongst researchers that Anonymous 
was notary to King B61a m  (for which see L£szl6 Veszprdmy’s afterword in Anonymous, op.cit., p75). 
Anonymous mentions a “vlach”, or Romanian, by the name of Gyalu as ruler of Transylvania when 
Tdtdny decided he would conquer it for himself and his descendants (Anonymous, op.cit., p26 and for 
Tdtdny’s victory and Gyalu’s death, pp27-8). The Kdpeczi history questions the reliability of the Gesta 
as a source as neither the colourful characters nor the skirmishes enlivening its pages are mentioned 
elsewhere (true of earlier foreign works and the original Hungarian Gesta as preserved in tradition). 
Moreover, archaeological remains do not corroborate his version (Kdpeczi, op.cit., p i96). Anonymous 
had frequently been cited as an authority by Romanians, however, as the Supplex Libellus Valachorum 
shows: “When by the end of the 9th century the Hungarians led by Duke Tuhutum invaded 
Transylvania, the Roman inhabitants of these [parts] had a changed name, Vlachs, according to the 
earliest writer of Hungary, Anonymous, the notary of King Bdla; at their head was their own Duke 
Gelu, who enjoyed supreme power but was unlucky in the war he started against the Hungarians for the 
defence of his own country, as he lost his throne and his life in that fight” (Prodan, p456). In his 
Deliberate Falsification o f History: Method and Style, in Romanian Review, Volume 5, 1987, pp86- 
102 (henceforth Popovici), Titus Popovici opines: “The fury with which they reduce to naught the
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world over form the basis for the reconstruction of a given historical period or set of 
events - have to be so lightly set aside in so far as written records are absent? In the 
days of the Ottoman Empire's occupation did the Romanian lands not fight and did 
they not preserve their autonomy? It is a well-known fact that in the Balkans they 
were alone in retaining their autonomy! Did Mircea defeat Baiazid with imaginary 
armies?1232 Or did §tefan cel Mare?1233 Or did Mihai Viteazul, in whose armies 
numerous Sz6kely units battled?1234 Was the common battle of the Romanians and 
the Hungarians against the Ottoman Empire merely a figment of the imagination? 
Was Jdnos Hunyadi who ultimately became the head of the Hungarian state, an 
imaginary figure?”1235
hapless Anonymous, found guilty of having mentioned the existence of Romanian state formations in 
the area prior to Arpdd’s arrival is simply funny” (p91).
1232 Mircea the Elder (Mircea cel B&trin) reigned from 1386-1418. In 1390 he sent an expedition to 
drive the Ottoman army out of Dobrudja, annexing the area himself. The following year, Ottoman 
irregular soldiers ransacked the Wallachian lowlands. In 1394 Sultan Bayezit I, nicknamed 
..Thunderbolt” also invaded Wallachia. A battle was fought on 10th October near Craiova. Although 
probably victorious, the Romanians were forced to withdraw to their capital of Tirgovi§te. Two years 
later, Bayezit routed a large Christian army on 25th September at Nicopolis. The Sultan’s downfall 
came in 1402 when he was taken prisoner by Tamerlane after the Battle of Ankara, dying a few months 
later (Castellan, pp36-7). On Mircea, see also Ofetea, pp 194-6.
1233 Stephen the Great (§tefan cel Mare), ruler of Moldavia from 1457-1504 won a decisive victory 
against the Ottomans at the head of a force buttressed by Hungarian, Szlkely and Polish allies at Vaslui 
on 10th January 1475, earning him the epithet of “Christ’s champion” from Pope Sixtus IV (Castellan, 
pp40-l). See also Ofetea, pp201-6.
1234 Michael the Brave was ruler of Wallachia from 1593 to 1601. For further details, see footnote 
1137, p334 above.
1233 Ceau§escu, Romdnia Szocialista Kdztdrsasdg Magyar is  Nimet Dolgozdi Tandcsainak Plinumai, 
1987.februdr26-27, Politikai Konyvkiadd, Bukaiest, 1987, ppl8-19. Jdnos Hunyadi (in the Romanian 
version Iancu of Hunedoara), son of a Romanian who had been elevated to the ranks of the nobility 
(thereby becoming Hungarian) was Governor of Hungary from 1446 to 1452. In 1441, he raided 
Serbian territory, beating the troops of the Bey of Smederevo. This and other victories made him the 
candidate of the papal administration to lead an international anti-Ottoman crusade, solicited by 
Byzantine Emperor John VIII. In the “long campaign” of 1443-4, Hunyadi marched as far as Sophia. 
Although no lands were regained, the Christian armies returned without having suffered a defeat The 
Sultan sued for peace, but Cardinal Cesarini persuaded Hunyadi and the Hungarian king that promises 
to the infidel need not be kept. The campaign launched shortly afterwards proved disastrous. At the 
battle of Varna in 1444, the tide turned with the Ottomans winning decisively. Hunyadi’s final hour of
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Ceau§escu’s desire to impose ideological homogeneity did not stop at the Hungarian- 
Romanian frontier, as his scathing comments show:
“In my opinion history [...] must serve the cause of bringing peoples closer together 
and of fraternity and not that of emphasising negative aspects. In the course of many 
historical events - 1 am thinking mainly of more recent periods - the ruling classes of 
one or other country were given a role to play. But negative moments in relations 
between various countries in a given historical era should not be dwelt upon. Instead 
the policy of the former exploiting, ruling classes should be rejected and the starting 
point be the necessity for us to evolve and perfect a new history, the history of 
friendship and cooperation. This applies in general to Europe and the rest of the 
world and all the more so to relations between Hungary and Romania!
It is difficult to comprehend the revival of Horthyist, fascist, chauvinist and even 
racist propositions. How can it be possible for a scientific academy to give its seal of 
approval to the publication of writings and works that offend other peoples? What 
breed of science is this? Whom does so-called science of this type serve if not the 
most reactionary imperialist circles? Such precepts by no means serve the cause of 
friendship and cooperation, the cause of Socialism!
We are in favour of exchanges of experience, but we staunchly oppose any variety of 
interference in internal affairs. We have never allowed that under any circumstances 
whatsoever, we do not allow it today and we shall never allow it in future! The 
Romanian people in its entirety, in complete unity, is responsible for solving 
Romania's problems and issues relating to Socialist development, its leading force, 
the Romanian Communist Party will solve them!"
Broadening relations with other Socialist countries, including immediate neighbours 
such as Hungary, had always been one of Romania's concerns. All attempts at 
distorting reality and then taking the distortions to international forums were at odds 
with the interests of both peoples. Ordinary Hungarians could not be tarred with the 
same brush as the handful of malicious individuals, but the episode had direct 
implications for the Hungarians in Transylvania:
military glory came in 1456 at the battle of Belgrade, inducing the Sultan to retreat (Kontler, ppl 13-8). 
See also Ofetea, pp 198-9; Castellan, p47 and J6zsef Held, Hunyadi Jdnos pdlydja, in Bdrdi, pp59-65.
1236 Idem, ppl9-20.
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"But how can we agree to augmenting the distribution of Hungarian [as in 
anyaorszdgi] press and literary products in Romania when it is in this very press that 
insults are hurled at the workers of our country! We would be doing ourselves a 
disservice if we were to accept that. The press, radio and television, our instruments - 
literature, art - all must serve but one end: rapprochement, friendship and instruction 
in the spirit of Socialism and international solidarity. Any other interpretation and 
approach is at variance with the interests of the peoples today, tomorrow and 
forevermore!"1237
In the spate of imitations of Ceau§escu's original critique, other reviewers were even 
less charitable than he had been. Titus Popovici, describing the book as “a still-born 
product of a gang-rape of history”1238 writes: “I am long past the age of surprises, and 
yet I can hardly find a word other than shock to describe my impressions after reading, 
pencil in hand, that piece of printed matter. Disbelief when confronted with samples 
of utter ignorance which would have made a high-school student flunk his test; 
stupefaction at a nonchalant display of ‘historical' aberrations that have long since 
been disproved by the most elementary research of the most elementary sources; 
anger about the insults and less-than-urbane slander proffered by the authors in a 
patronizing tone”.1239
This is indeed an eloquent testimony to the complete politicisation of the historical 
field and particularly any enquiry related to Hungarian minority identity.
Conclusion
The Communist principle of classification did not in reality displace the nationalist 
one. Instead it appropriated nationalism for its own purposes. Internationalism, with 
its insistence that borders and national identity are immaterial in the face of the 
solidarity engendered by the experience of class oppression gave primacy to
1237 Idem, p21.
1238 Popovici, p87.
1239 Popovici, p87. Emphasis in original. Cf. also the review from 1987 by §tefan Pascu, Mircea 
Mu§at and Florin Constantiniu reproduced in Gale Stokes, From Stalinism to Pluralism, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1991, pp229-231.
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occupation-based functional identity. Inter-ethnic strife was destined for the 
scrapheap, the obsolete by-product of the cynical manipulation of patriotism by a 
minority of bourgeois capitalists.
In Communist Romania, the rhetoric of international brotherhood disregarded the 
minority problem: it had been eliminated along with other forms of exploitation. No 
special protection of rights was needed. This refusal to admit the multi-national 
composition of the population was coupled with increasingly aggressive assimilation 
policies devised to prevent the Hungarians from reproducing their collective identity. 
Even “ethnic dilution” did not satisfy Ceau§escu: the total erasure of all symbolic and 
architectural tokens of a Hungarian presence was to have been the next stage of his 
plan to impose homogeneity on Romanian society.
Representations were rigorously controlled. The price of non-compliance with the 
official doctrine for intellectuals was the figurative banishment of non-publication. 
Ceau§escu’s every statement was recycled by Party hacks who owed their positions to 
his good graces. History became the battleground upon which identity was fought 
oven exerting control over the past would determine the future.
In an interview conducted in Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca on 18th January 1991, S£ndor 
N. Szildgyi gave anecdotal evidence that the poison had eventually done its work:
"In general people did not take the Ceau§escu-style propaganda seriously because day 
after day they encountered facts that proved the exact opposite. If they heard that the 
Romanian standard of living was on a par with the average in the developed world 
whilst they could see that there was nothing at all in the shops then it was obvious that 
they did not believe that they were well off. As far as nationalist manipulation was 
concerned, however, the contradiction between the facts and the propaganda spiels 
was not completely obvious to the Romanian masses because they were simply 
deprived of authentic information. In this instance therefore the preventive reflex 
could not function.
For this reason the masses were completely at the mercy of nationalist propaganda. 
Many Romanians to this very day only know as much about the Hungarians as they 
were informed about them during the Ceau§escu era. But the real problem is not so 
much that the Romanian masses do not, as it were, know anything about the 
Hungarians as it is that what little they do know is all wrong. Propaganda of this type 
sooner or later has its influence and this became palpable before long in everyday 
contacts as well. The reason I venture to say this is that in those days, from 1972
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onwards, I lived in Bucharest. From several points of view the capital was a quite 
different environment from Transylvania. If someone challenged me on the bus as to 
why I was speaking Hungarian, as this was Romania after all, I knew for certain that 
the individual in question was from Transylvania. Someone from Bucharest didn't 
say that kind of thing. The Hungarians were so far removed frGm him; he had so little 
to do with them that he was remarkably tolerant towards the Hungarians. Latterly, 
however, particularly if remarks of this type were made by younger persons, I could 
unfortunately no longer be certain that they were not from Bucharest, the influence of 
nationalist propaganda had become so tangible".1240
1240 In Istv&n Schlett: Kisebbsig nizoberu Beszelgetisek is  dokumentumok. Kossuth K5nyvkiad6, 
Budapest, 1993, p36.
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Conclusion
The two major identity paradigms of recent years can be encapsulated in the concepts 
of essence and construct.1241 Postmodern critiques have claimed that contingency, 
discontinuity, fragmentation, rupture, dissipation, diffusion and reflexivity have 
displaced the certainties and stability of modernity.1242 Identity is a project, a task to 
be performed, day in day out.1243 Essence and construct are not mutually exclusive, 
however, as my arguments concerning principles of classification and materiality 
(which is based on shared classifications, meanings and institutions, in short, culture 
as opposed to genetic predispositions or racial traits) demonstrate. Although material 
identities are being challenged they have not been eroded to the extent of irrelevance: 
they continue to reflect the way the social world is organised, permeating the 
individual’s sense of self and providing an overall narrative framework within which 
the significance of events and the course of lives can be interpreted and a context 
where (to use Keupp’s phrase) identity work” can take place.
Principles of classification are indispensable for the functioning of any society. They 
are historically and culturally relative, drawing the boundaries of who belongs to the 
collectivity and who does not, limiting the repertoire of possible new ideas by 
defining (directly, with the active intervention of the state as under Communism or 
less obviously on the free market of ideas as under capitalism inside a nation-state) 
the criteria of relevance (what is interesting and what is not). They thus establish an 
identity of identities”,1244 which takes precedence over all others.
Institutions embody principles of classification, simultaneously exploiting them for 
purposes of legitimation. The privileged identity is cast as „material”, corresponding 
to nature and dropping out of sight into the realm of the taken for granted. This does 
not mean that it is thereby exempt from change: like any identity, it too is the product
1241 Cf. Gleason, op. cit., p918, where, contrasting the work of Erik H. Erikson and „the sociologists”, 
he summarises the main difference between their respective positions: identity is to be understood as 
something internal that persists through change or as something ascribed from without that changes 
according to circumstance”. Cf. also Douglas Kellner's Popular Culture and the Construction o f 
Postmodern Identities, ppl41-3 and 157-8 in Lash, ppl41-175 and Keupp, pp30 and 40-56.
1242 Keupp, p30.
1243 Keupp, pp30 and 60.
1244 BiUig, plO.
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of interaction and experience. The exigencies of the present combine with the 
perceived outlook for the future in settling which aspects of identity are given 
emphasis, which are deemed virtuous and worthy of cultivation and which recede 
temporarily into the background. These shifts are reflected in representations, 
whether editorials or history textbooks.
Where the nation-state takes root as the recognised unit of sovereignty over a 
territory, it displays the characteristics of an institution, presenting itself as the most 
rational form of government, keen to appear self-evident. Nationhood is the principle 
of classification it employs and the identity to which it accords particular value is that 
said to inhere in the nation. Metaphors of kinship (whether „blood” or „spiritual” 
ties) are advanced as explanations of what binds compatriots to each other and to the 
land they inhabit (in turn fostering an emotional attachment to the national home). 
Inequalities in status or between classes and disparities in the distribution of capital 
(economic, cultural and social) are downplayed. What matters where nationalism 
prevails as the legitimating doctrine (the political articulation of the principle of 
classification) is similarity amongst members of the collectivity (and, by extension 
their material difference from all other collectivities). Communism, by contrast, is 
founded upon a principle of classification situated entirely in the world of human 
transactions (as opposed to the prior world of the natural), rejecting material in favour 
of functional (in this instance work-related) identities with certain categories enjoying 
greater prestige than others. Although national content was frowned upon (at least in 
the Stalinist era), national forms (and symbols, such as anthems, currencies and flags) 
were retained (albeit with concessions to socialism).
In the case study of Hungarians in Romania, two periods may be distinguished 
between. Firstly, the interwar years, where the nationalist principle of classification 
reigned supreme and secondly the post-war decades through to the end of the 1980s 
where Communism initially attempted to assert its own principle of classification 
(brotherhood of the proletariat against the unscrupulous exploiters across frontiers, 
eradication of the oppressing classes at home) unsullied by nationalist sentiment 
before abandoning such pretensions altogether under Ceau§escu. In the latter phase of 
national Communism, nationalism with a thin veneer of socialism was the order of 
the day.
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Under the national principle of classification, national minorities and „submerged” 
nations1245 are anomalies, even though the ideal nation-state (one in which there is 
complete cultural and ethnic correspondence between rulers and ruled) is an elusive 
creature. Their material and functional identities do not coincide, making them not a 
mote, but a beam in the eye of the majority. The plight of the Hungarians in 
Transylvania points to the limits of citizenship as a salient marker of identity. On 
paper, they were (are) Romanian, they carried (and carry) Romanian passports, they 
have been officially incorporated into the Romanian state since 1921, yet culturally, 
linguistically and ethnically they were (are) different and have never been fully 
accepted into the wider collectivity. The consistency and indeed persistence of 
negative attitudes towards them cannot be understood outside of the concepts of 
material and functional identity.
The identity of the majority is portrayed as unproblematic, the norm from which the 
minority deviates and to which it must accommodate. The external component of 
identity therefore assumes far greater importance for minorities. They cannot simply 
shrug off what is being written about them. To put it slightly differently, they are 
unable to escape the suffocating weight of ascriptions since they do not enjoy a 
monopoly on self-definition. This has implications for the representations, which 
they use to depict themselves in the public sphere. Particularly where the surrounding 
environment is openly hostile towards them, they cannot afford to respond in kind. 
The inbuilt power imbalance between majority and minority exacerbates the latter* s 
vulnerability and dependence upon the goodwill of the wider community for an 
equitable share of the available resources. Thus minorities are continually pushed on 
the defensive, compelled to justify their resistance to assimilation.
In practice, the Hungarians were excluded from the Romanian definition of the nation 
(only to be criticised for remaining outside it) as shown by the discriminatory 
legislation passed against them regardless of whether the administration responsible 
for it was nationalist or Communist. These laws were designed to erode their 
autonomous identity as part of a deliberate homogenisation strategy by undermining 
their financial basis and hence capacity for independent cultural activity. Collective 
identities require maintenance through rituals, symbols and representations. Of these, 
representations were the most readily available to the Hungarians (the other two even
1245 Cf. Smith 1991, pl64.
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more open to being deliberately misconstrued as expressions of irredentism). By 
starving them of intellectual sustenance through restricting access to higher education 
opportunities in their mother tongue, Romanian politicians were launching an attack 
on their capacity to reproduce as a community with a separate identity. Not only was 
this an effort to cut off the supply of intellectuals (as political leaders and cultural 
producers), but it also aimed at drastically reducing the potential audience receptive to 
their message.
The link between representations, identity and politics becomes clear: adaptation to 
new circumstances is not a matter of cynical opportunism, but of survival where the 
principle of classification based on nationhood stays in place, but traditional 
assumptions have been overturned. The need for adjustment and reassessment is 
mirrored in the representations dating from the before the Communist takeover. The 
Hungarian minority struggled to retain a degree of control over how it was seen 
(rather than accepting the stigmatising labels of inferiority). In this it was split 
between a conventional application of the national principle of classification 
(according to which they considered themselves Hungarians artificially severed from 
the mother country) and declarations of loyalty to an alternative locus of identity 
(whereby the sacred landscape was that of Transylvania rather than Hungary and the 
focus moved to the distinctive Transylvanian traits within the broader notion of 
Hungarian essence), which preserved the idea of material difference, but situated it 
within narrower bounds in an effort to rebut the charges of separatism or disloyalty to 
the Romanian state.
Under Communism, the doctrine of the international solidarity of the working classes 
at first held out the hope of integration, but it was dashed by Ceau§escu’s reassertion 
of the national principle of classification (socialist gloss and all), which left the 
minority worse off than before as it was not at liberty to contest the official definitions 
imposed from on high. Not only was absolute conformity extracted, but any 
gravitation towards Hungary, however innocent, was branded suspect. Being a loyal 
minority citizen involved total and unquestioning acceptance of second-class status 
whilst praising the regime for its open-mindedness, liberalism and generosity. Such 
lip service (paid in the representations) was used on the one hand by the regime to 
rubber-stamp its policies and on the other by the minority intellectuals to defend the 
few rights that remained and stave off further restrictions in the future (as well as 
decrease the likelihood of a sudden withdrawal of resources in the present). The
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conciliatory tone of minority publications was neither expected of nor matched by 
Romanian authors who were permitted to indulge in anti-Hungarian diatribes without 
fear of legal repercussions as their overt nationalism was harnessed to bolster 
Ceau§escu’s position.
Communism in Romania (and elsewhere) was an experiment in the large-scale 
control of knowledge and opinion (by implementing and enforcing its principle of 
classification) and, as such, a test of the strength of representations.1246 The Party laid 
claim to a monopoly of wisdom and rationality, all but eradicating the distinction 
between the political and cultural fields. In the remunerative mode of control (of 
which post-1956 Hungary was a prime example)1247 we witness „soft warping” of 
knowledge and representations (with the safety vent of critical thought and carefully 
regulated dissent), whilst in the symbolic-ideological mode (Katherine Verdery) we 
encounter „hard warping” accompanied by tight allocative control of resources by the 
centre.
Any principle of classification influences knowledge and representations. Under 
Communism, however, state interference in setting the parameters of the acceptable 
and unacceptable was direct. From then on it was up to the intellectuals themselves 
whether they wanted to show voluntary restraint (by avoiding controversy and with it 
inconvenience and harassment), openly collaborate and reap the rewards of reputation 
and funding dispensed by the state or risk the penalties of outright dissent (for 
example banishment from the elite). The benefits of ideological purity could be 
substantial, as Verdery shows: The stakes are who gets to write the school manuals 
that present a particular version of reality, or to produce an official history, or to 
define the literary ’canon’, or to render the lineage of philosophical knowledge; 
whose books will be published and in what press runs; whose projects will receive 
investments that will facilitate still other investments later; whose work will receive
1246 In a nutshell, if representations were omnipotent or sufficient in themselves to convince populations 
that their institutions were the pinnacle of human achievement the Communist regimes might very well 
still be in place today. Instead, the phraseology of class struggle rang increasingly empty as 
Communism was hollowed out from within by its adoption of the forms (and content) of nationalism 
coupled with economic discontent, environmental degradation and the other factors dealt with in detail 
elsewhere (for example, in Kemp, pp83-6,143-4, 174-5, 189-190 and 195-7).
1247 For the modes of control, see Verdery, pp85-6. On its application in Kdddr’s Hungary, see Tok6s, 
op.cit., p254.
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prizes -  valuable not because they increase sales and, therefore, incomes, as in the 
capitalist world, but because the mere receipt of prizes enhances one’s claims to 
future allocations and promotes the values on which one has staked one’s work 
(which may include, covertly, values of resistance to the totalising effects of Party 
rule). Authors under socialism need mass publics to buy their works less than they 
need the attention of bureaucrats who will fund their projects)”.1248 
The tightest grip on representations was kept by the symbolic-ideological mode: 
monitoring of academic output was more stringent, there was less leeway for „within- 
system” criticism1249 and inclusion in the ranks of approved intellectuals more 
difficult to achieve.
That the boundaries of the field of cultural production are fixed in relation to other 
fields (an issue neglected by Bourdieu) emerges particularly clearly under 
Communism. The role to be played by intellectuals was stipulated by its function- 
orientated principle of classification, according to which manual labour earned the 
highest respect (if not remuneration). It was impossible for intellectuals to dispel the 
faint aura of suspicion clinging to them due partly to their structural ambiguity1250 and 
partly to the fact that they were intrinsically less biddable. If the workers built 
socialism with their hands, writers built it with pen, ink or typewriters, their 
contributions channelled to service the immediate needs of a given undertaking, 
whether extolling the virtues of the latest Five Year Plan or those of socialist 
patriotism. In the symbolic-ideological mode official speeches by the venerated 
leader and the Party programmes adopted to translate them into policy set the agenda 
for social, political and cultural life and the tone for representations.1251 They were 
not immune to pressure from external events (as noted in relation to 1956 and 1968), 
rendering the field less stable. Ceau§escu’s ..declaration of independence” from 1964, 
for example, opened the floodgates for nationalist vindications of Romania’s separate 
path.1252 Orthodoxy could rapidly be demoted to heresy (injecting an element of 
insecurity into cultural production).
1248 Verdery, p94.
1249 Tok6s, op.cit. pl68.
1250 See Bauman, Intellectuals, ppl78-180.
1251 Cf. Hetven iv  p70 on Romania in the 1970s.
1252 Similarly, the, July theses” had very clear effects on the literary field, for which see Verdery, 
ppl 86-7.
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Even under (capitalist) free market conditions, however, cultural producers from 
minorities are subject to additional restrictions. With their smaller target audiences 
they are generally less attractive to publishers (from the point of view of expected 
profit margins), although it can enhance a publisher’s reputation to showcase their 
work (thereby compensating for the financial outlay with symbolic capital). In the 
case of the Hungarians in Transylvania a niche readership certainly existed 
(complemented by potentially greater numbers in Hungaiy), but from the very outset 
they were hampered by the purchasing power of minority members (which 
plummeted after the civil servants were sacked en masse, the loss of income from 
land holdings and the other problems discussed). Moreover they had to cater for local 
tastes, contend with unequal access to starting capital as well as bearing in mind the 
need to avoid incurring the displeasure of majority figures with the authority to clamp 
down on the minority as a whole. In short they had to devote the lion’s share of their 
efforts to treading carefully both before and after the Communist takeover. The 
fragility of internal unity within the minority, the virtual consensus on the importance 
of preserving it in order to make the most effective use of whatever political clout the 
Hungarians did possess to improve their lot and the duty to reproduce the collective 
identity acted as further constraints upon the intellectuals and the content of their 
representations. The ceaseless verbal onslaught against the Hungarians could not 
simply be ignored: the stream of accusations and slanders had to be refuted and 
loyalty proven.
In spite of having control over the instruments of identity reproduction (rituals, 
symbols and manipulation of representations) Ceau§escu did not attain his objective 
of cultural assimilation of the Hungarians. This led him to pursue ever more 
repressive policies towards them, drastically curtailing their contacts with friends and 
relatives outside Romania’s borders, forcing them to use Romanian place names 
instead of the equivalents in their mother tongue and so on. These measures would 
have culminated in the physical demolition of monuments to the Hungarian presence 
in Transylvania to match the symbolic displacement accomplished through the 
rewriting of history, which projected (non-existent) ethnic homogeneity into the 
Dacian past and cast the Hungarians as interlopers, invading barbarians, unwelcome 
guests. In the meantime, ethnic dilution through incentives for Romanians to resettle 
in the urban centres of Transylvania and the simultaneous moving of Hungarians to 
predominantly Romanian areas under the guise of work placements was devised to
page 387
erode the minority. Had the Conducator not been overthrown, the Hungarians* future 
had promised to be veiy bleak.
With the demise of Communism throughout Central and Eastern Europe the national 
principle of classification has been re-established, sometimes with devastating 
consequences (as in former Yugoslavia). The Hungarians of Transylvania continue to 
be regarded as materially different from their Romanian fellow countrymen, the 
targets of agitators making a career out of stirring up strife.1253 What is striking is the 
continued irreconcilability of the Hungarian and Romanian visions of the nation, the 
monistic and endogamous tendencies of the latter proving remarkably resilient to 
change, all external influences being treated by it as alien and hostile. Although more 
pluralistic, some of the monism of the collectivity against which it defines itself has 
rubbed off on the Hungarians.1254 Perhaps the prospect of accession to the European 
Union (dependent upon fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, which include respect of 
minority rights)1255 will yield sufficient motivation to tackle the outstanding 
problems.
There are no grounds for complacency, however, either in East or West. As Michael 
Billig*s banal nationalism thesis proves, the national principle of classification is alive 
and well, going unobtrusively about its business of legitimation, providing us with our 
identity of identities**. „Civic** and „ethnic** nationalism both avail themselves of it, 
so that identity matters. Where extremism and intolerance are stoked by social and 
economic discontent „ouf” nationalism could easily become indistinguishable from 
„theirs”.
1253 The most obvious example being Gheorghe Funar, mayor of Kolozsvdr/Cluj-Napoca. On his 
recent excesses, see the articles in Magyar Nemzet, 1st September and 7th November, 2003.
1254 On the problems encountered by the Hungarian minority in post-Ceau§escu Romania, see Eldd 
Kineses, Marosvdsdrhely fekete mdrciusa, Pttski, Budapest, 1990 and Fehir konyv az 1990. mdrcius 
19. 4s 20-i eseminyek Marosvdsdrhelyen, Pttski, Budapest, 1991; Vladimir Tismaneanu, The Quasi- 
Revolution and Its Discontents: Emerging Political Pluralism in Post-Communist Romania, in East 
European Politics cmd Societies, Volume 7 (2), 1993, pp309-348 and Andrei Marga, Cultural and 
Political Trends in Romania Before and After 1989, in East European Politics and Societies, Volume 7 
(1), 1993, ppl4-32. On the more inclusive Hungarian approach, see Judit Boda Pdlok, The Protection 
o f National and Ethnic Minorities' Rights in Hungary, in Romsics 1999, pp317-345.
1255 On the Copenhagen criteria, see Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union, An Introduction to European 
Integration, Second Edition, Macmillan, Houndmills, 1999, ppl90-1.
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